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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a comparative and analytical study which comprises of an analysis of the rules 
of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods of four legal systems; Korean law, English 
law, the U. N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) and the E. C. 
Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees. 
The purpose of this study is to ask whether there is any need to introduce a unified liability 
system into Korean law and how to achieve the system under the existing law in order to 
overcome all the complexities caused by the separate existence of the general liability for non- 
performance and the seller's guarantee liability. A further purpose is to investigate how 
effectively the rules of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods protect the reasonable 
expectations of the parties; in particular, the interests of consumers and private sellers which 
are distinguished from those of commercial buyers and business sellers, respectively, and 
where the issue is not directly related to the particular interests of consumers or private sellers, 
the common interests of all the parties. 
The study is conducted by an internal evaluation within the boundaries of law in a legal 
context and an external evaluation in light of `efficiency' as used by economists. It shows, 
first, that Korean law needs a unified liability system which is based on a contract to resolve the 
problems originating in the distinction between the general liability as a contractual liability 
and the seller's guarantee liability as a legal liability. Second, achieving a genuine unified 
liability system requires one's interpretation that rescission and damages in the seller's 
guarantee liability should be as they are in the general liability. This would settle other 
problems inherent in the casuistic distinction between the general liability as a fault liability 
and the seller's guarantee liability as no-fault liability and its consequences in interpreting 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability. Finally, in what aspects of the seller's liability 
for non-conforming goods each jurisdiction fails to reflect the interests of consumers and 
private sellers, and the common interests of all the parties. 
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I. Introduction 
1. The scope of study 
This thesis is a comparative and analytical study which comprises of the analysis of the rules 
of four legal systems, namely, Korean law, English law, the U. N. Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (1980) (hereinafter CISG) and the E. C. Directive on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees (hereinafter the Directive). ' 
It is mainly concerned with the rules as to the seller's liability for the delivery of non- 
conforming goods. There are various aspects of non-conformity, for instance, non-conformity 
in quality, quantity and title. In addition, it may also broadly include the seller's non- 
conforming delivery in terms of time and place. Of the aspects of non-conformity, the seller's 
delivery of non-conforming goods in quality and quantity is given special emphasis in this 
thesis. In addition, the study deals with the rules as to the control of the exclusion or limitation 
clauses of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods in standard form contracts. The rules 
as to the seller's liability for non-conformity in quality and quantity will be examined in the 
order of: the liability system in general; the nature, requirements, and effects of the seller's 
liability; and the validity of exclusion or limitations of the seller's liability in standard form 
contracts. 
2. The background and purpose of study 
In general, the Korean Civil Code (hereinafter KCC) imposes on the seller two liabilities: a 
general liability for non-performance (chae-moo-bul-e-haeng-chaek-im) and the seller's 
guarantee liability for defective goods (ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im). First, the general liability for 
non-performance, which is applied to all the contracts including sales contracts, is based on the 
fault principle. This liability is divided into three categories according to the type of non- 
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performance: delay in performance (e-haeng ji-chae), 2 impossibility of performance (e-haeng- 
but-neun 3 g), or incomplete performance (positive breach of contract; bul-wan-jeon-e-haeng or 
Jeok-kuk jeok-chae-kwon-chim-hae). 4 Second, the seller's guarantee liability, ' which is applied 
to a defect in quality, quantity or title, can be raised irrespective of the fault principle. This 
liability exists separately from the general liability for non-performance. Therefore, it is said 
that the seller takes on dual liability, comprising of the general liability for non-performance 
and the seller's guarantee liability. 
The dual liability system in Korea, on the one hand, has benefits in that this system controls 
efficiently various legal problems arising from sales contracts. This is due to the role of the 
seller's guarantee liability for defective goods which is applied only to sales contracts, 
complementing the general liability for non-performance which is applied to all other contracts. 
On the other hand, this dual liability system causes some complexities owing to the separate 
regimes, raising the problems of application as to which liability arises. On some occasions, the 
complexities involve the problem of co-existence of two liabilities in one breach of contract. In 
addition, in relation to the substance of the liability system, the complexities occur not only in 
the requirements of the seller's guarantee liability, but also in the effects of the seller's 
guarantee liability when one tries to distinguish it from the general liability for non- 
performance. For instance, the provisions applicable to damages or rescission as an effect of a 
breach of the seller's guarantee liability apply mutatis mutandis to the provisions for the effects 
of breach of the general liability for non-performance. There are many difficulties in applying 
them correspondingly since the general liability for non-performance is quite different from the 
seller's guarantee liability for defective goods in its nature and contents; for instance, the 
1 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees (1999) O. J. L171/12,7 July 1999. 
2 KCC Arts. 387,392,395,544. 
3 KCC Arts. 390,546. 
'' This category is recognised by cases and scholars. 
KCC Arts. 570 ff. 
requirement of fault, the rationale of liability and etc. Academic theories have tried to solve the 
problems caused by the complexities, producing different results in practice. However, the fact 
that there has been no satisfactory theory which most people can agree on for 43 years since the 
legislation of KCC draws our attention to the question of whether this liability system is still 
plausible or not. Besides, one must note that a proposal for a further step forward to a unified 
liability system in Germany, which is representative of the civil law systems which influenced 
Korean law in many aspects, was affected by CISG. 6 It is also noticeable that, like CISG, other 
developed legal frame works such as in English law take the unified liability system which is 
based on the use of the unitary concept of breach of contract. ' 
Furthermore, the fact that the previous studies in this area have been limited to the study of 
theory for its own sake is enough for us to re-examine the seller's guarantee liability system in 
light of its practical purpose in contract law. ' That is, it is time to investigate whether the law 
has served the purpose of properly accommodating the different interests of the parties, for 
example, of consumer and commercial buyers and of private and business sellers, in the area of 
the seller's guarantee liability, thus overcoming the limitation of the previous studies. The 
different interests are varied in that, for example, the interests of a consumer in using9 one 
particular remedy as opposed to another may be different from those of a commercial buyer, '° 
6 Abschlußbericht der Kommission zur überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, hrsg. von Bundesminister der 
Jusitz (1992). 
7 The unified contractual approach to the parties' duties is implemented by the unified system of 
remedies for breach without the requirement of fault. The unified set of remedies applies when one party 
fails to deliver goods that are not in conformity with the contract of sale. Therefore, regarding the seller's 
guarantee liability for defective goods under KCC, CISG, English law and the Directive embrace the 
concept of the seller's guarantee liability into a unified contractual liability by providing the seller's duty 
to deliver the goods conforming to the contract. 
8 The studies have mainly focused on the theories on the nature and the effects of the seller's guarantee 
liability for defective goods. 
9 Or the interest of consumer in resisting the use of a particular remedy. 
10 That is, e. g., while a commercial buyer may prefer damages or repair to rescission, a consumer may 
often insist to claim rescission or replacement rather than damages or repair remedies because his 
expectation in most cases is to get defect free goods in his actual hands. 
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and the interests of a private seller in the extent of liability for non-conforming goods may not 
be treated same as those of a commercial seller. In addition, even if the issue is not directly 
related to the particular interests of consumers or private sellers as opposed to those of 
commercial buyers or sellers, it should be generally examined whether the law effectively 
reflects the common interests of all the parties. Therefore, one is overall required to examine 
whether the existing law properly complies with its underlying policy of protecting the 
reasonable expectations of the parties" in the matters of the liability system, the requirements 
and the effects of the seller's guarantee liability, in particular, in the context of consumer 
transactions. In addition, as to the exclusion or limitation clauses of the seller's guarantee 
liability in contracts to adhesion, there is a need to examine whether Korean law has effectively 
responded to the demand of fairness, protecting the reasonable expectations of consumers. The 
reason for that is that the policy of freedom of contract under KCC'2 is often used as a free 
ticket for unscrupulous business sellers to take unfair advantage of consumers who can be 
hardly equal to commercial buyers in terms of knowledge or sophistication. The necessity of 
this study becomes more apparent when one looks at other developed laws; particularly, in 
English law which currently provides rules which distinguish consumer sales and commercial 
sales, " and the Directive which introduces the seller's legal guarantee for the delivery of 
conforming goods. 
Having set out the background of this study, the purposes underlying the thesis are twofold. 
The first is to ask whether there is any need to introduce the unified liability system into Korean 
law and, if there is such a need, to show how to achieve the unified liability system under the 
existing law in order to overcome all the complexities caused by the separate existence of the 
general liability for non-performance and the seller's guarantee liability. The second is to 
11 There is no specific provision under KCC for this policy, but it is generally assumed by scholars and 
cases without doubt. 
12 KCC Art. 105. 
13 The Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994; The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; The Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 
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investigate how effectively the relevant rules as to the seller's liability for non-conforming 
goods protect the reasonable expectations of the parties; it asks in particular whether they reflect 
the different interests of consumer and commercial buyers as well as those of private and 
business sellers. If an issue is not related to the particular interests of consumers or private 
sellers, there still remains a general question of if they reflect the common interests of all the 
parties. 
3. The sources of law and a brief sketch of KCC 
It can be safely said that Korea is a Civil Law jurisdiction, in that the enacted statutes are 
recognized as the primary source of the law by which Korean courts are bound. In addition, 
Korean courts are conscious of interpretations of codes and statutes by law scholars and jurists 
and in some cases resort to scholarly interpretations as a source of law. 14 Judicial decisions per 
se do not have legal authority as precedents to a later case of similar nature. 15 The law in Korea 
is rather articulated and codified so that, at least in the abstract, the doctrine of `stare decisis' is 
not recognized with respect to judicial decisions. However, it does not seem necessarily true 
that the judicial decisions do not play any role in Korea. The reason for that is not only because 
de facto influence of a higher court upon a lower court seems considerable, " but also because 
where the codes are not clear, case law sometimes provides an opportunity to evaluate the 
merits of different views and contributes to the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
competing visions of the law. " 
KCC was enacted in 1958 and took effect on January 1,1960. It is usually said that KCC was 
14 Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law, (1987), at 644. 
15 Korean Supreme Court, Judicial System of Korea, (1991), at 20. 
16 One must note that where a decision of a lower court in a subsequent case is not consistent with that of 
a higher court, it is very likely to be reversed on appeal. An interpretation of law in the supreme court in 
a particular case is treated as the source of binding authority by the lower courts when that case is 
remanded to them. Jae-yeol Kwon, "An Isolation in Systems of Law: Differences Between the 
Commercial Codes of the United States and Korea", (1996) Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1095, at 1100. 
17 Id. 
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influenced in its enactment by the French Civil Code and the German Civil Code whose origins 
can be traced to Roman law. In addition, the influence of the Japanese Civil Code'g seemed to 
be inevitable since Korea was forcibly annexed into Japan's growing colonial empire from 1910 
to 1945.19 It consists of five books, following the German or pandectist model: "general 
principles", "law of property", "law of obligation", "law of family", and "law of succession". 
Of the five books, Book III on "law of obligation" is our main concern. In addition, the concern 
is also extended to the Korean Commercial Code (hereinafter KCmC), which was enacted in 
1962, and which deals with commercial sales because this code as a special law prevails over 
KCC insofar as it overlaps with the latter. KCmC is also composed of five books. Book II, 
which deals with various commercial transactions, has a chapter on sales, and we must consider 
this in relation to the rules of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods. 
4. The tasks to be undertaken and the methods for the evaluation of the rules as to 
the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
4.1. The tasks to be undertaken 
In order to achieve the purposes of the study, the thesis sets two tasks. The first task is to 
execute a comparative study, in detail, of the rules as to the seller's liability for non-conforming 
goods of four legal systems; Korean law, English law, CISG and the Directive. In the 
comparative study, an attempt will be made to highlight differences and similarities between the 
four jurisdictions and to identify if there is any gap in one jurisdiction compared to another. 
The second task is to evaluate the significance of any similarities, differences and gaps found in 
the first stage. In this task, two questions are posed as to which jurisdiction is better where the 
study finds differences and whether a gap in the provisions of one system can be usefully filled 
by a rule from one of the other systems. The evaluations are carried out in light of the ultimate 
18 For the history of Japanese law, see Oda, Japanese Law, (1999), at 12 ff. 
19 Ki-baik Lee, (Eng. trans. by Wagner & Schultz), A New History of Korea. (1984), at 290 ff. 
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purpose of the study to decide whether it is necessary to introduce the unified liability system in 
Korean law and to what extent the rules of each jurisdiction as to the seller's liability for non- 
conforming goods and those as to the control of the exclusion and limitation clause of the 
liability in standard form contracts has responded to protect the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. 
4.2. The evaluation methods 
4.2.1. Internal evaluation 
This is an evaluation that is conducted within the boundary of law in a sense that it is not 
intended to be connected with any other disciplines and it is executed in a legal context. It is, in 
particular, an evaluation in terms of the discipline of comparative law which asks whether a 
solution from another jurisdiction would facilitate the systematic development and reform of 
one's own jurisdiction. 20 The evaluation is brought in, first, where a comparison shows a gap in 
a jurisdiction in a particular topic which is covered in another jurisdiction, second, where it 
finds that the position in a jurisdiction for a legal matter is unclear, and third, where it reveals 
that the position in a jurisdiction for a legal issue is clear, but is different to that in another 
jurisdiction. 
In relation to the first case, an attempt at evaluation will be made in terms of whether a rule in 
a jurisdiction governing a legal matter could be utilised as a guideline to fill the gap in another 
jurisdiction that does not cover the matter in light of the practicability and appropriateness of 
the rule to control the matter. As to the second case, an evaluation of the issues of unclearness 
in a jurisdiction may be carried out on the basis of whether the clear position in another 
jurisdiction would provide any aid for the former to clarify its unclearness. The matter of 
20 Cf. For the functions, aims and methods of comparative law, see De Cruz, Comparative Law in a 
Changing World, (1999), at 18 ff, 213 ff.; Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd 
ed. (Eng. Trans by Tony Weir), (1992), at 13 ff., 28 ff. For a further study of the methodology, see 
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dissimilarity in the third case can be evaluated by inquiring how the problems inherent in a 
jurisdiction are exposed in light of another jurisdiction and whether the problems are properly 
resolved in the latter jurisdiction, and vice versa. Thus, an evaluation will begin with 
highlighting what problems a jurisdiction has suffered by not following an approach taken in 
another jurisdiction and then it will attempt to see if the approach can provide some idea as a 
suggestion of how to settle these problems. We must bear in mind that when we attempt to 
evaluate the position in one jurisdiction as against another, the primary purpose of this thesis is 
to decide whether it is desirable to introduce the unified liability system in Korean law and how 
effectively each jurisdiction protects the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
In addition, an evaluation will be also made in light of the reasonable expectations of the 
parties in some cases where a comparison shows similarities because the finding of similarities 
does not necessarily mean that the expectations are properly protected. 
4.2.2. External evaluation 
4.2.2.1. Efficiency in general 
This is an evaluation of the law in terms of `efficiency' in the specialised sense in which that 
term is used by economists. Efficiency in the economics context is used to mean the allocation 
of resources that maximises value, where value is human satisfaction as measured by the 
aggregate willingness of the party to pay for goods or services. 
2' Through the process of 
voluntary exchange, any exchange of goods or resources which create mutually advantageous 
transactions will continue to occur between buyers and sellers in an existing or hypothetical 
Markesinis, Foreign Law and Comparative Methodology: a Subject and a Thesis, (1997). 
21 Posner, The Economics of Justice, (1981), at 60 ff. He then concludes that efficiency demands the 
maximization of value as measured in dollar amounts by the process of exchange through an existing or 
hypothetical market system. Value is synonymous with wealth, and value maximization refers to wealth 
maximization. The wealth of society includes not only the market value in the sense of price times 
quantity of all goods and services produced in it, but also the total consumer and producer surplus 
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competitive market system as long as transactions increase the wealth of at least one party 
without reducing the wealth of another party or until potential gains from the transactions are no 
higher than costs. 22 All contracting parties are basically said to be the best judges of their own 
interests and to act rationally, maximizing their utility or satisfaction within the constraints of 
their economic resources. 23 One must note that one of the fundamental conditions for the 
optimal operation of a competitive market is that all the parties in the market, as the best judge 
of their self-interest, have perfect information about the nature and value of the goods traded. 24 
As each transaction will leave each party better off, there will be an overall increase in the 
wealth of society as a whole, 25 which conveniently disregards possible third parties effects. 26 
generated by those goods and services. Id. 
22 When a position has been reached in which it is impossible to exchange goods further without 
lowering the wealth of one party, the resulting allocation of goods is called the `Pareto-efficient 
allocation', named after the Italian economist Vifredo Pareto. See Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and 
Economics, (1983), at 7. 
23 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (1998), at 3 f. 
24 In addition to all the parties having perfect information, there are 4 more conditions for the optimal 
operation of the market as follows; first, all the costs of producing goods are borne by the producer and 
all the benefits of goods accrue to the consumer, that is to say, there are no externalities, second, there are 
numerous buyers and sellers in the market, so that the activities of any one contracting party will have 
only minimal impact on the output or price in the market, third, there is free entry into and exit from the 
market, fourth, the goods sold in the market is homogeneous, that is, essentially the same product is sold 
by each seller in the particular market. Ramsay, United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading, Rationales for 
Intervention in the Consumer Marketplace, (1984), at 15 f. 
25 Posner, supra n. 21, at 88 ff.; Beale, Remedies for Breach of Contract, (1980), at 11. To this 
normative judgment that society is better off, there can be at least two objections. First, this view does 
not say anything about the existing distribution of wealth and income. The distribution of wealth and 
income is crucial in a sense that if the distribution is a very unequal, demand price does not reflect the 
relative urgency of the needs of different persons, and the allocation of resources determined by the 
demand price offered for consumers' goods is far from attaining the maximum of social welfare for while 
some are starving others are allowed to indulge in luxury. See Thurow, "Toward a Definition of 
Economic Justice", (1973) 31 Pub. Interest 56, at 57. See also Posner, supra n. 23, at 15 (admitting the 
limitation of efficiency analysis in economics terms, which does not answer the question whether the 
existing distribution of income and wealth is good or bad and whether an efficient allocation of resources 
would be socially or ethically desirable). Second, this view assumes that interpersonal comparisons of 
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The optimal operation of a competitive market may continue by its own control without any 
legal enforcement, but the law is necessary to make the parties' voluntary agreements, which 
are not to be completed instantaneously, to be more reliable because it may reduce the danger 
that one party will default to the cost of the other. 27 Thus, the reliability produced by the legal 
enforcement of agreements may make exchanges less risky so that it may encourage exchange 
and cooperation among people in an optimal way of enhancing economic efficiency. 28 Suppose 
that A offers to sell a pair of shoes for $50 and his competitor, B, offers one for $55 with a 
welfare are possible, with individuals' welfare functions being assigned numerical weight and 
aggregated, in which wealth is being substituted for the traditional notion of utility. It is, however, 
difficult to compare the values and desires of different human beings. It is inherently impossible to 
measure individual welfare or utility unless one makes an essentially ethical judgment in selecting wealth 
as the measure of utility. See Mansfield, Microeconomics, (1982), at 439 f. Even if an ethical judgment 
has been made, there remain some problems in those situations in which wealth maximization cannot be 
established with reasonable certainty or in which the utility of a contract cannot be measured solely in 
dollar terms; for instance, there is no market place to be used for awarding damages, and it is difficult to 
quantify the utility of a contract in dollar terms if the utility arises from a sense of victory or if the 
contract serves to promote qualities like trust or honesty. 
26 However, in the real world most transactions have effects on third parties. Therefore, as an alternative, 
`Kaldor-Hicks efficiency' has been devised in a sense that a change from one situation to another is 
efficient if it is possible afterwards for those who gain from the change to be better off even after they 
fully compensate the third parties, regardless of whether any actual compensation takes place. See 
Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", (1939) 49 Econ. 
J. 549, at 550; Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics", (1939) 49 Econ. J. 696, at 711; Posner, 
"The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication", (1980) 8 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 487, at 491 ff. This analysis of efficiency reduces to a cost-benefit analysis that compares changes 
in situations. It asks, in a separate and isolated event basis, whether a change increases value measured in 
dollar terms rather than whether it maximizes value. By proving the increase of value in individual cases, 
it is said that efficient changes have been generated in society as a whole. Seita, "Uncertainty and 
Contract Law", (1984) 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75, at 99 ff. 
27 Posner, supra n. 23, at 101 ff.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 11 f.; Harris, Remedies in Contract and Tort, 
(1988), at 8 f.; Cooter & Ulen, Law and Economics, (1997), at 167 ff. 
28 It does not necessarily mean that without any legal enforcement the optimal operation of market would 
break down completely because there are contracts in societies that have no formal legal enforcement 
machinery, for instance, commercial reputation will threaten the party in breach by the loss of customers 
in the future. Posner, id., at 102 f.; Beale, id., at 12. 
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genuine guarantee that they will last three times as long as B's shoes. The difference in 
durability is not apparent on the consumer's casual inspection. Consumers may be willing to 
pay B extra for the guarantee if they can recover compensation where the shoes do not last as 
guaranteed. However, even if economic efficiency requires B's shoes with the guarantee to be 
purchased, consumers may be reluctant to purchase B's shoes if the law fails to provide the 
compensation because they may doubt the honesty of the guarantee. 
In addition to a function of the law to make contracts more reliable, it may assist the parties to 
minimise transaction costs through providing a set of standard terms to cover the contingencies 
for which the parties have made no provision and through imposing the solution that they would 
have reached without the need to negotiate where a dispute about the contract arises between 
them. 29 The reason is that, unlike economists' assumption of the ideal world of contracts, in 
reality there is hardly ever a wholly complete contingent contract which exhaustively specifies 
all the parties' rights and obligations in every possible situation and provides a set of procedures 
and penalties to deal with every possible default of contract. The barriers to the ideally made 
complete contingent contract are, for instance, that it would be too costly to negotiate an 
agreement on how it should be dealt with and enforced because the parties are constrained by 
time and may have insufficient information, that is, there are always positive transaction costs. 30 
The same is also true in their attempts to negotiate a settlement where a dispute about the 
contract arises. 
On the assumption of the parties being rational maximizers of their self-interest, the efficiency 
of the law as to the seller's liability for non-conforming goods may be measured by analysing 
the extent to which the rules serve the goal of reducing the negotiation costs through providing a 
set of default terms, and through imposing an efficient solution which may assist value 
maximising exchange where disputes arise. 31 
29 Posner, id., at 104 ff.; Beale, id., at 12 ff. Cf. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 172 if. 
30 Cooter & Ulen, id., at 180 ff.; Beale, id., at 12 f.; Harris, supra n. 27, at 9 f. 
31 Cooter & Ulen, id., at 167 ff.; Beale, id., at 11 ff.; Posner, supra n. 23, at 101 ff.; Priest, "Breach and 
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In relation to the primary function of the law of providing a set of default terms to cover the 
contingencies for which the contracting parties have not made provisions, 32 it may be measured 
by the question of whether the rules regarding the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
which allocate various risks reflect the preferences of the contracting parties, i. e., what would 
have been mutually agreed between the contracting parties had they decided to negotiate for the 
contingency. 33 The closer the default terms for the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
provided by the law are to the preferences of the contracting parties, the more the transaction 
costs should be reduced because if the default terms do not correspond to the preferences of the 
parties, the parties may incur more costs to contract out of the terms. 34 
Another question to be asked is closely related to the above question about the reflection of the 
parties' preference. It concerns unforeseen risks. The question is whether the rules as to the 
seller's liability for non-conforming goods effectively allocate the unforeseen risks to the party 
who is the better risk bearer, that is, the party who could better prevent the risk from occurring, 
Remedy for the Tender of Non-Conforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic 
Approach", (1978) 91 Harv. L. Rev. 960, at 961 f. 
32 There are two types of contingency closely related, which are unforeseen and unprovided for 
contingencies. See Posner, id., at 105; Cooter & Ulen, id., at 180 f. 
33 Posner, id., at 104 f.; Priest, supra n. 31, at 962; Cooter & Ulen, id., at 181 ff.; Posner & Rosenfield, 
"Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis", (1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 
83, at 89 ff.; Harris, supra n. 27, at 9 f. However, a contrary view has been presented in a way that even 
if the parties have not failed to reach agreement on the contingency due to shortage of time or resources, 
there is possibility that they simply do not wish to enter into such detailed specification for fear of failure 
to reach agreement. See Johnston, "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default 
Rules", (1990) 100 Yale L. J. 615; Collins, The Law of Contract, (1997), at 223. 
34 In addition, if the law precludes a contrary agreement, the parties may adjust other contractual terms to 
compensate for their inability to minimize costs. Such adjustments may require negotiation and 
consequently raise the cost of making a contract. See Posner, supra n. 23, at 108; Beale, supra n. 25, at 
12. Cf. Collins, id, at 227; Beale, id., at 14. (arguing that it is far from clear that the parties in the market 
deliberately avail themselves of the opportunity to save transaction costs). Yet, it can be argued that even 
if the parties would not avail themselves of the opportunity, transaction costs can be saved one day by the 
role of the law to routinise its rules in contract. 
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or who could better insure against a realized risk. 35 As rational maximizers of their self interest, 
the contracting parties have mutual interest in minimizing the cost of performance because the 
larger the joint profit is, the more each party is likely to gain. 36 
A further question is whether the rules of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods are 
clear to the parties since clarity is very important in the following aspects. 3' First, it will 
prevent inefficiencies caused by the uncertainty of liability. 38 Second, it will reduce the need 
for the contracting parties to incur transaction costs in an attempt to reduce uncertainty. 39 Third, 
it will reduce the likelihood that litigation will occur as a result of uncertainty about the possible 
outcome at tria1.40 
As to another function of the rules to assist value maximising exchange by providing an 
efficient solution where disputes arise, it is generally said that the law affects the costs of 
dispute settlements arising after the contract is concluded. 4' The measurement of the efficiency 
of the rules of dispute settlement in the event of the seller's delivery of non-conforming goods is 
to ask the question of how the rules encourage the most efficient result by imposing the solution 
which minimizes joint costs in a way that the contracting parties, as rational maximizers of their 
interests, would have resolved it had they negotiated between them. 4` In turn the minimizing of 
the costs of negotiating a resolution to the dispute will increase the joint value of the contract. 
Lastly, a question in respect of this function is whether the legal resolution of the dispute helps 
35 Posner, supra n. 23, at 105 ff.; Harris, supra n. 27, at 11 f.; Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 184; Posner 
& Rosenfield, supra n. 33, at 90 f. 
36 Posner, supra n. 23, at 105. 
37 Note, "Risk of Loss in Commercial Transactions: Efficiency Thrown into the Breach", (1979) 65 Va. 
L. Rev. 557, at 558 f. 
38 Id. For instance, there is the possibility that both parties will carry insurance against the same event at 
the same time due to the unclarity of the law. 
39 Id 
" Id. See also Priest, supra n. 31, at 967 (maintaining that the parties' expenditure in attempts to gain 
distributional benefits will be reduced by making the rules certain in application) 
41 Priest, id., at 962. See generally Posner, "An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration", (1973) 2 J. Legal Stud. 399, at 419. 
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to provide clarity since, for the same reasons as above in relation to the primary function of the 
law of providing a set of default terms, uncertain rules will increase the costs of negotiating a 
settlement. 43 
4.2.2.2. Efficiency in consumer context 
All the above tests rendered in terms of efficiency could be correspondingly applicable to 
consumer sales under the conditions for the optimal operation of a competitive market, ' in 
particular, `all the parties in the market have perfect information about the nature and value of 
the goods traded'. However, there are additional points to be examined in consumer contexts. 
That is, a number of potential market failures exist in a way of deterring the optimal operation 
of a competitive market in consumer markets. 45 Among other things, 46 two kinds of market 
failure which may cause economic loss to consumers need to be taken into account. 47 First, 
compared to merchant sellers, consumers may often lack adequate information on the reliability, 
durability and running costs of the goods, and consumers may often be ignorant of the exact 
nature of their post-purchase rights, the relative rights and responsibilities of buyer and seller, 
and other terms of contract including the exclusion or limitation clauses of the seller's 
42 Priest, id.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 13. 
43 Priest, id. 
44 See supra n. 24 and accompanying texts. 
45 The economic rationale for regulating contracts resembles the economic rationale for regulating 
markets. It begins with a description of a perfectly competitive market, which requires no regulation. 
Next the theory describes the ways that actual markets depart from this ideal and then show suggestions 
to remove barriers to a competitive market. The ensuing discussion depends on this approach. The 
assumptions of market failure analysis are as follows; first, an unregulated perfectly competitive market 
will achieve an efficient allocation of resources, second, market intervention by government is only 
justified to remove barriers to the smooth operation of markets or to achieve important public objectives. 
Ramsay, supra n. 24, at 22. 
46 First, there may be a lack of competition (monopoly, oligopoly), second, there may be barriers to 
entry, third, there may be problems with product differentiation where there are qualitative differences 
within a product market (and thus a lack of product homogeneity), fourth, there may be third party effects 
which are not costed in the market price, i. e., externalities. Ramsay, id., at 15 f. 
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liability. 48 Second, there is the market failure resulting from the high enforcement costs of 
using the private-law system. 49 As to the first point, it is mainly attributed to inequality of 
information gaining power between parties, which do not conform to the conditions for the 
optimal operation of market, i. e., the perfect information possession by all the parties. 
Information in relation to price, quality and other terms generally leads buyers to efficient result 
in their transaction. Without adequate information, consumers may misjudge the costs or 
benefits of transaction they are contemplating, in turn which may cause inefficient results. 50 
Therefore the efficiency of the law as to the seller's liability for non-conforming goods in 
consumer sales should be dealt with by the fundamental question of how the law redresses the 
market failures caused by the information gap between merchant seller and consumer. 51 
The first test which analyses the efficiency of the rules as to the seller's liability for non- 
conforming goods in consumer sales is whether the rules make clear the seller's liability for 
non-conforming goods and spell out more clearly the situation as to remedies in the event of the 
47 Ramsay, id., at 22. 
as Id. 
49 Id. For example, the high costs of the existing legal system, the need for technical expertise, the 
uncertainty of legal terms in application and etc. The problem of the high costs of the existing legal 
system is not the main concern in this thesis insofar as we are dealing with the substantives of the rules as 
to the seller's liability for non-conforming goods. It will be rather the need for technical expertise and the 
uncertainty of legal terms in application which are mainly caused by unequal information. 
50 For more details about how inequality of information between parties leads to market failure, see 
generally Ramsay, supra n. 24, at para. 4.3. ff. (Imperfect consumer information might result in the 
following market failures. First, it will lead to misallocation of consumer resources. Second, inferior 
informational market power will be created to consumer against even small sellers in unconcentrated 
market. Third, there will be problems of artificial product differentiation due to inequality of the 
information market power. Fourth, it will lead to informational inefficiency, that is, the inability of 
consumers to observe product quality characteristics may channel competition in a market towards more 
easily observed attributes (e. g. price), leading a general depression of quality below the level which 
would operate in a perfectly functioning market). See also Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 188 if. 
51 There are various ways to redress the information gap as to quality or quantity problems; e. g., 
labelling, grading systems or information standards (i. e. disclosure duty in certain aspects). However, 
these examples are not our main concern in this thesis mainly dealing with post-purchase information 
because they are related to pre-purchase information. 
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delivery of non-conforming goods. 52 Most consumer cases do not normally proceed to courts 
and, even if they do, consumers are not certain about the result in court due to their ignorance. 53 
This fact seems to suggest the importance to consumers of low-cost, routinised redress 
procedure. 54 Therefore, it is plausible to say that the clearer the rules are, the more routinized 
redress procedures are encouraged out of court, lowering the cost of using the private-law 
ss system. 
The second test is how effectively the law regarding the seller's liability for non-conforming 
goods protects its efficient default terms from the informed merchant's attempts to exclude 
those terms. 56 The efficiency of the rules formulated under the assumption of the parties being 
fully informed, which allocate risks to superior risk bearer, may be easily undermined when 
only the superior risk bearer (the merchant seller) is knowledgeable about contract risks because 
the seller's response to the efficient default terms may well be to undo the terms. 57 This 
inefficient situation is caused by the facts that first, information costs may discourage the 
ignorant consumer from obtaining information about the terms and possible risks in the 
transaction because their value of a single transaction is relatively small. Second, the 
information costs to educate all ignorant consumers may also prevent the informed merchant 
from charging a higher price for assuming a risk. Third, even if the merchant charges more for 
the risk assuming, the ignorant consumer may fail to understand the reason for the higher price 
and they will naturally seek a less expensive contract elsewhere. 58 It may, thus, result in that 
52 Board of Trade, Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection (The Molony Committee), 
Cmnd. 1781/1962, paras. 254,256. 
53 Id. 
54 Ramsay, Consumer Protection, (1989), at 420. 
55 However, market forces such as reputational effects in long-run relations also play an important role to 
secure the parties' performance as informal devices rather than enforceable rules. Beale, supra n. 25, at 
12. See also Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 193 ff. (explaining how enduring relationships, as opposed to 
enforceable contracts, affect parties' behaviour by using the example of the agency game). 
56 Seita, supra n. 26, at 121 f. 
57 Id. 
58 Id., at 122 f. See also for the reasons why business tends to use harsh terms in standard term contract, 
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the informed merchant is likely to find it more profitable if he shifts the risk expressly to the 
ignorant consumer by rewriting the contract, even though the run of ignorant consumers would 
be better off in paying a premium to avoid bearing the risk. 
Goldberg, "Institutional Change and Quasi-Invisible Hand, (1974) 17 J. of Law and Economics 461, at 
485 
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II. The Liability System in General and The Nature of the Seller's 
Liability for Non-conforming Goods 
1. General remarks 
A buyer who enters a sales contract expects a seller to perform as he promised. The buyer 
may be disappointed because the goods may not be delivered, delivery may be delayed or even 
if the goods are delivered, they may be defective in terms of quality, quantity or title. The 
question then arises what forms of relief each legal system will offer the innocent buyer who 
has been deceived in his expectation that the contract will be properly performed. 
The following sections provides a comparative overview of the way the different legal systems 
address the problems raised in the event the sales contract is not properly performed as expected 
by the parties in their program. Two fundamental questions are asked; in what way does each 
legal system generally deal with the cases where the seller does not perform as expected by the 
buyer (in particular, the seller's delivery of non-conforming goods)? and what is the nature of 
the seller's liability for non-conforming goods? 
2. Comparative accounts 
2.1. The dual liability system in Korean law 
2.1.1. Dual liabilities 
2.1.1.1. General 
Traditionally under Korean law, like the other civil laws, the seller's liabilities are provided in 
a dual manner, i. e. the general liability for non-performance and the seller's guarantee liability 
for defective goods. 
The general liability that is applicable to all kinds of contract is divided into three categories: 
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delay in performance, 59 impossibility of performance '60 and incomplete performance. 
6' The 
categories of non-performance depend on what has happened to the goods rather than on 
whether the obligation has been broken. Korean law has no comprehensive concept such as 
`breach of contract' in Anglo-American law, and it does not deal with non-performance in a 
unitary manner. That is, even though the concept of non-performance is generally applicable 
where the sales contract is not properly performed as agreed by the parties in their program, the 
specific independent rules of each category exclusively govern the case. 62 Therefore, the first 
question one must ask in the event of non-performance is what kind of non-performance it is, 
and then under the categorization of non-performance, whether the requirements for the 
appropriate remedy are satisfied. One of the unique features of Korean law compared to other 
civil law countries is that while the remedy of damages is specified in one provision which can 
be applied in any type of non-performance, 63 other remedies are separately provided according 
to the type of non-performance. " 
In addition the seller is liable under the special regime for the seller's guarantee liability for 
59 KCC Arts. 387-389,392,395,544. 
60 KCC Arts. 390,546. 
61 This category is not specified in KCC, but recognized by scholars' theory and cases. See the Korean 
Supreme Court Case, 28/1/1994,93 Da 43590. 
62 Yun-jik Kwak, Chae-kwon-chong-ron (General Rules in Obligatory Law), (1999), at 127 ff. This is a 
majority view at present in Korea, which is mainly influenced by German law. For the German approach 
to non-performance, see generally, Markesinis, Lorenz, and Dannemann, The German Law of 
Obligations, Volume I: The Law of Contracts and Restitution: A Comparative Introduction, (1997), at 
398 if., and see also Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 524 ff.; Horn, Kötz, and Leser, German Private 
and Commercial Law: An Introduction, (1982), at 93 if. In German law, impossibility of performance is 
provided under BGB §§280-283 and delay in performance is under BGB §284. 
63 KCC Art. 390 (Non-performance of Obligations and Claim for Damages) "If an obligor fails to effect 
performance in accordance with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages; 
but this shall not... ". Cf. Notwithstanding the overwhelming influence of German law, this provision is 
rather similar to French law (Code Civil Arts. 1142,1146,1147). 
64 E. g., KCC Arts. 544 (Delay and Rescission), 546 (Impossibility and Rescission), 389 (Specific 
performance), and etc. 
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defective goods. 65 This does not only deal with defects in title of the goods but also defects in 
quality and quantity. 
2.1.1.2. Non-performance 
2.1.1.2.1. Impossibility of performance 
Impossibility of performance can be defined as when the seller cannot perform after the 
contract was concluded because the performance of the seller has become permanently 
impossible by the seller's fault or intention. 66 
The prerequisites of impossibility of performance in the legal sense are as follows; first, 
performance has become impossible after the contract was concluded, second, the impossibility 
of performance must be due to the seller's fault or intention, 67 third, there must be unjustified 
impossibility. 68 One must note that impossibility of performance here means only subsequent 
impossibility since initial impossibility is a matter of validity of contract. 69 
65 KCC Arts. 570 ff. 
66 Hyung-bae Kim, Chae-kwon-chong-ron (General Rules of Obligatory Law), (1998), at 189 ff. 
67 KCC Art. 390. The scope of the seller's fault or intention is extended to contractual assistants so that 
the seller is liable not only for his own shortcomings, but also, for those of the people whose services he 
uses in the execution of his obligation. See KCC Art. 391. The burden of proof is generally on the seller 
to prove his lack of fault or intention. If a situation of impossibility happens without the seller's fault, the 
impossibility does not in principle raise the liability for non-performance. Notwithstanding this principle, 
there is a minority view contending that fault or intention is not required in the case of claiming 
rescission. Hyung-bae Kim, Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1997), at 218 ff. 
69 `Lack of justification' (Unrechtmäßig in German terms) as a requirement has been broadly admitted in 
Korea and it is a majority view; it means when a performance of one party is not in accordance with his 
obligation or the other party's right. Therefore, an objective fact of non-performance in accordance with 
the contract is deemed to include lack of justification under the law as to non-performance. See Yun-jik 
Kwak, supra n. 62, at 131 if., 158 and Prof. Ki-sun Kim, Seok-woo Kim, Joo-soo Kim, Jeung-han Kim, 
Hyun-tae Kim, Seung-jong Hyun are in favour of this view; Contra see Eun-young Lee, Min-bup-hak- 
gang-eoi (Lectures in Civil Law Study), (1996), at 587,589 ff., and 605; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 
173 ff. 
69 Unlike German law (BGB §306), there is no provision in KCC about invalidity in the case of initial 
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The effects of impossibility of performance are basically rescission70 and/or damages. " A 
claim for damages is a substitutionary compensation in money in lieu of performance (damages 
for non-performance). In any event of impossibility the buyer cannot claim for specific 
performance due to the nature of impossibility of performance. Unlike a claim for delay there is 
no need of a notice of default and nachfrist (notice setting an extra performance period). 72 
When the performance has become partially impossible, the buyer may claim damages as to the 
part and specific performance as to the balance of what was originally promised. However, if 
the objective of the contract is not obtainable by the seller's performance of the balance, he may 
reject the performance of the balance and claim damages for non-performance of the entire 
contract, 73 or he may be entitled to declare the contract rescinded in its entirety. 74 If it is 
obtainable, his right of rescission or damages will be restricted to the part which has become 
impossibility. In addition there is no provision in KCC to distinguish subjective or objective 
impossibility, whereas German law has one to make the contract valid in the case of subjective 
impossibility so that the debtor is still responsible for subjective initial impossibility (BGB §275 II). The 
principle of Culpa in Contrahendo can be applicable in the case of objective initial impossibility (KCC 
Art. 535). 
70 KCC Art. 546. 
71 KCC Art. 390. By the provision of art. 551 KCC has abandoned the German rule that rescission and 
damages cannot be claimed together (BGB §§325-326). In addition to rescission and damages, even 
though KCC does not specifically provide it, the buyer has a right to claim for a surrogate benefit which 
the seller may have such as the proceeds of an insurance policy received by the seller in lieu of the goods. 
In German law, stellvertretendes commodum (surrogate benefit) is specified in BGB §281, whereas in 
Korean law it is admitted by case (the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 12/5/1992,92 Da 4581; 22/12/1995, 
95 Da 38080). For the view of scholars, see Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 159 f.; Contra Eun-young 
Lee, supra n. 68, at 531. 
72 KCC Art. 546. For the definition of nachfrist and how it works in the creditor's claim for delay, see 
infra n. 85-89 and accompanying texts. 
73 No specific provision in KCC, but generally admitted. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 158 ff.; 
Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 196 ff. Cf. BGB §280 II. 
74 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 218 f.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 764; Yun jik Kwak, Chae- 
kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1998), at 154. See also the Korean Supreme Court 
Cases, 7/7/1987,86 DaKa 2943; 14/4/1992, Da 43527; 9/2/1996, Da 57817. 
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partially impossible. 75 
2.1.1.2.2. Delay 
Delay as the second type of non-performance may be defined if the seller is capable of 
performance but has not performed within the time allowed by the contract due to his fault or 
intention. 76 
The prerequisites to satisfy delay in performance in legal sense are as follows; first, time for 
performance must be due, " second, the promise is capable of performance, third, delay in 
performance has been due to the seller's fault or intention, 78 fourth, there must be unjustified 
75 Eun-young Lee, id.; Yun-jik Kwak, id. 
76 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 175. 
77 The time when the debtor is put in delay is decided as follows. First, where a definite time for 
performance is fixed, the debtor will be responsible for delay from the commencement of such time. In 
this case, the debtor does not need to be put on notice by means of a warning (Mahnung in German terms) 
(KCC Art. 387(1)). Second, if an indefinite time for performance is fixed (i. e., performance is due on a 
specified event), the debtor will be liable for any delay as from the time when he has become aware of the 
arrival of the time for performance (e. g., in an agreement on the debtor's payment only when A dies, the 
debtor will be liable as from the time when he is aware of the death of A) (KCC Art. 387(1)). In this 
case, there is no need to give a warning to the debtor. Nevertheless, if the debtor is put on the notice of 
warning, he will be responsible for delay as from the time of the arrival of the notice to the debtor. See 
Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 177 f. Third, if a time for performance is not fixed, the debtor will be 
responsible for the delay as from the time when a notice of warning has been made upon him (KCC Art. 
387(2)). This notice need not be in any particular form provided that it makes clear to the debtor that he 
is required to perform, but it needs to be communicated to the debtor. 
79 While impossibility of performance specifically requires the seller's fault or intention by code (KCC 
Arts. 390,546), there is no requirement of fault in delay in performance. The requirement is, however, 
generally recognized on the ground of, first, the principle of `liability for fault' as a basic principle of 
KCC, second, there being no logical reason to distinguish between impossibility and delay in terms of 
fault requirement, third, analogical interpretation of KCC Arts. 391 and 392. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 
62, at 141 ff. On the other hand, one scholar argues there is no need to require fault or intention in the 
case of claiming rescission or specific performance for delay in performance. See Hyung-bae Kim, supra 
n. 66, at 183; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 208 ff.; the Korean Supreme Court case 24/8/1993,93 Da 
7204. For the scope of the seller's fault or intention and burden of proof, see supra n. 67. 
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delay. 79 
In fulfilling of the above requirements, the buyer may claim specific performance, 8° 
rescission, 81 and/or damages. 82 In addition, the seller who is in delay becomes more liable for 
additional risks: although the accidental impossibility of his performance would not generally 
render him liable under the rules as to impossibility, the seller will be liable if he is in delay 
when impossibility arises. 83 A claim for damages is in principle a compensation for delay, 
which is to compensate for all disadvantages caused by the delay. The buyer may exceptionally 
claim damages for non-performance84 when the seller fails to perform within a time set by a 
reasonable notice from the buyer (nachfrist)85 or there is no longer interest in performance after 
delay for the buyer. 86 Instead of claiming damages for non-performance the buyer may rescind 
the contract on the condition of nachfrist. 8' The buyer may, however, even do so without 
nachfrist in the case of the seller's advance declaration of intention not to perform within the 
extra time, 88 or where the contract fixed a specific day for performance. 89 It must be noted that 
where the performance has been partially delayed, the buyer's right of rescission in its entirety 
is limited to the cases where the objective of the contract cannot be achieved by the seller's 
delivered part and the seller fails to deliver the part in delay after nachfrist. 90 However, if it can 
79 For the meaning of `lack of justification', see supra n. 68. 
80 KCC Art. 389. 
81 KCC Arts. 544,545. 
82 KCC Art. 390. 
83 KCC Art. 392. 
84 This claim for damages is same as a damages claim in impossibility which is a substitutionary 
compensation in money in lieu of performance. 
85 A German term, Nachfrist, is a period given by the creditor to the debtor with a further warning that he 
will refuse the debtor's performance after that period expires. 
86 KCC Art. 395. 
87 KCC Art. 544. 
88 Id 
89 KCC Art. 545. Fixgeschdit in German. 
90 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 209 f.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 762 f.; Yun jik Kwak, supra n. 
74, at 145 f. 
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be achieved, his right of rescission is restricted to the part in delay. 9' 
2.1.1.2.3. Incomplete performance 
Incomplete performance or positive breach of contract as the third category of non- 
performance covers the situation where the seller appears to have performed his contractual 
duty, 92 but causes some harm to the buyer due to the incompleteness in his performance of 
contractual duty. 93 There are serious arguments as to the definition of the concepts of 
incomplete performance and positive breach of contract and their interrelationship, and as to 
what amounts to incomplete performance and its effects. 94 The legal authority for this category 
91 Id. Cf. The Korean Supreme Court case 28/7/1981,80 Da 2400. 
92 In this sense it cannot fall within the category of impossibility or delay in performance. 
93 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 161 ff.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 601; Sang-yong Kim, Chae- 
kwon-chong-ron (General Rules in Obligatory Law), (1996), at 166. 
94 For two distinguishing views with regard to the definition of the concepts of incomplete performance 
or positive breach of contract and their interrelationship, see Hyung-bae Kim, Min-bup-hak-yeon-koo 
(Civil Law Study), (1989), at 161 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 218 ff. The first view which is a 
minority view in Korea argues that incomplete performance should be divided into 3 concepts; 
incomplete performance in a broad sense, incomplete performance in a narrow sense, and positive breach 
of contract. The first includes all the cases which the performance of the seller has been simply executed 
incompletely. Among these cases, some cases belong to the second where the incomplete performance 
does not cause the buyer material harm beyond the normal contractual field or non-performance (namely, 
consequential loss), and the third where it causes such harm. See Yong-Han Kim, Chae-kwon-bup- 
chong-ron (General Rules in Obligatory Law), (1988), at 159; Joo-soo Kim, Chae-kwon-chong-ron 
(General Rules in Obligatory Law), (1988), at 120; Seoung-jong Hyun, Chae-kwon-chong-ron (General 
Rules in Obligatory Law), (1982), at 129; Jeong-pyoung Im, Chae-kwon-chong-ron (General Rules in 
Obligatory Law), (1989), at 161. The second view as a dominant view in Korea understands that 
incomplete performance and positive breach of contract is synonymous. It insists that incomplete 
performance (or positive breach of contract) arises when the performance itself is incomplete or the 
incomplete performance causes a material harm to the buyer beyond non-performance. There is, 
therefore, no need to distinguish the cases of extra harm beyond non-performance and non-extra harm. 
For the scholars in favour of this dominant view, see supra n. 93. Prof. Eun-young Lee places her 
emphasis on the incompleteness of performance as the essence of incomplete performance rather than the 
extra harm. 
In addition there are 4 different views as to the grounds in substance of incomplete performance in terms 
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is found in KCC Art. 390 that may include impossibility, delay and all the other types of non- 
performance. 95 
The prerequisites for incomplete performance are as follows; first, there must have been the 
act of performance as opposed to non-performance, second, the performance is incomplete, 
third, incomplete performance has been due to the seller's fault or intention, 96 and fourth, there 
must be unjustified incomplete performance. 97 
As regards the consequences of incomplete performance, if complete performance is possible, 
the buyer may claim specific performance and at the same time claim damages, if any, for delay 
and additional damages for any consequential loss to the buyer. 98 If the seller fails to perform 
of a network of duties. The first view is to argue that the substance of incomplete performance is not only 
the breach of the main duties such as the duty to deliver the goods or pay the price, but also the breach of 
the duties of care and protection of the other party's life, health or property. See Yong-han Kim, id., at 
155; Jeong-pyoung Im, id., at 161. The second view says it is the breach of the duties ancillary to the 
main duties or the further conduct duty (Weitere verhaltenspflicht in German), e. g., the duty not to give 
non-conforming tenders. This view is a majority view in Korea at present. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 
62, at 167 ff.; Seoung-jong Hyun, id., at 128. The third view contends that incomplete performance is 
only related to the main duties but not to the duties of care and protection so that the breach of care and 
protection is governed by the law as to the unlawful act (the liability for unlawful act is a special term 
comparable to tortious liability in common law). It is also argued that distinguishing between the main 
duties and the ancillary duties is meaningless because the breach of the latter duties will fall into the 
category of the breach of the former duties at the end in light of the consequence of breach. See Eun- 
young Lee, supra n. 68, at 591 ff., 601 ff.; Eun-young Lee, "Woo-ri-min-bup-ae-man-nun Chae-moo-bul- 
e-haeng-chaek-im-eoi Cahe-gae (An Liability System for Non-performance Suitable to Korean Civil 
Law)", (1990) 39(12) Bup-jo 3, at 6 ff., 19 ff. The fourth view insists that it is the breach of the main 
duties, the ancillary duties and the duties of care and protection. In this view the ancillary duties are 
distinguished from the second view in that the seller takes the duties of care or diligence to properly 
perform the main duties, e. g., the duty of proper preparation for delivery, the duty of safe custody and etc. 
See Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 32 ff., 219 ff. 
45 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 166 ff.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 589 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra 
n. 66, at 221 ff. 
96 For the scope of the seller's fault or intention and burden of proof, see supra n. 67. 
97 For the meaning of `lack of justification', see supra n. 68. 
98 `Special circumstances' in KCC Art. 393(2) may be applied in this case of the additional damages. 
The additional damages may include consequential loss to the buyer's other property or body. 
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within a reasonable extra fixed time for which the buyer has given notice (nachfrist), 99 the buyer 
may rescind the contract. On the other hand, if complete performance is not possible, or if there 
is no interest in complete performance for the buyer even if complete performance is possible, 
the buyer may claim damages for non-performance and, additional damages, if any. In the case 
of no interest in complete performance, the buyer may rescind the contract without nachfrist. 10° 
2.1.1.3. The special regime for defective goods 
If the goods delivered by the seller are not of the quality or quantity specified in the contract, 
the contractual program has not been fulfilled. In this case although there has been delivery and 
transfer of title, the buyer's expectations have not been answered, and the balance between price 
and value has been upset. For this case, the general liability for non-performance does not 
apply here, '°1 but KCC imposes a special liability for defective goods on the seller, so called, 
the seller's guarantee liability for defective goods. 102 Therefore, as soon as the risk in the goods 
has passed, 103 the rules as to defects take precedence over the general rules as to non- 
performance. This is due to the special nature of the rules on defects. 
A distinction must be drawn between the matters of aliud (another thing in nature) and a defect 
in quality. In the first instance the buyer is entitled to demand either specific performance or to 
claim rescission and/or damages in accordance with the rules under the general liability. '04 In 
99 For the definition of nachfrist and how it works in the creditor's claim for delay, see supra n. 85-89 
and accompanying texts. 
1°0 It should be noted that rescission is allowed only in the case of the breach of the main duties. On the 
other hand, the breach of the duties subordinate to the main duties, e. g., the duty to deliver a manual or a 
letter, the breach of the ancillary duties or the breach of the duties of care and protection per se do not, in 
principle, allow rescission. 
101 See supra n. 66-100 and accompanying text. 
102 KCC Arts. 580-584. 
103 It may generally coincide with delivery. 
104 Dong-seok Kim, "Mae-soo-in-eoi Ha-ja-tong-ji-eoi-moo-eoi Seong-lip-yo-keon (The Requirements 
for the Buyer's Duty to Notify the Seller of the Defects)", (1988) 33(12) Ko-shi-gae 95, at 99 ff. Cf. 
Jeong-pyoung Im, supra n. 94, at 165; Jeung-han Kim and Hak-dong Kim, Chae-kwon-chong-ron 
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the second the buyer is limited to the remedies under the seller's guarantee liability-105 
Having said that, the starting point to explain the seller's guarantee liability in Korean law is in 
understanding its nature because the different understanding may yield the different results in 
practice. 1°6 There are two opposing views in the understanding of its nature; the legal liability 
theory (bup jeong-chaek-im-seol)107 and the contractual liability theory (chae-moo-bul-e-haeng- 
chaek-im-seol). 108 The former theory maintains that the nature of the seller's guarantee liability 
is not a contractual liability but `a liability specially recognized by the law' for the purpose of 
protecting the buyer irrespective of the seller's fault. Thus the seller's guarantee liability exists 
separately from the general liability for non-performance. On the other hand, the latter theory 
contends that the seller's guarantee liability is `in the nature of contractual liability' in a sense 
that KCC presumes `a contractual obligation' to deliver the goods free from defects. The rules 
on the seller's guarantee liability exist as the special rules within the general rules for non- 
performance, being categorized as incomplete performance. 'o9 
The prerequisites to raise the seller's guarantee liability can be generalized as follows. "0 First, 
there exists a defect in the goods. One must note that whether or not the defect exists depends 
upon which theory one adopts because the concept of a defect and the time when a defect must 
exist are interpreted differently. "' Second, the buyer was not aware of the existence of the 
defect in quality and quantity1. and he was not negligent in failing to discover the defect in 
(General Rules in Obligatory Law), (1998), at 111 (they argue that it may be governed by the rules on 
incomplete performance). 
105 Id 
106 For the practical differences in general, see infra n. 208-216 and accompanying texts. 
107 This theory is a prevailing view at present in Korea. The scholars in favour of this view are Profs. 
Yun-jik Kwak, Ki-sun Kim, Jeung-han Kim, Hyun-tae Kim, Tae-jae Lee, etc. See infra n. 135. 
108 The scholars in favour of this theory are Profs. Joo-soo Kim, Hyung-bae Kim, Jeok-in Kim, Eun- 
young Lee, etc. See infra n. 167. 
109 For more details about two opposing views, see infra n. 134-207 and accompanying texts. 
110 For more details, see Chap. III. 
111 See infra n. 208-213 and accompanying texts. 
112 KCC Arts. 572(3), 580(1). 
27 
quality at the time of the conclusion of the contract-"3 Third, the buyer must exercise his rights 
on the ground of the seller's delivery of defective goods within the following periods from the 
time when he was aware of the defect; six months and one year in the cases of qualitative and 
quantitative defects, respectively. ' 14 Fourth, the buyer must examine the goods without delay 
and immediately notify the defect to the seller. "' In any event, the notice must be given within 
six months from the time when the buyer takes delivery of the goods where the defect could not 
be discovered by due examination. "' This requirement is only required in commercial sales, 
not in consumer sales. ' 17 
The effects of the seller's guarantee liability are generalized as follows. "' In the case of the 
sale of specific goods, the buyer may rescind the contract and concurrently claim damages only 
if the buyer would not be able to achieve the object of the contract due to the defect in quality of 
the goods, or if he would not have entered into the contract had he known of the defect in 
quantity at the time of contract. 19 Otherwise, only a claim in damages or a price reduction is 
available. 120 One must note that there is no specific provision on the price reduction where the 
goods are defective in quality, but where they are defective in quantity. 121 In the case of the 
defect in quality in the sale of generic goods, the buyer may rescind the contract and/or claim 
damages in accordance with the same principle as above in the case of the sale of specific 
goods. 122 It should be noted that a claim for damages does not necessarily mean full damages 
113 KCC Art. 580(1). 
114 KCC Arts. 573,582. 
115 KCmC Art. 69(l). 
116 Id 
117 Id. 
118 For more details, see Chap. IV. 
119 KCC Arts. 572(2), 575(1), 580(1). 
120 Id. 
121 KCC Art. 572(3). 
122 KCC Arts. 575(1), 581(1). One must note that the matters of a defect in quantity in the sale of generic 
goods are not dealt with under the seller's guarantee liability, but under the general liability. 
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because it is differently interpreted by adopting either theory as to its nature. 113 Instead of 
rescission and/or damages, the buyer has a right to claim replacement of the defective goods as 
124 well. There is no specific provision for the buyer's right to claim the seller's repair as a 
remedy for the seller's guarantee liability. 
2.1.1.4. The differences between two liabilities 
First, the seller's guarantee liability is a strict liability which does not require the seller's fault 
or intention, 125 whereas the general liability is a liability based on the principle of fault. '26 
Second, while the seller's guarantee liability requires the buyer's lack of knowledge about the 
existence of a defect and (as the case may be) absence of negligence in failing to discover the 
existence of a defect at the time of contract, 127 the general liability does not. 
Third, the scope of damages is based on the buyer's expectation interests in the case of a claim 
under the general liability, whereas it is variously interpreted under the seller's guarantee 
liability by adopting either the legal liability theory or the contractual liability theory. However, 
both theories have generally attempted to distinguish the scope of damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability from that under the general liability in a way that limits the former to 
something narrower than the latter. 128 This seems to be based on the idea that the remedy of 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability which exists regardless of the fault principle 
cannot be treated in the same way as under the general liability which is governed by the fault 
principle. 
123 See infra n. 214-216 and accompanying texts. 
124 KCC Art. 581(2). 
125 However, only one scholar insists that fault is required to raise the seller's guarantee liability. See 
Joo-soo Kim, Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1995), at 214. 
126 KCC Arts. 390 f. 
127 KCC Arts. 572(3), 580(1). 
128 E. g., it is limited to the compensation based on the buyer's reliance interests or it is even understood 
to mean mere price reduction, which seem to exclude the buyer's consequential losses. For more details, 
see infra n. 1021-1042 and accompanying texts. 
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Fourth, the availability of the buyer's right of rescission by virtue of the rules of the seller's 
guarantee liability is always dependent upon the questions of whether he is able to achieve the 
object of the contract in the case of defects in quality, 129 or if he would have entered into the 
contract had he known of defects in quantity at the time of contract, 130 whereas in the general 
liability for non-performance the right of rescission does not necessarily rely on these 
questions. "' 
Fifth, the limitation period for claims arising out of defects is extremely short: one year or six 
months from the time when the buyer was aware of the defect. 132 This contrasts strikingly with 
ten years, which is the general limitation period for the general liability. 133 
2.1.2. The nature of the seller's guarantee liability for defective goods 
2.1.2.1. The legal liability theory 
2.1.2.1.1. General 
This theory maintains that the seller's guarantee liability for defective goods is an effect of a 
non juristic act134 rather than a juristic act by the intention of a contractual party. The liability is 
imposed on the seller by the law regardless of the contractual party's intention on the basis of 
129 KCC Arts. 575(1), 580(1). 
130 KCC Art. 572(2). 
131 For instance, the buyer's right of rescission for delay does not depend on the possibility to achieve the 
object of the contract even though the seller's failure to perform within the added time given by nachfrist 
may make it negative. KCC Art. 544 (Delay and rescission). On the other hand, the right of rescission 
for impossibility is closely related to the matter of the possibility in a sense that impossibility is in its 
essence a typical case of non-achievable object even though it is not expressly provided in KCC Art. 546 
(Impossibility and rescission). 
132 KCC Arts. 573,582. 
133 KCC Art. 162. 
134 A juristic act has its legal effects on the condition of a party's declaration of intention to do the act or 
the conduct, whereas non juristic act lacks the intention. 
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the unique nature of contract made for a consideration. '35 That is, it is the legal liability 
intended to protect the buyer who paid the price in reliance on the goods being free from 
defects. Even though there seems to be no unified opinion as to its background and nature 
among the scholars in favour of this theory, it can be generalized as below. 
2.1.2.1.2. Background for the legal liability theory 
2.1.2.1.2.1. Historical background: Roman law background (Aedilis curulis edictum) 
The seller's guarantee liability basically originated in the jurisdiction of the aediles curules 
over slaves market transactions at the time of Salvius Iulianus. '36 The aediles curules 
135 For the scholars' view in favour of this theory, see Tae-jae Lee, Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in 
Obligatory Law), (1982), at 173; Ki-sun Kim, Han-kook-chae-kwon-bup-gak-ron (Particulars in Korean 
Obligatory Law), (1988), at 133; Seok-woo Kim, Chae-kwon-bup-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory 
Law), (1978), at 182; Young-hwan Lee, "Jong-ryu-mae-mae-wa Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im (Generic Goods 
Sales and the Guarantee Liability for Defective Goods)", (1977) 7(6) Bup-jeong 115; Young-hwan Lee, 
"Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-eoi Bon-jil-ae-kwan-han E-ron-eoi Jae-gum-toe (Re-examination of the theories 
as to the Nature of the Seller's Guarantee Liability)", (1989) 16(12) Ko-shi-yoen-koo 109; Jeung-han 
Kim, Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1989), at 146; Hyun-chae Kim, Joo-seok- 
chae-kwon-gak-chik (Commentary on Particulars in Obligatory Law), Book I, (1989), at 541; Hyun-tae 
Kim, Shin-go-chae-kwon-bup-gak-ron (New Edition of Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1975), at 117 f.; 
Won-lim Jee, "Chae-moo-bul-e-haeng-eoi Yu-hyung-ae-kwan-han Yeon-koo (A Study as to the 
Categories of Non-performance)", (1997) 15 Min-sa-bup-hak 374, at 400 ff.; Yeon-eoi Eo, "Ha-ja-dam- 
bo-chaek-im-eoi Bon-jil (The Nature of the Guarantee Liability for Defective Goods)", (1989) 226 Pan- 
rae-wol-bo 19, at 21 ff.; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 227 ff. (He argues that the seller's guarantee 
liability is regulated under the name of legal liability due to its historical development, even though it is 
generally admitted that the nature of the seller's guarantee liability is a contractual one). For the cases in 
favour of this theory, see e. g., the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 30/10/1957,4290 Min-Sang 552; 
21/4/1960,4292 Min-Sang 385. 
136 Kyu-chang Cho, "Mool-kun-eoi Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im (The Guarantee Liability for Defective 
Goods)", (1983) 21 Bup-hak-non jip (The Institute of Legal Study of Korea University) 221, at 224 ff.; 
Dae-jeong Kim, "A Study on the Seller's Guarantee Liability", The Graduate School of Sung Kyun Kwan 
University, (1990), PhD Thesis, at 12 If. For the references to Roman law in general, see Zimmermann, 
The jail, of Obligations; Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, (1996), at 293 ff.; Watson, The 
Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic, (1965), at 86 ff. Cf. Rogerson, "Implied Warranty 
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introduced the edicts which established what have become known as the aedilitian remedies, 137 
which is to protect the buyer from the notoriously ill-reputed slave-traders in the market. 138 
Under these edicts the seller was obliged to declare at the time of contract all non-apparent 
physical defects or diseases and defects of character which impaired the slave's fitness for 
use. 139 The parties were also allowed to extend the scope of the seller's guarantee beyond the 
specified defects in the aedilitian edicts; an affirmation that the slave was free from further 
defects or that he possessed special qualities was sufficient. '4° If the slave turned out to have 
one of specified defects in the edicts, without the seller having declared it, if a quality that had 
been affirmed was absent, or if the seller acted fraudulently, the buyer was granted two 
alternative rights; the actio redhibitoria'41 and the actio quanti minoris. 142 These liabilities were 
imposed on the seller as an objective liability, namely, he was liable regardless of whether he 
against Latent Defects in Roman and English law", in: Daube (ed. ), Studies in the Roman Law of Sale, 
(1959), at 112 ff.; Honore, "The History of the Aedilitian Actions", in: Daube (ed. ), id., at 132 ff. 
137 Ulp. D. 21.1.1.1. For English translation, see Mommsen, Kruger, and Watson, (Eng. trans. edited by 
Watson), The Digest of Justinian, Vol. II, (1985). 
138 It should be noted that the aedilitian remedies were applied not only for slaves sales but also for 
livestock sales. Ulp. D. 21.1.38. 
139 Note that the aedilitian remedies applied only to latent defects. Ulp. D. 21.1.1.6. Therefore, if the 
buyer did not notice an apparent defect, e. g., female or male, knocked out eyes, big scar, and etc., he was 
precluded from taking recourse against the seller under the aediltian remedies. See Zimmermann, id., at 
311 f. Cf. For the details as to the contents of defects to be declared, see Zimmermann, supra n. 136, at 
311 ff. 
1 40 Ulp. D. 21.1.17.20, Gai. D. 21.1.18-19.4. 
141 Ulp. D. 21.1.1.1. By this right the buyer could return the slave and obtain restitution of the purchase 
price. Both parties had to be restored to the position they would have been had the sale not been 
concluded (Ulp. D. 21.1.23.7). The limitation period for the action redhibitoria was six months of the 
defect having become apparent (Ulp. D. 21.1.19.6). For further details regarding the requirements and the 
effects of the aedilitian remedies in general, see Zimmermann, supra n. 136, at 317 ff. 
142 There is no specific provision for the actio quanti minoris in Ulp. D. 21.1.1.1. Nevertheless, this 
remedy was already available in early classical law. See Zimmermann, id., at 318. The action quanti 
nninoris was for the difference in the purchase price between what the slave was worth with the defect and 
what he would have been worth without it. The limitation period was twelve months of the defect having 
become apparent (Ulp. D. 21.1.38). 
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was at fault or whether he had made special affirmations. 143 They were rather relied upon the 
kinds or the nature of the subject matter, or the circumstances of the transactions. 
Having said that, as the legal liability theory maintains, the aedilitian edicts were focused on 
the objective nature of liability, which were imposed on the seller by the law as a means to 
protect the buyer's reliance on there being no defect. 1' The legal liability theory argues that the 
aedilitian edicts under Roman law have been succeeded in modern civil code provisions and 
become the seller's guarantee liability at present. 145 The seller's guarantee liability is, therefore, 
in the nature of legal liability. 
2.1.2.1.2.2. Theoretical background: Impossibilium nulla obligatio and Specific goods 
dogma 
The basis of the theory relies on its unique view of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific 
goods dogma in specific goods sales. The view points out that if there was an initial defect in 
the specific goods at the time of contract and the contract requires the seller to deliver non- 
defective goods, it is treated as an initial impossibility related case due to the unique nature of 
the specific goods and nullified by the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio. 146 On this 
basis the legal liability theory argues that the contract nullified by the principle cannot be 
compatible with the seller's guarantee liability which presumes the validity of the contract. 147 It 
means that, insofar as the specific goods are concerned and an initial defect exists at the time of 
contract, one's treatment of the seller's guarantee liability as imposing on the seller a 
contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods would contradict the seller's guarantee liability 
143 Ulp. D. 21.1.1.2. 
144 Kaoru Yuzuki, Kekkanhin-ni-okeru Urite-no Sekininhosyou-ni-tuiteno Kenkyu (Study on the Seller's 
Guarantee Liability for Defective Goods), (1963), at 15 ff. 
145 Id 
146 Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 543; Sik Choi, "Mae-joo-eoi Dam-bo-chaek-im-kwa Bool-wan- 
jeon-e-haeng-kwa-eoi Kwan-kae (The Relationship between the Seller's Guarantee Liability and 
Incomplete Performance)", (Nov., 1961) 16(11) Bup-jeong 49. 
147 Id. 
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standing on the assumption of the validity of the contract because the contract must be void by 
virtue of the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio. Therefore, where the contract concerns 
specific goods and there exists an initial defect at the time of contract, the seller's contractual 
duty to deliver non-defective goods should be denied under the rules as to the seller's guarantee 
liability and his duty must be limited to deliver the goods in status quo at the time when the 
contract was made (so called, the specific goods dogma). 148 That is, if the seller delivers 
specific goods in the condition in which it exists at the time of the conclusion of contract, it 
amounts to complete performance of the seller's duty to deliver and does not raise the seller's 
contractual liability at all for any defect the parties have not expected. All in all, the seller's 
contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods under the seller's guarantee liability would not 
be recognized in the sale of specific goods and the seller's guarantee liability is not in the nature 
of contractual liability but in the nature of legal liability. 
Regarding the generic goods sales, the theory justifies its reasoning for the question of how the 
principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma can be understood in the 
sale of generic goods sales by saying that once the generic goods are specified, the goods are to 
be treated as specific goods, making another room for the application of the seller's guarantee 
liability in generic goods sales. 'a9 
2.1.2.1.2.3. Positive law background: Relationship with other provisions 
The theory analyses the legal nature of the seller's guarantee liability by the analogical 
148 id. 
149 That is, as long as the principles of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma are 
presumed for the seller's guarantee liability, there is no room for the application of the seller's guarantee 
liability in the case of generic goods sales which always concerns a matter of subsequent defects. 
Therefore the theory solves the problem of its theoretical basis of impossibilium nulla obligatio and 
specific goods dogma by deriving the idea that the generic goods are treated as specific goods when the 
goods are thereafter specified. See Young-hwan Lee, supra n. 135, at 124 f. According to the theory, the 
reasoning is even clearer when KCC Art. 581(1) 
is read: "Even where the subject-matter of a sale has 
been specified in kind, if there exists any defects in the specified subject-matter, the provisions of the 
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interpretation of the other provisions. The positive law backgrounds are as follows. First, it 
presents KCC Art. 462 as a proof of the specific goods dogma, which reads. 
"If the delivery of a specific thing is the subject of the obligation, the obligor must deliver 
the thing in the condition in which it exists at the time when the delivery thereof is due. , 150 
Insofar as the seller's delivery of the specific goods in status quo at the time of delivery 
amounts to complete performance of his duty on the basis of art. 462, it raises the necessity to 
protect the buyer in terms of law where the seller delivers defective goods which are not value 
for the money the buyer paid because the buyer may not be able to rely on the contract for the 
remedies. 15' Second, a claim for damages under the general liability for non-performance may 
be allowed regardless of the matters of whether the buyer was aware of the existence of a defect 
in quality or quantity and whether he was negligent in failing to discover the defect in quality at 
the time of contract, whereas awarding damages under the seller's guarantee liability may 
depend upon those matters. 152 In this sense, the seller's guarantee liability should be 
distinguished from the general liability. Third, in the case of the specific goods sales with fixed 
quantity, a contractual liability can not take effect in principle for the partial shortage which 
existed in fact at the time of contract because it will amount to initial impossibility in part and 
make the contract void for the shortage. Nevertheless, KCC'53 provides that the guarantee 
liability for the shortage is imposed on the seller. 154 Fourth, KCC does not make the donor 
liable in principle when a gift is defective. 155 It should have been allowed if KCC had presumed 
that the guarantee liability is a contractual one. 156 Fifth, the seller's guarantee liability does not 
require fault in the seller's part, whereas the general liability for non-performance requires 
preceding Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. " 
150 Young-hwan Lee, supra n. 135, at 116. 
151 Id. 
152 KCC Arts. 572(3), 580(1); Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 182; Tae-jae Lee, supra n. 135, at 174. 
153 KCC Art. 574. 
1)4 Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 182; Tae-jae Lee, supra n. 135, at 174. 
155 KCC Art. 559(1). 
156 Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 182; Tae-jae Lee, supra n. 135, at 174. 
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fault. "' 
2.1.2.1.3. The nature of the seller's guarantee liability 
2.1.2.1.3.1. Non-fault based liability 
The theory maintains that the seller's guarantee liability is the liability especially imposed by 
the law regardless of the seller's fault for the purpose of protecting the buyer's reliance on the 
transaction made for consideration and for the purpose of striking a balance in terms of value 
for money in the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods. 158 This view of non-fault 
based liability is in general the same as the one for the contractual liability theory. 
2.1.2.1.3.2. Liability for initial impossibility in part 
As discussed above in the theoretical background, the seller's guarantee liability is closely 
related to initial impossibility in part (or initial defect). The seller's guarantee liability is 
imposed on the seller by the law on the presumption of the validity of the contract where there 
is initial impossibility in part because the initial impossibility may result in the contract 
becoming partially invalid and the law needs to strike a balance in terms of value for money. 159 
There are opposing views whether the liability for initial impossibility as a nature of the seller's 
guarantee liability is admitted as a whole or part; the real question here is whether the seller's 
157 id. 
158 Tae-jae Lee, supra n. 135, at 173 f.; Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 135, at 134; Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, 
at 182; Jeung-han Kim, supra n. 135, at 146; Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 542; Hyun-tae Kim, supra 
n. 135, at 117 f.; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 22. 
159 In relation to subsequent impossibility, it can be a matter of non-performance and burden of risk. The 
seller's responsibility for non-performance depends upon the existence of his fault in the subsequent 
impossibility. If he is not in fault, it leaves the case to the burden of risk (KCC Art. 537). However, 
insofar as the generic goods sales are concerned, the matter of a subsequent defect can be also dealt with 
the seller's guarantee liability (KCC Art. 581). Cf. Tae-jae Lee, "Chae-moo-bool-e-haeng-chaek-im-kwa 
Dam-bo-chaek-im (Non-performance and the Guarantee Liability)", (Jan., 1983) 108 Wol-kan-ko-shi 38, 
at 43 f. 
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guarantee liability is in its nature the liability only for the cases of initial impossibility or the 
liability for the cases of initial impossibility and some other cases as well, e. g., a defect in 
generic goods sales or a defective title in the sale of goods belonging to another. l60 
2.1.2.1.3.3. Relationship with the general liability for non-performance: Concurrence 
with incomplete performance ? 
When the seller tenders defective goods and the defective tender is attributable to the seller's 
fault, it may satisfy the requirements of both the seller's guarantee liability and the general 
liability for incomplete performance. It may raise the question of whether the buyer can claim 
on the basis of non-performance or the seller's guarantee liability (or maybe both). 
2.1.2.1.3.3.1. Concurrence with incomplete performance 
Among the scholars in favour of the legal liability theory, there are some scholars arguing that 
concurrence with the general liability should be allowed. 16' Their view is based on the idea that 
there should not be any problem whichever liability the buyer is to claim because the seller's 
guarantee liability and the general liability are completely different in their natures. 162 
2.1.2.1.3.3.2. No concurrence with incomplete performance 
There are other scholars who are against the view that concurrence with the general liability 
160 For the former view, see Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 135, at 133; Hyun-tae Kim, supra n. 135, at 117; Tae- 
jae Lee, supra n. 135, at 174. For the contra view, see Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 229 f.; Seok-woo 
Kim, supra n. 135, at 182 f.; Jeung-han Kim, supra n. 135, at 147; Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 542; 
Yeon-eoi Eo, supra n. 135, at 26. 
161 For the scholars allowing the concurrence in the sale of specific goods, see Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 135, 
at 134; Hyun-tae Kim, supra n. 135, at 117. For the scholars allowing the concurrence in the sale of 
generic goods, see Young-hwan Lee, supra n. 135, at 115 ff.; Yeon-eoi Eo, supra n. 135, at 26. 
162 Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 135, at 134; Hyun-tae Kim, supra n. 135, at 117; Young-hwan Lee, supra n. 
135, at 115 ff. 
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for incomplete performance should be allowed. '63 They contend that, insofar as the legal 
liability theory is based on impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma, there is no 
room for non-performance because once the seller delivers the goods in status quo at the time of 
tender, his contractual obligation is extinguished because he fulfils the contractual obligation. '64 
In relation to generic goods, it is argued that the provision for the seller's guarantee liability for 
such generic goods165 are especially stipulated for the purpose of excluding the application of 
the rules as to the general liability for incomplete performance. 166 
2.1.2.2. The contractual liability theory 
2.1.2.2.1. General 
The contractual liability theory has been presented only in the 1980's with raising the question 
of whether the legal liability theory as a majority view is logical and suitable for the modern 
contract world as represented by mass production. 167 It denies the theoretical basis of 
163 Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 543; Tae-jae Lee, supra. n. 159, at 43 f.; Jeong-pyoung Im, supra n. 
94, at 165; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 247 f.; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 169 ff.; Won-tim Jee, 
supra n. 135, at 402 f.; Jeung-han Kim and Hak-dong Kim, supra n. 104, at 111 f.; Yong-han Kim, 
"Bool-wan-jeon-e-haeng-eoi Bon-jil-kwa Yo-kun (The Nature and Requirements of Incomplete 
Performance)", (1980) 25(5) Ko-shi-gae 23, at 33 ff. 
164 Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 543; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 169 ff. 
165 KCC Art. 581. 
166 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 247 f.; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 170 f.; Yong-han Kim, supra n. 
163, at 34 f.; Jeung-han Kim and Hak-dong Kim, supra n. 104, at 112. Cf. For the importance of art. 581, 
see Tae-jae Lee, supra n. 159, at 43 f. 
167 For the scholars in favour of this theory, see Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 309 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, 
supra n. 66, at 224 ff.; Eun-Young Lee, Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1997), at 
206 ff.; Juk-in Hwang, "Ha ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-eoi Bup jeok-seong jil (The Legal Nature of the 
Guarantee Liability)", (Mar., 1979) 24(3) Ko-shi-gae 81; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 221 ff.; Joo- 
soo Kim, supra n. 125, at 198 ff.; Sang-hoon Kim, "Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-eoi Bon-jil-ron (The Nature 
of the Guarantee Liability for Defective goods)", (1984) 24 Bup jeong-non-chong (The College of Law, 
Choong Ang University) 75; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 136, at 199 ff.; Bup-young Ahn, "Mae-mae-mok- 
jeok-mool-eoi Ha-ja-ro-in-han Son-hae-bae-sang (Damages for Defective Goods)", (1995) 11,12 Min-sa- 
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impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma in the legal liability theory and instead 
it provides its theoretical basis that there is a contractual obligation to tender non-defective 
goods. The seller's guarantee liability is, thus, understood as a contractual liability for the 
breach of the contractual obligation which may be categorized as incomplete performance. 
According to the contractual liability theory, the rules as to the seller's guarantee liability are 
generally interpreted as the special rules of the general liability. The following accounts are to 
attempt to generalize the various views of the scholars in favour of this theory as to its 
background and nature. 
2.1.2.2.2. Background for the contractual liability theory 
2.1.2.2.2.1. Historical background: Justinian law background (the ius civil) 
Before Justinian's time two sets of remedies governed the cases where the seller delivered 
defective goods; the actio empti168 and the aedilitian edicts. 169 These remedies were devised to 
improve the position regarding the buyer against the principle of caveat emptor, which 
governed early Roman law. However, the problem in light of the buyer's protection was that 
bup-hak 194.; Choon-soo Ahn, "Ha-ja-dam-bo-bup-sang-eoi Jae-moon-jae (Problems under the 
Guarantee Liability Law)", (1995) 11 Min-sa-bup-hak 419; Sang-kwang Lee, "Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im- 
eoi Ki-bon-moon-jae (The Basic Matters in the Seller's Guarantee liability)", (1998) 5(1) Bee-kyo-sa-bup 
283, at 283 ff. For the cases in favour of this theory, see e. g., the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 
14/11/1989,89 DaKa 15298; 14/4/1992,91 Da 17146.17153; 30/6/1995,94 Da 23920. 
168 With the development of the consensual contracts of good faith the seller was responsible under the 
actio empti for fraud which included the fraudulent concealment of a defect known to him but not to the 
buyer and which was not apparent (Liability for dolus). Flor. D. 18.1.43.2; Ulp. 21.1.4.4. In addition the 
seller was responsible under the actio empti if he had stated during negotiation that the goods sold 
possessed a particular quality which it later transpired that it did not, or were free from a defect, which in 
fact it did possess (Liability for dicta in venditione). Pomp. D. 19.1.6.4. By the actio empti the buyer 
could claim for quod actoris interest so that the seller is liable not only for the reduced value of the goods 
themselves but also for consequential loss. Ulp. D. 19.1.13 pr.; Pomp. D. 19.1.6.4; Ulp. D. 19.1.13.2; 
Marci. D. 18.1.45. 
169 See supra n. 136-143 and accompanying texts. 
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the two sets of remedies were far from perfect and thus the principle of caveat emptor still 
prevailed to a large extent. That is, the problem as to the aedilitian remedies was that the buyer 
was limited not only to the sale of slaves and livestock, but also to market transactions only. 
The problem as to the actio empti was in that it was only available to the cases of the seller's 
dolus although it covered all kinds of sales. If the buyer wanted the seller to be responsible for 
a particular quality under the actio empti, he had to ask the seller's affirmation about the 
quality. 170 Therefore, in the absence of the affirmation, the problem of the actio empti from the 
point of view of the buyer was that it required proof by the buyer of the seller's knowledge of 
the defect since it was based on the bad faith of the seller. 171 
In Justinian's time, with the growing complexity of Roman economic life and further 
development of the consensual contract of good faith inherent therein the principles laid down 
in the aedilitian edicts were gradually assimilated into the ius civile. "2 The aedilitian remedies 
which were originally applied to slaves and livestock sales were extended to all sales but not to 
other contracts. 173 In addition the actio empti was also extended to cover cases in which the 
seller did not know of the defect and had not given an affirmation against defects. Therefore, 
the seller was liable under the actio empti for a defect even though he did not know of the defect 
as long as he did not disclaim liability for the defect, which amounted to an implied guarantee 
against latent defects. '74 This guarantee which was implied by law was based on a 
generalization of the aedilitian remedies and was effected by means of a more refined 
interpretation of what was owed in good faith principle, under the actio empti. "s 
Regarding the buyer's remedies in such cases of implied guarantee, it depended upon whether 
170 Liability for dicta in venditione. 
171 Ulp. D. 19.1.13.1. 
172 Zimmermann, supra, n. 136, at 321. 
173 Ulp. D. 21.1.63. 
174 Ulp. D. 19.1.13. 
175 Zimmermann, supra. n. 136, at 321. 
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the seller was aware of the defect or not. 176 In the case where the seller knew of and concealed 
the defect the law allowed the buyer to claim his full damages, quod interest. 177 On the other 
hand, in the case of the seller's ignorance of the defect, the buyer was only allowed to claim the 
aedilitian remedies of either redhibitoria or quanti minoris. "$ One of the unique features of the 
buyer's remedies at that time was that the nature of the objective liability in the aedilitian 
remedies was transformed into the nature of the subjective liability in ius civile which depended 
upon the seller's good or bad faith. 179 
Having said that, the contractual liability theory maintains that there is no doubt in that the 
historical origin of the seller's guarantee liability is directly related to the aedilitian edicts. 'so 
The institution that modem civil law inherited from Roman law is, however, the ius civil in 
Justinian's time, which assimilated the aedilitian remedies. 181 That is, it is the implied 
guarantee, which was inherently part of the contract in line with the principle of good faith. 
Their reasoning for this assertion is as follows. First, there remain some doubts whether the 
inheritance of the aedilitian edicts necessarily results in deciding the nature of the seller's 
guarantee liability under modem civil law. 182 The doubts exist because the use of the aedilitian 
edicts is quite different from modern civil law insofar as one admits that the interrelationship 
with other legal institutions and complexity of economic life in modem society are different 
176 Ulp. D. 19.1.13. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. In relation to the limitation period, it was six months and one year in the cases of the claims of 
redhibitoria and quanti minoris, respectively. For the actio empti, based on the bad faith of the seller, to 
which was assimilated knowledge of the hidden defect, and which alone of the three actions carried the 
right to damages, it was the traditional one of 30 years. See generally Zimmermann, supra. n. 136, at 322 
ff. 
179 In view of these remedies it seems to be redundant to keep the aedilitian remedies if we consider the 
office and jurisdiction of the aediles had been abolished. However their existence explained evidence of 
the traditionalism of both the East Roman school jurisprudence and Justinian. Id. 
180 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 136, at 12,13. 
181 Dae-jeong Kim, id., at 25,37. 
182 Id. 
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from the time when the aedilitian edicts were used. 183 Namely, the aedilitian edicts had been 
created under their own historical background of ancient commerce of slaves and livestock sales 
and under the institutional need of legal supplementation caused by the insufficiency of the 
actio empti to protect the buyer from notorious slave traders. 184 Thus, the nature of the seller's 
guarantee liability under modem civil law should be distinguished from the aedilitian edicts 
insofar as the status of other legal institutions in light of the buyer's protection and complexity 
of economic life are quite different from those at the time of the aedilitian edicts. Second, it 
should be noted that the seller's liability under the aedilitian edicts was based on `the breach of 
the seller's duty to declare all non-apparent defects' as a contractual duty. 185 
2.1.2.2.2.2. Theoretical background: Denying the principles of Impossibilium nulla 
obligatio, Specific goods dogma 
The contractual liability theory denies the principles of impossibilium nulla obligatio and 
specific goods dogma and contends that the seller takes the responsibility for incomplete 
performance if he delivers defective goods. 196 This theory assumes the seller is under a 
contractual obligation to tender non-defective goods in specific goods sales as well as in generic 
goods sales. 197 Consequently, denying the principles of impossibilium nulla obligatio and 
specific goods dogma, the seller in specific goods sales must deliver the goods in the same 
condition `as it should be' rather than `as it is' (in status quo). 188 
The grounds for this argument are as follows. First, the proposition of the specific goods 
dogma that the delivery in status quo is deemed to be a fulfilment of his contractual obligation 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 228 ff. 
186 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 311 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 224 ff.; Eun-Young Lee, 
supra n. 167, at 208 ff.; Juk-in Hwang, supra n. 167, at 83 ff. 
187 Id. 
188 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 209. Undoubtedly, there is a `as it should be' obligation in generic 
goods sales (KCC Art. 375(1)). 
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of tender may turn out at variance with one's ordinary expectation. 1S9 Second, there is a 
contradiction between KCC Arts. 462 and 374. The former provision explains the specific 
goods dogma as the legal liability theory maintains. 19" In contrast, the latter provides: 
"If the delivery of a specific thing is the subject of a claim the obligor is bound to preserve 
such thing with the care of a good manager until it is delivered. "191 
Third, KCC Art. 462 must be excluded in the sale of goods due to the principle of lex specialis 
derogat legem generalem. 192 Fourth, the partial invalidity of the contract due to initial 
impossibility in part can be plausible only in the case of defects in quantity, not in the case of 
defects in quality. 193 
2.1.2.2.2.3. Positive law background: Relationship with other provisions 
The theory concludes its finding of the contractual nature of the seller's guarantee liability by 
the analogical interpretation of the other provisions. The positive law backgrounds are as 
follows. First, it is argued that a contractual obligation to deliver non-defective goods could be 
drawn from KCC Art. 580 which imposes on the seller the liability in the sale of specific goods 
where the seller delivers defective goods. 194 This is based on the idea that the liability cannot be 
189 auk-in Hwang, supra n. 167, at 83 ff. Cf. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 211. 
190 For the texts of art. 462, see supra n. 150 and accompanying texts. 
191 That is, in the event of a subsequent defect by the seller's or his employee's fault in preserving the 
specific goods, the law does not answer properly the question of whether the buyer must take the delivery 
in status quo on the basis of KCC Art. 462 or reject the delivery and rescind the contract on the basis of 
KCC Art. 374 as is possible in some cases of the buyer's claim for incomplete performance. 
192 Id. One must note that this argument is based on the idea of there being the seller's duty to deliver 
non-defective goods even in specific goods sales by virtue of the rules as to the seller's guarantee 
liability. See Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 787. Therefore, KCC Art. 462 as a general rule is in 
conflict with the rules as to the seller's guarantee liability and the conflict leads to the exclusion of KCC 
Art. 462 by the principle of a lex specialis derogat legeirr generalem. 
193 Kwang-min Seo, "Mae-do-in-eoi Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-eu-ro-seo-eoi Son-hae-bae-sang-chaek-im- 
eoi Nae-yong-kwa Yo-gun (The Contents and Requirements of Damage Claim in the Seller's Guarantee 
Liability)", (1994) 21(3) Ko-shi-yeon-goo 25, at 36. 
194 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 210 f. 
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made without an obligation. 195 Second, KCC provides the seller's guarantee liability not only 
for the sale of specific goods but also for the sale of generic goods196 and the buyer is allowed to 
claim for replacement in the sale of generic goods. 197 This provision for replacement can be 
explained only on the assumption that the seller's guarantee liability is a contractual one. 198 
2.1.2.2.3. The nature of the seller's guarantee liability 
2.1.2.2.3.1. Non-fault based liability 
Like the legal liability theory, the contractual liability theory understands that there is no 
requirement of the seller's fault, '99 even though it is plausible to say in logical terms that it 
needs the seller's fault as long as the theory insists on the contractual nature of the seller's 
guarantee liability and there is no specific provision for non-fault based liability. 200 
2.1.2.2.3.2. Liability for the breach of the seller's contractual obligation to deliver 
non-defective goods 
While the legal liability theory insists that the seller's guarantee liability is imposed on the 
seller by the law on the basis of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma, the 
contractual liability theory contends that the seller's guarantee liability is a contractual one in its 
nature imposing on the seller a contractual obligation to tender non-defective goods in generic 
195 Id. In contrast, the legal liability theory understands that art. 580 provides a legal obligation which 
may raise a legal liability. 
196 KCC Art. 581(1). 
197 KCC Art. 581(2). 
198 Sik Choi, Shin-chae-kwon-bup-gak-ron (New Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1961), at 99; Juk-in 
Hwang, supra n. 167, at 83 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 336 f.; Contra, for the view of Prof. Tae- 
jae Lee, see supra n. 159. 
199 Hyung-bae Kirn, supra n. 67, at 310 f.; Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 206; Juk-in Hwang, supra n. 
167, at 84; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 262; Contra, Joo-soo Kim, supra n. 125, at 214. 
200 Juk-in Hwang, Hyun-dae-min-bup-ron IV: Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Modern Civil Law IV: Particulars in 
Obligatory Law), (1987), at 232; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 260 ff. 
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goods sales as well as in specific goods sales. 20' Therefore, the seller's guarantee liability is 
said to be a responsibility of the seller for the breach of the contractual obligation to tender non- 
defective goods, which may fall within the category of incomplete performance. 202 
2.1.2.2.3.3. Relationship with the general liability for non-performance: Concurrence 
with the general liability ? 
This theory understands that the seller's guarantee liability falls within a category of non- 
performance, i. e., `incomplete performance'. The interrelationship between the general liability 
and the seller's guarantee liability is a relationship of general versus special rules, which may 
result in, at least in principle, no concurrence with the general liability. There are two opposing 
views; no concurrence theory and concurrence theory. 
2.1.2.2.3.3.1. Concurrence with incomplete performance 
This view203 maintains that concurrence should be allowed because although the seller's 
guarantee liability is somewhat similar to incomplete performance in its nature, the `general' 
incomplete performance must be distinguished from the `special' incomplete performance in 
that the special incomplete performance regarding the seller's guarantee liability is quite 
different in terms of its requirements to raise incomplete performance; fault, limitation period, 
and etc. 204 The rationale for this view is to protect the buyer by the means of allowing 
201 For its theoretical background, see supra n. 186-193 and accompanying texts. 
202 For the case the court recognized the seller's guarantee liability as incomplete performance although it 
was not the case dealing with the seller's guarantee liability, see the Korean Supreme Court Case, 
14/4/1992, Da 17146.17153. 
203 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 313 ff.; Sang-yong Kim, "Bool-wan-jeon-e-haeng (Incomplete 
Performance)", (July, 1994) 246 Wol-kan-ko-shi 76, at 80 f.; Bup-young Ahn, supra n. 167, at 225 f.; 
Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 306 ff. 
204 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 224 ff. The reasoning for the concurrence theory seems to be quite 
odd in the light of a simple principle that special rules preclude general rules (lex specialis derogat legem 
generalem), but currently it has given another explanation to support its view on the basis of negation of 
the principle of lex specialis derogat legem genegalem. See Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 314 f. 
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concurrence with incomplete performance where there are additional damages which cannot be 
recovered by the rules of the seller's guarantee liability. 205 As far as the concurrence is allowed, 
to raise the general liability the requirement of fault is essential. 
2.1.2.2.3.3.2. No concurrence with incomplete performance 
This view denies concurrence with incomplete performance on the basis of the general 
principle of lex specialis derogat legem generalem. 206 That is, the seller's guarantee liability is 
only applied in the cases where the seller's delivery of defective goods fulfils the requirements 
of both the seller's guarantee liability and the general liability for incomplete performance 
because of the nature of the special rules against the general rules. 2' 
2.1.2.3. Practical differences in general in adopting either theory 
The differences in understanding as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability are not only 
of academic interest as to a matter of theoretical framework, but also extend to the practical 
matters in relation to the requirements to invoke the seller's guarantee liability and the 
remedies, in particular, damages. The ensuing discussions are to give important differences in 
its substances when it is understood as either a legal one or a contractual one in its nature. 
Of the requirements to raise the seller's guarantee liability, "' the question of whether there 
exists a defect is of importance in its practical differences. First, the concept of a defect is 
differently defined by each theory so that the different definition may have an effect on the 
decision of whether there exists a defect. According to the legal liability theory, it is defined 
205 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 225 f. For further discussions of this view, see infra n. 1057-1060 
and accompanying texts. 
206 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 211 f.; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 260 ff.; Dae-jeong Kim, 
"Chae-moo-bul-e-haeng-chaek-im-seol-ae-eoi-han Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-eoi Jae-koo-seong 
(Reconstruction of the Guarantee Liability for Defective Goods by the Contractual Liability Theory)", 
(1993) 9 Min-sa-bup-hak 242, at 264 ff. 
207 For further discussions of this view, see infra n. 1061-1066 and accompanying texts. 
208 For the requirements in general, see supra n. 110-115 and accompanying texts. 
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when there is a lack of the reasonable (and general) quality or nature in the goods, which are 
expected by a reasonable person. 209 In other words it should be decided objectively so that if 
the goods delivered are not conformed to the general purpose of the concerned goods, there is a 
defect in the goods. 21° In contrast the contractual liability theory maintains that a defect should 
be decided subjectively by the test of whether the goods delivered are conformed to the 
purposes agreed by the contract between the parties. 21 Second, the time when a defect must 
exist is also related to the matter of the understanding of its nature so that it may cause different 
results in the question of the existence of a defect. On the one hand, the legal liability theory 
insists that the seller's guarantee liability in the sale of specific goods is raised where a defect 
existed at the time of contract because the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio and 
specific goods dogma is concerned only with the matter of the defect at that time. 212 On the 
other hand the contractual liability theory maintains that the existence of a defect in either 
specific goods or generic goods must be decided at the time of the transfer of risk. 213 
In addition, the issue as to the nature affects the practical matter of remedies, in particular, the 
measure of damages. The legal liability theory insists that the extent of damages should be 
limited to compensation for expenses or other losses incurred in reliance on the validity of the 
contract owing to its theoretical background derived from the principle of impossibilium nulla 
obligatio and specific goods dogma in which a part of the contract becomes invalid due to there 
209 For more detail, see infra n. 389-391 and accompanying texts. 
210 This is so called `the objective criterion theory'. Thus, there can exist a defect even if no defect is 
found by the contractual agreements. 
`11 This is so called `the subjective criterion theory'. For more detail, see infra n. 392-393 and 
accompanying texts. 
212 For more detail, see infra n. 511 and accompanying texts. In the cases of the sale of generic goods the 
legal liability theory argues that the seller may be responsible for defective goods from the time when the 
goods are subsequently specified after the conclusion of contract. See supra n. 149 and accompanying 
texts. 
213 It might be at the time of delivery. Therefore, the seller will be responsible whether the defect before 
the transfer of risk are caused by initial or subsequent impossibility, or the seller's breach of duty of due 
care as a good manager. For more detail, see infra n. 512-513 and accompanying texts. 
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being initial impossibility in the goods. 214 Contrary to that, the contractual liability theory 
should argue in principle that damages are compensation for the buyer's expectation interest 
because the seller's guarantee liability is in the same nature as the general liability. "' 
Notwithstanding the principle, the damages under the seller's guarantee liability are variously 
interpreted among the scholars in favour of this theory in a way that limits the scope of damages 
to something lesser than the buyer's expectation losses. The basis of their idea is that the 
remedy of damages under the seller's guarantee liability which exists regardless of the fault 
principle cannot be treated in the same way as under the general liability which is governed by 
the fault principle. "' 
2.1.3. Summary 
The seller's liabilities under Korean law are provided in dual manner, i. e. the general liability 
and the seller's guarantee liability. Depending upon what has happened to the goods, the 
general liability has been divided into 3 categories; delay in performance, impossibility of 
performance and incomplete performance. The seller is liable under the general liability only if 
he can be blamed for performing otherwise than agreed in the contract. In addition, the seller is 
also liable under the special regime for the seller's guarantee liability for defective goods. 
Unlike the general liability, the seller's guarantee liability is a strict one to ensure their freedom 
from any defect so that all the remedies under the seller's guarantee liability exists irrespective 
of the fault principle. 
As to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability, scholars in Korea have been divided into 
two groups; the legal liability theory group and the contractual liability theory group. The 
major difference between the two theories is that the former does not admit a contractual duty to 
214 Namely, the damages are for the buyer's reliance interest. For more detail, see infra n. 1021-1025 
and accompanying texts. 
21 Prof. Eun-young Lee seems to stand with this view. See infra n. 1029-1030 and accompanying texts. 
216 E. g., it is limited to the buyer's reliance loss or mere price reduction, which seem to exclude the 
buyer's consequential losses. For more details, see infra n. 1026-1042 and accompanying texts. 
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deliver non-defective goods in the sale of specific goods, whereas the latter assumes the duty. 21 
One must note that adopting either theory may produce substantial differences in practice as to 
the matters of the existence of a defect and the scope of damages. 
2.2. The unified liability system in English law, CISG, and the Directive 
2.2.1. The unified liability 
2.2.1.1. General 
As discussed above, two different liabilities are imposed on the seller in the event that the sales 
contract is not properly performed as expected by the parties under Korean law; the general 
liability and the seller's guarantee liability. The ensuing discussions are to examine the way the 
different legal systems address the problems raised in that event by asking under what liability 
system the cases where the seller does not perform as expected by the buyer are dealt with and 
what is the nature of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods. 
2.2.1.2. The unified liability under the name of `breach of contract' 
Unlike Korean law, the underlying doctrine under both CISG and English law as a theoretical 
starting point is that they treat all contracts as promises leading to a claim for damages for 
`breach of contract', i. e., the contractual liability, if the promised result is not produced by the 
debtor. 21' This being the principle, several distinctive points can be found compared to the 
217 For the background of each theory, see supra n. 136-157,168-198 and accompanying texts. 
218 For the doctrine in English law, see Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 540. For the doctrine in CISG, 
see Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales, (1999,3`d ed. ), at 301 f.; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), 
(Eng. trans. by Thomas), Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods, (2nd ed., 
1997), at 368. However, one must note that the breach of contract in English law parlance is seen as there 
being a breach of contract only when the creditor has a right to damages, whereas it is not tied to the 
remedy of damages under CISG, in other words, there is a breach of contract where the creditor has at 
least one of remedies among specific performance, avoidance, reduction of the debtor's own 
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general liability and the seller's guarantee liability under Korean law as follows. 
In comparison with the general liability of Korean law, first, English law and CISG 
does not 
need to separate and categorize the various types of non-performance as Korean law does; 
it 
does not matter if the seller has wholly failed to deliver as agreed in the contract or has 
delivered very late or has delivered the goods but failed to perform in one way or another 
required by the contract. Furthermore, it does not matter whether the obligation is one of 
principal obligations219 or some lesser obligations. 220 This is due to their use of the unified 
concept of `breach of contract' which may include all kinds of non-performance in Korean 
law. 22' All in all, once the agreed result has not been achieved, the guarantee undertaken has not 
been observed and it is said that there has been a `breach of contract'. Second, in contrast with 
Korean law, it is irrelevant whether the debtor or his employee was to blame for non- 
performance. What really matters under both CISG and English law is whether or not the agreed 
result has been in fact procured. 222 
performance, and damages. See Lando, "Non-Performance (Breach) of Contract", in: Hartkamp et al. 
(ed. ), Towards a European Civil Code, (1998), at 341 ff. One of the practical differences seems to be that 
even in case of an excused non-performance (e. g. force majeure) CISG may allow the creditor to 
terminate the contract under the name of breach of contract, even if the debtor is exempted from damages 
by CISG Art. 79. 
219 E. g., the seller's obligation to deliver the goods and the buyer's obligation to pay. See CISG Arts. 30, 
53, the SGA s. 27. 
220 E. g., ancillary obligations. 
221 In this case CISG uses both the concept of `failure to perform' (as in art. 45(1)) and `breach of 
contract' (as in art. 25 and in the heading to Section III for the buyer's remedies). Both concepts are in 
essence precisely same in their meaning. See Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), Commentary on the 
International Sales Law: the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, (1987), at 331. 
222 For the reference of English law see Paradine v. Jane [1647] Aleyn 26,82 Eng Rep 897; Nicolene 
Ltd. v. Singmonds [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 419,425, per Sellers J.; aff'd [1953] 1 QB 543 (CA); Raineri v. 
Miles [ 1981 ] AC 1050,1086, per Lord Edmund-Davies. For CISG reference, see arts. 45 and 61. Under 
those provisions the buyer (or seller) may invoke a single set of remedies when the seller (or buyer) fails 
to perform any of his obligation under the contract or CISG. See also Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 
218, at 358 f.; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 301 f. Admittedly, English law sometimes releases a debtor 
from liability when he has been prevented from performing. This is not because he and his employee are 
free from blame as regards non-performance, but because on a proper view of the contract he is not liable 
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Compared to the seller's guarantee liability of Korean law, 
both CISG and English law treats 
the seller's guarantee liability as part of the general system of 
`breach of contract' rather than as 
an independent regime dealing with only defects 
in goods since the breach of guarantees in 
contracts of sale are just like all other breaches of contract which themselves arise 
from broken 
promises. That is, the buyer's claim with regard to defective goods 
is dealt with under the 
paradigm of contractual liability. The assimilation of the seller's guarantee 
liability into the 
paradigm of contractual liability by breach of contract seems to explain why the seller 
is strictly 
liable for the harm caused to the buyer by the defect. 
223 Therefore, as long as liability for 
defective goods is removed from its special regime, it is possible for the buyer who receives 
defective goods to invoke the full range of remedies for breach of contract in the paradigm of 
contractual liability without being restricted by the fault principle. 
Insofar as the Directive is concerned, it is not necessary to discuss the liability system in 
general. This is because it only deals with certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees in respect of the non-conformity of goods with the contract and it does 
not however impinge on provisions and principles of national law relating to contractual and 
non-contractual liability. 224 Therefore, it seems impossible to explore in general the liability 
for performance in all circumstances and his guarantee does not cover certain obstacles to performance. 
For the case relieving the debtor where the continent lawyer would speak of `initial impossibility', see 
Couturier v. Hastie [1856] 5 HLC 673,10 Eng Rep 1065. (Subsequent English cases have treated 
analogous cases as instances of error and have held that a contract based on a `common mistake' of the 
parties is not valid) For the leading cases covering subsequent impossibility in perspective of continent 
lawyers, see Taylor v. Caldwell [1863] 3 B&S 826,122 Eng Rep 309; Howell v. Coupland [1874] LR 9 
QB 462. CISG also releases the debtor from his damage liability when his failure to perform any of his 
obligations results from an impediment beyond his control (cf. force majeure), which he could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of contract or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences. See CISG Art. 79(1). However, the creditor retains all other 
remedies available to him under CISG except for his claim to damages. See CISG Art. 79(5). One must 
note that it is far from clear if the sphere of the application of art. 79 extends to the case of the seller's 
delivery of defective goods. See infra n. 1094 and accompanying texts. 
223 Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 540. 
224 Directive(99/44) Art. 8.1.; Recital 6. 
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system of the Directive as long as each Member State's own liability system remains unchanged 
and the Directive supplants only their own corresponding rules pertaining to the non-conformity 
of the goods with the contract. 225 
2.2.1.3. The seller's liability for defective goods 
2.2.1.3.1. English law 
The law with regard to the seller's liability for defective goods is embodied mainly in the 
SGA. The SGA confers on the buyer the right to a guarantee based on the notion of the 
existence in the sales contract of implied terms, according to which the goods delivered must be 
of certain standard and quality. 226 Of the implied terms the interesting terms in particular 
comparable with the seller's guarantee liability of Korean law are specified in the SGA s. 13 
(Sale by description), s. 14 (Implied terms about quality and fitness), s. 15 (Sale by sample) and 
s. 30 (Delivery of wrong quantity). 227 
Under the SGA the following terms will be implied. First, where the goods are sold by 
225 For instance, it does not change at all the dual liability system in Germany and also does not influence 
on their general liability based on the types of non-performance and the fault principle. The only thing it 
seems to be influenced is that it is to clarify that the nature of the seller's guarantee liability in consumer 
sales is a contractual liability. This is because German law will incorporate the rules of the Directive as 
to non-conformity of the goods into their existing rules of the seller's guarantee liability in consumer 
sales, in particular, the seller's duty to deliver the goods in conformity with the contract of sale, which 
requires, e. g., normal quality in goods of the same type and meets with the consumer's reasonable 
expectation even in the sale of specific goods. See Directive(99/44) Arts. 2.1., 2.2. 
226 Like the other laws, the SGA also regulates the matter of defective title separately from the matter of 
defective quality. See the SGA s. 12 (Implied terms about title). 
227 Note that in English law terms can be implied not only by statute, but also by custom and common 
law. However, the SGA s. 14(1) says that `Except as provided by this section and section 15 and subject 
to any other enactment, there is no implied condition or warranty about the quality or fitness for any 
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale'. Therefore our discussion on the seller's 
guarantee liability should focus on the statutory implied terms, although cases are very much related to 
understand the provisions of the SGA and further terms may be annexed to a contract by custom or usage 
(s. 14(4)). 
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The basic requirement for the buyer's action on a guarantee when one of the 
implied terms in 
the sale of goods has been broken is that there must be a defect in some way 
in the goods in 
light of the above implied terms. A0 Further requirement for the buyer's action on the ground of 
the seller's breach of the implied term of satisfactory quality is that the existence of the 
unsatisfactory quality must not be specifically drawn to the buyer's attention 
before the contract 
is made, 241 or where the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, it must not 
be 
one that examination ought to reveal, 
242 or in the case of a contract of sale by sample, it must 
not be one which would have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample. 
243 In 
the buyer's action for the seller's breach of the implied term that the goods will be free from any 
defect, making their quality unsatisfactory, the buyer is also required to show that it would not 
be apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample. 244 
The effects of the breach of the implicit terms are basically as follows. 245 First, the buyer has 
the right to reject the goods and terminate the contract because they are either expressly or in 
substance classified as conditions. 246 However, in non-consumer cases, the right of the non- 
240 For more details, see Chap. III. 
241 The SGA s. 14(2C)(a). 
242 The SGA s. 14(2C)(b). 
243 The SGA s. 14(2C)(c). 
244 The SGA s. 15(2)(c). There seems to be no requirement to notify the defect in English law, although 
it is very much related to the buyer's right to reject and terminate the contract. See infra n. 623-625 and 
accompanying texts. 
245 For more details, see Chap. IV. In English law, the first step to examine the effects of the breach of 
contractual term is to distinguish condition, warranty or innominate term. This is because the remedy of 
rejection is only available to the buyer when the seller's breach of contract goes to the root of the 
agreement, i. e., either because it is a breach of condition or because of the nature or consequences of a 
breach of an innominate term, whereas if the term broken by the seller is merely a warranty, the buyer 
will only have a remedy in damages. Their thought that a contractual term must be either a condition or a 
warranty is due to the wording of statute in the SGA s. 11(3). For the authority there being an innominate 
term as the third category notwithstanding the SGA s. 11(3), see Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v. 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [ 1962] 2 QB 26; The Hansa Nord [ 1976] QB 44. 
246 The SGA ss. 11(3), 13(IA), 14(6), 15(3). For the relationship between rejection and termination, see 
infra n. 782-788,841-853 and accompanying texts. 
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consumer buyer may be restricted where the breach of the implied conditions of ss. 13,14 and 
15 is so slight that it would be unreasonable of him to reject. 247 Similarly, the non-consumer 
buyer cannot exercise his right to reject the whole of the goods delivered where the shortfall or 
excess in quantity is so slight that it would be unreasonable to reject the whole. 248 The buyer is 
precluded from rejecting and terminating the contract when he is considered as having accepted 
the goods in accordance with the provisions on acceptance in the SGA. 249 Second, the buyer 
has the right to claim for damages. The buyer is entitled to claim damages as for breach of 
warranty where the buyer has decided not to invoke his right to reject and terminate the contract 
based on the breach of one of the implied conditions of ss. 13,14 and 15,250 or he has lost the 
right to reject and terminate the contract as above. 251 In addition, damages may be also awarded 
for non-delivery where he rejects and terminates the contract because it is treated as if the seller 
has not delivered. 252 Similarly, in the case of short delivery, if the buyer elects to accept the 
short delivery and not to take the remaining goods, he can recover the price paid for them and is 
entitled to damages for any further loss suffered through non-delivery at the proper time. Third, 
the buyer can apply for a decree of specific performance by the court. The court by its 
judgment and decree is allowed to make an order of specific performance against the seller only 
on the conditions that, first, the goods to be delivered are "specific or ascertained", and second, 
the court must "think fit" the grant of an order. 253 However, English law does not seem to 
arrange for replacement or repair of the goods in general as a buyer's remedy . 
254 
247 The SGA s. 15A. 
248 The SGA s. 30(2A). 
249 The SGA s. 35(1) and (4). 
250 The SGA s. 11(2). 
251 The SGA s. 53. 
252 The SGA s. 51. 
253 The SGA s. 52(1). However, it is submitted that the statutory formula is much wider than the 
practice. See infra n. 1214. 
254 In addition, the buyer may have the right to claim interest, or to recover money paid in the event of a 
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description, they must correspond with the description. "' This term will not be implied unless 
the statement made about the goods forms part of the description by reference to which the 
goods were sold. 229 Second, the goods must be of satisfactory quality. 230 This term will be 
implied provided that the seller sells the goods in the course of a business, 23' which includes `a 
profession and activities of any government department or local or public authority'. 232 Third, 
the goods must be reasonably fit for the buyer's purpose where he, expressly or by implication, 
makes that known to the seller, whether or not that is a purpose for which goods of that type are 
commonly supplied. 233 Like the implied term of satisfactory quality, this term will not be 
implied unless he sells the goods in the course of a business. 234 Furthermore, this term will not 
be implied if the buyer does not rely on the seller's skill and judgment, or it was unreasonable 
for him to do so. 235 Fourth, where the goods are sold by sample, the bulk must correspond with 
the sample in quality236 or the goods must be free from any hidden defect making the quality of 
the goods unsatisfactory. 237 All the above terms are treated as conditions. 238 
As to the matter of defects in quantity, although the SGA does not deal with it under the 
heading of implied terms as either conditions or warranties, the SGA imposes, in substance, an 
implied condition that the seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity required by the 
contract. 239 
228 The SGA s. 13(1). 
229 For the meaning of the description by reference to which the goods were sold, see infra n. 404-406 
and accompanying texts. 
230 The SGA s. 14(2). 
231 Id. Cf. infra n. 408 for the interpretation of `in the course of a business'. 
232 The SGA s. 61(1). 
233 The SGA s. 14(3). 
234 Id. For the definition of `business', see the SGA s. 61(1) and infra n. 408. 
235 The SGA s. 14(3). 
236 The SGA s. 15(2)(a). 
237 The SGA s. 15(2)(c). A sale is not a sale by sample unless there is an express or implied term in the 
contract to that effect. See the SGA s. 15(1). 
238 The SGA ss. 11(3), 13(IA), 14(6), and 15(3). 
239 The SGA s. 30. 
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2.2.1.3.3. The Directive 
Like English law, the Directive also imposes on the seller a presumed guarantee liability on the 
ground that the seller undertakes implied obligations in the sale of consumer goods to deliver 
the goods in conformity with the contract of sale. The heart of the relevant provisions as to the 
seller's guarantee liability for defective goods is art. 2. First of all, it requires as a ground rule 
that the goods must be in conformity with the contract of sale. 255 Then, the Directive specifies 
four aspects of conformity of goods in quality for the purpose of deciding if the goods are in 
conformity with the contract. 256 Therefore, insofar as the seller delivered the goods in 
conformity with the contract satisfying the four aspects, there is a presumption that the seller 
fulfilled his implied obligation to deliver the conforming goods with the contract. 257 
The seller's implied obligations are as follows. First, the goods must comply with the 
description given by the seller and possess the qualities of the goods the seller has held out to 
the consumer as a sample or model. 258 Second, the goods must be fit for any particular purpose 
the consumer requires provided that the consumer has made known to the seller the particular 
purpose and the seller accepted it. 259 Third, the goods must be fit for the purposes for which 
goods of the same type are normally used. 26° Fourth, the goods must show the quality and 
performance which are normal in goods of the same type and which the consumer can 
reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and taking into account any public statements 
on the specific characteristics of the goods made about them by the seller, the producer or his 
total failure of consideration. See the SGA s. 54. 
255 Directi ve(99/44) Art. 2.1. 
256 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2. It does not deal with the matter of a defect in quantity. 
257 However, it seems to be unclear if the other terms of the contract than the four aspects as to quality 
must be considered when we decide the conformity of the goods with the contract and in the event of the 
breach of the other terms the remedies provided in the Directive are applied. See Beale and Howells, 
"EC Harmonisation of Consumer Sales Law -A Missed Opportunity? ", (1997) 12 Journal of Contract 
Law 21, at 28. 
258 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(a). 
259 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(b). 
260 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(c). 
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representative, particularly in advertising or on labelling. 
26' 
The requirements for the consumer's action for the breach of the seller's implied obligations 
are as follows. 262 First, there must exist non-conformity of the goods which does not satisfy at 
least one of the seller's implied obligations as above. 263 Second, the consumer was unaware or 
could not be reasonably aware of the lack of conformity at the time of contract. 
264 In addition to 
this, the lack of conformity must not have its origin in materials supplied by the consumer. 265 
Third, the lack of conformity which existed at the time of delivery must have emerged within 
the two-year cut-off period from the time of delivery. 266 However, one must note that since this 
period is a minimum harmonisation requirement among the Member States, they are allowed to 
retain their own more extensive limitation rules. 26' Fourth, the buyer must notify the seller of 
the lack of conformity within a period of two months from the date on which he detected such 
lack of conformity. 26ß However, this requirement is subject to the option of the Member States 
to impose the notice duty on the buyer. 269 
The effects of the breach of one of the seller's implied obligations are explained by two stage 
remedies; repair or replacement for the first stage, and then reduction or rescission for the 
second stage. 270 As regards the first stage, the consumer may require the seller to repair the 
goods or replace them free of charge unless this is impossible or disproportionate. 2 ' The repair 
261 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(d). 
262 For more details, see Chap. III. 
263 Directive(99/44) Arts. 2.1., 2.2., 2.3. 
264 Directive(99144) Art. 2.3. 
265 Id. 
266 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.1. 
267 Id. 
268 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.2. 
269 Id. 
270 For more details, see Chap. IV. 
271 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.3. For the purpose of deciding which of remedies are disproportionate and 
which of remedies must be exercised, a comparison must be done between repair and replacement by 
asking the question of whether a remedy imposes costs on the seller which are unreasonable in 
comparison with the alternative remedy, taking account of factors such as the value of the goods if there 
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or replacement should be carried out within a reasonable time and without any significant 
inconvenience to the consumer, 272 and free of charge for the consumer. 273 As to the second 
stage, the consumer can claim for an appropriate reduction in the price274 or have the contract 
rescinded if there is no right to a repair or replacement as described above, or if the seller has 
not completed the remedy within a reasonable time or without significant inconvenience to the 
consumer. 275 The buyer, however, is not entitled to have the contract rescinded so long as the 
lack of conformity is minor, "' even though the buyer may still claim a price reduction. The 
Directive does not regulate the matter of damages which may involve consequential losses. 
This matter is left to the Member States' own law. 27 
2.2.1.3.2. CISG 
Similarly to English law and the Directive, CISG imposes on the seller a presumed guarantee 
liability on the basis of the idea that there exist implied obligations by which the seller must 
deliver the goods being of certain standard and quality except where the parties have agreed 
otherwise. 278 The relevant provision in particular corresponding with the seller's guarantee 
were no lack of conformity, the significance of the lack of conformity and whether the alternative remedy 
could be completed without significant inconvenience to the consumer. Id. 
272 id. 
273 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.4. 
274 In English law the right to claim for an appropriate reduction in the price is explained by the 
application of damage rules. For the detailed comparison, see infra n. 1153-1157 and accompanying 
texts. 
275 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.5. 
276 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.6. 
277 Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services, COM (93) 509 Final, at 
90; 10`h Report by Select Committee, Session 1996-7, Consumer Guarantees, HLP 57, at 21. See also 
Directive(99/44) Art. 8.1. 
278 The rationale for the implied terms is that in the usual sale, and absent evidence of contrary intent, the 
buyer is entitled to expect the goods to possess certain basic qualities even if the contract does not 
explicitly specify them. See Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 32, Art. 35, No. 13. 
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liability of Korean law is art. 35.279 It begins with the emphasis of a point that the goods 
delivered must be of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and contained 
or packaged in the manner required by the contract. 280 Yet, particularly important is that where 
the contract contains insufficient details as to the quality or quantity of the goods CISG sets out 
a series of implied obligations in order to determine the conformity of the goods. 
The implied terms are, in the absence of any contrary agreement, as follows. First, the goods 
must be fit for the purposes for which the goods of the same description would ordinarily be 
used. 281 Second, the goods must be fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made 
known to the seller at the time of contract. 282 This term applies only if the buyer relied on the 
seller's skill and judgment, and it was reasonable for him to do so. 283 Third, the goods must 
possess the qualities of goods which he has held out as a sample or model. 284 Fourth, the goods 
must be contained and packaged in the usual manner for such goods or if there is no usage to 
determine the usual manner, it must be in an adequate manner to protect and preserve the 
goods. 285 
The requirements for the buyer to bring an action on the seller's delivery of non-conforming 
goods in quality or quantity are as follows. 286 First, there must exist the lack of conformity in 
accordance with, at least, one of the implied terms above or the quantity required by the 
279 In addition CISG respects any usage widely observed in the trade concerned and any practice which 
the parties have established between themselves to be implied in the contract as part of the bargain in fact. 
See CISG Art. 9. Note that, like any other domestic sales law including Korean and English law, CISG 
separately provides the seller's implied obligation as to title, which are free from any right or claim of a 
third party. See CISG Arts. 41,42. 
290 CISG Art. 35(l). In fact it is not necessary to spell out the point (e. g., the SGA does not specify this 
point). 
281 CISG Art. 35(2)(a). 
282 CISG Art. 35(2)(b). 
283 Id. 
284 CISG Art. 35(2)(c). 
285 CISG Art. 35(2)(d). 
286 For more details, see Chap. III. 
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contract. 287 Second, the buyer did not know of and could not have been aware of the lack of 
conformity at the time of contract, about which he is going to bring an action. 288 One must note 
that this requirement does not apply to the matter of non-conformity in quantity. 289 Third, the 
buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined within as short a period as is 
practicable in the circumstances. 290 Fourth, the buyer must give the notice to the seller stating 
the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or should 
have discovered it pursuant to art. 38.291 Fifth, in any event, the buyer must give the seller the 
required notice by virtue of art. 39(1) at the latest within two years from the date on which the 
goods were actually handed over to the buyer. 292 The two-year time limit ordinarily applicable 
by virtue of art. 39(2) will not apply where the contract sets forth a cut-off period of shorter or 
longer duration. 293 
The effects of the seller's non-conforming delivery are as follows. 294 First, the buyer has a 
right to require specific performance in the form of replacement provided that the lack of 
conformity represents a fundamental breach of contract. 295 This right is not allowed if the 
specific performance in the form of replacement is not so available pursuant to the 
corresponding domestic sales law of the forum state. 296 Second, the buyer has a right to require 
repair of the lack of conformity unless it is unreasonable to do so having regard to all the 
287 There may be some overlap between the implied terms in art. 35(2) or even between arts. 35(1) and 
35(2). 
288 CISG Art. 35(3). 
289 The wording of art. 35(3) makes it clear by referring to the aspects of non-conformity under art. 35(2). 
290 CISG Art. 38(1). 
291 CISG Art. 39(1). 
292 CISG Art. 39(2). 
293 Id. 
294 For more details, see Chap. IV. 
295 CISG Art. 46(2). A fundamental breach of contract is one which the buyer must have suffered a 
detriment which substantially deprives him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract and the 
detriment must be one which the seller ought to foresee. CISG Art. 25. For more detail, see infra n. 879- 
889 and accompanying texts. 
296 CISG Art. 28. Contra; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 310 f. 
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circumstances. 297 This right is also subject to the domestic sales law of the forum state. 298 
Third, the buyer can declare the contract avoided on the grounds of lack of conformity provided 
that it amounts to a fundamental breach of contract. 299 However, the seller's right to cure the 
lack of conformity within the contract delivery date may limit the buyer's right to avoid for a 
fundamental breach unless the cure causes the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or 
unreasonable expense, since the buyer cannot avoid until the contract delivery date has 
passed. 300 Fourth, the buyer has a right to a price reduction. 301 The price reduction is available 
even where the buyer is not entitled to avoidance or cure except where the seller cures the lack 
of conformity in accordance with arts. 37 or 48 or the buyer refuses to accept the seller's cure in 
accordance with those articles. 302 Fifth, the buyer is entitled to damages in accordance with the 
rules for measurement of damages as provided in art. 74.303 The buyer who requires the seller 
to perform either repair or replacement may also recover damages for the loss resulting from the 
delay or other deficiency in the seller's performance. 304 In the case of avoidance, he may 
recover damages as provided in arts. 75 and 76305 as well as damages for the loss suffered as a 
297 CISG Art. 46(3). This right is not limited to the cases of a fundamental breach of contract, but 
applied to any breach of the seller's duty to deliver conforming goods. 
298 CISG Art. 28. 
299 CISG Art. 49(1)(a). A declaration of avoidance should be duly communicated in accordance with the 
applicable notice rules. CISG Art. 26. 
300 CISG Art. 37; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 269. Arguably, the seller's right to cure even after the 
delivery date cannot be defeated by the buyer's declaration of avoidance for a fundamental breach. Thus, 
where cure is feasible and an offer of cure can be expected even after the delivery date the buyer's right 
to avoid the contract may be limited because the possibility of cure may not reach a fundamental breach 
in accordance with art. 25. CISG Art. 48; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 319 ff. However, this limit to 
avoidance is far from clear. For more detail, see infra n. 890-899 and accompanying texts. 
301 CISG Art. 50. 
302 Id. 
303 CISG Art. 45(1)(b). 
304 CISG Art. 45(2). For the measurement of damages in this case, CISG Art. 74 applies. 
305 CISG Arts. 75 and 76 provide contract/cover differential and contract/market differential as a rule to 
compensate the loss in the case of avoidance. 
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consequence of the breach by virtue of art. 74.306 However, the buyer may be arguably deprived 
of his right to damages where the seller proves that the lack of conformity is due to an 
impediment beyond the seller's control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken the impediment into account at the time of entering into the contract or to have overcome 
or avoided it or its consequences. 3o' 
2.2.2. The nature of the seller's liability for defective goods 
2.2.2.1. Contractual liability 
As was briefly discussed about the nature of the seller's guarantee liability, Korean law has 
suffered tortuous debates about the nature of the seller's guarantee liability308 and the 
relationship between the general liability and the seller's guarantee liability. 30' However, 
English law, CISG and the Directive do not need to be involved in such an endless debate 
because of their idea that there exists implied obligations in the contract of sale to deliver the 
goods in conformity with the contract and to deliver the goods corresponding with a certain 
standard or quality, e. g., satisfactory, ordinary or normal quality, compliance with description, 
fitness for particular purpose, and fitness for sample or model . 
310 These obligations are imposed 
on the seller regardless of the subject-matter of the sales contract, i. e., specific goods or generic 
goods. Therefore, there is no doubt in that the seller's liability for defective goods is a 
306 CISG Arts. 45(2), 75,76(l). 
307 CISG Art. 79(1) and (5). Yet, one must note that the seller's exemption from damages in the case of 
the lack of conformity is not so obvious. See infra n. 222. In addition to all the remedies above, the 
buyer may claim interest insofar as the award of interest is valid under the law of forum state without 
prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under art. 74. CISG Art. 78; Schlechtriem, Uniform 
Sales Law, (1986), at 100. 
308 See supra n. 134-207. 
309 See supra n. 161-166,203-207 and accompanying texts. 
310 The SGA ss. 13,14,15, CISG Art. 35, Directive(99/44) Arts. 2.1., 2.2. 
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contractual one. 311 
2.2.2.2. Non-fault based liability 
Like Korean law312 the seller's liability for defective goods under English law, CISG and the 
Directive is non-fault-based liability; it is strict in that the seller is liable even though he was 
unaware of the defect and took all reasonable care. This is based on their idea as a theoretical 
starting point that they treat all contracts as promises leading to a claim for `breach of contract' 
if the promised result is not produced by the debtor. 313 In this context the starting point is 
different in that while the starting point of English law and CISG is based on a strict liability 
treating all contracts as promises, 314 that of Korean law is relied on the fault principle but gives 
an exception for the special regime for the seller's guarantee liability. "' 
2.3. Comparative view 
As was examined above in a comparative way, the seller's guarantee liability for defective 
goods in each jurisdiction is explained as one within either the unified liability system or the 
dual liability system. '16 
Under English law and CISG, the seller's guarantee liability is understood as a part of the 
unified liability system using the concept of `breach of contract' because the breach of 
311 Even though the liability system itself is quite different compared to Korean law, the understanding of 
the seller's guarantee liability in its nature is same as the contractual liability theory in Korea. 
312 See supra n. 158,199-200 and accompanying texts. 
313 See supra n. 218-225 and accompanying texts. 
314 The starting point of the Directive cannot be discussed because it does not deal with the liability 
system. See supra n. 224-225 and accompanying texts. 
315 The difference in the starting point may result in the differences in the scope of damages; the scope of 
damages under English law and CISG seems to be based on the buyer's expectation losses, whereas that 
under Korean law is generally understood that it is limited to something lesser than the expectation losses. 
See supra n. 128,214-216 and accompanying texts. 
316 For the general comparison between Korean law, English law and CISG, see supra n. 218-223 and 
accompanying texts. 
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guarantees in the sales contract are just same as all other breaches of contract which themselves 
arise from broken promises. 317 Their way to impose the seller's guarantee liability on the seller 
is to understand that there impliedly exists `a contractual duty' to deliver the goods with a 
certain standard and quality in the contract. 318 The Directive also imposes the seller's guarantee 
liability in the same way as English law and CISG. 319 In this sense the seller's guarantee 
liability is said to be the contractual one in its nature. Undoubtedly, the seller's liability in these 
jurisdictions is a strict one which exists regardless of the fault principle. 
In contrast with English law and CISG, the seller's guarantee liability under Korean law 
constitutes one within the dual liability system; the general liability for non-performance32° and 
the seller's guarantee liability for defective goods. 32' The former is governed by the fault 
principle (so called, fault liability), whereas the latter is a strict one to ensure the delivery of the 
goods free from any defect (so called, strict liability or no-fault liability). As far as the nature of 
the seller's guarantee liability is concerned, scholars in Korea have been divided into two 
groups; the legal liability theory group and the contractual liability theory group. The main 
difference between two theories is that the former does not admit a contractual duty to deliver 
non-defective goods in the sale of specific goods, whereas the latter assumes the duty. 322 In 
addition, adopting either theory may result in substantial differences in practice as to the matters 
of the existence of a defect and the scope of damages. 323 
317 As has been noted, the liability system of the Directive in general is out of question because of its 
restricted application in certain aspects. See supra n. 224-225 and accompanying texts. 
318 For the implied terms of English law and CISG in General, see supra n. 226-238,278-285 and 
accompanying texts. 
319 For the implied terms of the Directive in General, see supra n. 258-261 and accompanying texts. 
320 For the general liability under Korean law in general, see supra n. 66-100 and accompanying texts. 
321 For the seller's guarantee liability under Korean law in general, see supra n. 101-124 and 
accompanying texts. As to the differences and the interrelationship between two liabilities in general, see 
supra n. 125-133,161-166,203-207 and accompanying texts. 
322 For the background of each theory, see supra n. 136-157,168-198 and accompanying texts. 
323 See supra n. 208-216 and accompanying texts. 
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3. Evaluating accounts 
I. Internal evaluation 
3.1.1. Unified liability system vs. Dual liability system 
3.1.1.1. General 
The matter of `the unified liability system vs. the dual liability system' can be evaluated by the 
inquiry of how the problems inherent in the dual liability system are exposed in light of the 
unified liability system and whether the problems are properly resolved in the unified liability 
system, and vice versa. Thus, the following accounts are of what problems Korean law has 
suffered by not having the unified liability system, but having the dual liability system, and 
whether the liability system of English law and CISG are enough to settle the problems. 
3.1.1.2. The origin of problems in the dual liability system 
The dual liability system in Korea, on the one hand, has benefits in that this system efficiently 
controls various legal problems raised from sales contracts. This is due to the role of the seller's 
guarantee liability which is applied only to sales contracts, supplementing the general liability 
for non-performance which is applied to all other contracts. This is a relationship that the 
special rules supplement the general rules without infringing the other general rules not related 
to the special rules. 324 On the other hand, as to the matter of the liability system, itself, this dual 
liability system causes some complexities owing to the separate existence of the two systems. 
The complexities originate in the unique idea in the dual liability system that the seller's 
liability is differentiated according to the external type of non-performance. That is, whether 
the seller is responsible under the general liability or the seller's guarantee liability depends 
upon, first of all, the question of whether the external type of non-performance falls within the 
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broad category of non-performance or defective performance. However, it has revealed some 
drawbacks of the idea. One is where there is a borderline case; it is necessary to distinguish 
between the matters of aliud and a defect in quality. 325 In the first instance, the buyer is entitled 
to demand either specific performance, or rescission and/or damages in accordance with the 
rules of the general liability. 326 The remedies are in principle governed by the fault principle 
and must be pursued within ten years. 327 In the second, the buyer is limited to the remedies of 
claiming a substitute good, or rescission and/or damages under the special rules of the seller's 
guarantee liability; 328 which are available regardless of the fault principle and must be exercised 
within the short limitation period of six months after the buyer's awareness of the defect. 329 
These differentiations may cause unjustified results in some borderline cases to either the seller 
or the buyer because the substantial differences in the available remedies and the limitation 
period are hardly justified in one breach of contract. 
In addition, the complexities also originate in the assumption of the dual liability system that 
the general liability is quite different from the seller's guarantee liability in light of its nature 
and contents. "" It causes confusion in that, unlike German law, rescission and damages in the 
324 In this way the special nature of the other contracts could be preserved. 
325 For instance, in the case of a sales contract for a consignment of Auslese wine, the wine only tasted 
like Auslese because it contained certain prohibited additives. It was held that this was the delivery of an 
aliud and not of defective goods. See the German case, BGH (VIII) ZR 247/87,23 November 1988 
[1989] DB 1513. Another borderline case is where a robot without an arm essential for its proper 
performance was delivered. It was held that it was a delivery of aliud not of defective goods. See BGH 
(VIII) ZR 72/89,27 June 1990, DB 2016. The delivery of winter wheat instead of spring wheat agreed in 
the contract was held to be an aliud. See BGH, NJW 68,640. 
326 The seller may first demand a substitute good in the form of specific performance in the case of the 
sale of generic goods. If the seller refuses to provide a substitute good or it is impossible to provide a 
substitute good, the buyer may rescind the contract and/or claim damages. For the remedies under the 
general liability, see supra n. 70-75,80-91,98-100 and accompanying texts. 
327 KCC Art. 162. 
328 For the remedies under the seller's guarantee liability in general, see supra n. 118-124 and 
accompanying texts. 
329 KCC Art. 582. 
330 See supra n. 125-133 and accompanying texts. 
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general liability are identically specified for the remedies in the seller's guarantee liability under 
KCC. 33' That is, the difficulties are in the question of how the assumption of the dual liability 
system would explain the remedies of damages and rescission in the seller's guarantee liability 
even though these are identical to those in the general liability and how these could be 
differentiated from the general liability. 
"' 
Furthermore, in some occasions, it is plausible to say that the complexities may extend to the 
problem of co-existence of two liabilities in one breach of contract: namely, the problem of 
concurrence with incomplete performance. 3B 
The scholar's theories and the cases have tried to solve the problems caused by the 
aforementioned complexities and have appreciated the unique features of the dual liability 
system since the legislation of KCC in 1950's. However, the fact that there has been no 
satisfactory theory which most people can agree on for 43 years since the legislation of KCC 
draws our attention to the question of whether there is any need to re-examine this liability 
system. 
334 
331 In German law, the remedies under the special regime for the seller's guarantee liability are Wandlung 
and Minderung (cancellation and price reduction). Wandlung is used in somewhat different sense from 
Rücktritt (rescission) even though it is similar to Rücktritt in its effects and is, indeed, in many respects 
governed by the same rules (BGB §467). KCC does not differentiate between Rücktrit and Wandlung, 
using Rücktrit in the rules for both the general liability and the seller's guarantee liability. Compared to 
Wandlung in German law, the rescission in the seller's guarantee liability under Korean law is given on 
the condition that it is unattainable to achieve the objective of the contract due to the defect, whereas the 
requirements for Wandlung in German law are in principle same as for Minderung. In this sense the 
requirements for rescission in Korean law are stricter than those for Wandlung in German law. 
Minderung is a reduction of price which is not expressly provided in KCC for the remedies in the case of 
a defect in quality, but in the case of a defect in quantity. While KCC allows the buyer to claim damages 
in any cases, under BGB the buyer's right to damages is limited to only those cases where there is a 
violation of a warranty or deceit. See BGB §§459 II, 463. 
332 The explanations of damages and rescission by scholars which start from the finding of the nature of 
the seller's guarantee liability are well related to practical points too. See supra n. 208-216 and 
accompanying texts. 
333 See supra n. 161-166,203-206 and accompanying texts. 
334 Prof. Hyung-bae Kim also pointed out the need of re-examination under Korean law in order to 
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The need for the re-examination is further inspired by the German proposal to reform the law 
of obligations, which can be appreciated as a further step forward to an unified liability system 
in Germany in terms of the obligation law influenced by CISG. 335 It also very much suggests 
that English law and CISG, which have an unified liability system, solve most difficulties 
originated in having the dual liability system in Korea because all the matters of non- 
performance are homogeneously dealt under the name of `breach of contract'. 
336 
3.1.2. Legal liability vs. Contractual liability 
3.1.2.1. General 
As has been discussed, the difficulties faced by the dual liability system have led us to ask 
ourselves whether there is any need to re-examine it. Given that the re-examination can reveal 
any superiority of the unified liability system under the existing law337 and a vehicle to unify the 
dual liability system is a contract, the residual matter in light of the possible unification of the 
dual liability system is the question of whether the seller's guarantee liability can be understood 
as a contractual one rather than a legal one specially imposed by the law. In this context, the 
matter of `legal liability vs. contractual liability' is closely connected with the matter of `the 
unified liability system vs. the dual liability system'. The thing to note is that the former matter 
is in its essence in the question of whether the seller's contractual duty to deliver non-defective 
goods is recognized even in the sale of specific goods. 
simplify the dual liability system and re-arrange the effects of two liabilities. See Hyung-bae Kim, "Gae- 
yak-chaek-im-ron Bi-pan (Critics on the Contractual Liability Theory)", (Dec., 1992) 430 Ko-shi-gae 
116; Young-bok Park, "Choi-keun Seo-koo-eoi Gae-yak-chaek-im-non-eoi-wa Woo-ri-min-bup-sang-eoi 
Gae-yak-chaek-im-chae-gae (Current Discussions as to Contractual Liabilities in the West and the 
Liability System in Korea)", (1996) 13 & 14 Min-sa-bup-hak 316, at 337. 
135 Abschlußbericht der Kommission zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, hrsg. von Bundesminister der 
Jusitz (1992). 
-136 See supra n. 218-223 and accompanying texts. 
337 The complexities of the dual liability system as examined above seem to prove the superiority fairly 
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The next discussions are to examine the existing theories with regard to the nature of the 
seller's guarantee liability in light of the possible unification of the dual liability system in 
Korean law. 
3.1.2.2. Problems of the legal liability theory 
Further to the arguments of the contractual liability theory, 338 more questions can be pointed 
out in order to prove the legal liability theory based on the principle of impossibilium nulla 
obligatio and specific goods dogma unjustifiable, 
339 
First, the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma should at least 
make clear to what extent the principle can be applied. 340 This is because it seems unreasonable 
to apply the principle to all kinds of specific goods including substitutable and repairable goods. 
The argument is analogous to the criticism that the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio is 
not justified in Korean law when one considers that there is a tendency gradually to modify and 
interpret it narrowly by saying the seller has undertaken a guarantee. 34' For instance, there may 
be a case where the implied guarantee of the seller's ability to deliver non-defective goods can 
enough. 
338 See supra n. 167-198 and accompanying texts. 
339 See supra n. 134-157 and accompanying texts. 
340 Accord: Dae-jeong Kim, "Mae-do-in-eoi Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-eoi Bon-jil (The Nature of the 
Seller's Guarantee Liability)", (1992) 19 Bup-hak-yeon-koo (Chun-buk National Univ. ) 181, at 208. 
According to this principle, if the goods are specified at the time of contract and there exists a defect at 
that time (initial defect), the seller's contractual duty is only to deliver the goods in status quo because of 
its idea of the delivery of non-defective goods being impossible in light of the unique nature of specific 
goods. The extent to which the principle applies seems to include all kinds of specific goods since the 
idea is identified as from the time of contract. See supra n. 146-148 and accompanying texts. 
341 For the trend and some criticism on this principle in general, see Markesinis, Lorenz, and 
Dannemann, supra n. 62, at 405 ff. For some queries about this principle in Korean law in general, see 
Chang-soo Yang, "Won-shi-jeok Bul-neung-ron I (Initial Impossibility I)", (1986) 27(2&3) Bup-hak 
(Seoul National University) 126. In addition, it should be noted that there is no provision like the present 
BGB §306 specifying the principle in `the draft for the German proposal to reform the obligation law' 
(the Komnnissionsentwit rf; hereinafter BGB-KE). 
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be found in the seller's act to enter the contract. 342 The denial of this principle seems to be also 
proved by the absence of a positive background for the principle in KCC in contrast with 
German law. 343 Therefore, the extent to which the principle can be applied should be limited at 
most to the cases of non-substitutable goods and non-repairable defect. 
Second, the proposition of the specific goods dogma seems to treat the obligation to tender 
only as a matter of the status quo and disregard the question of what the tender should be. 344 
However, the law as a norm may require the tender of non-defective goods even if the tender is 
impossible in physical terms because the law is not physics but a norm to state what should be 
tendered. 345 
Third, contrary to the insistence of KCC Art. 462 as a positive law background for the specific 
goods dogma, 34E' it should be noted that while KCC Art. 462 deals with the defect at the time of 
delivery, the specific goods dogma is concerned with the matter of the defect at the time of 
contract. 347 Therefore, it proves itself wrong in its positive background on KCC Art. 462 for the 
specific goods dogma. 
Fourth, the distinction between initial and subsequent defects in the specific goods and the 
342 This is the case, e. g., where the specific good is a good specified by the intention of the parties among 
the generic goods. 
343 BGB §306. 
344 Accord: Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 224 f.; Dae jeong Kim, supra n. 340, at 208. 
345 For instance the seller's obligation to acquire and pass the title to the buyer in the sale of a title 
belonging to another person proves the `what should be' proposition in light of the role of the law as a 
norm. KCC Art. 569; Contra, French Code Civil Art. 1599. 
346 For the texts of art. 462, see supra n. 150 and accompanying texts. 
347 Accord: Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 340, at 213 f. The insistence seems to make sense provided that the 
specific goods dogma is based on the German idea of `error in motive' because error in motive can be 
effective to the matter of a subsequent defect as well, but most legal liability theorists in Korea generally 
relies on the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio dealing with the matter of the defect at the time of 
contract. Cf. Choon-soo Ahn, supra n. 167, at 427. For the idea of error in motive in German law, see 
Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, Band II, Halbband 1, Aufl. 13, (1986), at §66 ff.; see also Flume, 
Allgemeiner Teil des Bidrgerlchen Rechts, Band 2, Aufl. 3, (1979), at §435 ff. 
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seller's guarantee liability being limited only to the cases of initial impossibility 348 may lead us 
to inquire whether there is any justification in the different treatments between an initial and 
subsequent defect in cases of a defect in the sale of specific goods. The different treatments 
may cause substantial differences in the remedies available for an initial or subsequent defect. 
Namely, in the case of an initial defect the buyer may recover his losses due to the defect on the 
basis of the seller's guarantee liability regardless of the fault principle, whereas in the case of a 
subsequent defect it may be possible to recover his losses under the general liability governed 
by the fault principle, but he will not be able to recover any if any fault is not found on the 
seller's part. 349 What justifications could be made for the substantial differences in the remedies 
where there may be a borderline case, where it is not easy to distinguish between an initial and 
subsequent defect? "' 
Fifth, it is open to criticism that the legal liability theorists' understanding as to the sale of 
specific goods may yield a kind of unnecessary detour and complexities in imposing on the 
seller the liability for defective goods; they understand that, in contrast with the sale of generic 
goods, the seller's delivery of defective goods in status quo is, at first, treated as the seller 
having completed his contractual duty and then the law imposes the liability for defective goods 
on the seller. "' This account becomes clear when it is considered that in the end the liability 
means an obligation so that there is no doubt in implying the seller's contractual duty to deliver 
non-defective goods. 352 
Finally, it is needless to say that the legal liability theory which sticks to the dual liability 
system runs counter to the unification of the dual liability system in Korea. 
353 
348 See supra n. 159-160 and accompanying texts. 
349 KCC Art. 374. 
350 The difficulty may result in harshness for the buyer who has to prove the existence of an initial defect 
in order to raise the seller's guarantee liability. 
351 This is in the same context as an argument of the contractual liability theory that there is a contractual 
duty to deliver non-defective goods even in the sale of specific goods. 
352 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 787. 
353 Note that the problems in the dual liability system are in its essence analogous to the problems in the 
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All in all, the above arguments the legal liability theory is unjustifiable under the existing KCC 
seem to show why the seller's guarantee liability should be a contractual one. 
3.1.2.3. Illusion in the contractual liability theory 
3.1.2.3.1. An immutable truth of the seller's guarantee liability 
Scholars in both the legal liability theory and the contractual liability theory camps have 
generally admitted the idea as an immutable truth that the relationship between the general 
liability and the seller's guarantee liability is the one between fault liability and no-fault liability 
so that all the remedies under the general liability are governed by the fault principle, whereas 
those under the seller's guarantee liability exists regardless of the principle. 354 This relationship 
has led them to argue that, although the remedy of damages under the general liability is 
identically specified for that under the seller's guarantee liability, the latter remedy is 
distinguished from the former remedy in a way that limits the scope of damages the buyer can 
recover under the seller's guarantee liability. This is based on their artificial idea that the 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability which exists regardless of the fault principle 
cannot be treated in the same way as the damages under the general liability which is governed 
by the fault principle . 
3" The idea, however, has yielded various complexities, in particular, in 
the ways to find the most appropriate interpretation of damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability and the relationship with damages under the general liability. "' This can be said to be 
another casuistry inherent in the distinction between fault liability and no-fault liability in 
addition to that we have experienced in the distinction between the general liability as a 
legal liability theory because the legal liability theory represents the dual liability system. 
354 See supra n. 158,199-200 and accompanying texts. 
ass This is because of a unique idea in Korean law derived by the way to find the solution in the conflict 
between the tradition of continental law of Wandlung and Minderung' and KCC's provision of the same 
`rescission and damages' as in the general liability. For the differences between German and Korean law 
in general, see supra n. 331. 
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contractual liability and the seller's guarantee liability as a legal liability. 357 
3.1.2.3.2. The immutable truth equals illusion in the contractual liability theory 
The contractual liability theory has been much appreciated in that it has been made quite a 
plausible theory in terms of finding the contractual nature of the seller's guarantee liability in its 
attempt to unify the dual liability system. However, quite unlike the rationale of the theory to 
unify and simplify the dual liability system, it proves the rationale itself somewhat illusive in 
that it has created another complexity in relation to its interpretation of damages under the 
seller's guarantee liability. This is because the theory has not overcome the same casuistic 
distinction between fault and no-fault liability as the legal liability theory has that all the 
remedies under the general liability are governed by the fault principle and those under the 
seller's guarantee liability exist regardless of the fault principle so that the damages under the 
seller's guarantee liability cannot be treated in the same way as the damages under the general 
liability, 358 
In defiance of the artificial distinction of fault or no-fault liability and its consequences in the 
interpretation of damages under the seller's guarantee liability, it is submitted that we should 
consider another way of thinking that, unlike German law, the fact that the rules of the seller's 
guarantee liability have the same remedies of rescission and damages as those of the general 
356 See supra n. 128,214-216, infra n. 1014-1066 and accompanying texts. 
357 Accord: Young-bok Park, supra n. 334, at 338. 
358 On the basis of the distinction, the theory has attempted to limit the scope of damages under the 
seller's guarantee liability to the buyer's reliance losses or mere price reduction. See supra n. 215-216 
and accompanying texts. The other losses (e. g., expectation losses or consequential losses) may be 
compensated according to one's interpretation as to the relationship with the damages under the general 
liability (i. e., whether concurrence with the general liability should be allowed). See Hyung-bae Kim, 
supra n. 67, at 314 f. and 345 f. However, there are some scholars who argue that the losses are also 
compensated within the seller's guarantee liability with the requirement of fault or without the 
requirement of fault. For the former view, see Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 262 ff. For the latter 
view, see Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 799 f. For more details about the various interpretation of 
damages, see infra n. 1014-1066 and accompanying texts. 
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liability have may give a good opportunity to unify the dual liability system in Korean law. 359 
Namely, one's interpretation of the remedies under the seller's guarantee liability should be 
uniform so that those remedies are as they are under the general liability and the requirement of 
fault depends upon what remedy the buyer seeks to claim. 360 This unified way of interpretation 
may not raise, at least, the complexities the contractual liability theory has experienced so far in 
interpreting damages under the seller's guarantee liability and in finding the relationship with 
damages under the general liability. For instance, suppose that a seller delivers a defective car 
in quality and a buyer seeks to claim damages under the seller's guarantee liability because the 
defect is not serious enough to rescind the contract. Assuming that all the remedies under the 
seller's guarantee liability are differently treated from those under the general liability on the 
basis of the distinction between fault and no-fault liability, the scope of damages the buyer can 
recover under the seller's guarantee liability may be governed by one's artificial rules which are 
separate from those under the general liability and may depend upon how one interprets the 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability and the relationship with the damages under the 
general liability. "' However, if it is presumed that the remedy of damages is as it is under the 
general liability, the buyer can recover his losses simply by virtue of the same rules of the. scope 
of damages as under the general liability; it does not need to be involved in endless debates to 
create the artificial rules and to find the relationship with damages under the general liability. 
The critical point here is that the prerequisite of fault depends upon whether the rules as to 
damages under the general liability require fault, rather than the casuistic idea that all the 
remedies under the general liability are governed by the fault principle, whereas those under the 
seller's guarantee liability exists regardless of the principle. Consequently, as the provision for 
359 German law has Minderung and Wandlung quite different from Rücktrit (rescission) and damages. 
Cf. See supra n. 331. However, the seller's guarantee liability under BGB-KB has the same rescission 
and damages as under the general liability. BGB-KE §462. 
360 Cf. This view is in the same line as under BGB-KE which provides that the rules as to rescission and 
damages under the general liability are correspondingly applied to the cases of the seller's guarantee 
liability. BGB-KE §462. 
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damages under the general liability specifies, 362 the prerequisite is crucial for the buyer's 
damages claim. At first sight, this presumption appears to yield disadvantages from the point of 
view of the buyer compared to the above artificial rules because, given that he cannot claim a 
price reduction due to no specific provision on the price reduction in the case of qualitative 
defects under KCC, 363 he may not be entitled to rely on any monetary relief where it is not 
shown any fault on the seller's part. Yet, one must note that there may be no difference in 
practice when one considers that, even if there is no fault, as will be argued later, the buyer is 
still allowed to claim a price reduction which exists separately from a damages claim, 364 and the 
above artificial rules may limit the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability to, at 
most, reliance losses or price reduction, 
365 
3.2. External evaluation 
3.2.1. General 
The ensuing discussion is to investigate the liability system in each jurisdiction from the 
perspective of efficiency. Of the aspects of efficiency as given in the previous chapter, the 
question of to what extent the rules are consistent with certainty366 will be particularly inquired 
in order to evaluate the dual liability system in Korean law and the unified liability system in 
English law and CISG. In the same context it will also examine the nature of the seller's 
guarantee liability, which has been said either the contractual liability or the legal liability in 
361 See supra n. 358. 
362 KCC Art. 390. 
363 But note that KCC has such provision in the case of defects in quantity. KCC Art. 572(3). 
364 Notwithstanding no provision on price reduction, the ensuing discussion will show how the price 
reduction in the case of defects in quality could be independently recognised of damages under the 
existing KCC. See infra n. 1175 and accompanying texts. 
365 See supra n. 358. 
366 For the importance of certainty or clarity in promoting efficiency of the rules, see supra n. 38-40 and 
accompanying texts. See also supra n. 52-55 and accompanying texts for another importance in 
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each jurisdiction including the Directive. 
3.2.2. Dual liability system vs. Unified liability system 
As has been examined in the internal evaluation of the dual liability system, all the problems 
Korean law has faced by having the dual liability system are related to the issue of uncertainty 
and complexity. 367 The fact that there have been no satisfactory theories and cases to 
understand the dual liability system inherent in Korean law proves itself how uncertain and 
complex to the ordinary people involved in this area because it has been not so clear even to the 
experts both in courts and in schools. 
The uncertainty and the cost of remedying it can lead to a form of market failure in which the 
transaction cost prevents what would otherwise be wealth-maximising exchanges taking place. 
To take an example of a borderline case, 368 both the buyer and the seller who are not certain 
about his rights or liabilities may cause an inefficient situation where two parties carry 
insurance against the same event at the same time, causing to raise the transaction costs. In this 
example, the inefficient situation in the form of the increase of the transaction costs can also 
appear where the parties who are not clear will try to add or exclude his rights or liabilities. 369 
In addition, it may be also expected that the litigation of the parties will be more likely to occur 
due to its uncertainty. All these points seem to say to us that the uncertainty can not be solved 
unless either it is attempted to interpret the existing liability system at least in an unified way, 
i. e., the unified liability system, or clear guidelines are found to distinguish between the seller's 
guarantee liability and the general liability. 370 
consumer sales. 
367 See supra n. 325-333 and accompanying texts. 
368 See supra n. 325. 
369 This is a case in particular where the parties are uncertain as to the limitation period so that they try to 
add a clause in the contract specifying his clear rights or liabilities. 
370 Although it seems true that the finding of clear guidelines would well settle the problems of 
uncertainty, one must note that one's experience since the legislation of KCC shows that many studies to 
find the guidelines have not been so successful. Cf. Won-lim Jee, supra n. 135, at 374 ff. 
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By the same token the casuistic distinction between fault liability and no-fault liability also 
gives much room to cause an inefficient result increasing the transaction costs. This is because, 
as we have examined, all the attempts to interpret the remedy of damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability on the basis of the distinction have caused another complexity in their 
understanding in light of the unification of the dual liability system. 371 
On the other hand, the unified liability system may well enhance its certainty and simplicity, 
and reduce the transaction costs. This is because under English law and CISG conceptions a 
mere breach of obligation is enough to trigger one of remedies irrespective of the type of breach 
falling within the seller's guarantee liability or the general liability; no distinction need be made 
between them and the parties will know what liability or rights they would have. It will also 
facilitate decision-making in the courts, reducing transaction cost, especially in light of the fact 
that English law and CISG authorize an award of monetary compensation for any breach along 
the lines of a no-fault regime. 
3.2.3. Legal liability vs. Contractual liability 
Given that the above evaluation in terms of uncertainty and complexity has well revealed any 
superiority of the unified liability system in Korean law, it proves itself that the nature of the 
seller's guarantee liability should be a contractual one rather than a legal one because it is 
needless to say that a vehicle to unify the dual liability system is a contract. That is, the 
understanding that the seller's guarantee liability is a legal one in its nature may obstruct one' s 
passage to the unification of the dual liability system because it still theoretically sticks to the 
dual liability system by insisting that the general liability is raised in the case of the breach of 
contractual duty, whereas the seller's guarantee liability is brought in the case of the breach of 
legal duty imposed by the law. 372 
371 See supra n. 354-361 and accompanying texts. 
372 The evaluations on the practical differences (see supra n. 208-216 and accompanying texts) produced 
from the different understanding as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability in light of efficiency 
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4. Concluding remarks 
4.1. Conclusion on the evaluation 
The evaluation of `the dual liability system vs. the unified liability system' has been executed 
first by the question of how the problems inherent in the dual liability system are exposed in 
light of the unified liability system and whether the problems are properly resolved in the 
unified liability system. It has found that the dual liability system caused various complexities 
owing to the separate existence of the general liability and the seller's guarantee liability which 
relies on its artificial distinction between `non-performance' and `defective performance' . 
373 As 
long as the complexities are basically due to the separate existence of two liabilities, the unified 
liability system seems to resolve most problems Korean law faces because all the matters of 
non-performance in English law and CISG are homogeneously dealt under the name of breach 
of contract. The resolution of the complexities of the dual liability system by having the unified 
liability system and the fact that there have been no satisfactory theories and cases for the 
complexities seems to suggest us the need for re-examination of the dual liability system. 
Along the same lines as the above evaluation, the issue of `legal liability vs. contractual 
liability' has been evaluated in terms of the logic and reasonableness of existing theories, which 
is closely related to the possible unification of the dual liability system in Korea. The 
examination of the legal liability theory has revealed its theoretical background of the principle 
of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma unjustifiable by several pieces of 
evidence. 374 In addition, the contractual liability theory has been investigated in light of another 
casuistic distinction between fault and no-fault liability. It has been found that the rationale of 
the theory to unify and simplify the dual liability system is proved somewhat illusive in that it 
will be attempted when this study examines each rule as to the seller's guarantee liability. As will be 
examined later, the evaluations consistently argue that it is a contractual one. 
373 See supra n. 325-333 and accompanying texts. 
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does not overcome an artificial idea that all the remedies in the general liability are governed by 
the fault principle and those in the seller's guarantee liability exist regardless of the fault 
principle even though it is much appreciated for its contribution for the unification of the dual 
liability system. In this context, it was suggested to avoid the idea and consider that the fact that 
the remedies of rescission and damages in the general liability are identically specified in the 
articles dealing with the seller's guarantee liability may provide us a good opportunity to unify 
the dual liability system. 
Having said that, the external evaluation of `the dual liability system vs. the unified liability 
system' in light of efficiency has been pursued by the question of which liability system is 
clearer. As was examined above in the internal evaluation, the complexities Korean law has 
experienced prove by themselves that the unified liability system seems to offer more clarity. 375 
An artificial distinction between fault and no-fault liability in Korean law was also proved that 
it might result in inefficiency due to its inherent complexities. 37' In addition, given that the 
above external evaluation shows any superiority of the unified liability system in Korean law, it 
proves itself that the nature of the seller's guarantee liability should be a contractual one insofar 
as there is no doubt in that a vehicle to unify the dual liability system is a contract. 
4.2. The unified liability system in Korea ? 
All the aforementioned evaluations seem to prove that the unified liability system provides us 
instructive substitutes for the problems the dual liability system has experienced in Korea. As a 
starting point to achieve the genuine unified liability system in Korean law which is free from 
all the problems, the first hurdle to overcome is related to the question of whether and how the 
seller's guarantee liability is understood as a contractual one in its nature. The question seems 
to be well answered by the previous evaluations which have argued that it is better to interpret 
37' See supra n. 340-353 and accompanying texts. 
37' See supra n. 368-370 and accompanying texts. 
376 See supra n. 371 and accompanying texts. 
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that the nature of the seller's guarantee liability is a contractual one. 37 However, given that the 
contractual nature is still arguable in terms of the theories themselves, one seems to need a 
legislative consideration to introduce a provision for a contractual duty to deliver non-defective 
goods in the sale of goods including specific goods, which is similar to English law, CISG and 
the Directive. The ultimate goal of introducing the provision is to finalize the endless debates 
as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability, to clarify the contractual nature and to launch 
the unified liability system. 
Another hurdle is related to a casuistic distinction between fault and no-fault liability that all the 
remedies in the general liability are governed by the fault principle and those in the seller's 
guarantee liability exist regardless of the fault principle. 378 As was suggested in the internal 
evaluation, this hurdle can be overcome by another way of thinking that the fact that the 
remedies of rescission and damages in the general liability are identically specified in the 
articles of KCC dealing with the seller's guarantee liability may provide us a good opportunity 
to unify the dual liability system. That is, it should be interpreted in a unified way that the 
remedies of rescission and damages in the seller's guarantee liability should be as they are in the 
general liability and the focus of distinction should be based on the requirements of each 
remedy rather than resting on the casuistic distinction between fault and no-fault liability. 
Consequently, each remedy could stand individually on the basis of its own requirements so 
that, unlike the casuistic distinction, not all the remedies in the seller's guarantee liability are 
free from no-fault principle. One must note here that the assumption that each remedy stands 
individually in terms of its own requirements means abandonment of the proposition that the 
prerequisite of fault is always necessary to raise the general liability for non-performance. In 
this context, it is submitted that, like the concept of `breach of contract' under English law and 
CISG, one needs to create a unitary new concept of non-performance which is free from the 
377 See supra n. 338-353,372 and accompanying texts. 
378 For the complexities in relation to damages by the casuistic distinction, see supra n. 358,361 and 
accompanying texts. 
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fault principle. The reason for this is that the previous concept of non-performance assumes the 
existence of fault as one of crucial factors to constitute non-performance and raise the general 
liability for non-performance; 3'9 namely, insofar as fault cannot be proved, the existence of non- 
performance itself is denied and consequently the buyer cannot rely on the general liability for 
non-performance. 380 The use of the new concept of non-performance isolated from the fault 
principle may enable one to deal with each remedy individually in terms of its requirements, in 
particular, the requirement of fault; on this basis fault is relevant to individual remedies but not 
to the existence of liability. 391 This construction to deal with each remedy individually can be 
proved by the separate provision for each remedy with its own requirements under the existing 
KCC. 382 The consequence of the construction would be that, as the wording of KCC Art. 390 
specifies, 383 it should be interpreted that fault is only required for a claim for damages, 384 but not 
for other claims. 385 Therefore, even if the goods are defective without the seller's fault, the 
buyer may be still entitled to rescission, price reduction and replacement provided that, as will 
be examined later, the requirements of each remedy are fulfilled. 38' 
379 See supra n. 67,78,96 and accompanying texts. 
380 Accord: Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 600; Young-bok Park, supra n. 334, at 339. Cf. Hyung-bae 
Kim, supra n. 66, at 150 ff. (He uses the concept of `irregularity in performance' which is free from fault 
and can be differentiated from the concept of non-performance cohesive with fault); BGB-KE §280. 
381 Eun-young Lee, id. 
382 For instance, see KCC Arts. 389 (Specific performance), 544 ff. (Rescission), 390 (Damages) 
383 KCC Art. 390 (Non-performance of Obligations and Claim for Damages): "If an obligor fails to effect 
performance in accordance with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages; 
but this shall not apply to cases where the performance has become impossible and this is due to the 
obligor's intention or fault. " 
384 Although it seems inevitable to require fault for damages under the existing KCC, it will be found 
later that Korean law may need a legislative consideration to remove the requirement. See infra n. 1132- 
1133 and accompanying texts. 
385 Young-bok Park, supra n. 334, at 341 ff. Cf. Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 334, at 117. Contrary to this 
consequence, KCC Art. 390 has been presented in the prevailing view to prove the fault principal for any 
claim under the general liability for non-performance. 
386 For the requirements of rescission and replacement, see infra n. 826-840,1199-1202 and 
accompanying texts. For the recognition of price reduction in the case of qualitative defects which is 
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III. Requirements for the Seller's Liability for Non-conforming Goods 
1. General Remarks 
The study has so far examined in a comparative way a) under what kind of liability system the 
problems raised in the event that the seller delivers non-conforming goods either in quality or in 
quantity are governed in each jurisdiction, b) what is the position of the rules dealing with those 
problems within the liability system, and c) what is the nature of those rules. In addition, the 
study has briefly described the substance of those rules in each jurisdiction as to the 
requirements and effects of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods. 
The ensuing discussions are a further study to scrutinise in detail the rules as to what 
requirements must be satisfied in order to raise the seller's liability for non-conforming goods in 
each jurisdiction. The study will attempt to compare the rules in one jurisdiction to those in 
another in light of the ultimate purpose of this thesis to investigate if there is any need to 
introduce a unified liability system into Korean law, and how effectively the rules protect the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. 
2. The existence of a defect 
2.1. The concept of a defect 
2.1.1. Comparative accounts 
2.1.1.1. Korean law 
To define a `defect' is crucial in the context that the seller's guarantee liability depends upon, 
above all, the question of whether there is a defect in the goods delivered. Different definitions 
independent of damages, see supra n. 1175 and accompanying texts. 
82 
yield different results as to the existence of a defect, and consequently, different results as to the 
availability of the seller's guarantee liability. Unfortunately, notwithstanding its crucial 
importance, KCC fails to stipulate the definition of a defect so that it is left open to scholars' 
view and cases. 38' 
There are two opposing views as to the definition of a defect; the objective criterion theory and 
the subjective criterion theory. 388 According to the former, which is the prevailing view at 
present and supported by the legal liability theory, the test for the existence of a defect is, in 
principle, if the goods in question are of the ordinary standard in quality and performance, 
which are normal in goods of the same kind. 38' Namely, the existence of a defect is judged 
objectively by the ordinary standard alone, regardless of the parties' intention shown by the 
relevant circumstances of the contract. However, in the cases where the seller promised specific 
quality or performance by showing a sample or an advertisement, or he specifically stated so in 
the contract, the test exceptionally turns on the specific quality or performance promised by the 
seller rather than the ordinary standard. 390 Thus, the exceptional test is restricted to the cases of 
a sale by sample or an advertisement and the seller's specific warranty of the quality or 
performance in the contract. For instance, in the sale of whale meat, the seller's delivery of 
whale unfit for human consumption may not raise the seller's guarantee liability as long as it 
can satisfy with the ordinary standard, e. g., it is useable as feed for livestock, unless the sale is 
categorised one of the cases of which the seller promised the specific quality by showing a 
387 Cf. German law defines defects which diminish or destroy its value or fitness for its ordinary use, or 
the use provided for in the contract. BGB §459(1). 
189 In contrast, there seems to be no particular case defining the concept of a defect and specifically 
dealing with which theory is better under the existing KCC. Cf. the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 
5/12/1957,4290 Min-Sang 160; 5/11/1968,68 Da 1832; 23/11/1993,92 Da 38980; 30/6/1995,95 Da 
2616.2617. 
389 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 245; Juk-in Hwang, supra n. 200, at 258; Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, 
at 194. However, one scholar among the contractual liability theorists holds this view. See Joo-soo Kim, 
supra n. 125, at 213. 
390 Id. 
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sample, by an advertisement, or by a warranty. 39' 
On the other hand, the latter theory that is supported by the contractual liability theorists 
argues that the primary test of whether the goods are defective or not is a subjective one, and 
turns on the use to which both parties to the contract of sale intended that the goods were to be 
put. 392 Thus, it is said that there is a defect when the goods supplied do not reach the standard 
the parties agreed, or they diminish or destroy their value or fitness for the use the parties 
intended. For example, if a buyer orders book crates, the purpose of the crates has been 
determined, and if the crates supplied prove to be too weak for the purpose, it can be said there 
is a defect and the buyer can rely on the rules on the seller's guarantee liability, 393 However, if 
the buyer orders crates with specified dimensions rather than crates for a specified purpose, 
crates which are adequate for ordinary standards will not be defective even if they are not sturdy 
enough to carry books. All in all, the existence of a defect is primarily decided by the parties' 
intention and then by the ordinary standards. 
394 
As regards the matter of defects in quantity, one thing to note is that the seller's guarantee 
liability in KCC does not deal with the matter of excess quantity. Another thing is that it must 
be distinguished from the above concept of a defect in quality because the cases where the 
goods sold by quantity395 show a shortage, or part of them had already been lost at the time of 
391 This is because the theory is based on the ordinary standard of the goods supplied which are normal in 
goods of the same kind, disregarding the parties' contemplation that the goods were to be put. 
392 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 337 f.; Dae-jeong Kim, "So-bi-ja-bo-ho-rul-we-han Ha-ja-dam-bo- 
chaek-im-eoi Bup-ri-koo-seong (The Construction of the Legal Theory as to the Seller's Guarantee 
Liability for the Purpose of Consumer Protection)", (1993) 10(1) Jae-san-bup-yon-koo 9, at 13 f. and 16 
ff.; Sang-yong Kim, Chae-kwon-gak-ron (Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1998), at 237. Cf. Eun-young 
Lee, supra n. 167, at 219 f. (she argues that the concept of `non-conformity with the contract' should be 
used to define a `defect', which is similar to that in the Directive and CISG). 
393 On the other hand, according to the legal liability theory, it may not be found any defect because it is 
judged by the ordinary standard alone. 
394 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 337 f. 
39$ The goods sold by quantity means the sales that the buyer pays the price on the basis of the quantity 
agreed in the contract. For an example of a shortage in this kind of sale, a sale for land of 100 sq., 
payment $ 1,000 per sq. but in fact only 90 sq. Yun jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 237. 
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the conclusion of contract, are governed by the rules as to the seller's guarantee liability for 
defects in title of the goods rather than those for defects in quality. "' And the other thing is 
that, although KCC does not specifically state it, it is deemed to be of relevance only to specific 
goods. 397 The cases of generic goods are, thus, excluded from the scope of the seller's 
guarantee liability and governed by the rules of the general liability. "' 
The matters of aliud and defects in packaging are not within the definition of a defect under 
the seller's guarantee liability. "' Consequently, they are not governed by the rules of the 
seller's guarantee liability, but by those of the general liability for non-performance. 400 
2.1.1.2. English law 
In English law, there is no concept of `defect' or `non-conformity' as in Korean law, the 
Directive and CISG. 40' However, it is rather explained through the notion of implied terms of 
the contract, which are mainly embodied in the SGA. 402 Namely, it is said there is a breach of 
implied term when the seller delivers the goods which do not comply with any one of the 
implied terms. 
The test to judge whether the goods delivered comply with those terms is as follows. First, the 
question is whether the goods correspond with the description by which the goods are sold. 403 
396 KCC Art. 574. Namely, the provisions for the seller's guarantee liability for defects in title rather 
than for defects in quality are mutatis mutandis applicable to the cases of deficiency in quantity. 
397 No opposing view about this. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 238; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 
326 f.; Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 223. 
398 The reason for the application only to specific goods is that the shortage of the quantity agreed and the 
partial loss of the goods which had already been occurred at the time of contract is a typical type of initial 
impossibility of performance, which can be applied only to specific goods. In the cases of generic goods, 
there could not be partial loss or shortage at the time of contract. 
399 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 99 ff. 
4°° For the scholars who argue the matter of aliud may fall within the category of incomplete 
performance, see supra n. 104. 
401 The concept of non-conformity used in the Directive and CISG will be examined shortly. 
402 The SGA ss. 13,14 and 15. Cf. supra n. 227. 
403 The SGA s. 13(1). 
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This test may not be undertaken unless the statement made about the goods forms part of the 
description by reference to which the goods were sold. 404 It means that the statements must be 
expressly or by implication employed in order to identify or define the goods sold405 and they 
must, at least in some measure, be relied upon by the buyer to identify or define the goods. 4°6 
Second, the question is whether the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory 
quality. 407 This question is applied provided that the seller sells the goods in the course of a 
business, 408 which includes `a profession and activities of any government department or local 
or public authority'. 409 `The goods supplied under the contract' makes clear that what is 
required to be of appropriate quality is not only the contract goods agreed but also the whole of 
what is supplied in purported performance of the contract, including containers and other 
articles mixed in with the contract goods. 410 The criterion to decide whether the goods are of 
satisfactory quality is whether they comply with the standard that a reasonable person would 
regard as satisfactory, taking into account the description, the price of the goods and all the 
other relevant circumstances . 
41 The following aspects of quality are also considered in 
404 The SGA s. 13 does not seem to remove the distinction between mere representation and contractual 
term. Thus, in order for a contract to be for sale by description, first of all, the descriptive statements 
must be a contractual term. See e. g., Oscar Chess Ltd v. Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325; Harlingdon & 
Leinster Enterprises Ltd v. Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd [1991] 1 QB 564; T&J Harrison v. Knowles 
and Foster [ 1918] 1 KB 608. 
405 The statements must identify the kind of goods to be supplied, rather than simply identify the 
particular item. See Ashington Piggeries Ltd v. Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441; Reardon Smith Line 
Ltd v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989. But identity could be more or less large according to 
commercial context; Reardon Smith Line Ltd v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen (Lord Wilberforce at 998). 
406 Joseph Travers & Son Ltd v. Longel Ltd [ 1947] 64 TLR 150; Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd 
v. Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd [ 19'91 ]I QB 564. 
407 The SGA s. 14(2). 
408 1d. It should be noted that all sales by a business will be assumed that it is a transaction made in the 
course of that business, even if the sale in question is a one-off or ancillary transaction. See Stevenson v. 
Rogers [1999] 1 All ER 613. 
409 The SGA s. 61(1). 
10 Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668; Wilson v. Rickett, Cockerill & Co. [1954] 1 QB 598. 
411 The SGA s. 14(2A). 
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appropriate cases to see the existence of unsatisfactory quality: fitness for all the purposes for 
which goods of that kind are commonly supplied, appearance and finish, freedom from minor 
defect, safety, and durability. 412 
Third, the question is whether the goods supplied under the contract413 are reasonably fit for 
the purpose made known to the seller. 414 Like the question as to satisfactory quality, this 
question will not be applied unless he sells the goods in the course of a business. 41' The 
particular purpose can be made either expressly or by implication so that where the goods are 
bought for their normal purpose, the buyer will be held to have impliedly made his purpose 
known to the seller and will be able to rely on this test. 416 However, this test does not apply 
where the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely or it is unreasonable for him to rely 
on the seller's skill or judgment. "" 
Fourth, the question is whether the bulk corresponds with the sample418 or the goods are free 
from any hidden defect making the quality of the goods unsatisfactory. 419 
With regard to the matter of discrepancy in quantity, although the SGA does not deal with it 
under the heading of implied conditions or warranties, 420 the SGA imposes, in substance, an 
implied condition as to quantity on the seller in a similar way to the above implied terms as to 
quality so that the seller is liable for a breach of condition in the event of the delivery of either 
412 The SGA s. 14(2B). 
413 For the meaning of `the goods supplied under the contract', see supra n. 410 and accompanying texts. 
414 The SGA s. 14(3). 
415 Id. For the definition of `business', see supra n. 408-409 and accompanying texts. 
416 Priest v. Last [1903] 2 KB 148; Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85. 
417 The SGA s. 14(3). See Wren v. Holt [1902] 1 KB 610. Cf. Manchester Liners Ltd. v. Rea [1922] 2 
AC 74. 
418 The SGA s. 15(2)(a). 
419 The SGA s. 15(2)(c). It should be noted that in the sale by sample as well as by description the buyer 
will be able to claim for the breach of the implied terms in the sale by description should the bulk of the 
goods do not correspond with the description, even though the bulk of the goods corresponds with the 
sample. The SGA s. 13(2). 
420 It is dealt with under the heading of `Performance of the Contract'. 
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excess or deficient quantity. 421 
2.1.1.3. The Directive 
The Directive uses the concept of `non-conformity with the contract' for the rules of the 
seller's guarantee liability. 422 The concept includes discrepancies in quality and delivery of 
aliud. However, the matter of discrepancies in quantity is not dealt as a kind of non-conformity 
with the contract in the Directive so that it seems to be left to the applicable domestic law. 423 
The primary test to determine non-conformity with the contract is what the parties lay down 
for qualities of the goods in the contract. "' The presumption of conformity with the contract is 
made by asking the following questions. First, do the goods comply with the description given 
by the seller and possess the qualities of the goods the seller has held out to the consumer as a 
sample or model? 425 Second, given that the consumer has made known to the seller of his 
particular purpose and the seller accepted it, are the goods fit for the particular purpose the 
421 Atiyah and Adams, Sale of Goods, (1995), at 109 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 36; Treitel, Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, (1988), at 364. For a contrary view, see infra n. 858 and accompanying texts. 
422 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.1. 
423 Cf. Oughton and Lowry, Consumer Law, (2000), at 195 (arguing that a shortage in quantity may 
amount to a breach of art. 2.2(a), i. e., non-compliance with the description given by the seller). 
424 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.1. 
425 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(a). Unlike English law, there seems to be no warrant in art. 2.2(a) for 
restricting the statements made by the seller to the contractual terms so that it may extend to mere 
representations. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, "The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees - All Talk and No Do? ", (2000) Web Journal of Current 
Legal Issues, No. 2 (seen at "http: //webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html") Notwithstanding this 
argument and that there is no provision in the Directive for the interpretation of statements, there seems to 
be no doubt in that the Directive will reach the same result as English law because most Member States 
may understand that the seller's liability for non-conformity with the description in art. 2.2(b) stands only 
on the assumption that it is a contractual term taking account of the parties' intention. If a statement does 
not amount to a contractual term, it may be distinctively dealt with under the heading of error or 
misrepresentation under domestic law. Cf. It is conceivable that although a statement is treated as a 
contractual term, it may also raise the matter of error or misrepresentation under domestic law. 
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consumer requires? 426 Third, are the goods fit for the purposes 
for which goods of the same 
type are normally used? 427 Fourth, do the goods show the quality and performance which are 
normal in goods of the same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given 
the 
nature of the goods and taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics 
of the goods made about them by the seller, the producer or his representative, particularly 
in 
advertising or on labelling? 428 Fifth, was there any lack of conformity caused by 
incorrect 
installation where installation of the consumer goods forms part of the contract and the goods 
were installed by the seller or under his responsibility? 
429 Sixth, was the consumer's incorrect 
installation due to a shortcoming in the installation instruction where he is to install the 
43° product? 
2.1.1.4. CISG 
In a similar way to the Directive, CISG is based on the concept of `lack of conformity'. 431 It is 
a unitary concept which includes not only discrepancies in quality, but also discrepancies in 
quantity, delivery of an aliud432 and defects in packaging. 433 
426 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(b). 
427 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(c). 
428 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(d). However, the seller is not bound by public statements if he shows that 
he was not aware and could not reasonably have been aware of the statement in question, or shows that 
by the time the contract was concluded the statement had been corrected, or shows that the decision to 
buy the consumer goods could not have been influenced by the statement. Directive(99/44) Art. 2.4. 
429 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.5. That is, such lack of conformity is treated as if the goods themselves did 
not conform. 
430 Id. 
431 CISG Art. 35. 
432 In CISG it is of no significance in art. 35 to distinguish between `peius' and `aliud' so that the seller's 
delivery of coffee instead of cocoa required in the contract constitutes non-conformity under art. 35 and 
accordingly, the buyer is obliged to give notice of non-conformity under art. 39. See Schwenzer, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 277 f.; Enderlein and Maskow, International Sales Law, (1992), at 
142 f.; Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 67; Schlechtriem, "The Seller's Obligations under the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", in: Galston/Smit (ed. ), 
International Sales, (1984), at 6-12/13; probably also Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 270 ff. 
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The conformity determination in CISG begins with the inquiry of what characteristics of the 
goods the parties lay down in the contract by means of description as to quantity or quality. The 
primary test is to ask whether the goods are in conformity with the quantity, quality and 
description required by the contract and they are contained or packaged in the manner required 
by the contract. 43a The requirements of the contract can be expressly or impliedly determined 
by the contract. 435 In the cases of there being no details at all or insufficient details of the 
requirements in the contract to be satisfied by the goods for the purpose of the above primary 
test, the following series of subsidiary criteria are used in order to determine the conformity of 
the goods. First, the goods must be fit for the purposes for which the goods of the same 
description would ordinarily be used. 436 Second, they must be fit for any particular purpose 
expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of concluding the contract. 
437 This 
test applies only if the buyer relied on the seller's skill and judgment, and it was reasonable for 
Cf. OLG Düsseldorf, 6U119/93,10-2-1994: seen at http: //www. jura. uni-freiburg. de/iprl/cisg/urteile/ 
test/ l15. html and http: //www. uncitral. org/en-index. htm (CLOUT No. 82) (which has taken the view that 
an aliud is a non-conforming delivery by simply stating that art. 39 was applicable in that case). Contra; 
Neumayer, in Doralt (ed. ), Das UNICITRAL-Kaufrecht im Vergleich zum österreichischen Recht, (1985), 
at 136; Bydlinski, in Doralt (ed. ), op. cit., at 137; Loewe, Internationales Kaufrecht, (1989), at 52; quoted 
in Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 278 (arguing by reference to the Secretariat's 
Commentary (O. R., at 29, Art. 29, No. 3) that an aliud is treated as a failure of delivery so that it does not 
constitute non-conformity under art. 35 and there is no need to give notice). 
433 Id 
434 CISG Art. 35(1). Unlike English law, CISG does not draw any technical distinction between different 
types of descriptive statements so that it appears that there is no warrant in art. 35 for restricting the 
seller's liability to a contractual term, but it is extended even to mere representations. See Bridge, The 
International Sale of Goods, (1999), at 82. Note that CISG gives effect to the expectation latent in any 
description of the goods (art. 35(2)(a)) and the basic rules on contract interpretation emphasise the 
understanding that statements produce in a reasonable person (art. 8). See Honnold, supra n. 218, at para 
254 f. 
43' Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 276 f.; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 432, at 141. 
436 CISG Art. 35(2)(a). Cf. The SGA s. 14(2) and Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(c). Like English law, the 
seller must furnish the goods that are fit for `all the purposes' for which the goods of the same description 
are ordinarily used. See Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 32, Art. 33, No. 5. 
437 CISG Art. 35(2)(b). Cf. The SGA s. 14(3) and Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(b). 
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him to do so. 438 Third, they must possess the qualities of goods which he has held out as a 
sample or model. 439 Fourth, they must be contained and packaged in the usual manner for such 
goods or if there is no usage to determine the usual manner, it must be in an adequate manner to 
protect and preserve the goods. 44° 
2.1.1.5. Comparative view 
The terminology used in each jurisdiction to deal with the seller's liability for the goods that 
do not coincide with the parties' expectation is different; `defect' of Korean law, `non- 
conformity' of the Directive and CISG, and `breach of implied term' of English law. Even 
though it seems needless to mention that there is no practical difference in terms of its use of 
terminology, the concept of `non-conformity' in CISG is quite distinctive from the other laws in 
the context that it is a unitary concept embracing not only discrepancies in quality, but also 
discrepancies in quantity, discrepancies in nature and defects in packaging. The following 
comparative accounts are for the question of how each law solves the problem of discrepancies 
in aspects other than quality. 
First, as regards the matter of discrepancies in quantity, Korean law deals with it separately 
under the heading of the seller's guarantee liability for defects in title, thus the requirements of 
the seller's guarantee liability for discrepancies in quantity are quite different from those for 
discrepancies in quality, 44' and unlike English law and CISG, it is limited to the cases of specific 
goods so that the cases of generic goods are governed by the rules of the general liability for 
non-performance. In English law, although it appears to be dealt with separately from the 
implied terms as to quality, there seems to be of no difference because it is, in substance, an 
implied condition. The Directive does not deal with this matter. 
438 Id. 
439 CISG Art. 35(2)(c). Cf. The SGA s. 15(2) and Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(a). 
440 CISG Art. 35(2)(d). Cf. English cases quoted in supra n. 410. 
441 It will be examined below in turn when each requirement is dealt with, inter alia, the buyer's good 
faith and absence of negligence, and the limitation period. 
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Second, regarding the matter of aliud, it is governed under the general liability for non- 
performance in Korean law. In English law, there is no doubt in that it is dealt with under the 
heading of correspondence with description, z whereas it seems uncertain that the same rule as 
English law applies in the Directive by means of using non-conformity with description because 
there may be a tendency to interpret the matter of aliud as non-performance in light of the 
Member States' own law. 
443 
Third, the matter of defects in packaging does not fall within the definition of a defect under 
the seller's guarantee liability in Korean law, which are rather governed by the rules of the 
general liability, 444 whereas CISG includes it as part of conformity of the goods so that it may 
raise the seller's liability for non-conforming goods in the event of unusual or inadequate 
packaging. 445 The position in English law is that it is treated as part of implied condition as to 
satisfactory quality and fitness for a particular purpose required by the buyer, 446 The Directive 
does not specifically deal with the matter of packaging within its scope of non-conformity, even 
though it may be arguable that goods include packaging. 
Having said that, the following accounts discuss the matter of discrepancies in quality by 
asking the question of what tests are taken to judge the existence of a defect in each law. 
First, there are two different views as to the criterion to judge the existence of a defect in 
Korean law; the objective criterion theory and the subjective criterion theory . 
44' The main 
difference between them depends upon the question of whether or not the parties' intention is 
recognised as a crucial factor to decide the existence of a defect. In this light, the position in 
English law, the Directive and CISG seems close to the subjective criterion theory in that it is 
4 42 The SGA s. 13. 
443 German law can be a unique example, which distinguishes between peius and aliud. Cf. Bradgate and 
Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
444 The defect in packaging may be categorised as a breach of ancillary duty. 
44' CISG Art. 35(2)(d). 
446 See the English cases quoted in supra n. 410. 
447 See supra n. 388-394 and accompanying texts. 
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decided not only by ordinary standards? 8 but also by the parties' intention. 
449 
Second, while the interpretation of description in the SGA s. 13 is confined to the essence or 
identity of the goods and the contractual term, "' Korean law, the Directive and CISG seem to 
employ a broader interpretation without limiting the description to the essence or identity of the 
goods and without the technical distinction between mere representation and contractual term so 
that the whole range of remedies under the seller's guarantee liability are potentially available. 
45' 
However, the buyer who relies on a contractual description which is not related to the essence 
or identity of the goods in English law may still have some remedy depending upon the nature 
and seriousness of the breach because it may fall within the category of innominate terms. 
452 In 
addition, although a descriptive statement does not amount to a contractual term, the seller may 
be liable for misrepresentation provided that the statement was found untrue and induced the 
448 E. g., fitness for the ordinary purposes (CISG Art. 35(2)(a)), being of satisfactory quality (the SGA s. 
14(2)) or being of the normal quality and performance (Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(d)). 
449 E. g., compliance with description (the SGA s. 13, Directive(99144) Art. 2.2(a), CISG Art. 35(1)), 
fitness for the purpose the buyer requires and made known to the seller (the SGA s. 14(3), 
Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(b), CISG Art. 35(2)(b)). 
450 Ashington Piggeries Ltd v. Christopher Hill Ltd [ 1972] AC 441; Reardon Smith Line Ltd v. Yngvar 
Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989. Cf. supra n. 404 (descriptive statements for the application of s. 13 
must be a contractual term). 
451 In Korean law, even though there is no such technical distinction, the rules of interpretation may 
achieve the same result as English law, which are centred on the intention of the parties. Cf. Eun-young 
Lee, supra n. 68, at 76 ff. The result may be also achieved in the Directive and CISG. See supra n. 425, 
434. One must note that so far as the Directive and CISG are concerned, the remedial scheme of the 
seller's guarantee liability under the Directive and CISG may conflict with that of error or 
misrepresentation under domestic law because it is conceivable that a statement concerning qualities of 
the goods may fall within both the issue of the seller's guarantee liability and the issue of error or 
misrepresentation. In Korean law, the majority view is that the rules as to the seller's guarantee liability 
prevail over those as to error in the event of the conflict. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 790. 
452 Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 26; The Hansa Nord 
[ 1976] QB 44. Note that a descriptive statement that is incorporated as a contractual term also retains its 
identity as an inducing misrepresentation which may give the representee the usual remedies available for 
the misrepresentation. 
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buyer to enter into a legally binding contract. 453 
Third, Korean law seems to require the particular purpose to have been contractually agreed 
upon. 454 Similarly, the requirement in the Directive of acceptance by the seller intends the 
purpose to be contractually agreed upon. 455 On the other hand, there seems to be no need for the 
purpose to have been contractually agreed upon in English law as it appears in the SGA s. 
14(3), 456 and also in CISG Art. 35(2)(b). 45' All they ask is whether it was impliedly or expressly 
made known to the seller. However, it seems that there is no real difference in practice because 
in the end both English law and CISG would make an enquiry as to what amounts to a 
contractual agreement when this is in disputes. 458 That is, the mere fact that buyer made known 
the particular purpose to the seller does not necessarily allow the buyer to insist on the particular 
purpose if the enquiry finds that the seller was deemed to raise an objection as to the purpose at 
453 Oscar Chess Ltd. v. Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370; cf. Dick Bentley v. Harold Smith [1965] 1 WLR 
623. 
454 In Korean law, whichever theory to be taken the buyer can rely on the purpose only if the purpose is 
contractually agreed. In the objective criterion theory, the seller may be liable for non-compliance with 
the purpose only if the buyer is given a warranty. On the other hand, according to the subjective criterion 
theory, the seller will be liable either if the buyer is given a warranty or if the purpose is intended by the 
parties. 
ass Directive(99/44) Art. 2.2(b). 
456 Bristol Tramways v. Fiat Motors Ltd. [1910] 2 KB 831. Cf. In another aspect, the Directive seems 
narrower than English law and CISG; the Directive appears to require the seller's actual awareness of the 
particular purpose for which the goods would be put because of the requirement of the seller's acceptance 
on that purpose, whereas English law and CISG seem to be sufficient that the seller had cause to 
recognise the purpose for which the goods would be used because the wording of s. 14(3) and art. 
35(2)(b) which focuses on the act of `making known' seems to indicate that it is sufficient if one could 
have recognised the particular purpose from the circumstances. Cf. Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra 
n. 218, at 281; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 432, at 145. But Secretariat's Commentary appears to 
require the seller's actual awareness. See Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 32, Art. 33, No. 8. 
¢57 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 281. Cf. O. R., at 316, No. 57 ff. (A German proposal 
for the requirement of a particular purpose being contractually agreed upon was rejected because it may 
unjustifiably restrict the seller's liability for the fitness of the goods for a particular purpose; UNCITRAL 
Yearbook VIII, AJCN. 9/SER. A/1977, (1978), at 37, para. 173). 
458 Cf. Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 32, Art. 33, No. 8. 
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the time of contract. 
Fourth, fitness for all the common purpose(s) for the goods of the kind in question in English 
law is qualified by the wording of `in appropriate cases', whereas the Directive, Korean law and 
CISG459 do not have the qualification so that it appears to impose an absolute requirement. 460 
For instance, assuming that the goods are not fit for one of the common purposes and a buyer 
states at the time of sale that he intends the goods for another purpose, or he does not intend to 
use the goods for the purpose for which they are unfit. In this event, there is a possibility for the 
buyer to change his mind in the former case, and to behave opportunistically relying on their 
selective unfitness for the purpose of repudiating the contract. 46' However, it seems that the 
same result would be achieved by reference to the principle of good faith, 462 
Fifth, the concept of a defect in the Directive seems to be broader than that in English law, 
Korean law and CISG in that it takes into account the public statements made about the goods 
not only by the seller, but also by the producer or his representative. 463 Therefore, the seller in 
the Directive may be liable if the goods do not correspond with the quality or performance in 
the way suggested in advertising by the manufacturer or by his representative unless the seller 
can prove one of the safeguards set out in art. 2.4. In contrast the public statements in English 
law, Korean law and CISG are only applied to the circumstances between the seller and the 
459 For the requirement of fitness for all the common purposes in CISG, see Secretariat's Commentary, 
O. R., at 32, Art. 33, No. 5. Even though it is submitted that the Directive seems a bit ambiguous about 
whether it requires fitness for all the common purposes or fitness for almost all the common purposes 
(Twigg-Flesner, "The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees, (1999) 7(2) Consumer Law Journal 177, at 181), the better view seems to extend to the 
fitness for all the common purposes. 
460 See Bridge, supra n. 434, at 80 f. 
461 Id. 
462 Id. Cf. For the principle of good faith, see CISG Art. 7(1); Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 30 ff. 
463 It seems to be still far from clear about the meaning of the public statements even though it stresses on 
advertising and labelling. It is submitted that it is intended to be wider than advertising and labelling 
themselves. Cf. Memorandum by Beal and Howells, in Minutes of Evidence (appended in Consumer 
Guarantees, 10`h Report by Select Committee, Session 1996-7, HLP 57), at 5. 
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buyer. 464 
Sixth, any lack of conformity resulting from incorrect installation by the seller or under his 
responsibility is dealt with as if the goods themselves are defective in the Directive, 465 whereas 
in English law it may arguably fall within the category of a contract for work and materials in 
some cases so that it is governed by another regime, namely the Supply of Goods and Services 
Act 1982.466 In English law a defect in the supply of services is deemed to exist only when the 
supplier does not carry out the service with reasonable care and skill, 467 whereas in the other 
jurisdictions it is strict in the context that if a supplier installs goods which fail to perform 
properly as a result of defective installation, he is liable for the failure no matter how negligent 
he was in the installation. 468 Although this seems to show a significant difference at first sight, 
it is not necessarily true since it will be often easy to prove negligence by the supplier where the 
goods installed do not work properly and common law may impose strict liability on the 
464 Cf. Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 277; Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 
273. 
465 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.5. Cf. Directive(99/44) Art. 1.4. (stating that `contracts for the supply of 
consumer goods to be manufactured or produced shall also be deemed contracts of sale for the purpose of 
this Directive'). 
466 E. g., a contract to supply and fit a gas fire or a shower. See Bradgate, "Consumer Guarantees: the 
EC's Draft Directive", (1997) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, No. 1 (seen at "http: //webjcli. ncl. ac. 
uk/1997/issuel/bradgatel. html"). 
467 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 s. 13. 
468 In CISG this is the case only where an obligation to supply or obtain labour or other services does not 
constitute the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who supplies the goods. Otherwise, it is 
left with the applicable domestic law. CISG Art. 3(2). In Korean law, no matter what the contract for 
supply of goods and services is governed by the contractor's guarantee liability for the supply of services 
(KCC Arts. 667 ff. ) or the seller's guarantee liability for defective goods (KCC Arts. 580 ff. ), there is no 
doubt in that the seller/installer is strictly liable for the result of his performance. Cf. Regarding the 
question of whether the contract for supply of goods and services is construed as a sales contract or a 
contract for work, the better view seems that it depends upon whether the contract is related to generic 
goods or specific goods; a contract related to generic goods is deemed to be a sales contract, whereas a 
contract regarding specific goods a supply of services contract. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 441 
ff.; probably Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 593 ff. Cf. BGB §651. 
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supplier. "' 
Seventh, insofar as an implied term of satisfactory quality and fitness for the purpose made 
known to the seller is concerned, it is not applied to the case of a private sale in English law, 470 
whereas it may be so in Korean law and CISG. 47 
2.1.2. Evaluating accounts 
2.1.2.1. Internal evaluation 
2.1.2.1.1. Unitary concept vs. Separate concept 
As examined above in a comparative study, Korean law separately deals with the matters of 
quality, quantity, aliud and packaging in the context that differences both in quantity and in 
quality are treated as the matters of `defect', whereas both delivery of aliud and defects in 
packaging are dealt as the matters of `non-performance'. Once the case is categorised as the 
matter of defect, it is governed by the special regime for the seller's guarantee liability resulting 
that remedies are available regardless of the fault principle, 472 but subject to a short limitation 
period of six months in the case of difference in quality and one year in the case of difference in 
quantity. 473 On the other hand, the categorisation of non-performance results that it is governed 
by the rules of the general liability for non-performance, and consequently all the remedies are 
469 IBA v. BICC Construction Ltd [ 1980] 14 BLR 9 (quoted in Bradgate, supra n. 466). Cf. Bradgate and 
Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. Notwithstanding that, the codification of the strict liability cannot be same 
as the rules in case law from the point of view of the consumer. Cf. Bradgate, supra n. 466. 
470 See supra n. 408-409,415 and accompanying texts. The same is also true in the Directive. Cf. Infra 
n. 631-635 and accompanying texts. 
471 In light of the clear wording of CISG Art. 2(a), private purchases are excluded from the application of 
the rules of CISG, but not private sales. See Herber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 32. Cf. See 
supra n. 636-640 and accompanying texts. 
472 For the remedies available in general, see supra n. 118-124 and accompanying texts. 
473 KCC Art. 582 and KCC Art. 573 respectively. 
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subject to the fault principle4? 4 and a relatively long limitation period of ten years. a"s 
As discussed in the last chapter, a problem Korean law has revealed, inter alia, as to the matter 
of aliud, is the borderline between non-performance and defect. 476 The separate treatment in the 
case may produce unjustified results to either the seller or the buyer because the substantial 
differences in terms of the remedies available and the limitation period cannot be justified in 
one breach of contract. 477 Another problem arises where a consumer is involved and has found 
a defect in the goods due to a lack of packaging. It may be unjustifiable if the consumer who 
generally expects defect-free goods and who cannot distinguish between the matters of quality 
and packaging finds that he cannot rely on the seller's guarantee liability and also he cannot 
claim any remedies under the general liability because the seller is proved to have committed no 
fault in the packaging stage. 478 The other problem is that although the matters of differences in 
quality and quantity are governed under the seller's guarantee liability, differences in quantity 
are separately dealt with as if there have been defects in title. The consequences are that some 
requirements to raise the seller's guarantee liability are quite different from those as to defects 
in quality; first, both the buyer's ignorance of the existence of a defect and the absence of 
negligence in failing to discover the defect are required in the case of defects in quality, 479 
whereas only the buyer's ignorance of the existence of a defect in the case of a shortage in 
quantity. 4' Second, the limitation period in the case of defects in quality is six months481 
474 The case of aliud is governed by the rules as to either delay or impossibility in performance (cf. some 
argue it is governed by the rules as to incomplete performance; see supra n. 104) and the case of a defect 
in packaging is governed by the rules as to incomplete performance. For the remedies as to delay, 
impossibility and incomplete performance in general, see supra n. 70-75,80-91,98-100 and 
accompanying texts. 
475 KCC Art. 162. 
476 For the examples of the borderline cases, see supra n. 325. 
477 See supra n. 325-329 and accompanying texts. 
478 Generally, the creditor must prove the debtor's fault. In the case of a consumer involved, there may 
be a transfer of the burden of proof as to fault. 
479 KCC Art. 580(1). 
480 KCC Art. 572(3). For more detail, see infra pp. 117 f. 
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compared to one year in the case of a shortage in quantity. 4S2 The differences may raise in some 
cases the following question: given that the matter of quantity is, in its nature, generally similar 
to the one of the seller's liability to deliver the goods conforming to the description as to 
quality, what is the rationale for the different treatments? 483 Overall, Korean law seems to 
ignore the fact that in some cases separate treatment cannot be justified especially when one 
considers that all the matters of aliud, packaging, quality and quantity are closely interrelated 
with each other. 
English law does not seem to encounter the same problems as in Korean law because all the 
problems are homogeneously dealt with under the name of breach of implied terms. However, 
when one considers the whole of s. 30 is simply the application of the seller's description duty 
imposed by s. 13, it is doubted whether there is any justification to treat separately between 
breaches of quality duties and breaches of quantity duties; e. g., the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977, in consumer sales, renders invalid any attempt to exclude or limit the seller's liability for 
implied conditions imposed by ss. 13-15, but only an unreasonable attempt to exclude or limit 
his liability for wrong quantity imposed by s. 30.48' 
The position in the Directive seems that there is a possibility to encounter the similar problems 
to Korean law in relation to the matters of packaging and aliud where there is still a tendency to 
look at the Directive in light of the Member States' own domestic law. 485 However, given that 
481 KCC Art. 5 82. 
482 KCC Art. 573. 
483 It has been explained for the different treatment that there is a similarity between a shortage of 
quantity and a defect in title in the context that the part of shortage is under someone else's property. See 
Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 237. However, it is doubted in that the explanation is plausible when one 
considers that the case of shortage in the seller's guarantee liability is a typical type of initial 
impossibility of performance (see supra n. 398), whereas the case of a defect in title is of no relevance of 
the initial impossibility because the defect in title is deemed to be repairable in theory. Cf. Eun-young 
Lee, supra n. 167, at 223. 
484 Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 109 f. 
485 This is the case where, in particular, Germanic legal system is involved; a lack of package and 
delivery of aliud may be treated as non-performance so that the seller may avoid his liability by proving 
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the Directive is inherited from CISG, those matters could be solved by analogical interpretation 
of Directive(99/44) art. 2 in accordance with CISG Art. 35. The residual matter is related to the 
quantity issue which is not specified in the Directive and left open to domestic law. The 
consequence is that a consumer may not bring the Directive's remedial scheme into play in the 
event of a breach of quantity duty so that it is separately dealt with from breach of quality 
duty. 496 
CISG uses a unitary concept of `non-conformity with the contract', embracing not only 
differences in quality, but also differences in quantity, delivery of aliud and defects in 
packaging. Namely, those matters are dealt with in a unitary manner in the context that the 
buyer may rely on the same remedial scheme. Although it does not necessarily solve all the 
problems each jurisdiction has, the unitary manner using the concept of `non-conformity' seems 
to give at least some idea as a suggestion of how to solve those problems. 
2.1.2.1.2. The objective criterion theory vs. The subjective criterion theory 
There have been the opposing views as to the criterion to judge the existence of a defect in 
Korean law; the objective criterion theory and the subjective criterion theory. The disputes as to 
the criterion are closely connected with the arguments regarding the nature of the seller's 
guarantee liability; the legal liability theory, as a matter of course, believes in the objective 
criterion because the theory is based on the idea that the seller's guarantee liability is an effect 
of non juristic act, which is imposed by the law regardless of the parties' intention, 487 whereas 
the contractual liability theory insists on that the parties' intention (subjective criterion) should 
not be disregarded because the seller's guarantee liability from the point of view of the 
contractual liability theory is imposed on the basis of the contract, namely, the parties' 
the absence of fault. 
486 It seems to be required to expressly insert in the Directive the duty as to quantity. 
487 Cf supra pp. 30 ff. 
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intention. 48' Insofar as the latter theory has been found more suitable under the existing KCC 
than the former theory in the last chapter, there seems to be no doubt in that the subjective 
criterion is superior to the objective criterion. 489 In addition, the objective criterion cannot be 
supported in the following two aspects. First, the criterion supported by most scholars before 
the present KCC came into force cannot be brought into the present law because, unlike the 
present law, the seller's guarantee liability at that time was not applied to generic goods, but 
only to specific goods. 49° Second, the objective criterion proves itself contradictory by allowing 
the subjective criterion to be used in the exceptional cases of the seller's warranty on the 
specific quality so that it reveals the objective criterion cannot stand as a comprehensive 
concept. 49' Furthermore, as examined in the comparative study, English law, the Directive and 
CISG also support the subjective criterion theory in that a defect should be decided not only by 
ordinary standards, but also by reference to what the parties intended. 492 
2.1.2.1.3. Other issues 
With respect to the question whether the seller's guarantee liability should take into account 
public statements made not only by the seller but also by the producer or his representative, 
unlike the Directive, English law, Korean law and CISG concern only to the statements by the 
seller. Although it could be justified in some cases of merchant sales, the problem is in 
consumer sales where the consumer often purchases branded goods relying on manufacturer's 
advertisements. It seems to be unreasonable if the seller is excluded from his liability by 
proving that it was not his statement because insofar as he takes some benefits from the 
Ogg Cf. supra pp. 38 ff. 
489 For the discussion about `legal liability vs. contractual liability', see supra pp. 68 ff., 77 f. 
490 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 392, at 16 ff. 
491 Id. In contrast, the subjective criterion can be a comprehensive concept to judge the existence of a 
defect because even an ordinary standard which may fall within an objective criterion is understood as a 
standard the parties already assumed in the contract. See id., at 18. Cf. For the similar approach in 
English law, see supra n. 416 and accompanying texts. 
492 See supra n. 447-449 and accompanying texts. 
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statement, it seems reasonable to impose on the seller liability for the statement in certain 
circumstances493 except, first, where he was not, and could not reasonably have been aware of 
it, 494 second, where he corrected it at the time of sale, and third, where it could not have 
influenced the consumer's decision to purchase the goods. "' 
As regards the position in Korean law and CISG, unlike English law, the rules as to the 
existence of a defect are normally applied even to a private sale, and thus the question arises as 
to whether it could be justified where a private seller sells goods to a merchant buyer. 496 The 
rules are open textured so that the same criteria as in the sale involving a merchant seller may 
not be applied to the private sale. However, it seems unreasonable when one considers a case 
where a merchant buyer, who has a specific knowledge on goods, recklessly pays more than a 
normal price and later sues a private seller, who has no such knowledge, on the basis of that the 
goods are not of a satisfactory quality in terms of value for the money he paid. 
2.1.2.2. External evaluation 
2.1.2.2.1. Unitary concept vs. Separate concept 
As discussed above in the internal evaluation, the problems inherent in Korean law were 
mainly due to having separate concepts as regards quality, aliud, quantity and packaging even 
though they are closely interrelated. The matter of having the separate concept could be 
questioned by the following two criteria in light of efficiency; first, does it provide the parties 
with certainty as to the separate rules? 497 Second, is it enough to reflect the parties' preference in 
the context that it reflects what would have been mutually agreed between the parties had they 
493 Accord; Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 30. 
494 This is the case, e. g., where it was advertised only in some other area. 
44' Directive(99/44) Art. 2.4. 
496 See supra n. 470-471 and accompanying texts. 
497 For the importance of certainty or clarity in promoting efficiency of the rules, see supra n. 38-40 and 
accompanying texts. See also supra n. 52-55 and accompanying texts for another importance in 
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decided to negotiate for it? 98 
In relation to the matter of aliud, it has been particularly problematic in a borderline case in a 
way that raises uncertainty as to whether the case falls within the category of non-performance 
or defect. As discussed in the last chapter, insofar as there is no clear guidelines to distinguish 
between those categories, it seems to lead to a form of market failure which causes the increase 
of transactions costs for the parties uncertain about their rights or liabilities to cope with the 
uncertain situation and the increase of likelihood of litigation due to the uncertainty about the 
possible outcome at trial. 49' The uncertainty may result in even more severe market failure in a 
consumer context because it could prevent the consumer's easier access to the relevant rules and 
consequently the merchant seller may easily take advantage of the ignorant consumer. In 
addition, the separate treatment of aliud does not seem to reflect the parties' preference in that 
the parties do not generally expect that they simply promise to do their best as to the matter of 
aliud, but expect that they guarantee non-defective goods. soo 
Leaving the matter of packaging to the rules of the general liability may increase the 
transaction costs since it may cause the court difficulties where it is hard to find whether the 
cause of a defect was an inherent defect or packaging. Besides, the separate treatment of 
packaging does not seem to reflect the parties' general preference because given that packaging 
is closely related to the matter of quality, the parties are likely to extend the guarantee of defect- 
free goods to the goods being packaged in the manner usual for such goods or in a manner 
adequate to preserve and protect the goods. This is truer to the reality of a contract involving 
the consumer who may generally expect defect-free goods actually in their hands without 
consumer sales. 
'98 Cf. supra n. 32-34,41-42 and accompanying texts. 
499 Cf supra n. 368-370 and accompanying texts. It seems true that the court may generally find the 
existence of the seller's fault on the delivery of aliud, but there is no guarantee of this, and thus it may 
still increase the transaction costs. 
500 The preference seems to become clearer when one considers exchange transactions in the modern 
world which are very largely standardised and quickly executed in the context that the parties are 
generally treated as guaranteeing the certain result. Cf. Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 549 f. 
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distinguishing between the matters of packaging and quality. 
The treatment of a shortage in quantity as defects in title does not seem to raise the matter of 
uncertainty regarding the relevant rules. However, the question arises whether the separate 
treatment of a shortage in quantity from defects in quality reflects the parties' preference. It 
seems that the parties are likely to deal with the matter of shortage in quantity under the same 
heading as defects in quality rather than defects in title because, as was argued in the internal 
evaluation, it is closely related to the matter of description as to quality, although the 
consequences of the separate treatment do not seem to be an issue on which one can easily 
assert what the parties' preference would be. 501 In addition, the application of the seller's 
guarantee liability only to the cases of a shortage in quantity of specific goods does not seem to 
reflect the parties' preference in that they do not generally expect that the cases of specific 
goods are governed by the seller's guarantee liability, whereas the cases of generic goods are 
left to the rules of the general liability which is subject to the fault principle. In particular, the 
consumer may be surprised when he finds he has no remedies at all for a shortage in quantity of 
generic goods when the seller is proved not to be at fault on the shortage. Even if the court may 
find the seller's fault in most cases for a shortage in quantity of generic goods, one must note 
that there is no guarantee about that, and consequently it causes the increase of transaction costs 
to make clear the seller's strict liability on a shortage in quantity of generic goods. 
As to the problems of the Directive found in the internal evaluation above, 502 the evaluation in 
terms of efficiency executed in Korean law could be correspondingly applied to the matters of 
aliud, packaging and quantity in the Directive. 503 
50 t For the consequences of the treatment, see supra n. 479-482 and accompanying texts. The 
consequences may reflect the parties' preference in a consumer context that it is understandable to avoid 
the harshness in the case of a defect in quality (i. e., the shorter limitation period of six months and the 
absence of negligence requirement). 
502 See supra n. 485-486 and accompanying texts. 
503 Insofar as the matter of a shortage in quantity is left to the domestic law, as discussed above in Korean 
law, the consumer may be surprised where the consumer realises that he has no remedies at all for a 
shortage in quantity by virtue of the domestic law (e. g., German law which the seller's guarantee liability 
104 
Although English law has no such unitary concept as CISG, it cannot be said its rules are 
inefficient in economic terms because it does not at least face the same problems as in Korean 
and the Directive. 114 However, it is doubted whether the consequences of the expulsion of the 
matter of quantity from the one of quality with regard to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
are properly reflecting the parties' preference in a consumer context. 505 
On the other hand, CISG having an unitary concept of `non-conformity' seems to enhance its 
certainty which reduces the transaction costs for the parties and to properly secure the parties' 
preference because insofar as the concept embraces not only the matter of quality, but also 
quantity, aliud, and packaging, there is no need to distinguish between them, and the concept is 
governed under the unified liability system which is of no relevance of the fault principle. 
2.1.2.2.2. The objective criterion theory vs. The subjective criterion theory 
One must refer to the previous evaluation on the nature of the seller's guarantee liability 
since, as discussed above, the issue of `the objective criterion theory vs. the subjective criterion 
theory' is basically relied on the matter of the nature of the seller's guarantee liability. 5o6 Given 
that the evaluation has proved that the nature is a contractual liability on the basis of that the 
dual liability system is inferior to the unified liability system due to its complexities and 
uncertainty and the only vehicle to unify the dual liability system is a contract, 507 it seems that 
the subjective criterion theory supported by the contractual liability theorists is more efficient in 
the way that it reduces the transaction costs which would otherwise increase due to the 
complexities and uncertainty elements. In addition, the subjective criterion theory seems to be 
is not applied to the cases of shortage in quantity, but left to the rules of the general liability). In this 
light, it seems to increase the transaction costs to amend the rules based on the fault principle as to a 
shortage in quantity. 
504 This is because all the matters of quality, aliud, quantity, and packaging are governed by the strict 
liability rules and they are homogeneously dealt with under the name of breach of implied terms. 
505 See supra n. 484 and accompanying texts. 
506 See supra n. 372 and accompanying texts. 
507 id# 
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in a better position to enhance the efficient situation because, unlike the objective criterion 
theory, it is mainly focused on the parties' intention to judge the existence of a defect. 
2.1-2.2.3. Other issues 
With respect to the matter of the public statements made by the producer to be taken 
into 
account, the parties' preference in consumer sales is likely to include the statements in their 
judgment for the existence of a defect because, as discussed in the internal evaluation, the 
consumer often relies on them in making his decision to purchase the goods and the merchant 
seller takes some benefits from them. Otherwise, it would undermine an optimal operation of 
market place because the statements are deemed of part of an overall exchange for which the 
buyer's price is given. However, it is quite unlikely where, first, the seller has no reason to 
know of them, second, the consumer has no reason to be influenced by them in his purchase, 
and third, the seller corrected them at the time of sale. 508 Although it is arguable that the same 
is also true in some cases of commercial sales, it does not necessarily mean that it is appropriate 
to include the public statements in all commercial sales because in many cases commercial 
buyers rely on rather their own expertise than the staternents. so9 
Regarding Korean law and CISG, in that the rules as to the existence of a defect are 
508 See supra n. 493-495 and accompanying texts. It is doubted whether the second situation where the 
seller is not bound by the statements if he proves that the buyer's decision to purchase the goods could 
not have been influenced by the statements is justified. As long as the statements made to the public as a 
whole appear to become part of bundle of attributes that the buyer purchases, the exception based on the 
statements that could not have been influenced the buyer's decision may undermine a market-based 
standard for legal guarantees. That is, it may deny the buyer's claim for non-conforming goods based on 
such statements even though they are included in the price the buyer paid. See Holdych, "Warranties and 
Conditions in the Sale of Goods: A Market Based Assessment of English and European Community 
Warranty Law", (1998) 29 Cambrian Law Review 73, at 86. One of the reasons for this seems that even 
if some buyers do not value the statements, rejecting enforcement of the legal warranty would undermine 
the utility of such promises in a sense that a rule allowing the seller to inquire into the subjective 
preference of purchases would inject substantial uncertainty into the enforcement of such promises, 
increasing transaction costs. Id., at 82. 
509 Cf. Lando and Beale (ed. ), Principles of European Contract Law, (2000), at 299 if. 
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unexceptionally applied to a private sale, it seems to fail to reflect the private sellers' interests 
which may be distinguished from the merchant sellers' when one considers the case given in the 
above internal evaluation. 510 This is because, assuming that most private sellers are risk-averse, 
they are not likely to take a risk that a buyer claims non-satisfactory quality in terms of value for 
money at the later stage. In the case stated in the internal evaluation, it may be more efficient if 
the buyer takes the risk insofar as he has much more knowledge of the goods than the seller. 
2.2. The time when a defect must exist 
2.2.1. Comparative accounts 
2.2.1.1. Korean law 
Further to the matter of the definition of a defect, another matter is in the question of when a 
defect must exist for the purpose of raising the seller's guarantee liability. In Korean law, 
insofar as discrepancies in quality are concerned, this matter is particularly related to the 
debates as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability. According to the legal liability theory, 
it maintains that the time when a defect must exist is at the time of concluding the contract. 
This is because, as examined before, its theoretical understanding is based on the principle of 
impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma which is related to the time when the 
contract was entered into. "" 
On the other hand, the contractual liability theory contends that the relevant time should be 
when risk passes to the buyer. 512 It is generally submitted that the time for the transfer of risk is 
510 See supra p. 102. 
s" For the details about the principle, see supra pp. 33 f. However, as long as the sale of generic goods 
is concerned, it is the time when the goods are specified. See supra n. 149 and accompanying texts. One 
scholar among the contractual liability theorists also argues that the relevant time is the time when the 
generic goods are specified. See Sang-yong Kim, supra n. 392, at 238. 
512 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 338 f.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 221; Choon-soo Ahn, supra 
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related to the time when the goods are delivered to the buyer in both the sale of specific goods 
and the sale of generic goods. 513 Therefore, the defect must exist, at least in embryo, at the time 
that the buyer takes over the goods, i. e., upon the change in control over thern. 
As regards the cases of discrepancies in quantity, a shortage or a partial loss must exist at the 
time of entering into the contract. 514 
2.2.1.2. English law 
In English law, although it is far from clear, the better view seems that the goods must 
correspond to the terms of the contract at the time when risk passes to the buyers'' Therefore, 
the relevant time when the quality of the goods must be assessed to decide whether a defect 
exists or not is the time of the passage of risk. " It may often correspond with the time of 
n. 167, at 427 ff.; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 392, at 13 f. and 16 ff.; Sang-yong Kim, supra n. 392, at 237. 
Cf. Unlike Korean law, German law stipulates in the code that a defect must exist at the time when risk 
passes from the seller to the buyer. See BGB §459(1). 
513 No provision for this principle in KCC, but it is generally agreed by scholars. See Bun-young Lee, 
supra n. 167, at 145 ff. and 221 (She is based on the idea that the risk generally passes when the property 
is transferred to the buyer and the transfer of property occurs at the time of delivery); Hyung-bae Kim, 
supra n. 67, at 160 ff. and 338 ff. (In contrast to Prof. Lee, he concludes the relevant time is when goods 
are delivered on the ground that the completion of bearance of risk as when a party completed all the 
performances must be distinguished from the concept of the passage of risk and the passage of risk should 
be divorced from the transfer of property because the buyer is normally in a better position to protect 
against the economic consequences after he takes over the goods even if the transfer of property has not 
occurred yet). Cf. Contrary to Korean law, this principle is stipulated in the German law code. See BGB 
§446(1). 
514 KCC Art. 574. One must note that it is only related to the specific goods. See supra n. 397-398 and 
accompanying texts. The matter of a partial loss subsequent to the conclusion of the contract is dealt with 
either the rules of the general liability or the rules as to the passage of risk. In the cases of generic goods, 
the relevant time seems the time of passage of risk that is governed by virtue of the rules of the general 
liability. 
515 Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), Benjamin's Sale of Goods, (1997), para. 11-062. 
516 Id Cf. Regarding the case where a defect becomes apparent after the risk is transferred, the position 
is that the requirement of durability as given in s. 14(2B)(e) does not put off the time when a defect must 
exist until it becomes apparent, but it rather requires that at the time of the passage of risk they should be 
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delivery. However, it does not necessarily mean that risk passes when delivery takes place 
because the transfer of risk and delivery are often not concurrent, even though risk passes at the 
time of delivery in some cases. 5' This may be the case where a buyer purchases a specific 
second hand car and agrees to collect it the following day because while the property in the car 
and the risk of damage to it may pass to the buyer immediately, "' the delivery is postponed 
until the buyer's collection. "' The time of the passage of risk seems to be also decisive in the 
cases of discrepancies in quantity. 
2.2.1.3. The Directive 
Although the Directive does not clearly address the time when a defect must exist, it can be 
inferred from art. 2 which requires the seller to ensure that the goods which are delivered to the 
consumer are in conformity with the contract of sale. 52° That is, the relevant time at which a 
in such a condition that they will remain fit for purpose and of satisfactory quality for a reasonable period. 
See Law Commission 160, `Sale and Supply of Goods', (1987), at para. 3.52. Cf. Lambert v. Lewis 
[ 1982] AC 225; Mash & Murrell v. Emmanuel [ 1961 ]1 WLR 862; Healy v. Howlett & Sons [ 1917] 1 KB 
337. 
517 For the cases holding that the implied terms are related to the time of delivery, see Henry Kendall & 
Sons v. William Lillico & Sons [ 1969] 2 AC 31,118; Lambert v. Lewis [ 1982] AC 225,276; Jackson v. 
Rotax [1910] 2 KB 937,945; Lee v. York Coach and Marine [1977] RTR 35,43. In principle, the 
passage of risk occurs when the property in the goods is transferred to the buyer whether delivery has 
been made or not unless otherwise agreed by the contractual parties. The SGA s. 20(1). The property is 
transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties intend it to be transferred. The SGA s. 17(1). 
518 The SGA s. 18, r. 1. 
519 Bradgate, supra n. 466. In this case the second hand car is deemed to be constructively delivered to 
the buyer when the contract was made and thereafter the seller may be liable as bailee for loss of or 
damage to the goods due to negligence on his part. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
520 Accord; Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425; probably Shears, Zollers & Hurd, "It will be the 
Biggest Change to Consumer Rights for 20 Years", (2000) J. B. L. 262, at 272. Cf. Recital 17. Contra; 
Singleton, "The Consumer Guarantees Directive 1999/44", (1999) 18(2) Tr. Law 126, at 127 (stating `at 
the time of purchase'). Like English law, the requirement of durability that may be given by art. 2.2. does 
not seem that goods should remain true to the fitness and quality standards for a reasonable period but 
that at the time of delivery they should be in a condition that they will not deteriorate no more rapidly 
than might be reasonably expected. 
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defect must exist is the time of delivery. 52' It must be noted that the references to the time of 
delivery do not necessarily imply that the Member States must change their rules on the passing 
of risk. "' 
2.2.1.4. CISG 
As to the time when a defect must exist, CISG provides that the seller is liable for any lack of 
conformity basically at the time when the risk passes to the buyer. 523 The seller is even liable 
for a lack of conformity, the cause of which already exists at the time of the passage of risk, 
even though it becomes apparent only after that time. 524 Therefore, the decisive moment when a 
defect must exist is the time at which the risk passes. 525 The passage of risk in CISG, in 
principle, depends on physical acts of transfer of possession (i. e., the handing over of the goods 
52' However, the Directive does not provide any rules as to what is meant by `delivery' so that this matter 
seems to be left open to domestic laws. 
522 Recital 14. Cf. Twig-Flesner argues that such a change seems desirable to ensure the Member States 
to take account of the approach taken in the Directive where the relevant time in domestic law is the time 
of the passing of risk of which is not linked to the time of delivery (e. g., the passage of risk linked with 
the transfer of property). Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 459, at 179. Cf. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 
425. 
523 CISG Art. 36(1). 
524 Id. CISG also provides that, even if a lack of conformity occurs even after the passage of risk, the 
seller is liable for the lack of conformity of which is due to the breach of a guarantee that for a period of 
time the goods will remain fit for their ordinary purpose or for a particular purpose or will retain specified 
qualities or characteristics (CISG Art. 36(2)). Similarly to English law and the Directive, the decisive 
moment is here again at the time of the passage of risk because the seller was in the breach of a guarantee 
at the time of the passage of risk in a sense that the goods were not in such a condition to remain useful at 
that time. 
525 However, the principle may be rebuttable when the lack of conformity which exists even after the 
passage of risk is due to a breach of any of the seller's obligations (CISG Art. 36(2)). The seller's breach 
includes not only the one occurred before and also after the passing of risk; for instance, in the former 
case, any lack of conformity due to the selection of an unreliable carrier, the choice of wrong route, or 
defective operating instructions, in the latter cases, any lack of conformity where the seller damages the 
goods when collecting his containers, where components are damaged in the course of a contract of sale 
with assembly obligations which falls as a whole under CISG. See Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra 
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to the buyer or a carrier). "' 
2.2.1.5. Comparative view 
As examined above, in Korean law, the time at which a defect as to quality must exist is 
broadly divided into two opposing views; the time of entering into the contract and the time of 
the passage of risk. The latter view seems close to English law and CISG in that a defect must 
exist at the time of the passage of risk. However, it is understood in Korean law and CISG that 
the passage of risk generally occurs when the goods are handed over, whereas it does not 
always concur with the handing over of the goods in English law. The practical difference 
would be explained by the example case in respect of the sale of the specific second hand car 
which was given in the English law section. "' Assuming that the goods are damaged before 
delivery without the seller's fault, but after the transfer of property, the buyer in Korean law and 
CISG may be able to rely on the seller's guarantee liability on the ground of the existence of a 
n. 218, at 291; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 432, at 150. 
526 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 393; Hager, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 504,512; Enderlein and 
Maskow, supra n. 432, at 255 f.; Stocks, "Risk of Loss under the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Comparative Analysis 
and Proposed Revision of UCC Section 2-509 and 2-5 10", (1993) 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1415, at 1439 ff. Cf. 
Roth, "The Passing of Risk", (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 291. Cf. For the detailed rules of arts. 66-70 as 
to the passage of risk under CISG, see Hager, id., at 501 ff. Cf. CISG abandoned the approach taken by 
ULIS of linking the passage of risk to the concept of delivrance because of the excessively complicated 
nature of `delivrance' based on its quite different functions to define the seller's obligations, the time and 
place for making payment and the passage of risk. In particular, the rules on the passage of risk under 
ULIS were proved to be unnecessarily complicated in the case of the delivery of defective goods because 
the seller would retain the risk indefinitely even if the buyer kept the goods so that it was required a 
special provision (art. 97(2)) to drop the link between the passage of risk and delivrance (see UNCITRAL 
Yearbook III, A/CN. 9/SER. A/1972, (1973), at 31-40; UNCITRAL Yearbook V, A/CN. 9/SER. A/1974, 
(1975), at 89-94; UNCITRAL Yearbook VI, A/CN. 9/SER. A/1975, (1976), at 108-110; Honnold, supra n. 
724, at 73-82,168-173,233-235). Cf. Note that the concept of delivrance is meant the handing over of 
conforming goods in art. 19 of ULIS. It is not delivery in the English sense because if the goods are 
defective there will be no delivrance. Nor does it amount to performance by the seller of his part of the 
contract because if the buyer refuses to accept conforming goods there will be no delivrance. 
'27 See supra n. 518-519 and accompanying texts. 
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defect at the time of handing over of the goods, 528 whereas English law may not allow it . 
529 The 
result seems to be due to the differences as to the rules of the passage of risk. 
53o 
2.2.2. Evaluating accounts 
2.2.2.1. Internal evaluation 
The disputes in Korea concerning the relevant time when a defect must exist are basically 
related to the arguments as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability; the legal liability 
theory insists `at the time of contract' and the contractual liability theory `at the time of the 
passage of risk'. Insofar as it has been found the latter theory more reasonable for the present 
KCC in the last chapter, the time when a defect must exist should be understood the time of the 
passage of risk. 53' In addition, the position in English law and CISG, which maintains the time 
of the passage of risk, supports this view. 
The next question is related to whether the passage of risk should be linked to the transfer of 
property or the handing over of goods. Given that a party who takes physical control over the 
goods is generally in a better position to protect against the economic consequences, it is 
528 The position in CISG relies on art. 69. 
529 However, if such loss or damage was proved due to negligence on the seller's part, he may be liable 
as bailee for loss of or damage to the goods. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. Cf. Compared 
to English law, Korean law and CISG appear to give more room for the buyer to rely on the seller's 
guarantee liability. However, it is not necessarily true because it is conceivable that the handing over of 
the goods occurs before the transfer of property so that English law may provide more room for the buyer 
than the others. Cf. Note that the position in the Directive is not clear because the rules as to the passage 
of risk is left to domestic laws. 
530 While the passage of risk in sales law is, in effect, linked to the handing over of the goods in Korean 
law and CISG (KCC Arts. 188(1), 569(1); CISG Arts. 66 ff. ), it is related to the transfer of property in 
English law based on the principle of res perlt domino (the SGA s. 20(1)). Cf. Like English law, Prof. 
Lee in Korea also links the passage of risk to the transfer of property, but it must be noted that the transfer 
of property in Korean law is connected with the moment of the buyer's actual possession of the goods, 
whereas that in English law to the intention of the parties. See supra n. 513. 
531 For the discussion regarding `legal liability vs. contractual liability', see supra pp. 68 ff. 
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doubted whether the passage of risk should be inevitably interrelated with the transfer of 
property. For instance, the problem arises, as examined above in the English law section, where 
the specific second hand car is damaged before delivery but after the transfer of property. 
Although it appears to be true that the seller would be liable for such damage in English law 
provided that he was negligent, 532 one must ask if this would be a right answer when one takes 
account of the fact that the seller was in a better position to take care of the car. The problem 
seems to be even clearer in a consumer context because the seller may not be liable unless 
negligence on his part is proved. In this sense, the approach taken by the contractual liability 
theory in Korean law and CISG seems to give a more plausible suggestion to the problem in 
question. 
2.2.2.2. External evaluation 
As discussed above, the disputes in Korean law as to the relevant time when a defect must 
exist basically rely upon the matter of the nature of the seller's guarantee liability. Given that 
the external evaluation in the last chapter has proved that the nature is a contractual one because 
the dual liability system is inferior to the unified liability system due to its complexities and 
uncertainty and the only vehicle to unify the dual liability system is a contract, 533 it seems 
natural to assert that the time of passage of risk supported by the contractual liability theory 
would lead to more efficient results in their transaction. Furthermore, although it appears to be 
theoretically possible from the perspective of economists that the buyer may not want the 
relevant time to be that of the passage of risk insofar as he gets value for money in a sense that a 
higher risk bearing53a is compensated by a lower price, most buyers who are assumed risk- 
averse in general may be prepared to pay more not to take the higher risk. 
53' The position may be same as the legal liability theory in Korean law, according to which the damage 
that occurs after the time of contract is governed by the general liability which is based on the fault 
principle. 
533 See supra n. 372 and accompanying texts. 
534 I. e., taking the risk of a defect after the time of contract. 
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The next discussion concerns with whether the passage of risk should be linked with the 
transfer of property or the handing over of goods. The parties' preference seems that they 
would try to effectively allocate the unforeseen risks to the more efficient risk bearer who could 
better prevent the risks from occurring or who could better insure against a realised risk. 535 In 
this light, the superior risk bearer seems to be generally the one who takes physical control over 
the goods rather than the one who takes control over the property. Thus, the relevant time 
should be connected to the time of handing over of the goods. In this way, the parties as 
rational maximizers of their self-interest minimise the transaction cost and in turn maximise the 
joint profit. 536 
2.3. Burden of proof 
2.3.1. Comparative accounts 
According to the traditional rules governing the burden of proof as to the existence of a defect, 
it will bear the buyer if he invokes the seller's guarantee liability in Korean law. 537 The same is 
535 Cf. Supra n. 35-36 and accompanying texts. 
536 Cf. Another issue to be discussed is related to the matter of distance sales in a consumer context. For 
instance, a consumer found goods defective when they were handed over from a postman, but it was 
proved that the goods were not defective at all and well packaged in a condition to be capable of 
surviving the anticipated carriage when they were posted. In this case, most law would say that the seller 
are not liable for the defective goods because once he puts the goods in the hands of an independent 
carrier, the risk is deemed to have been transferred to the consumer and he is released from the liability 
for the defective goods. See CISG Art. 67(1); Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425; Sang-yong 
Kim, supra n. 93, at 54 ff.; Kyung-hak Jang, Chae-kwon-chong-ron (General Rules in Obligatory Law), 
(1992), at 48 ff.; Jung-pyung Im, supra n. 94, at 70 ff. The question arises whether this result reflects the 
consumer's interest. Although it is theoretically possible that the risk in transit may be born by the 
consumer if it can be compensated by the lower price, the assumption of the consumer being risk-averse, 
i. e., he is most interested in defect-free goods in his actual hands, seems to result in that the seller is the 
one who may take the risk in transit. Therefore, it is suggested that the Directive that does not stipulate 
the rules as to delivery should be interpreted that the relevant time should be at the time of the buyer's 
actual possession of the goods in relation to distance sales. Accord; Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, id. 
537 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 392, at 20. 
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also true in English law so that the buyer must prove that one of the implied terms specified 
in 
the SGA has been broken at the time of the passage of risk. 538 The position in CISG is far from 
clear about who bears the burden of proof; it may be on the buyer539 or the seller. 
540 Like 
Korean law and English law, the Directive also seems to be based on the burden of proof on the 
buyer. However, unlike English law and Korean law, it has an expressive legal presumption of 
the existence of a defect providing for a partial reversal of the burden of proof regarding the 
moment of the existence of a defect in favour of the consumer for a short period of six months 
after delivery. 54' Therefore, insofar as the Directive is concerned, it is up to the seller to rebut 
the presumption of the existence of a defect until a six months period as from delivery is 
exhausted, but afterwards it lies with the consumer to establish the existence upon delivery. 
"' It 
should be, however, noted that it would not be applied if the presumption of the existence of a 
defect were incompatible with the nature of the goods or the nature of the lack of conformity. 543 
In that case the burden of proof is passed on to the consumer to prove the existence upon 
delivery, in which he might find not easy to do. It is not clear if there is such specific reversal 
of the burden of proof in CISG. However, it could be derived from the analogical interpretation 
of art. 36(2) in the case of a guarantee of durability, 544 That is, if after the passing of risk the 
538 Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 44. 
539 Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 432, at 149 f; Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 287 f.; 
Weiser, "Die Vertragsverletzung des Verkäufers und ihre Sanktion", in Doralt (ed. ), supra n. 432, at 110 
(quoted in Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 288). 
540 Huber, "Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf eines Obereinkommens über internationale Warenkaufverträge", 
Rabels Z. 43 (1979), at 479 f. (quoted in Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 432, at 149) See also 
Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 288 f. (once the buyer has given notice as to non- 
conformity, the seller has to prove that the goods are conformed with the contract at the time of the 
passage of risk, but if the buyer accepted the goods without notice, then the burden of proof is reversed). 
54' Directive(99/44) Art. 5.3. 
542 Explanatory Memorandum to the first Draft COM (95) 520 final, at 12. 
543 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.3. 
544 The guarantees of durability in art. 36(2) may be `expressly or impliedly' given to the buyer. See 
Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 293; Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 68. An implied 
guarantee may arise either from the interpretation of the contract, and hence from the actual but 
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lack of conformity becomes apparent that the goods do not conform with a guarantee of 
durability given by the seller, it is said, prima facie, that a defect existed at the time of the 
passage of risk, accordingly, the burden of proof is passed onto the seller to prove that the 
defect was attributed to a external impact which is outside of his sphere of responsibility. 
545 
In English law, although there is no comparable provision as to the legal presumption in the 
SGA, 546 it is submitted that the qualifications to the presumption make the current legal position 
in English law more or less the same, in which a de facto presumption often exists, 54' since the 
provision simply makes a express legal presumption out of what would, in any event, have been 
a de facto presumption . 
54' The position in Korean law would be similar to English law. 549 
2.3.2. Evaluating accounts 
Although there is no difference in the relevant rules, the introduction of a genuine legal 
presumption may be of assistance to the consumer in surmounting any initial resistance by the 
seller to accept the consumer's complaint on the ground of non-existence of a defect upon 
delivery, preventing the seller shifting the cost of proof on to the consumer, in particular, where 
it is very hard in technical terms and expensive for the consumer to prove the existence of a 
unmentioned wish of the parties, or from legal guarantees deduced from the presumed or fictitious wish 
of the parties. See Ghestin's speech in O. R. at 313. Contra; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 150. 
For the further discussion in detail as to this matter, O. R. at 312 ff. 
545 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 292,294; probably Schlechtriem, supra n. 432, at 6- 
26; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 151; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 265. 
546 Cf. The SGA s. 14(2B)(e) durability can be considered as a factor of quality. 
'" The presumption will come into play only when the goods are of a type where one would not expect 
such a defect to occur within six months, unless the goods had been defective on delivery, or had been 
subsequently damaged or abused, and when the defect is not likely to have been caused by damage or 
abuse in light of the nature of the defect. See Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 31. 
548 10`h Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 17; Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 31. The 
Select Committee suggested that the presumption would not produce major change in English law. See 
10`h Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 32. 
549 No provision for the legal presumption in KCC, but see Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 219. 
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guarantee liability where one would have discovered the defect had he taken reasonable care. 55a 
There are no straightforward rules as to when the buyer was negligent in failing to discover the 
defect. It should be individually determined by having regard to the practices between the 
contractual parties, the nature and state of the goods in question and etc. 555 One must note that, 
unlike defects in quality, the buyer who wants to raise the seller's guarantee liability for 
discrepancies in quantity need only show that he was unaware of the discrepancies at the time of 
contract, irrespective of his negligence in failing to discover the discrepancies in quantity. 556 
3.1.1.2. English law 
The corresponding rules in English law can be found in the SGA s. 14(2C). The buyer cannot 
rely on the implied terms of satisfactory quality in the following cases. The first case is where 
any matter making the quality of goods unsatisfactory is specifically drawn to the buyer's 
attention before the contract is made. 557 The second case is where the buyer's actual 
examination of the goods before the contract is concluded ought to reveal the unsatisfactory 
quality. 558 The third case is where, in the case of a sale by sample, the unsatisfactory quality 
would have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample. ss9 It should be noted that 
the requirements are applied only to the implied term of satisfactory quality, but not to the other 
implied terms of correspondence with description, fitness with a particular purpose, 
correspondence with sample, and not to the seller's duty to deliver the correct quantity. 
However, the requirement of the buyer's reasonable reliance incorporated into the terms in ss. 
554 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 221; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 340; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 
74, at 246. Note that this requirement does not necessarily demand the buyer's duty to examine the 
goods. 
555 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 221; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 311. 
556 KCC Art. 572(3). This is derived from the result that the cases as to discrepancies in quantity are 
correspondingly governed by the rules as to discrepancies in title. 
557 The SGA s. 14(2C)(a). 
sss The SGA s. 14(2C)(b). Note that there is no buyer's duty to examine at all. See Bradgate, 
Commercial Law, 2nd ed., (1995), at 235. 
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defect. 550 In this way it may more efficiently redress the information gap between the merchant 
seller and the consumer, keeping low-cost, routinised redress procedures. 
3. The buyer's ignorance and the absence of negligence 
3.1. Comparative accounts 
3.1.1. The buyer's ignorance and the absence of negligence 
3.1.1.1. Korean law 
Another requirement is the buyer's ignorance as to the existence of a defect and absence of 
negligence in failing to discover the defect. The underlying principle of this requirement is that 
in the case where the buyer purchases the goods which show noticeable or apparent defects, he 
is deemed to have agreed to the seller's proposal as determined by the effective state of the 
goods so that he cannot rely on the defects to invoke the rules of the seller's guarantee liability. 
In Korean law, it is required that the buyer be unaware of the defect at the time of contract, 55' 
which must amount to actual ignorance of the defect. 552 In addition, even if the buyer was not 
genuinely aware of the defect, he must not be negligent in failing to discover the defect at the 
time of sale. 553 Accordingly, the buyer may not be able to rely on the rules of the seller's 
550 See 10`h Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 32. See also Bradgate, supra n. 466. 
551 It is of the overwhelming view as to the relevant time of the buyer's ignorance and the absence of 
negligence. See Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 221; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 340; Yun-jik 
Kwak, supra n. 74, at 246. Cf. Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 392, at 20 if. (argues that the relevant time 
should be at the time of delivery). 
552 KCC Art. 580(1). 
553 Id. German law is more generous to the buyer than Korean law in that the buyer is required not to be 
in `gross negligence' in discovering the defect and the requirement is not applied to the cases where the 
seller has fraudulently concealed it and he has guaranteed that the goods are free from it. BGB §460. 
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13 and 14(3) seems to explain, in effect, the buyer's ignorance and the absence of negligence. 560 
That is, if the circumstances show either that a defect was drawn to the buyer's attention or that 
the buyer was in a reasonable position to appreciate that there is a defect, the buyer may not be 
able to rely on the implied terms of ss. 13,14(3) because it is unlikely to be said that the buyer 
relied on the absence of a defect or it was reasonable for the buyer to rely on the absence. In 
turn, most cases in those circumstances may fall within the situations in Korean law where the 
buyer cannot invoke the seller's guarantee liability because it may be held that the buyer was 
aware of the existence of a defect or negligent in failing to discover the defect at the time of 
contract. 
3.1.1.3. The Directive 
In the Directive the requirements of the buyer's ignorance and the absence of negligence are 
stipulated in art. 2.3. The consumer may not be able to invoke the rules as to conformity with 
the contract in art. 2 in the following cases; at the time of contract, where the consumer was 
aware of the lack of conformity, where he could be reasonably aware of the lack of conformity, 
or where the lack of conformity has its origin in materials supplied by the consumer. 561 It is 
uncertain whether the meaning of `could be reasonably aware of' xtends to mere negligence or 
more than gross negligence on the part of the consumer. 
3.1.1.4. CISG 
CISG provides that the seller is not liable for any lack of conformity under art. 35(2) if the 
buyer knew or could not have been unaware of the lack of conformity at the time of contract. 562 
559 The SGA s. 14(2C)(c). 
560 Bradgate, supra n. 466; Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. For the requirement of reasonable 
reliance, see supra n. 405-406,417 and accompanying texts. 
561 It does not seem to impose on the consumer the duty to examine the goods, but if required in the 
practice, he should take a reasonable care to discover a defect. 
562 CISG Art. 35(3). 
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Although there is uncertainty as to the meaning of `could not have been unaware of , it is 
submitted that it is more than gross negligence and it merely amounts to serve to ease the 
burden of proof where it is very difficult to prove the actual knowledge. 563 That is, there seems 
to be no practical difference between `knowledge' and `could not have been unaware of . 54 As 
the wording of art. 35(3) states, it must be noted that the requirements under art. 35(3) are 
applied only to the cases of lack of conformity under art. 35(2), but not to the cases related to 
those characteristics of the goods explicitly required by the contract. 565 Irrespective of art. 
35(3), the latter cases are rather open questions to be decided by interpretation of each case as to 
which characteristics were actually agreed: the quality actually agreed may be the lack of 
conformity of which the buyer was aware, or the quality which under the contract the seller 
must produce by remedying the lack of conformity, 
566 
3.1.1.5. Comparative view 
563 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 260 f.; Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 285; Hyland, 
"Conformity of Goods to the Contract under the United Nations Sales Convention and the Uniform 
Commercial Code", in: Schlechtriem (ed. ), Einheitliches Kaufrecht und nationales Obligation en recht, 
(1987), at 325. For the scholars interpreting the wording in the sense of gross negligence, Stump, 
Herber/Czerwenka, Magnus, Karollus, Reinhart; probably also Bianca, Honsell, Heilmann (quoted in 
Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 285, n. 102). Cf. Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 
221, at 279; Schlechtriem, supra n. 432, at 6-23. Note that it does not raise the buyer's obligation to 
examine the goods before the conclusion of the contract. Honnold, id.; Schwenzer, id.; Enderlein and 
Maskow, supra n. 288, at 148; Hyland, id.; Bernstein and Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG in 
Europe, (1997), at 59. 
564 Honnold, id. 
565 Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 32, Art. 33, No. 14; Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 
280; Schlechtriem, supra n. 432, at 6-23; Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 59; Schwenzer, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 286. See also O. R., at 426 ff., No. 5 if. (a proposal by Norway to 
include art. 35(1) within the scope of art. 35(3) was rejected at the Diplomatic Conference. Cf. For the 
theory behind inapplicability of art. 35(3) to art. 35(1), see UNCITRAL Yearbook IV, 
AICN. 9/SER. A. 11973, (1974), at 46, para. 74. Contra; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 147 f.; 
Hyland, supra n. 563, at 326; Weiser, in Doralt (ed. ), supra n. 432, at 109 f. (quoted in Enderlein and 
Maskow, id. ). 
566 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 286; Schlechtriem, supra n. 432, at 6-23 f. 
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As examined above, each jurisdiction generally requires the buyer's ignorance as to the 
existence of a defect and absence of negligence in failing to discover the defect at the time of 
contract. There is no doubt in that the requirement of the buyer's ignorance is the same 
in each 
jurisdiction. However, the extent to which the relevant requirement as to the absence of 
negligence in CISG is applied seems quite different from the one in English law and Korean 
law; the former requires more than gross negligence, whereas the latter mere negligence. 
567 
Insofar as an implied term of satisfactory quality in English law is concerned, one must note 
that, unlike Korean law, the requirement as to the absence of negligence in English law is 
applied only if the buyer actually examines goods. 
Another difference is in that the requirements in CISG and English law are exclusively related 
to the cases where the goods are not in conformity with the legal guarantees, 56' those in Korean 
law and the Directive seem to be applicable even to the cases where the goods are not in 
conformity with those characteristics explicitly required by the contractual guarantees. 569 
Accordingly, CISG and English law seem to significantly narrow the impact of the requirements 
of the buyer's ignorance and the absence of negligence on the buyer's protection afforded by 
the seller's guarantee liability. 
3.1.2. Burden of proof 
It seems to be similar in each jurisdiction regarding the burden of proof; when the seller wants 
56' Cf. Bridge, supra n. 434, at 82 (the test in CISG is somewhat more generous to the buyer who 
carelessly examines the goods than is English law). The position in the Directive seems unclear because 
the adoption of a similar phrase used in CISG does not necessarily mean that it must be interpreted in an 
identical way and consequently it might be left to the Member States' own interpretation. 
568 CISG Art. 35(2); the SGA ss. 14(2C), 14(3) and 15(2)(c). Cf. Note that the requirement of reasonable 
reliance regarding the implied term of correspondence with description in English law is rather related to 
the matter of whether a description is a contractual term so that, once it is deemed to be a contractual term 
in the first place, the seller who delivers the goods being not correspondent with the description may not 
be able to avoid his liability for the breach of s. 13. 
569 In the Directive, this is derived from the wording of art. 2.3. which links to all the provisions of art. 2. 
Cf. Supra n. 388 (the Korean Supreme Court Case, 5/11/1968,68 Da 1832). 
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to rely on the buyer's awareness or negligence, it is for him, because he is relying on an 
exception to the general rule, to prove that. 57° 
3.2. Evaluating accounts 
3.2.1. Internal evaluation 
As was found, CISG seems quite in favour of the buyer compared to the others. First, given 
that the meaning of `could not have been unaware of in art. 35(3) merely serves to ease the 
burden of proof so that it is not practically different from `knowledge', it produces much more 
room for the buyer to rely on the seller's guarantee liability than the other systems. 5 ' Second, 
it is also buyer-friendly in that, unlike the other systems, the requirements in art. 35(2) do not 
apply to the cases of contractual guarantees. 
With regard to the former point, the question arises if it could be justified in the case, e. g., 
where a second hand car dealer as a specialist purchases a used car from a private seller who has 
no special knowledge at all about the car and later the dealer sues the seller on the basis of a 
defect which a reasonable person in his profession should have discovered by a reasonable 
examination. 57' In addition, a similar problem arises even between merchants where a buyer is 
normally supposed to examine goods, but negligently fails to discover a defect of which one 
ought to have discovered by due examination. It seems that CISG does not warrant that the 
buyer in the above cases loses his rights under art. 35(3). 573 Insofar as an implied term of 
570 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 222; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 340; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 
74, at 246; Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 289. 
sal See supra n. 563-564 and accompanying texts. 
572 The dealer is in practice supposed to examine a car, e. g., a test drive, checking engine or external 
condition and etc. Note that although CISG is mainly centred on business transactions between 
merchants, the application of CISG is not limited in terms of the status of the parties. 
573 Cf. Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 285 (the seller may be arguably devoid of his 
liability according to the circumstances of the particular case, e. g., the nature of the goods, the skill, and 
experience of each party and the reasonableness of an examination). 
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satisfactory quality is concerned, the position in English law as to the problem raised above 
seems rather the same as CISG because the requirement of absence of mere negligence is 
applied only if the buyer actually examines the goods. 574 Another question is whether the 
requirement of absence of mere negligence in Korean law which appears somehow in favour of 
the seller could be justified in a consumer context. It seems true that the requirement is open 
textured so that it is unlikely to impose on the consumer any duty of examination in most cases 
and even if it would do so in exceptional cases, any negligence on the consumer's part would be 
hardly found because it cannot be required of a consumer the same standard of examination as 
required of a specialist dealer. However, given that most consumers decide to purchase the 
goods relying on the name of brand and the reputation of the retailer even without looking at the 
goods and they do not know whether they are supposed to examine the goods at the time of 
purchase, the position in English law and CISG seems more supportive. 
Regarding the latter point, a practical difference arises, e. g., where a seller specifically states to 
deliver `A' quality goods to a buyer who is aware of `B' quality in fact at the time of sale. In 
CISG parlance, this may be a matter of which quality was actually agreed by the parties in each 
case by interpretation; first, it may be `B' quality that the buyer was aware of where there is no 
possibility to secure `A' quality, second, it may be `A' quality even though the buyer was aware 
of `B' quality in fact because the seller was supposed to remedy its absence of `A' quality. "s In 
the first case, there seems to be no difference between CISG, Korean law and English law in 
substance because in any event the buyer may not be allowed to claim `A' quality. 57' However, 
574 The first problem raised above as to the sale of a second hand car does not arise in English law since 
an implied term of satisfactory quality does not take place unless the seller sells goods in the course of a 
business. 
575 Cf. Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 286. 
576 In CISG, it may find that `B' quality was actually agreed by interpretation without relying on art. 
35(3). On the other hand, Korean law may at the first instance reject the buyer's claim for `A' quality on 
the basis of the buyer's awareness of the existence of a defect and then find `B' quality was actually 
agreed between the parties. English law would turn down the buyer's claim for `A' quality on the basis 
of that the buyer did not rely on the seller's statement so that it did not form a contractual term. 
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in the second case, it is doubted whether the interpretation of KCC and the Directive gives a 
resort for the buyer to rely on `A' quality. 57 Insofar as it is understood that the requirements of 
the buyer's ignorance and the absence of negligence apply even to the characteristics explicitly 
required by the contract, it seems to be unreasonable for the buyer who in good faith relied on 
the specific guarantee by the seller who will remedy the defects'' Therefore, as long as the 
contractual guarantees are concerned, it is suggested either that the requirements in question are 
not applied, or at least that they should be interpreted to apply only to the cases where no 
remedy is possible and the buyer was aware of such impossibility. 
3.2.2. External evaluation 
In relation to the extent to which the relevant requirement as to the absence of negligence is 
applied, it seems that extending it to mere negligence is more plausible than limiting it to the 
buyer's actual state of mind about the existence of a defect insofar as the requirement of 
absence of mere negligence is in open texture to be flexibly applied according to all the 
circumstances to be taken account of. The reason for that is that if the requirement is limited 
only to the buyer's actual state of mind, there is little incentive for the buyer to inspect for 
obvious defects at the time of purchase even if such inspection is beneficial to both parties 
because it may avoid the additional costs that arise from the buyer subsequently discovering that 
a defect exists, or incurring additional damages and seeking an appropriate remedy from the 
seller. In addition, the limited requirement may result in imposing unnecessary losses on the 
seller that could have been easily avoided by the buyer informing the seller of the defect or at 
least refusing to make the purchase. At the end it may distort the efficient operation of market 
577 The Korean Supreme Court Case, 5/11/1968,68 Da 1832 (even in the case of the seller's specific 
guarantee, it questioned whether there was the buyer's good faith or negligence; see supra n. 388); 
Directive(99/44) Art. 2.3. (the wording of this art links to all the provisions of art. 2 including the 
compliance with description). 
578 Unlike Korean law, English law would find that the buyer could claim for `A' quality because it may 
be arguably said that the buyer reasonably relied on `A' quality. 
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in a way that decreases the wealth of society as a whole because it may prevent the optimal flow 
of the goods. However, it is doubted whether the position is also true in a consumer context. 
Although the requirement of absence of mere negligence is open textured so that in most 
consumer cases no negligence may be found, uncertainty inherent in the open texture may be 
often used rather for the seller to strengthen his power against consumers who often have 
insufficient sophistication and bargaining power and it may interfere with low-cost, routinised 
redress procedures that are essential for consumers who are often reluctant to proceed to courts 
due to their ignorance. 57' In addition, assuming that most consumers are risk-averse, they may 
not want the requirement of absence of negligence. Therefore, in the absence of clear 
guidelines to clarify the test of negligence, the consumer should not lose his rights as to defects 
unless the defects were specifically drawn to his attention before the time of purchase. 
As regards the difference about whether the requirements are applied to the cases of those 
characteristics explicitly required by the contractual guarantees, the approach taken by Korean 
law and the Directive does not seem to properly reflect the parties' intention which may 
increase the transaction cost for the parties to redress the approach. This is because, as shown 
above in the second case in the internal evaluation, 580 there is a danger that the seller may be 
devoid of his liability even if a certain aspect of quality is deemed to be contractually agreed by 
the parties and it was specifically guaranteed by the seller. It may defeat the true bargain made 
by the parties as rational maximizers of their self-interest. 
4. The seller's fault 
4.1. Comparative accounts 
Traditionally, under Korean law a general view is that there is no requirement of the seller's 
'74 See supra n. 52-55 and accompanying texts. 
580 See supra n. 575,577-578 and accompanying texts. 
125 
fault in order for the buyer to pursue the seller's guarantee liability. "' There seems to be no 
doubt that the requirement is unnecessary from the point of view of the legal liability theory in 
the context that the liability is imposed on the seller by the law for the purpose of protecting the 
buyer's reliance on the transaction made for consideration and striking a balance in terms of 
value for money in the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods. "' 
On the other hand, the contractual liability theory is questioned on the basis whether it is 
logical to say that it should not require the seller's fault because the theory understands that the 
seller's guarantee liability is in the contractual nature. 583 Nevertheless, all the scholars agreeing 
with this theory seem to consent to the opinion that there is no requirement of the seller's 
fault. 584 Their reason for no requirement of the seller's fault is in that, first, the seller's 
guarantee liability is in the nature of the objective institution which is different from the general 
liability being the subjective institution, "' second, if it was consistent with a contractual one and 
accordingly required fault, there would be no way to protect the buyer in good faith where the 
seller proves the absence of fault as to the delivery of defective goods. 586 The thing to note in 
relation to the seller's fault is that the scope of damages the buyer can recover within the special 
regime for the seller's guarantee liability may be closely connected with the existence of the 
seller's fault. S8' 
581 Cases also provide that it is a non-fault-based liability. See the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 
30/10/1957,4290 Min-Sang 552; 30/6/1995,94 Da 23920. Cf. the Korean Supreme Court Case, 
14/4/1992,91 Da 17146.17153. 
582 See supra n. 158 and accompanying texts. 
583 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 512, at 25. 
584 See supra n. 199-200 and accompanying texts. Contra; Joo-soo Kim, supra n. 125, at 214. 
585 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 94, at 242. This reason is similarly submitted by the legal liability theorists 
that the seller's guarantee liability as an objective institution aims to strike a balance in terms of value for 
money regardless of the subjective factor regarding the seller's fault. 
586 Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 262 ff.; Kwang-min Seo, supra n. 193, at 31. 
587 As it will be examined later, there are opposing views as to the scope of damages the buyer can 
recover within the special regime, which are closely related to the requirement of the seller's fault. For 
instance, the buyer's reliance, expectation and consequential loss without the seller's fault; only the 
buyer's reliance loss without the seller's fault (the other losses covered in the general liability for non- 
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In English law, the Directive and CISG, there is also no requirement of the seller's fault with 
respect to the seller's guarantee liability. 58' This is due to their understanding that the seller's 
guarantee liability is imposed on the seller as implied contractual obligations and all contracts 
are treated as promises leading to a claim for `breach of contract' if the promised result is not 
produced by the seller. $89 
4.2. Evaluating accounts 
Since there is no particular difference found, it appears that there is nothing to be discussed in 
the evaluating accounts. However, one must recall the arguments raised in the last chapter that 
all the problems Korean law suffers in the area of the seller's guarantee liability are partly 
caused by its artificial distinction between fault and non-fault liability; all the remedies under 
the general liability is governed by the fault principle, whereas those under the seller's 
guarantee liability exist irrespective of the principle. 59o In this light, it was argued that, in order 
performance with the requirement of the seller's fault); the buyer's reliance loss without the seller's fault, 
but the buyer's expectation loss with the requirement of the seller's fault (the consequential loss covered 
under the general liability with the requirement of the seller's fault). It should be noted that the buyer's 
reliance loss is, in any view, covered regardless of the seller's fault. For more detail, see infra pp. 217 ff. 
588 Cf. English law: see Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. [1905] 1 KB 608 (the seller was held liable despite 
the fact that he had taken all reasonable precautions to ensure that the milk was pure); Daniels v. White & 
Son [1938] 4 All ER 258 (a retailer was held liable even though it was impossible for him to discover the 
defect). Cf. CISG: see art. 45(1) which sets forth the no-fault starting point. However, there is a limited 
exception to the starting point in which the obligor may be exonerated from liability for damages to the 
extent that non-performance is attributable to an impediment beyond his control and unforeseeable and 
avoidable (art. 79). Despite the exception, one must bear in mind that it does not necessarily render an 
exceptional fault rule based on culpable breach with regard to a damages claim since the obligor may not 
be exempted merely by proving that he was not at fault, but by proving that it was due to the effect of an 
impediment outside his control. See Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 98; Schlechtriem, supra 
n. 307, at 101; Tallon, BiancalBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 572 f.; Stoll, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, 
at 603. The further thing to note is that there is an uncertainty as to whether the exception pursuant to art. 
79 can be applicable to the cases of defective goods For more detail, see infra n. 1092-1094 and 
accompanying texts. 
589 See supra n. 312-315 and accompanying texts. 
590 See supra n. 354-358 and accompanying texts. 
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to settle those problems, the requirement of fault should depend upon which remedy the buyer 
seeks to claim rather than on which liability his claim is based. "' 
5. Time limit 
5.1. Comparative accounts 
5.1.1. Korean law 
In Korean law the buyer's rights conferred by the rules of the seller's guarantee liability must 
be exercised within the certain period from the time when he became aware of a defect in the 
goods; six months as to discrepancies in quality, 592 one year as to discrepancies in quantity, 593 
There are two opposing views as to the interpretation of the time limit. The majority of scholars 
maintain that it means the period within which the defect in the goods entitles the buyer to 
institute legal proceedings before the court, and after which he may lose his rights. 594 On the 
other hand, the minority view and the cases take the view that it is the period within which 
discovery of the defect entitles the buyer to rely on the seller's guarantee liability. "' 
Accordingly, once the buyer is deemed to exercise his rights under the seller's guarantee 
liability outside the court during the period of six months or one year, he may institute his legal 
proceedings in the court within the extinctive prescription period of ten years. 596 
Insofar as commercial sales are concerned, the relevant period is connected with the buyer's 
591 See supra n. 359-365 and accompanying texts. 
592 KCC Art. 582. 
593 KCC Art. 573. 
594 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 247; Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 135, at 145; Joo-soo Kim, supra n. 125, at 
216; Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 195; Sang-yong Kim, supra n. 392, at 240; Eun-young Lee, supra 
n. 167, at 222 f.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 342. 
595 See the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 21/4/1964,63 Da 691; 12/11/1985,84 DaKa 2344; Dae-jeong 
Kim, "Mae-do-in-eoi Ha-ja-dam-bo-chaek-im-ae-kwan-han Pan-rae-eoi-dong-hyang (The Trend of Cases 
as to the Seller's Guarantee Liability)", (1997) 15 Min-sa-bup-hak 264, at 284 f. 
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notice requirement in that the buyer who fails to notify within a period of six months the seller 
of a defect, which could not be immediately discoverable, may lose all his rights based on the 
defect. 597 The period begins from the date on which the buyer took the seller's delivery. 598 
5.1.2. English law 
Under English law the buyer's action based on contractual liability must be brought before the 
court within the period of six years from the time of breach of the contract, generally the time of 
delivery in a sale case. 599 However, this period concerns only the buyer's action for damages, 
but not for his action to repudiate the contract. Insofar as the claim for the repudiation of the 
contract is concerned, the buyer may rely on the seller's liability as to implied conditions only 
for a brief time after delivery of the goods by virtue of the rules as to acceptance, which does 
not necessarily deal with the period within which an action must be before the court. 600 
5.1.3. The Directive 
The Directive stipulates a period of two years from the time of delivery during which the seller 
is liable for any lack of conformity which existed at the time of delivery of the goods. 60' This 
period must not be confused with the period within which the buyer must bring an action before 
the court. The consumer may be allowed to invoke the seller's guarantee liability during at least 
the two-year period as from the time of delivery. However, this period is not mandatory 
provided that such a period in the Member States is longer than two years from the time of 
delivery or where the starting time of the limitation period is not the time of delivery in the 
596 KCC Art. 162(1). See Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 595, at 284 f. 
597 KCmC Art. 69(1). Cf. For the scope of the application of this period, see infra n. 619-622 and 
accompanying texts. 
598 Id. 
599 Limitation Act 1980, s. 5. 
600 The SGA s. 35. For more detail as to the rules of acceptance, see infra pp. 205 f. 
601 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.1. Note that the period does not imply that all goods have to last for at least 
two years. 
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Member States, the total duration of the period is not shorter than two years from the time of 
delivery. 602 
5.1.4. CISG 
The time limit in CISG is clearly linked to the buyer's notice requirement in that the buyer 
may lose the rights to rely on a lack of conformity if he does not inform the seller of the lack of 
conformity at the latest within a preclusive two-year period from the time when the goods were 
actually handed over to the buyer. 6o3 This two-year time limit is not applicable if it is 
inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee. 604 The thing to note is that the buyer may be 
allowed to invoke the seller's liability for the lack of conformity during the two-year time limit 
which one must not confuse with the limitation period within which the buyer must bring his 
action before the court in order to enforce his existing claims. " 
5.1.5. Comparative view 
Given that the limitation period regarding the buyer's action before the court is left aside from 
our concern, the ensuing discussion could be focused on the following aspects; the objects dealt 
with in the time limit, its length, and the time when it begins to run. With regard to the first 
aspect, Korean law, the Directive and CISG deal with all the remedies, whereas English law 
deals with only the right to repudiate the contract under its special rules as to acceptance. In 
relation to the second aspect, Korean law provides six months for discrepancies in quality in 
non-commercial sales, one year for discrepancies in quantity in non-commercial sales and six 
months for discrepancies both in quality and quantity in commercial sales. The Directive and 
602 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.1. and Recital 17. 
603 CISG Art. 39(2). 
604 Id. 
605 In that regard, the UN Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods of 14 
June 1974 applies, which fixes a general limitation period of four years (art. 8) as from the date when the 
goods were actually handed over to the buyer (art. 10(2)). 
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CISG provide two years without distinguishing between discrepancies in quality and quantity, 606 
English law dealing only with the right to repudiate the contract, produces only a brief time 
according to the rules as to acceptance. Regarding the third aspect, the time limit in the 
Directive, CISG and Korean commercial law is based on delivery, whereas that in KCC dealing 
with non-commercial sales on discovery. 
5.2. Evaluating accounts 
5.2.1. Internal evaluation 
As examined above, each jurisdiction provides a certain time limit with regard to the seller's 
guarantee liability. The rationale for the time limit is submitted that it serves to provide the 
seller with certainty that he does not need to reckon with claims after a certain period and that 
he may close a ledger as complete. 607 However, the problem arises in the cases of, e. g., 
machinery, where some defects are hardly discoverable on a reasonable examination by the 
buyer within a certain fixed period. Although the time limit is not mandatory, it is questioned 
whether the rationale could be justified in the above cases of machinery where a buyer finds a 
defect only after the period expires so that he loses all the remedies. On the other hand, KCC 
when dealing with non-commercial sales and English law seem to show a flexible approach in a 
sense that the buyer in such cases may be still entitled to claim for any defect existed at the time 
of delivery, although in Korean law his claim for the defect may be restricted by the short 
limitation period of six months or one year as from the time of discovery, and in English law his 
claim for damages is subject to the limitation period of six years as from the date of breach. 
606 The period of two years is produced as a compromise. Examples of the time limit in domestic law; 
BGB §§477-479 (six years after delivery); Swedish Sales Act s. 54 (one year); Swiss Code of Civil Art. 
210 (one year limit on action); Mexican Commercial Code Art. 383 (five days from receipt as to quality 
and quantity, and thirty days from receipt as to latent defects). 
607 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 316. 
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5.2.2. External evaluation 
The matter of time limit is a difficult issue if it must be specified into a certain fixed time limit 
running from the time of delivery. This is because there is diversity in the types of the goods. 
Therefore, any fixed time limit running from the time of delivery whether it is short or long may 
be often arbitrary and face a criticism that it does not pay sufficient regard to the diversity in the 
goods and may operate to inefficient results in many cases. For instance, there is a possibility 
that a single arbitrary fixed time limit running from delivery may not produce efficient results 
where some defects in machinery are hardly discoverable by due examination until the time 
limit expires. In such a situation, the specified time limit excludes in effect a risk for which 
most buyers as being risk-averse might have been prepared to pay more to insure by having an 
extended time limit in the contract. In this context, the approach taken by KCC dealing with 
non-commercial sales that the time limit is based on discovery seems to be more plausible. 6os 
6. The buyer's duty to examine the goods and to give the notice of defects 
6.1. General 
The primary object of imposing on the buyer the duty to examine the goods and to notify the 
seller of any defect of the goods609 is to establish certainty for the seller that he does not need to 
reckon with claims at any particular time and that he may consider the contract to be 
508 It seems to secure at least that the seller will be held liable until discovery. One must note that the 
discovery statute of time limit should not make the seller liable for defects in the goods indefinitely. In 
the procedure to determine the existence of breach, it should be relevant of the reasonable useful life of 
the goods, the reasonable period for discovery and other reasonable circumstances including the duration 
taken by the buyer for his claim from the time of discovery or the time when it could have been 
discovered. 
609 It is inappropriate to call this a duty because it is a kind of indirect duty in a sense that it is in the 
buyer's own interest to observe, in which he may lose his rights on account of the defect if he cannot 
examine and notify the defect. Therefore, breach of the duty does not lead the buyer to take any 
responsibility to the seller for the consequences of the failure to examine and give notice. 
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completed. 61' In this way it may prevent the possibility of the buyer speculating at the cost of 
the seller. 6 ' In addition, it may place the seller in a position in which he may redress a defect in 
the goods, as the case may be, by delivering the missing goods or a substitute or by repair, or 
reduce the buyer's loss in some other way. b12 Furthermore, it may also give the seller an 
opportunity to prepare for any negotiation or dispute with the buyer regarding the defect and to 
take the necessary steps for a claim against his supplier. 
"' 
Having said that, Korean law provides an express duty on the buyer to examine the goods and 
to notify the seller of the defects of the goods, although such a duty is restricted to the cases 
where both parties are merchants and a transaction is a commercial act for both parties. 614 In 
CISG it stipulates the buyer's duty to examine the goods and to give notice of the defects of the 
goods. 615 The Directive also expressly stipulates the buyer's duty to notify the seller of the 
defect, although it does not provide the buyer's duty to examine the goods and the notice 
requirement is imposed only if a Member State decides to take the option for the buyer's notice 
duty. 616 On the other hand, English law has no express provision similar to the combination of 
the buyer's duty to examine the goods61 and to notify the seller of the defects. It is explained 
rather by the principle that the failure to inspect the goods and to give timely objection may bar 
the buyer from rejecting the goods but this does not preclude the buyer from claiming for 
610 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 301; Ki-su Lee, Sang-bup-hak (Commercial Law 
Study), Book I, (1997), at 194; Lak-hoon Cha et al., Joo-seok-sang-bup (Commentary on Commercial 
Law), Book I, (1977), at 322. 
611 Lak-hoon Cha et al., id. 
612 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 301. Cf. Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 34 f. 
613 id 
614 KCmC Art. 69(1). 
615 CISG Arts. 38,39. 
616 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.2. The Member States must inform the Commission of their use of this 
option, and the Commission must monitor its effect, reporting on the use made by the Member States 
until 7`h January 2003. 
617 Cf. Note that the SGA s. 34 confers on the buyer a `right' to examine the goods. 
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damages. 6'8 
6.2. The requirements for the application of the buyer's notice duty 
6.2.1. The scope of the application 
6.2.1.1. Comparative accounts 
6.2.1.1.1. Korean law 
The notice duty in Korean law is restricted to the cases where both parties are merchants 
whose transaction is a commercial act for both of them, 619 that is, the sale being related to their 
commercial business. 62' Therefore, if a car dealer purchases furniture for his home, the 
618 See the SGA ss. 34,35. 
619 KCmC Art. 69(1). Contra; Hong-keun Im, Sang-haeng-we-bup (Commercial Acts Law), (1989), at 
444 (he contends that, insofar as one of the contractual parties is a merchant, the case is governed by the 
commercial law on the ground of KCmC Art. 3. Accordingly, if a consumer purchases goods from a 
merchant, he is under the obligation to examine without delay and immediately notify a defect to the 
merchant (KCmC Art. 69(1))). However, the majority view is that art. 69 is applied only in the cases all 
the contracting parties are merchants so that there is no notice requirement because art. 69(1) expressly 
deals with the cases between merchants and consequently it is deemed to be an exception of art. 3. See 
Joo-chan Son, Sang-bup (Commercial Law), Book I, (1986), at 177; Beom-chan Lee, Sang-bup-gang-eoi 
(Lecture in Commercial Law), (1976), at 72; Hee-cheol Jeong, Sang-bup-hak-won-ron (Principles of 
Commercial Law), Book I, (1980), at 144. Cf. A merchant in Korean law may be an individual, a 
commercial partnership, or a company. See Ki-soo Lee, supra n. 610, at 38. Cf. The position in German 
law is same as in Korean law. See HGB §377. 
620 Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 194; Donb seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 96; Beom-chan Lee & June-sun 
Choi, Sang-bup-gae-ron (An Introduction to Commercial Law), (1995), at 137. Cf. A commercial act can 
be divided into 3 categories; a basic commercial act, an incidental commercial act and a quasi- 
commercial act. The basic commercial act is one of transactions enumerated in KCmC Art. 46 which is 
conducted by the merchant in the course of a business for the purpose of making a profit (for instance, a 
trader's purchase of a computer to resell or hire out). The incidental commercial act is a transaction to 
supplement the basic commercial act or the quasi-commercial act either in a direct way or in a indirect 
way, which could be any purchase of some essential item for the business or any other purchases for the 
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purchase is not deemed to be a commercial act so far as he is concerned. Consequently, he is 
not placed under the examination and notice duty because the case is concerned with a non- 
commercial sale. However, if he purchases a computer for his office, it may well fall within a 
commercial act so that he is obliged to notify the seller of any defect because it may come under 
an incidental commercial act to supplement his basic commercial act of the car dealing. 
In relation to the aspects of defects, it is limited to the cases of defects in quality and 
deficiency in quantity. "' Therefore, the cases of aliud and excess delivery in quantity are out of 
the scope of the application of the buyer's duty to give notice. 622 
6.2.1.1.2. English law 
In English law, although there is no corresponding procedure as to the notice duty, it seems to 
require the buyer in effect to give the notice as to lack of conformity in a way that intimates his 
rejection in order not to be deemed to have accepted the goods so that he may not lose his right 
to repudiate the contract. 623 The intimation requirement of rejection is irrelevant to the status of 
the parties and applied in both commercial and consumer sales. Regarding the aspects of 
defects, it applies to all the cases of defects including the cases of the delivery of an aliud624 or 
efficient conduct of the business (e. g., the purchase of salt by a restaurant or of a fax machine by a travel 
agent). The quasi-commercial act is a transaction conducted by a merchant by appearance, that is, an act 
conducted in a similar manner to one of the basic commercial acts enumerated in art. 46 (e. g., producing 
a computer software). See Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 38 ff., 137 ff. Thus, as long as the transaction falls 
within one of the above commercial acts, not only a basic commercial act but also an incidental 
commercial act satisfy to impose on the buyer the duty to examine the goods and to notify the seller of 
the defects. 
621 Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 194. 
622 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 100 f. In contrast, German law imposes the notice duty on the buyer 
even in these cases unless the delivered goods(aliud or excess or shortage in quantity) are as obviously 
different as expected not to be consented to the goods delivered by the buyer. HGB §378. 
623 The SGA s. 35. For an indirect application of the notice philosophy, see Panchaud Freres v. Ets 
General Grain Co. [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 53; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 95. 
624 See supra n. 401-419 and accompanying texts. The matter of aliud is treated as non-compliance with 
description. See supra n. 403-406,442 and accompanying texts. 
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of wrong quantity. 
625 
6.2.1.1.3. The Directive 
Since the buyer's duty to give notice under the Directive is not mandatory in the context that 
the Member States can decide whether they impose the duty on the buyer, 626 the ensuing 
discussion may be conducted on the basis of two different cases; first, the case of a Member 
State taking the option of notice duty, second, the case of a Member State not taking the option. 
In the former case, the consumer must notify the seller of any lack of conformity within a 
period of two-months in order to claim his rights conferred under the Directive, so far as a 
transaction is within the scope of the Directive. 627 In the case of a Member State not taking the 
option, the notice duty is left to domestic laws so that there may be no notice duty in most 
Member States that do not take the option. 628 However, it is possible that some Member States 
may still impose the notice duty on the consumer without taking the option specified in the 
Directive. 624 In this case, one must note that the relevant notice rules of domestic law are 
subject to the minimum two-month notice period, 630 Thus, even if a consumer is required to 
give notice either by a domestic law or the Directive, he has at least a period of two-months as 
long as a transaction is within the scope of the Directive. In order for the sale to be the one 
within the scope of the Directive, it must be a transaction between consumer and seller. A 
"consumer" is defined "any natural person who, in the contracts covered by this Directive, is 
625 See supra n. 420-421 and accompanying texts. 
626 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.2. and Recital 19. 
627 Italy and Portugal that have a notice duty within eight days and thirty days respectively are likely to 
fall within this case. See Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 40 ff. 
628 Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, and United Kingdom, which have no notice duty 
in consumer sales, are unlikely to take the option. See Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 40 ff. 
629 This may be the case of Denmark, Netherlands and Luxembourg which have a notice duty within a 
reasonable period or within a brief period. See Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 40 ff. 
630 Recital 19. Therefore, those countries are required to ensure the minimum period of two-months in 
their own legislation. 
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acting for purposes which are not related to his trade, business or profession". 63' In light of the 
intentional omission of the word, `directly', in the definition of consumer that was inserted in 
the previous draft Directive, "' it seems to exclude all purchases either directly or indirectly 
connected to his trade, business or profession. 633 A "seller" is defined "any natural or legal 
person who, under a contract, sells consumer goods in the course of his trade, business or 
profession". 634 It is not absolutely clear whether a sale "in the course of his trade, business or 
profession" under the Directive is extended to the cases of a seller's any incidental or one-off 
sale, 
635 
In relation to the aspects of defect, it does not deal with the matter of wrong quantity at all. 
6.2.1.1.4. CISG 
Although CISG does not apply solely to sales of a commercial character, 636 the exclusion of 
goods bought for personal, family or household use637 limits its sphere of application de facto to 
631 Directive(99/44) Art. 1.2(a). 
632 Accord; Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. Cf. EC Draft Directive (COM(95) 520) Art. 
1.2(a). The word `directly' had been interpreted as only excluding goods that a sole trader was going to 
resell or hire out and therefore a trader purchasing items of equipment to be used as a part of the business 
would be included. In addition, it was submitted that any purchase which is intended to be a main or 
essential part of the business should be excluded because it would be directly related to the trade. See 
Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 27 f. 
633 
E. g., a car dealer purchasing a computer for his office is out of the scope of the Directive. Cf. It 
appears that a company or other legal person however small is excluded from the definition of consumer. 
This seems to be derived from the clear wordings for the definition of seller specifying `any legal person'. 
634 Directive(99/44) Art. 1.2(c). 
635 It is submitted that the incidental or one-off sale is out of the scope of the Directive based on its use of 
languages of "in the course of `his' business" instead of "in the course of `a' business" so that, for 
instance, only if a car dealer sells a car, it is a transaction in the course of `his' business falling within the 
scope of the Directive, but if he sells an old fax machine in his office, it may be hardly within the scope. 
Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. Cf. Stevenson v. Rogers [1999] 1 All ER 613 (in this case, 
any sale by a business, whatever incidental or one-off, is deemed to be a transaction in the course of a 
business). 
636 CISG Art. 1(3). 
637 CISG Art. 2(a). 
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commercial purchases. 638 Therefore, the requirement of examination and notification seems to 
be conditional upon the goods being purchased for commercial purposes639 so that the 
requirement in the case of a purchase for other than commercial purposes is mostly left with 
domestic sales laws. One must note that its limitation to commercial purchases does not 
necessarily exclude private sales as long as a buyer's purchase from a private seller is for his 
commercial purposes; a used car dealer who purchases a person's own used car may be still 
obliged to give notice. 640 
Regarding the aspects of defect, the buyer's notice duty is applied to all cases of defects within 
the meaning of art. 35 including the delivery of an aliud and wrong quantity. "' 
6.2.1.1.5. Comparative view 
The scope of the application of the notice duty under Korean law is different from that under 
CISG in that it is required to raise the notice duty in Korean law that both the seller and the 
buyer be a merchant whose transaction is a commercial act from the point of view of not only 
the buyer but also the seller, whereas the only concern in CISG is whether a transaction is for a 
commercial or professional purpose from the point of view of the buyer, but not of the seller. 2 
This difference seems to explain that CISG is broader than Korean law in the following cases. 
First, the notice duty in Korean law may not be applied to the case where a buyer purchases 
goods from a private seller whose transaction is not regarded as a commercial act even if the 
buyer, being categorised as a merchant, purchases the goods relating to one of his commercial 
638 E. g., the purchase of a dictionary by an author or wet-weather clothing by a maritime pilot, of a 
camera by a professional photographer, or of a soap by a business man for his employees. Herber, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 31 f. 
639 The application of CISG is relied upon the purpose of the purchase at the time of entering into the 
contract. Honnold, supra n. 218, at 47. 
640 Herber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 32. Cf. supra n. 471. 
641 See supra n. 431-440 and accompanying texts. 
642 In the Directive, the nature of transaction for both parties is the decisive factor. The decision of the 
nature of transaction plays an important role to ensure a minimum notice period of two months 
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purposes. In contrast, CISG may raise the duty in that case provided that the buyer's purchase 
is for one of his commercial or professional purposes. Second, any purchase for a professional 
use in CISG is deemed to be within the scope for the notice duty, " whereas some of the 
purchases for a professional use in Korean law may be out of the scope for the notice duty 
because some of the buyers are not technically categorised as merchants (e. g., a lawyer, a doctor 
and an artist) on the basis of that their activities are not regarded as commercial acts 
traditionally in Korean law. 6¢a 
Another difference between CISG and Korean law is that unlike Korean law, there is an 
excuse in CISG for the seller to avoid his liability based on the buyer's failure to give notice 
where he was neither aware of the buyer's intention to purchase the goods for personal use nor 
ought to have known of such intention, 
645 
Insofar as the buyer's right to repudiate the contract is concerned, English law is most 
demanding in a context that the buyer's notice duty to intimate his rejection arises no matter 
what the status of the parties is, or whether the nature of transaction is for commercial or private 
purposes. 
Regarding the scope of the application of the notice duty in light of the aspects of defect, 
Korean law is narrower than English law and CISG because it is not applied to the cases of the 
delivery of an aliud and the excess delivery in Korean law, whereas it is in English law and 
CISG. 
6.2.1.2. Evaluating accounts 
6.2.1.2.1. Internal evaluation 
As discussed above, the scope of the application of the notice duty in Korean law is narrower 
throughout the Community whether the duty is imposed by either domestic laws or the Directive. 
643 Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 16, Art. 2, No. 2; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 31 f. 
644 Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 42,143 f.; Beorn-chan Lee & June-sun Choi, supra n. 620, at 57. 
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than CISG in two aspects; unlike CISG, first, some purchases for a professional use are out of 
the scope because some professionals (e. g., artists or doctors) are not categorised as merchants 
on the basis of their activities being not recognised as commercial acts, second, the commercial 
nature of transaction is decisive not only for the buyer but also for the seller. The problem as to 
the first case is in that a buyer who is not recognised as a merchant by commercial law in Korea 
does not need to give any notice at all even if his purchase is directly related to his profession; 
e. g., an artist's purchase of a painting brush or a doctor's purchase of a medical appliance. ` 6 As 
stated earlier, the primary object of imposing the notice duty on the buyer is to provide the seller 
with certainty and to prevent the buyer from speculating at the cost of the seller. 647 In light of 
the object, the position in Korean law does not seem to clearly explain why their professional 
purchases are excluded from the application of the notice duty. Another problem is related to 
the second case, in particular, where a merchant buyer purchases goods relating to his 
commercial purposes from a private seller whose transaction is not regarded as a commercial 
act; why should it be conditional upon the nature of transaction from the point of the seller's 
view? In view of the object of imposing the notice duty, the question is `is it reasonable not to 
impose the notice duty on the buyer in such a case, even though it seems apparent that the 
sellers in the case need more certainty than do others because they lack speciality in the goods 
sold? ' The consequence of not imposing the notice duty would be that the buyer in that case 
who is deemed to be a specialist would have more opportunity to speculate at the cost of the 
seller. On the other hand, CISG does not seem to face this matter because it does not take into 
account the status of the seller as does in Korean law. 
As regards the aspects of defect, another problem in Korean law is in non-application of notice 
duty in the case of aliud. It seems needless to emphasise the matter concerning aliud 
64-S CISG Art. 2(a). 
646 Cf. Supra n. 644. 
647 See supra n. 609-613 and accompanying texts. 
140 
particularly in the borderline cases as discussed before. 649 
6.2.1.2.2. External evaluation 
The problematic cases found above in Korean law where no notice duty is imposed may 
increase the likelihood that the buyer's claim for a defect which is discoverable by due 
examination is based on a supervening event, the risk of which is not allocated in the contract. ` 9 
The buyer's opportunistic behaviour may result in the seller who has believed in the buyer's 
acceptance incurring more expenses than he is supposed in the most efficient situation; e. g., it 
may cost more for the seller to cure the defect due to the buyer's delayed claim and the 
depreciation in value of the goods due to the defect while the goods are in the buyer's hand may 
cause the seller to spend the greater settlement or litigation costs in attempting to avoid the 
buyer's claim. 6so Another thing to note is that it may distort the efficient operation of market in 
a way that decreases the wealth of society as a whole; e. g., it may prevent the optimal flow of 
the goods because the seller may lose the best opportunity to resell the goods and may suffer an 
unreasonable economic loss from the depreciation in value of the goods due to the defect while 
the goods are in the buyer's hands. All these things seem to explain that the notice duty in those 
problematic cases may generally encourage the most efficient result, which minimises joint 
costs in a way that the parties as rational maximizers of their self-interest would have resolved it 
had they provided for it explicitly in the contract. 
Having said that, the question arises whether or not the policies behind the notice duty are 
relevant to consumer sales. Given that most consumers are ignorant of the duty, it may distort 
the optimal operation of consumer market in the context that they may misjudge the costs and 
benefits of transaction they are contemplating due to their ignorance of the duty. 65' In this light, 
648 Accord; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 100 f. Cf. Supra n. 476-477 and accompanying texts. 
649 Cf. Priest, supra n. 31, at 975,988. 
650 Cf. Id, at 984 ff., 988 ff. 
651 Cf. Miller, "Consumer Issues and the Revision of UCC Article 2" (1994) 35 W. &M. L. Rev 1565, at 
1587; Rosmarin, "Consumers-R-US: A Reality in the UCC Article 2 Revision Process", (1994) 35 W. M. 
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the position in the Directive that allows the Member States an option to impose a notice duty on 
the consumer seems unfortunate. 
652 
6.2.2. The goods being delivered to the buyer 
6.2.2.1. Comparative accounts 
In Korean law, another requirement for the buyer's notice duty is that the goods must have 
been handed over to the buyer in a state he can examine the goods and the buyer must have 
taken the goods handed over to him. 653 That is, the buyer's actual possession of the goods is 
required, accordingly, for example, the tender of a bill of lading, a warehouse receipt or a 
consignment sheet is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement, 654 As regards the documentary 
sales, KCC remains silent about the notice duty as to defective documents and does not seem to 
raise the notice duty as to defects in the goods apparent on documents until the goods being 
actually taken by the buyer, 
655 
In a similar way to Korean law, English law seems to require that the buyer must have taken 
the seller's delivery of the goods. The correctness of this position is derived from the criteria to 
decide whether the buyer has lost his right to reject; first, whether the goods have been handed 
over to the buyer, and second, whether he has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the 
goods. 656 That is, the reasonable opportunity of examination seems to logically stand on the 
assumption that the buyer has taken delivery. In the case of international sales dealt with 
& Mary L. Rev. 1593, at 1624; Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 32 f. 
652 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.2. 
653 KCmC Art. 69(1). See also Hee-cheol Jeong, revised by Yang, Seung-kyu, Sang- buP-hak-won -roll 
(Principles of Commercial Law), Book 1, (1986), at 148; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 97 f. Cf. BGB 
§377(1) (requiring that the goods be handed over to the buyer). 
654 Hee-cheol Jeong, supra n. 653, at 148; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 97 f. 
655 Cf. Id. 
656 See the SGA s. 35(2), (4) and (5). 
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documents, the buyer is also obliged to give notice to reject documents after tender of them 
because he has two distinct rights of rejection; rejection of the documents and rejection of the 
goods themselves. 657 Where one of shipping documents appears to state an apparent defect in 
the goods, 658 the buyer must give notice to intimate his rejection of the document in order not to 
be treated as the goods having been accepted659 because otherwise he may be subsequently 
deprived of the right to reject the goods on the basis of such defect , 
660 
Although the position in CISG is uncertain, it seems to be required that the goods be handed 
over to the buyer. 66' However, there may be a case in which the buyer under a documentary 
sale has to notify the seller of any defect apparent on the documents even before the goods are 
actually handed over to the buyer. 662 
In the Directive, although there is no relevant wording in the provision for the notice duty, it 
657 See Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd. [ 1954] 2 QB 459,487-8. 
658 E. g., a bill of lading indicating the goods shipped in bad condition. 
659 However, there may be no right to reject a document because the document which reveals a defect in 
the goods is not in itself a defective document (Tradax Internacional S. A. v. Goldschmidt S. A. [1977] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 604). He will be rather entitled to reject the goods if, for example, a certificate of quality 
indicates that the goods suffer from a defect that amounts to a breach of condition and either the goods 
actually suffer from such a defect or the certificate is conclusive as to their quality or description under a 
certification clause (Tradax Export S. A. v. European Grain & Shipping Co. [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 100). 
In addition, he may be also entitled to reject the document because it reveals a defect in the goods which 
justifies rejection of the goods, but not because it is in itself defective. This position seems to be assumed 
in Vargas Pena Apeztieguia y Cia v. Peter Cremer G. m. b. h [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 394,396-8. See 
Treitel, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 19-128. 
660 See Panchaud Freres v. Ets General Grain Co. [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 53; Bremer v. Vanden Avenne- 
Izegen [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 109; Bremer v. C Mackprang [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 220. It seems to be 
quite controversial as to the question of on what ground the buyer loses his right to reject the goods: Is it a 
matter of waiver, or estoppel, or solely the effect of s. 35? 
661 Cf. CISG Art. 39(2) requiring the buyer to give notice at least within two years from the date on 
which the goods were actually handed over to him. Cf. Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 
315 f. 
662 Accord; Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 307; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 
160. The correctness of this position is inferred from the wording of art. 39(1) requiring the buyer to give 
notice as to a defect in the goods within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have 
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seems that the consumer's duty to notify the seller of any defect is imposed on the assumption 
that the goods are actually handed over to the consumer. The Directive does not deal with the 
documentary sales. 
Overall, there seems to be no difference in that the notice duty is raised on the condition that 
the goods are handed over to the buyer. However, as far as the documentary sales are 
concerned, the buyer is, in English law and CISG, obliged to give his notice even prior to the 
goods being handed over to the buyer if a shipping document shows an apparent defect in the 
goods, whereas Korean law seems silent on this point. 
6.2.2.2. Evaluating accounts 
6.2.2.2.1. Internal evaluation 
When one considers the rationale of imposing the notice duty on the buyer is to provide the 
seller with certainty, to give the seller an opportunity to redress a defect in the goods, and to 
prevent the buyer from speculating at the cost of the seller, 663 it seems to become clear that the 
buyer in a documentary sales should be required to give his reasonable notice even before the 
seller's delivery of the goods if the buyer upon receiving documents gained awareness that the 
goods were defective at the time of shipment. Therefore, the silence as to documentary sales in 
Korean law should be resolved in this light. 
6.2.2.2.2. External evaluation 
The parties may intend that a defect apparent on the documents should be notified to the seller 
even before the goods are actually handed over to the buyer. Otherwise it may increase the 
possibility of the buyer to opportunistically behave on the basis of supervening events between 
the time when the buyer establishes the defect and the time when the goods are actually handed 
discovered it, which is not necessarily relevant with the actual handing over of the goods to the buyer. 
663 See supra n. 609-613 and accompanying texts. 
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over. In addition, it may increase the transaction costs due to the buyer's delayed claim; it may 
cost more for repair, and for litigation or settlement because the seller may make more efforts to 
avoid the buyer's claim because the value of the goods has diminished. 
6.2.3. The existence of a defect or delivery of wrong quantity 
It is needless to mention that there must exist a defect in the goods or the delivery of wrong 
quantity 664 in order to raise the buyer's duty to give notice. The matters of the existence of a 
defect have been discussed above, 
665 
6.2.4. The absence of the seller's bad faith 
6.2.4.1. Comparative accounts 
There must be also the absence of the seller's bad faith to raise the notice duty in Korean 
law. 666 The absence of the seller's bad faith means that he was unaware of the existence of a 
defect in the goods at the time of delivery of the goods. 667 It does not necessarily require his 
intention to deceive as to the existence of a defect in the goods. 6'68 In CISG, it requires that there 
must not exist any lack of conformity of which he knew or could not have been unaware and 
which he did not disclose to the buyer, 669 Compared to Korean law, it seems that CISG is more 
generous to the buyer in the following aspects. First, it does not raise the notice duty not only 
when the seller knew the existence of a defect, but also when he could not have been unaware 
664 As discussed above, the buyer's notice duty in Korean law is only concerned with the shortage in 
quantity, whereas the one in English law and CISG deals with all the matters of the delivery of wrong 
quantity. 
665 See supra pp. 82 ff. 
666 KCmC Art. 69(2). 
667 Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 195; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 104, at 101 f. 
668 Id Cf. BGB §377(5) (requiring that the seller wilfully deceive the buyer as to the existence of a 
defect). 
669 CISG Art. 40. 
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of the defect. However, it is submitted that there is no practical difference between the 
wordings that refer to facts that `he knows' and `he could not have been unaware' because the 
use of the wordings only intends to lighten the burden of proof with regard to knowledge which 
would otherwise be difficult to prove. 67' Second, as regards the relevant time for the absence of 
the seller's bad faith, although there is no reference to the time in CISG, it is submitted that it 
should be the time at which the period the buyer should give notice normally expires. 671 
In English law and the Directive, there is no equivalent of the requirement of absence of the 
seller's bad faith. 
6.2.4.2. Evaluating accounts 
6.2.4.2.1. Internal evaluation 
In light of the spirit and purpose of the buyer's notice duty, the requirement of absence of the 
seller's bad faith appears natural in a sense that if the seller already knew the existence of a 
defect, there would not be any need for the buyer's notice. 672 The position in the Directive and 
English law in not having such requirement seems to be doubted in this view. However, one 
must note that English law could be justified because the policy behind the notice duty is 
different from the other jurisdictions in that it is mainly to establish certainty for the seller that 
670 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 260 f.; Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 321 f. Contra; 
Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 70 (requiring gross negligence); Enderlein and Maskow, supra 288, at 164 
(requiring only simple negligence). 
671 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 323. Contra; Enderlein and Maskow, supra 288, at 
164 (the time at which the goods are handed over to the buyer). Cf. It could be less generous to the buyer 
than Korean law where the period expires before the actual handing over of the goods, e. g., the buyer 
becomes aware of a defect in the goods through a shipping document proving the goods shipped in a bad 
condition while the goods are still in transit. 
672 The reason for that is that once he knew of it, he would as a matter of course think of the possibility of 
disputes so that a purpose of notice duty concerning certainty could not stand and he would be deemed to 
be already given an opportunity to remedy a defect so that another purpose of notice duty to give the 
opportunity could not be sustained. 
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he does not need to reckon with the buyer's claim for rejection. 
In respect of the relevant time of the seller's bad faith, a careful consideration of the spirit and 
purpose of the buyer's notice duty would reveal that `the time when the period the buyer should 
give notice expires' is more plausible than `the time of delivery', even though cases where the 
seller gains awareness of a defect after the delivery otherwise than through the buyer's notice 
seem rare. 673 
6.2.4.2.2. External evaluation 
On the assumption that the seller learns of the existence of a defect, not to impose a notice 
duty on the buyer would not increase the transaction costs in a way that distorts the optimal 
operation of market because the seller as a rational maximizer of his interests would know what 
he should do upon the awareness of the existence of a defect. In addition, it can be hardly said 
that in such a situation the buyer is opportunistically behaving at the seller's cost as long as he 
knew of the existence of a defect. 
The time when the reasonable period of notice for the buyer expires can be defined as the most 
optimal point for the parties to be able to minimise the transaction costs. 674 Thus, it seems 
natural to say that the relevant time of the seller's bad faith should be connected with the 
optimal point which is the moment when the reasonable notice period expires. 
6.2.5. No contrary agreement 
The provision as to the notice duty is not a mandatory rule in Korean law. The parties, 
therefore, may agree in the contract that it does not apply at all. "' The position in CISG and 
673 E. g., a design defect affecting an entire type of manufactured cars could be known by other 
customers. See Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 323. 
674 Cf. The optimal point can be decided by balancing the cost to the buyer of discovering the defect with 
the cost to the seller of delay in discovery. See Priest, supra n. 31, at 976 f. 
675 However, the effectiveness of such agreement is governed by the Korean Act on Regulation of 
Standard Terms of 1986. 
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English law is the same as Korean law. 676 It is also true in the Directive because any contrary 
agreement to exempt the notice duty does not appear to fall within the cases where it is 
detrimental to a consumer in a way that waives or restricts the consumer's rights. 6' 
6.3. The contents of the buyer's duty to examine the goods and notify the defects 
6.3.1. The buyer's duty to examine the goods 
6.3.1.1. The method of examination 
In Korean law, the principle regarding the method of examination is as follows. First of all, it 
is primarily determined by the parties' agreement. In the absence of the agreement, the buyer 
must examine the goods in a reasonable manner which takes account of their nature, amount, 
packaging, and all other circumstances. 678 The reasonable manner must be in a nature as to 
disclose recognisable defects, due regard being had to a trade usage in question, the 
circumstances in the previous transaction between parties, and all other relevant 
circumstances. 67' The examination does not necessarily need to be one that would reveal every 
possible defect . 
6'0 The buyer must bear the consequences of a defective examination other than 
an examination in a reasonable manner, which may cause the failure of notice and, in turn, may 
lose his rights conferred under the seller's guarantee liability. This principle seems to be more 
or less the same in CISG6$' and English law. 682 Since the method of examination in each 
676 CISG Art. 6. 
677 Directive(99/44) Art. 7.1. 
678 Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 42; Dong-seok Kim, "Mae-soo-in-eoi Gum-sa/Tong-ji-eoi-moo-eoi Nae- 
yong (The Contents of the Buyer's Duty to Examine the Goods and to Give Notice)", (1989) 16(1) Ko- 
shi-vent-koo 131, at 138. 
679 Id. Cf. For the examples of reasonable manner, see Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 
304 f. 
680 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 139. 
681 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 303 if. 
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jurisdiction is a matter of fact as to decide what is a reasonable manner, there is little to discuss 
in a comparative context. 
6.3.1.2. The period for the examination 
6.3.1.2.1. The determination of period 
6.3.1.2.1.1. Comparative accounts 
In Korean law, the buyer must examine the goods `without delay' after the buyer takes the 
seller's delivery of the goods. 683 Due to the extreme diversity of the cases, the wording of 
`without delay' for the determination of the period for examination should be in flexible terms, 
taking account of the circumstances of the individual case and the parties' reasonable 
opportunities. 684 Included amongst those circumstances are, for instance, the type of the 
goods, 685 the quantity of the goods, the place of delivery of the goods, 686 the kind of packaging 
used, 6S7 the usage of the transaction in question and etc. 688 However, personal impediments 
682 In English law, it is also required that an examination be carried out in a reasonable manner because 
the notice of rejection to be given within a reasonable time presupposes that a corresponding examination 
be carried out in a reasonable manner. Cf. Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 12-048. For 
instance, if the buyer examines the goods beyond what is necessary, he may find that he has accepted the 
goods so that he may lose his right to reject. See Harnor v. Groves [1855] 15 CB 667; Heilbutt v. 
Hickson [1872] LR 7 CP 438,451. In the Directive, it used to be assumed that the wording of "ought 
normally to have detected it" in the previous draft made it incumbent upon the consumer to take normal 
care in examining the goods after the reception of the goods. See Explanatory Memorandum to the first 
Draft COM (95) 520 final, at 14. However, the deletion of this phrase in the present Directive is deemed 
that there is no examination duty imposed on the consumer. 
693 KCmC Art. 69(1). German law requires `immediate' examination after the delivery by the seller to 
the extent that this is practical in the ordinary course of business. BGB §377(1). 
684 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 138; Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 195. 
685 E. g., perishable goods or durable goods, single pieces or mass-produced articles. 
686 
E. g., technical facilities, experts, or a general strike. 
687 
E. g., container, tin, or no packaging. 
688 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 138; Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 195. 
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relating to the buyer or to his employees are not relevant in deciding the period except general 
and objective impediments, 
689 
The examination in English law must be carried out `within a reasonable time'. 690 The duration 
of `within a reasonable time' must be decided by having regard to the nature of the goods and 
all the circumstances of the case. 69' CISG requires the examination to be carried out `within as 
short a period as is practicable in the circumstances'. `i4' The duration for the examination 
depends upon the circumstances of each case taking account of the principle of 
reasonableness. 693 
As it appears in the wording used for the duration of examination, it seems that Korean law 
requires a shorter period than the other jurisdictions, 694 However, given that the duration in 
each jurisdiction is quite flexible in terms of that it takes account of all the circumstances of 
each case on the basis of the principle of reasonableness, there seems to be no particular 
differences in its determination of the duration. 
6.3.1.2.1.2. Evaluating accounts 
Although there has been no difference found in the above comparative study, the wording used 
in Korean law, `without delay', may increase the transaction costs for the parties to clarify the 
meaning of the wording of `without delay' and to adapt it into a reasonableness test because it 
generally gives the impression of an inflexible rule of prompt examination compared to the 
other jurisdictions. 
689 Id. 
690 Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 12-041 and 12-054. 
691 Williston, Sales, (1974), §476; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 12-041. See also Heilbutt 
v. Hickson [ 1872] LR 7 CP 438,451. 
692 CISG Art. 38(l). 
693 Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 155; Bianca, BiancalBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 298 f.; 
Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 305 f.; Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 61 if. 
694 'Without delay' in Korean law appears a bit more demanding in its use of terminology than `within a 
reasonable time' and `within as short a period as is practicable'. 
150 
6.3.1.2.2. The beginning of the period 
6.3.1.2.2.1. Comparative accounts 
In Korean law, the period within which the goods should be examined generally starts to run 
upon the buyer taking the seller's delivery. 695 It normally occurs when the buyer himself or a 
carrier as his agent takes the goods at the place of delivery, 696 However, in the case where an 
independent carrier is involved, the period does not embark until the buyer is deemed to take the 
seller's delivery, i. e., until the goods are arrived at the destination. 
The starting point for the period of examination in CISG is generally the time of delivery, 697 
However, in cases involving carriage, the period begins to run only upon their arrival at their 
destination. 69' This rule is based upon the consideration of unreasonableness of examination by 
the buyer at the time of delivery, i. e., upon the handing over of the goods to the first carrier, 
because an examination by the buyer at that time is normally impossible. 699 Where the goods 
are redirected in transit or redispatched, it begins only when the goods have arrived at their new 
destination on the condition that two requirements are satisfied; first, the buyer had previously 
no reasonable opportunity to examine the goods, second, the seller knew or ought to have 
known of the possibility of such redirection or redispatch at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. 700 
The position in English law seems to be similar to CISG. The prima facie rule as to the point 
695 KCmC Art. 69(1). Cf. The period in German law begins to run after the delivery. BGB §377(1). 
696 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 140. 
697 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 306. 
698 CISG Art. 38(2). It applies even where the buyer concluded the contract of carriage except the case 
where the handing over of the goods to the carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer and the carrier 
receives the goods as agent of the buyer. See Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 299; Enderlein 
and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 156; Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 307. 
699 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 307. 
700 CISG Art. 38(3). 
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of examination, so far as domestic sales are concerned, is that it starts when the goods are 
handed over to the buyer. 70' However, the rule is subject to the question of whether the buyer 
has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods at the place of delivery. 702 For 
instance, the point of examination in a c. i. f. contract is at the stage of complete delivery, i. e., 
when the goods are handed over to the buyer at the destination because the reasonable 
opportunity to examine the goods usually arises at that stage. 703 In the case of a f. o. b. contract, 
it is far from clear that any general rule can be laid down as to the point of examination even 
though delivery normally takes place when the goods are put on board. It may also depend 
upon the question whether the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods 
when the goods are put on board. 704 In most f. o. b. contracts, it has been held that the point to 
examine the goods is at the time when the goods actually get into the hands of the buyer. 705 As 
regards redirection or redispatch of the goods by resale, it used to be held that the buyer was 
deemed to have done an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership if he resold the goods and 
forwarded them to a sub-buyer so that he might be deprived of his right to reject the goods even 
if he had not had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods. 706 However, the present law is 
that such a delivery to the sub-buyer no longer of itself amounts to an act inconsistent with the 
ownership of the seller unless he has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods. 7 ' The 
701 Perkins v. Bell [ 1893] 1 QB 193; Commercial Fibres (Ireland) Ltd. v. Zabaida [ 1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
27. 
702 The SGA s. 35. 
703 In a c. i. f. contract, it has been said that there are three stages of delivery: a provisional delivery on 
shipment, a symbolic delivery on tender of documents, a complete delivery of the cargo when the goods 
are handed over to the buyer at the c. i. f. destination. Schmoll Fils & Co. Inc. v. Scriven Bros & Co. 
[1924] 19 LILR 118,119. It is submitted that the buyer's opportunity to examine the documents arises 
when the documents are tendered. See Treitel, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 19-136. 
704 W. Schofield & Son v. Rownson, Drew and Clydesdale Ltd [ 1922] 10 LILR 480,482. 
pos Scaliaris v. E. OfiJerberg & Co. [1921] 37 TLR 307; Boks & Co. v. J. H. Rayner & Co. [1921] 37 
TLR 800; Bragg i'. Villanova [1923] 40 TLR 154; Obaseki Bros. V. Reif & Son Ltd [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
364,367. See Treitel, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 20-094. 
706 Hardy & Co. v. Hillerns and Fowler [ 1927] 2 KB 491. 
707 The SGA s. 35(6)(b). 
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point to examine the goods in the cases of redirection or redispatch by resale may be, thus, 
deferred until the goods are arrived at the new destination on the condition that, first, the buyer 
has not had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods, and second, the seller was aware of 
that the goods are going further on. 708 
As examined above, although it appears at first sight different in the rules as to the starting 
time for examination, the comparative study has found no difference in its contents between 
Korean law, CISG and English law. The time when the buyer takes the delivery as the basic 
starting time in Korean law could be explained in a comparative way as follows; in the case of 
no independent carrier involved, the time of the buyer taking the delivery normally occurs at the 
time of delivery which is correspondent to the basic starting time in English law and CISG, but 
in the case of independent carrier involved, it generally occurs at the time when the goods are 
arrived at the destination which is complied with the moment until which the basic starting time 
in English law and CISG is deferred by virtue of the principle of a reasonable opportunity. 
6.3.1.2.2.2. Evaluating accounts 
As found above, the basic rule in English law and CISG is `from the time of delivery' and then 
the principle of reasonable opportunity is brought in as to correct the lack of justification of the 
basic rule in some cases. The approach taken by English law and CISG could be arguably said 
that it is a detour to reach the same result, which Korean law achieves in a more direct manner. 
This seems to be partly attributed to that it ignores the fact that no examination can logically 
arise until the buyer takes delivery. 709 In this light the consequence of taking the detour seems 
to unnecessarily increase the transaction costs for the parties to clarify the principle of a 
reasonable opportunity. 
708 Saunt v. Belcher & Gibbons [1920] 26 Com Cas 115,120, per Bailhache J. See also Molling & Co. v. 
Dean & Son Ltd [1901] 18 TLR 217; Bragg v. Villanova [1923] 40 TLR 154; A. J. Frank & Sons Ltd v. 
Northern Peat Co. Ltd. [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 721. 
709 The duty of examination could be certainly raised before the buyer takes delivery if he unreasonably 
delays in taking delivery. 
153 
6.3.2. The buyer's duty to notify the defects 
6.3.2.1. The content and form of notice 
6.3.2.1.1. Comparative accounts 
Regarding contents of notice, in CISG the notice must specify the nature of the lack of 
conformity. 7° When determining to what extent the buyer must specify the nature of the lack of 
conformity, mixed objective-subjective criteria should be applied, taking account of the 
respective commercial situation of the seller and the buyer, any cultural differences, but above 
all the nature of the goods. 71' No more than `not in order', `unsatisfactory quality', `non- 
conformity with sample', `complaint from customer', `defective quality or delivery of wrong 
goods', `inferior and poor quality', `non-conformity with our specifications and cannot be sold 
to customers', 72 `poor workmanship and improper fitting'713 does not specify the defects 
alleged with sufficient precision. 714 Although there is no such requirement in Korean law, it is 
generally recognised by scholars. 715 On the other hand, there seems to be no specific 
requirement to specify the nature of the lack of conformity in English law. 716 The requirement 
710 CISG Art. 39(1). 
711 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 312. 
712 See OLG München, 7U2070/97,9-7-1997, reported in UNILEX D. 1997-11 (also seen at 
http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/970709g 1. html and http: //www. uncitral. org/en-index. htm 
(CLOUT No. 273)). 
713 See LG München, 17HKO3726/89,3-7-1989, reported in UNILEX D. 1989-2 (seen also at 
http: //www. uncitral. org/en-index. htm (CLOUT No. 3)). 
714 Cf. Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 312. 
715 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 143; Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 196. Cf. German law requires the 
buyer to give his notice with precise details. See Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 312. 
716 Carter, Breach of Contract, (1991), at para. 1016. In English law, the buyer must have made notice 
for an effective rejection of the goods which must show an unequivocal indication that they are not 
accepted. See Lee rr. York Coach and Marine [1977] R. T. R. 35 (where it was held that the buyer did not 
have a right to reject a defective car because his solicitors asked the seller to remedy the defects or offer a 
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in the Directive is left with domestic laws. 
There is, in general, no requirement as to the form of the notice of lack of conformity in each 
jurisdiction. It could be, thus, made by the use of fax, telex, telegram, ordinary post, or by 
telephone, taking account of the trade usage or custom in question. 
6.3.2.1.2. Evaluating accounts 
6.3.2.1.2.1. Internal evaluation 
Given that the notice duty is intended to give the seller the opportunity to know there is a 
defect, to prepare any possible disputes by securing necessary evidence, to redress a defect, or 
to have recourse to his supplier, it seems reasonable to require the buyer to specify the nature of 
a defect. "' However, one must ask whether the requirement is an inevitable one for the 
purposes of the notice duty in light of an age of electronic communication. "' That is, as long as 
the buyer gives a notice showing his dissatisfaction, it could be arguably said that the purposes 
have been more or less achieved in certain circumstances although the notice is not specific 
enough because it may be left with the seller to make inquiries with the buyer to learn of what is 
the nature of a defect. Furthermore, the requirement seems more unreasonable in a consumer 
context; it may be harsh for the consumer if he loses his right to claim for a defect only because 
he does not give enough specification as to the defect in his notice, e. g., "this t. v. set is not of 
satisfactory quality". In such a circumstance, it might be rather expected of the seller to make 
refund and did not therefore unequivocally reject the car). Cf. If the ground stated in the notice does not 
in law justify termination, the notice may nevertheless be valid insofar as a ground which does justify 
termination actually exists. See Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co. [1922] 38 TLR 349. 
717 In this light, it appears that the position in English law is unreasonable. However, one must note that 
the policy behind the notice duty in English law is slightly different from the other jurisdictions in that it 
is mainly to establish certainty for the seller that he does not need to reckon with the buyer's claim only 
for rejection. Namely, it is primarily to let the seller know the position of the buyer as to rejection or 
acceptance of the goods. 
718 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 279. 
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inquiries with the consumer after the non-specific notice of the defect. 
6.3.2.1.2.2. External evaluation 
It seems true that the requirement of specification of the nature of a defect may function to 
minimise the transaction costs for both parties because in any event the seller needs to ascertain 
what is the nature of a defect and consequently the seller's awareness of the nature will enable 
him to act in a rational way to minimise the transaction costs. However, assume that a buyer 
give non-specific notice, it does not seem to increase the possibility of the buyer to behave 
opportunistically on the basis of supervening events the risk of which is not allocated in the 
contract since he is deemed of running the risk of losing all his rights at his cost, but not the 
seller's. What of the situation where the seller does not make any inquiry as to the nature of a 
defect even if the buyer's greater cost could have been avoided with a minimum effort on the 
seller's cost, e. g., a simple telephone call? In such a situation, it might arguably increase the 
likelihood of the seller speculating at the buyer's cost in a way that increases the transaction 
costs and distorts the optimal operation of market. This is particularly true in a consumer 
context where most consumers are deemed unaware of the requirement of specific notice. 
6.3.2.2. The period for giving notice of a defect 
6.3.2.2.1. Comparative accounts 
The buyer's notice in Korean law must be `immediately' given to the seller if he discovers any 
defect in the goods . 
719 Although the use of `immediately' seems to literally require prompt 
notice and losing no time in notifying, it is submitted that it should be interpreted in a similar 
way to `without delay' for the period of examination, which takes account of the custom or 
usage of trade in question. 72° When determining the period of `immediately', all the 
719 KCmC Art. 69(1). Cf. BOB §377(1) (requiring `without delay' notice if a defect is found). 
720 Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 195 f.; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 140 f. 
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circumstances of the specific case must be taken into account on the basis of reasonableness. 721 
Among other things, regard must be had to whether the buyer's delay in notice causes any 
economical harm to the seller. 722 
In CISG, the notice specifying a defect in the goods must be sent to the seller `within a 
reasonable time' after the buyer discovered or ought to have discovered it. 723 As in Korean law, 
the period for notice should be decided by giving due regard to all the circumstances of the 
specific case724 including the perishable nature of the goods and the remedies the buyer is 
invoking, the need for impartial sampling or testing and the possibility of cure by the seller. 725 
In English law, although there is no relevant specific provision in the SGA, it is apparent from 
the cases that the buyer must exercise his right to reject `within a reasonably short period of 
721 id. 
722 For instance, any disadvantage by fluctuation of price, by loss of possibility of repair or replacement, 
by shrinkage in values, by impossibility to gather or preserve evidence for use in any possible dispute 
with the buyer over the alleged defect in the goods regarding burden of proof, and etc. Dong-seok Kim, 
supra n. 678, at 141. 
723 CISG Art. 39(1). 
724 UNCITRAL Yearbook III, A/CN. 9/SER. A. /1972, (1973), at 87, para. 78; Honnold, Documentary 
History of the 1980 Uniform Law for International Sales, (1989), at 104. Cf. Enderlein and Maskow, 
supra n. 288, at 159 f. (arguing that the reasonable time is in any case a short period (just like in art. 39, 
ULIS) and `reasonable' will mean, in many cases, giving notice immediately); Rb Roemond, 920150,06- 
05-1993, reported in UNILEX 1993-14 (a Dutch case involving the buyer's delay in notice of three 
months after discovering defects in electric kettles says that `reasonable time' mean `as soon as 
possible'). 
725 Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 314 f.; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 280; Sono, 
Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 309; Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (1994), at 308,323 ff.; Rohwer & Coe, 
"The 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the UCC - Peaceful 
Coexistence? ", in: Campbell & Rohwer (ed. ), Legal Aspects of International Business Transactions, 
(1984), at 272 f. Cf. Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 160 (regarding the remedies the buyer is 
seeking, they contend that there is no reason why one requires prompt notice only in the case of rejection, 
but not in the case of damages because, even in the case of damages, reasonable timely notice is required, 
and no prompt notice in the case of damages may underestimate the difficulties to prove a non- 
conformity which grow as time goes by). 
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time' once he realised the existence of a defect. 726 It has been submitted in a commercial 
context that he is entitled during that time to consider what he will do after he becomes aware of 
a breach of a condition precedent by the seller, and his failure to notify the rejection at once 
does not deprive him of his right as long as he exercises it `within a reasonable time'. 727 When 
deciding what period of retention is reasonable, regard must be given to all the relevant facts in 
each case; 728 the goods were perishable, expert opinion could have been obtained earlier, the 
buyer appears to rely on his right to damages, he tries to negotiate for a reduction in price or he 
asks adjustments to the goods. 
729 
Assuming that the consumer in the Directive is obliged to give notice, "' he has at least a 
period of two months from the date of when he detected a lack of conformity in which to notify 
the seller of the lack of conformity. 73' Therefore, no matter what the circumstances of the case, 
he can give his notice anytime within the period of two months or longer. 
The above comparison seems to show that the rules to decide the notice period in each 
jurisdiction are more or less the same in that all the jurisdictions except the Directive take 
account of all the relevant circumstances of each case based on the principle of reasonableness 
although `a reasonable period' in English law and CISG can be hardly equated in literal terms 
with the requirement of `immediate notice' in Korean law. 732 
726 See e. g., Flynn v. Scott [1949] SC 442 (where it was held that rejection could not be made 3 weeks 
after a van had broken down when it should have been made within a very few days). 
727 Fisher, Reeves & Co. Ltd v. Armour & Co. Ltd [1920] 3 KB 614,624, per Scrutton L. J.; Bremer 
Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H. v. Deutsche Conti-Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H. [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 112, 
116. 
728 The SGA s. 59 states that what is a reasonable time is a question of fact. 
729 Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 12-055; Goode, Commercial Law, (1995), at 377. Cf. 
Hwang, "Time for Rejection of Defective Goods", (1990) L. M. C. L. Q. 334. 
730 For the cases where the consumer has the notice duty, see supra n. 627-630 and accompanying texts. 
73} Directive(99/44) Art. 5.2. and Recital 19. 
732 Even though one must depend on the facts of each case, a period of approximately 20 days at least is 
adopted as a rough average in Korean law (Ki-su Lee, supra n. 610, at 196), one month in CISG 
(Schwenzer, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 315). English law would be more or less the same 
because it seems to be clear from the rejection of proposals to create a long term right. See Law Com. 
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6.3.2.2.2. Evaluating accounts 
6.3.2.2.2.1. Internal evaluation 
The minimum period of two-months in the Directive is no doubt an improvement in some 
Member states that have a shorter period733 and it may be enough only in some cases from the 
perspective of consumer. However, what of the situation where it takes a consumer more than 
two-months? It seems to be easily conceivable that there may be many cases where consumers 
take more than two-months to appreciate they have a legal right and to prepare themselves for a 
claim. 734 The inappropriateness of the two-month period may become even more apparent when 
one considers cross-border claims that may arise from European consumers' cross-border 
shopping in the single market. 735 
6.3.2.2.2.2. External evaluation 
Although the above comparative study in relation to the rules to decide the notice period has 
shown no particular difference, the wording used in Korean law, `immediate notice', does not 
seem to satisfy the requirement of certainty in terms of efficiency in that it may increase the 
transaction cost for the parties to clarify the meaning of `immediate notice' and to adapt it to the 
standard of `a reasonable period' taken by English law and CISG. This is because the wording 
of `immediate notice' generally gives the impression of an inflexible rule of prompt notice 
compared to the other jurisdictions. 
As regards the position in the Directive fixing the minimum period of two-months, the 
question arises whether it reflects the parties' preference in most cases. Given that most 
consumers are unaware of the notice requirement, it may distort the optimal operation of 
No. 160, (1987), para. 5.6. ff. 
733 
E. g., Italy (eight days), Portugal (thirty days). 
734 Cf. Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 32 f. 
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consumer market in that they may misjudge the costs and benefits of the transaction they are 
contemplating due to their ignorance of the notice requirement. "' Even if they are aware of the 
existence of the notice requirement and also the period for notice, it may increase the 
transaction costs for the parties to exclude or amend the period where it is conceivable that it 
takes more than two months. 
6.3.2.3. The cut-off period 
In Korean law, the buyer must give his notice as to a defect at the latest within six months in 
the case in which the defect was not immediately discoverable. 737 A buyer who fails to notify a 
seller of a defect in the goods before the period expires may lose all his rights based on the 
defect, however latent or discoverable the defect may later prove to be. The period begins from 
the date on which the buyer took the seller's delivery. 73' It is applicable to the cases where the 
defect could not be discovered on a reasonable examination and in fact the buyer did not 
establish it upon his receipt of the seller's delivery, 739 but not applicable if the contract expressly 
sets forth a cut-off period of shorter or longer duration. 740 
The buyer's notice in CISG must be dispatched at the latest by a date that would enable the 
seller to receive the notice within a period of two-years, or he may lose his right to rely on a 
lack of conformity. 74' It applies where a lack of conformity is not discernible upon a proper 
examination and the buyer did not subsequently discover the lack of conformity and ought not 
735 Id. 
736 Cf. Supra n. 651. For the aspects of consumer market failure due to the lack of information, see supra 
n. 50. 
737 KCmC Art. 69(1). 
738 Id 
739 Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 678, at 141 f. 
740 An unreasonable short period is governed by the Korean Act on Regulation of Standard Terms of 
1986 so that the period clause in the contract may be invalid. 
741 CISG Art. 39(2). 
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to have discovered it. 742 The two-year cut-off period begins when the goods were actually 
handed over to the buyer, and it may be ruled out if it is inconsistent with a contractual period of 
guarantee. 743 
In the Directive, although there is no specific provision for cut-off period linked with the 
buyer's notice duty, there is a two-year cut-off period as from the date of delivery during which 
the seller is liable for any lack of conformity which existed at the time of delivery of the 
goods. "' The provision makes, in effect, that the buyer's notice cannot be in any event over the 
period of two-years as from the date of delivery, or he may lose all his rights based on the lack 
of conformity. 
In contrast, there is no such cut-off period in a way of fixing a certain period in English law as 
far as the buyer's notice requirement coupled with his right to reject and acceptance rules is 
concerned. 'as 
6.4. The consequences of failure to give any or proper notice 
6.4.1. Comparative accounts 
In Korean law, CISG, and the Directive, the buyer may lose all the rights he can rely on in the 
event of the seller's delivery of defective goods if he does not give notice in timely and proper 
fashion. 746 However, the buyer in CISG may at least retain the right to claim a price reduction 
and damages (except damages for loss of profit) should he have a reasonable excuse for failing 
742 This rule also applies even where the buyer had a reasonable excuse for the failure to notify the seller 
of the non-conformity (CISG Art. 44). Therefore, he may lose his possible rights to claim reduction in 
the price and damages that may be allowed for him where he has a reasonable excuse. 
743 CISG Art. 39(2). 
744 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.1. 
745 However, there is a limitation period as to damage claims, which has nothing to do with the notice 
requirement. See supra n. 599 and accompanying texts. The cut-off periods in each jurisdiction have 
been evaluated above when the time limits were examined and there are no further things to be discussed 
here. See supra pp. 131 ff. 
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to give notice. 747 Although it seems vague to see what the reasonable excuses for failure to give 
the required notice are, 748 it has been submitted that it indicates the applicability of more 
individualised considerations than would be relevant under the more objective standard of art. 
39( 1). 74' This provision is of particular importance to the international traders from developing 
countries who are illiterate about machinery or other highly technical equipment, or whose 
domestic law or local practices are unfamiliar with the examination and notice requirement. 750 
As the notice requirement in English law is only concerned with the right to reject and terminate 
746 KCmC Art. 69(1); CISG Art. 39(1); Directive(99/44) Art. 5.2. 
747 CISG Art. 44. This provision was drafted as a concession to certain developing countries who said 
that their merchants could not live with the provisions on notice and the loss of all remedies in case of 
failure to give proper notice. Cf. O. R. at 320 ff.; Kritzer, supra n. 725, at 327; Date-Bah, "Problems of 
the Unification of International Sales Law from the Standpoint of Developing Countries", in: Problems of 
Unification, (1980), at 47 ff. 
748 Cf. Schlechtriem, "Uniform Sales Law - The Experience with Uniform Sales Laws in the Federal 
Republic of Germany", Juridisk Tidskrift, (1991/92), at 1-28: http: //www. cisg. law. pace. edu/cisg/text/ 
schlechtriem44. html; Schlechtriem, "Recent Developments in International Law", (1983) 18 Israel L. 
Rev. 309, at 325; Ziegel, "Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods", (1981), at 103: http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/wais/db/articles/ 
english2. html; Schneider, "The Seller's Right to Cure under the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", (1989) 7 Ariz. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 69, at 80 (arguing that `a reasonable excuse' for the failure to give notice has been already 
considered as a factor to decide `a reasonable time' under art. 39(1)). 
749 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 283; Reitz, "A History of Cut-off Rules as a Form of Caveat Emptor: Part I 
- The 1980 UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods", (1988) 36 Am. J. Com. L. 437, at 461. 
Cf. For the criteria to establish whether there is a reasonable excuse under art. 44, see Huber, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 350. 
750 Id., at 349; Sono, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 326. In addition, it may be frequently useful 
for the traders in the developed countries as experience in Germany has shown. Huber, Schlechtriem 
(ed. ), supra n. 218, at 349; Schlechtriem, supra n. 748 (Juridisk Tidskrift), at 1-28. Cf. Prof. Date-Bah 
finds that it is most useful for the purpose of avoiding an unfair total loss of the buyer's remedies 
whenever an examination of the goods has been done within a reasonable time that cannot be qualified as 
short. Date-Bah, "The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the Perspective of the 
Developing Countries, in: La Vendita Internazionale, (1981), at 31 f. (quoted in Garro, "Reconciliation of 
Legal Traditions in the U. N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", (1989) 23 
International Lawyer 443, as reproduced at "http: //www. cisg. law. pace. edu /cisg/biblio/garrol. html") 
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the contract, the failure to give notice may deprive the buyer of only the right to reject and 
terminate the contract. 
6.4.2. Evaluating accounts 
6.4.2.1. Internal evaluation 
One of the problems as to the consequences of the failure to give proper notice in Korean law 
and the Directive is that it might be harsh on the buyer in the context that a minor oversight by 
the buyer should lead to the loss of all his rights in respect of defects in the goods even if the 
oversight was understandable and there was no substantial prejudice to the seller. For instance, 
where the buyer ordered packing papers with a certain design, but as a result of a mistake by the 
seller, the papers supplied were about 1.5-2 mm excessive, the buyer kept them in his stock 
without further examination, relying on the fact that the seller had correctly performed his order, 
and then he found the defect only after two months when he used them in the process of packing 
his products. 75' In this case, it would be held in Korean law that the buyer's claim for any 
remedy is dismissed on the basis of the buyer's failure to examine the goods and to give timely 
notice of defects, whereas CISG would arguably hold that there was a reasonable excuse for the 
failure of notice so that the buyer might at least claim for a price reduction and damages except 
those for loss of profit. 752 Although the buyer's conduct in this case was not correct in itself and 
not in accordance with the rules as to the notice requirement, it seems that the buyer deserves to 
be accorded a degree of understanding and leniency. The harshness of the consequences for the 
failure of notice is even more serious in a consumer context. For example, assuming an English 
751 This case are based on the facts in the Korean Supreme Court Case, 21/7/1987,86 DaKa 2446, but the 
matter of the buyer's reliance is purely assumed for the present discussion. Cf For the case where the 
reliance is deemed to exist, see BGH WM 1975,562 = NJW 1975,2011 = LM §HGB No 15 (cited in 
Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 350). 
752 For more specific cases which would lead the buyer to a reasonable excuse, see Huber, Schlechtriem 
(ed. ), supra n. 218, at 350 f. 
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consumer who is not familiar with the notice requirement and its consequences at all purchased 
a Walkman during his travels in Italy where it is expected to take the option to impose a two- 
month notice requirement, the consumer found a defect in the remote control later but kept 
using it until the two-months notice period expired. Is it understandable to deprive the 
consumer of all his rights, even if he is ignorant about the notice requirement and its 
consequences in Italy and he has a reasonable excuse? 
6.4.2.2. External evaluation 
The notice requirement has been explained in terms of efficiency that it may prevent the 
likelihood of the buyer's claim based on the supervening events the risk of which is not 
allocated in the contract and it may also function to prevent the parties inefficiently increasing 
the transaction costs in a way that distorts the optimal operation of market. In this light, it has 
been assumed that the parties generally prefer to impose the notice duty on the buyer. The 
remaining question is whether the parties would have mutually agreed that the failure of notice 
may result in no remedies at all for the buyer so that in some cases he must pay the full price for 
defective goods of no value in the market; even if he has a reasonable excuse for the failure. In 
such a situation, on the assumption that the parties are generally risk-averse, the buyer would 
have said that he wants to have an exception in order to secure at least a reduction although he 
is asked to pay more for the exception. 
7. Concluding remarks 
7.1. "Dual liability system vs. Unified liability system" and "Legal liability vs. Contractual 
liability" 
Further to the previous discussions in Chap. II, this study has examined how the problems 
Korean law has suffered by having the dual liability system and by adopting the legal liability 
theory are unfolded in the substance of the rules as to the requirements of the seller's guarantee 
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liability and the examination of the rules showed inferiority of the dual liability system and the 
legal liability theory. 
As to the problems of the dual liability system, it was found that the separate treatments based 
on the artificial distinction between `non-performance' and `defective performance' that while 
delivery of aliud and non-conformity both in quantity in the sale of generic goods and in 
packaging are governed under the general liability, non-conformity both in quantity in the sale 
of specific goods and in quality is governed under the seller's guarantee liability, are themselves 
unreasonable in light of the practicability and appropriateness of the rules, comparative study, 
the parties' preference and the rules' certainty. 753 This is because, although all these aspects of 
non-conformity are interrelated each other, the treatments may produce substantial differences 
in the requirements and the remedies available. 
754 
Regarding the problems in the legal liability theory, two points were proved. First, the 
subjective criterion theory to judge the existence of non-conformity based on the parties' 
intention which is supported by the contractual liability theorists is superior to the objective 
criterion theory based on an ordinary standard alone regardless of the parties' intention which is 
supported by the legal liability theorists in terms of history and logic, comparative study and the 
parties' preference. 115 Second, the relevant time when non-conformity must exist should be at 
the time of the passage of risk, as argued by the contractual liability theory in light of 
comparative study and the parties' preference. 756 
7.2. Protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties? 
The study also investigated how effectively each law protects the reasonable expectation of the 
parties; the main question was posed in whether the rules reflect the different interests of 
consumer and commercial buyers as well as those of private and business sellers, and even if an 
753 See supra pp. 97 f, 102 ff. 
754 Id. 
'" See supra pp. 100 f., 105 f. 
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issue is not related to the particular interests of consumers or private sellers, whether they reflect 
the common interests of all the parties. 
7.2.1. Private sellers' interests 
The study found that Korean law and CISG seems to fail to reflect the private sellers' interests, 
which may be distinguished from business sellers' because, unlike English law, the rules as to 
the existence of a defect under the seller's guarantee liability are unexceptionally applied to 
sales even between private seller and commercial buyer, even if in many cases the extent of 
liability of the private seller may be considerably different from that of the business seller. 757 
7.2.2. Consumers' interests 
It also showed various aspects in which each law fails to reflect consumers' interests which 
may be differentiated from commercial buyers'. 
First, English law is open to criticism because of its separate treatment of breaches of quality 
duties and quantity duties which results in the absolute ban on the business seller's attempt to 
exclude or limit his liability in consumer sales not applying to the matter of quantity. 758 
Second, Korean law, English law and CISG, which do not take account of public statements 
made by the producer or his representative as a factor to decide the existence of non-conformity, 
do not seem to reflect the interests of consumers, who often rely on the statements in making 
their decision to purchase. "' 
Third, Korean law, which requires the absence of negligence on the buyer's part in failing to 
discover non-conformity at the time of contract, does not seem to reflect the interests of 
consumers, whose purchase decision often rely on the name of brand and the reputation of 
retailer even without having a look at the goods and do not know whether they are supposed to 
756 See supra pp. 112. 
757 See supra pp. 102,106 f. 
758 See supra pp. 99,105. 
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examine the goods at the time of purchase. 760 The uncertainty in this matter under the Directive 
should be resolved in this light. 
Fourth, the Directive that allows the Member States an option to impose a notice duty on the 
consumer and, its minimum period of two-months seems against the interests of consumers who 
are normally unaware of the duty and even if they are aware of it, it may often take more than 
two-months for them to appreciate they have a legal right and to prepare themselves for a 
claim. 76' 
7.2.3. Common interests 
Where the issue was not directly related to the interests of consumers or private sellers as 
opposed to those of commercial buyers or sellers, the study showed in what aspects each 
jurisdiction is inappropriate to reflect the common interests of all the parties. 
First, the separate treatment between non-conformity in quality and in quantity and its 
consequences under Korean law may not reflect the contractual parties' preference, given that 
the matter of quantity is, in its nature, generally similar to that of description as to quality. 76' 
Second, the position in English law that the passage of risk, which is the relevant time when 
non-conformity must exist, is connected with the transfer of property rather than the handing 
over of the goods does not reflect the parties' preference because they may put the risk of 
damage on who is in a better position to take care of the goods. This is rather more closely 
related to the matter of delivery than to the transfer of property. 763 
Third, insofar as the requirements as to ignorance of the existence of non-conformity and 
absence of negligence in failing to discover non-conformity are applicable even to the cases of 
the contractual guarantees in Korean law and the Directive, it is likely to interfere with the basis 
759 See supra pp. 101 f., 106. 
760 See supra pp. 122 f., 124 f. 
761 See supra pp. 141 f., 159 f. 
762 See supra pp. 98 f., 104. 
763 See supra pp. 112 f., 114. 
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of bargain the parties have agreed where a buyer genuinely relies on a specific contractual 
guarantee by a seller who is supposed to remedy a non-conformity. 764 
Fourth, a fixed two-year period in CISG and the Directive running from the time of delivery 
after which the buyer may not rely on any lack of conformity for his claim may frequently 
confront a criticism that it does not take account of the diversity in the goods and any arbitrary 
time limit may run counter to the parties' intentions in some cases where non-conformity is 
hardly discoverable until the expiry of the time limit. 765 
Fifth, the position in Korean law which does not impose the notice duty in the following two 
cases seems inappropriate to reflect the parties' interests; (a) where some of professionals (e. g., 
artists or doctors who are not categorised as merchants) purchase goods relating to their 
profession, (b) where a merchant buyer purchases goods relating to his commercial purposes 
from a private seller whose transaction is not regarded as a commercial act. 766 This is because 
the sellers in those cases are most likely to demand the duty to prevent the buyers, who are 
professional, from speculating at the expense of the sellers and to establish certainty that they do 
not need to reckon with claims at any particular time. 76' 
Sixth, Korean law, which is silent as to the earliest time when the notice duty could emerge in 
documentary sales, should consider that most sellers in the documentary sales are likely to 
require the duty even before the delivery of the goods if the buyer learns of non-conformity of 
the goods upon receiving documents. 768 
Seventh, the seller's ignorance at the time of delivery of the existence of non-conformity as a 
requirement to raise the notice duty in Korean law does not fully reflect the parties' intention 
because the parties may prefer the time being at the time when the reasonable period for a 
notice expires rather than at the time of delivery in light of the purposes of imposing the notice 
764 See supra pp. 123 f., 125. 
765 See supra pp. 131 f. 
766 See supra pp. 139 ff. 
767 Id. 
768 See supra pp. 144 f. 
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duty. 769 
Eighth, Korean law and CISG that require the buyer to specify the nature of non-conformity in 
his notice seems inadequate in light of a modem age of electronic communication because, 
given that a notice of mere dissatisfaction may more or less achieve the essential purpose of 
notice to prevent the buyer's opportunistic behaviour, it should be the seller who makes inquires 
with the buyer to learn of what is the nature of non-conformity by a simple phone call. "o 
Finally, depriving the buyer of all the rights he can rely on where he fails to give notice in 
timely and proper fashion in Korean law and the Directive is inappropriate to reflect the parties' 
intention since it may be harsh on most buyers in the context that a minor oversight would mean 
the loss of all their rights as to non-conformity even if the oversight was understandable and 
does not cause any substantial prejudice to the seller. "' 
769 See supra pp. 146 f. 
770 See supra pp. 155 f. 
771 See supra pp. 163 f. 
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IV. Effects of the Seller's Liability for Non-conforming Goods 
1. General Remarks 
The courses of action open to the buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's failure to deliver 
conforming goods may be divided at a broad level into three series of remedies. First, he may 
be able to claim specific performance by either repair or replacement. Second, he may be 
allowed to claim monetary relief which may involve the claim for damages or reduction of the 
contract price. Third, he may be entitled to terminate the contract or simply to suspend to 
perform his part of the contract insofar as the seller's failure to deliver conforming goods 
continues. 
The following discussions will deal with the question of, first, how the broad threefold 
division of the courses of action is recognised in each jurisdiction, second, what are the exact 
conditions in which each remedy is available, and third, what are the precise effects of the 
remedy if granted. The discussions will be executed in a comparative way in light of the 
ultimate purpose of this thesis to investigate if there is any need to introduce a unified liability 
system into Korean law and how effectively the rules protect the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. 
2. Suspending performance 
2.1. General 
In the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods, the buyer may be reluctant to accept the 
goods and part with the money if he has not yet paid. In this case, the law may entitle him to 
suspend his part of the contract so long as the seller's failure to deliver non-defective goods 
continues. This is a kind of `dilatory plea' which does not terminate the contract but merely 
allows the buyer for a while to maintain his refusal to perform his part until the seller either 
performs or offers to do so; it is purely in the nature of defence against non-performance of his 
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duty based on the sales contract being deemed of the synallagmatic nature in a sense that failure 
by one party to perform his part of the promised exchange will justify the other party's refusal 
to perform. 7' 
The ensuing discussions deal generally with whether and how each jurisdiction recognises the 
right of suspension and in what circumstances the right is restricted. 
2.2. Comparative accounts 
2.2.1. Korean law 
The right to suspend performance is not specifically provided for in the rules for the seller's 
guarantee liability in KCC. The recognition of this right under the seller's guarantee liability 
must be examined in light of one's understanding of whether the seller is assumed to take a 
contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods in the sale of specific goods. Thus, this matter 
is, at the end, linked with the disputes as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability. 
According to the legal liability theory, it is natural to say that the buyer has no right to suspend 
his performance in the sale of specific goods on the basis of the specific goods dogma 73 because 
once the seller delivers the goods as they were at the time of contract, it is assumed that 
performance of the seller's contractual duty has been completed. 7' In the case of the sale of 
generic goods, there also seems to be no such right insofar as the generic goods are specified 
because of their understanding that once the generic goods are specified, they are treated as 
specific goods so that the seller's delivery of the goods as they were at the time of specification 
may amount to complete performance of the seller's duty . 
775 
In contrast, the contractual liability theory argues that the buyer certainly has the right of 
772 This is known in civil law systems as the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. Cf. Treitel, supra n. 421, 
at 245 ff. 
773 See supra pp. 33 f. 
774 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 486. 
775 See supra n. 149 and accompanying texts. 
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suspension. 776 This is based on their idea that the seller has a contractual duty to deliver non- 
defective goods in the sale of both specific and generic goods. "' 
Insofar as the right of suspension in Korean law is conferred upon the buyer where the seller 
delivers defective goods, the availability of the right depends upon whether a defect affects an 
important or trivial part of the goods as a whole. 7' Thus, the buyer may not be able to rely on 
the right if his exercise of the right would be contrary to the principle of good faith, having 
regard in particular to the relatively slight or trivial nature of the defect. 7' 
2.2.2. English law 
In general, the first step to examine the buyer's remedies for the seller's breach of contract is 
to categorise contractual terms into conditions, warranties or innominate terms. 78° This is 
because the remedy of rejection and termination is only available to the buyer when the seller's 
breach of contract goes to the root of the agreement, i. e., either because it is a breach of 
condition or because of the nature or consequences of a breach of an innominate term, whereas 
if the term broken by the seller is merely a warranty, the buyer will only have a remedy in 
damages. 78' Insofar as the seller's liability for defects in quality is concerned, the implied terms 
stipulated in ss. 13-15 are all classified as conditions, and any breach of condition may entitle 
the buyer to reject the goods and terminate the contract. 
776 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 311 ff., 342 f.; Choon-soo Ahn, supra n. 148, at 432 ff. See also 
KCC Arts. 536,588. But this right in the case of specific goods is limited to the cases where a defect can 
be repairable without unreasonable costs and inconvenience. Id., at 434. 
777 See supra pp. 42 ff. 
778 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 152; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 106 f. 
79 Id. Cf. BGB §320(2). 
780 Its understanding that a contractual term must be either a condition or a warranty is based on the 
wording of statute in the SGA s. 11(3) which distinguishes between conditions and warranties. Wallis, 
Son & Wells i'. Pratt & Haynes [1910] 2 KB 1003. For the authority there being an innominate term as 
the third category notwithstanding the SGA s. 11(3) recognizing condition and warranty as the only 
classifications of contractual terms, see Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd 1v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd 
[1962] 2 QB 26; The Hansa Nord [1976] QB 44. 
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Having said that, the recognition of the buyer's right of suspension in English law seems to 
depend upon the question of whether or not the breach of condition confers on the buyer the 
right to treat the contract as repudiated and terminate it separately from the right to reject. The 
current position seems not entirely clear from both the SGA and the case law. '8' It can be 
divided into two opposing views; first, the right to reject is treated as if it were merely a 
component of the general right to terminate a contract for breach, 783 and second, it is separate 
from the right of termination. 784 According to the latter view, rejection involves the buyer 
refusing to perform his primary duty to accept the goods in a sense that it is a specific example 
of the right of suspension. 78' This is based on the idea that `condition' stated in the SGA is a 
description for a term which defines a party's duty to perform, compliance with which is a 
condition precedent to the other party's duty to accept the performance. 78' In this light, the 
seller's delivery of the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract is the pre-condition of 
the buyer's duty to accept and pay in exchange for that. "' Therefore, a failure by the seller to 
781 The SGA ss. 11(3), 61(1). 
782 For an explanation of the unclear position in terms of legislation and case law, see Bradgate and 
White, "Rejection and Termination in Contracts for the Sale of Goods", in: Birds and Bradgate (ed. ), 
Termination of Contracts, (1995), at 57 f.; Jafarzadeh, The Buyer's Remedies for Seller's Non 
Conforming Delivery: A Comparative Study under English Law, the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and Shi'ah Law, Doctoral thesis in Univ. of Sheffield, (1998), at 33 ff. 
783 See Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 459,480, per Devlin J; The 
Hansa Nord [ 1976] QB 44,83-84, per Ormerod U. Cf. For non-sale of goods cases, Wickman Machine 
Tools Sales Ltd. v. Schuler A. G. [ 1972] 1 WLR 840,850, per Lord Denning M R; Photo Production Ltd. 
v. Securicor Ltd. [ 1980] AC 827,849, per Lord Diplock. See also Carter, supra n. 716, at para. 628, 
940; Treitel, The Law of Contract, (1991), at 690. 
784 Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 449; Beale, supra n. 25, at 20,80; Bradgate and White, supra n. 
782, at 57,61 f.; Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 245; Furmston, Sale and Supply of Goods, (1995), at 158 f.; 
Goode, supra n. 729, at 362 f.; Treitel, The Law of Contract, (1995), at 670,704; Bridge, The Sale of 
Goods, (1997), at 162 f.; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 12-028. 
785 Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 57 ff.; Bradgate, "Termination for Breach", in: Birds and 
Bradgate (ed. ), Termination of Contracts, (1995), at 45 ff.; Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 245. Cf. Beale, 
supra n. 25, at 18 ff., 28 ff. 
786 Bradgate and White, id. 
787 Cf. The SGA ss. 27,28. 
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comply with the implied conditions will justify the buyer in suspending performance of his duty 
to accept the goods. 788 
Assuming that a separate right to suspend performance is admitted in English law, any breach 
of condition specified in ss. 13-15 may, in principle, confer on the buyer the right of suspension 
without terminating the contract whether or not the consequence of breach is serious. However, 
one must note that it does not apply in non-consumer sales where the breach is so slight that it 
would be unreasonable for the buyer to exercise the right. 789 Similarly, in relation to the buyer's 
right to reject all the goods delivered in the event of either deficient or excess quantity 
delivered, the business buyer may not be allowed to reject the whole if the deficiency or excess 
is so slight that it would be unreasonable to reject the whole. 790 
2.2.3. The Directive 
The Directive does not deal with the right of suspension, although it may possibly be deducible 
from the provision as to the right to require repair or replacement. 791 It seems that the right is 
left to domestic laws. 
2.2.4. CISG 
The right of suspension in the event of the seller's actual delivery of defective goods is not 
clearly provided for in CISG, although it clearly confers on the buyer the right in the cases of 
the seller's prospective non-performance. 792 However, it is submitted that an analogical 
788 From the point of this view, the buyer's right to terminate the contract is a separate right which must 
be justified on another ground. See infra n. 846-853 and accompanying texts. 
789 The SGA s. 15A(1). 
790 The SGA s. 30(2A). 
791 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.3. 
792 CISG Art. 71. Under this provision, the buyer is given the right where it becomes apparent that the 
seller will not perform a substantial part of his obligation; it does not concern where the seller has 
performed his duty to deliver the goods in a way that do not correspond with the contract. Cf. For the 
buyer's right to refuse to take delivery in the event of the seller's early or excess delivery, see CISG Art. 
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interpretation of arts. 30,53, and 58 has impliedly recognised a right to refuse to take delivery 
where the goods delivered do not accord with the contract terms and CISG; the buyer is not 
bound to pay and take delivery so long as the seller has not fulfilled his duty to deliver the 
goods which are conformed to the contract and CISG. 793 Suspending his performance to pay 
and take delivery, he may require the seller to deliver substitute goods or to repair non- 
conformity under art. 46(2) or (3). 
Although it is not clear what degree of lack of conformity may entitle the buyer to suspend his 
performance, it is submitted that the buyer does not necessarily have to show that the lack of 
conformity has amounted to a `fundamental breach' defined in art. 2579 which is only related to 
the right of termination79' and of requiring substitute goods. 796 Minor lack of conformity should 
not allow the buyer to refuse to take delivery when one considers the principle of good faith 
provided in art. 7(1). 79' 
2.2.5. Comparative view 
Where the seller delivers defective goods, each jurisdiction has no specific provision or case as 
to the buyer's right to suspend his performance to pay and take delivery. Nevertheless, each 
jurisdiction has tried to recognise the right in their own way, having regard to their own 
particular liability system, on the basis of the sales contract being deemed of the synallagmatic 
nature. Although the recognition of the right seems arguable in each jurisdiction, the 
contractual liability theorists in Korean law, some scholars in English law and CISG have 
52. 
793 Maskow, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 389 ff.; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 229 
ff.; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 367. Cf. For further details, see Jafarzadeh, supra n. 782, 
at 116 ff. 
794 For the definition of `fundamental breach', see infra n. 879-889 and accompanying texts. 
795 CISG Arts. 49(1)(a), 51(2), 73. 
796 CISG Art. 46(2). Cf. Jafarzadeh, supra n. 782, at 125 f. 
797 Maskow, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 392; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 230. Cf. 
CISG Arts. 46(2), (3), 71(1). 
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accepted that the buyer has the right in certain circumstances. 
As to the circumstances to raise the right, they differ in that, while the right in English law 
seems so strict that any breach of implied conditions entitles the buyer to suspend his 
performance, Korean law and CISG seem to restrict the right by insisting that the buyer cannot 
rely on the right where a defect takes a relatively slight or trivial nature so that the buyer's 
exercise of the right would be contrary to the principle of good faith. However, one must note 
that, insofar as the matters of non-conformity with the implied terms specified in ss. 13-15 and 
of either deficient or excess quantity are concerned, the difference between them is not so 
substantial because the strict rule in English law is not applicable to the cases where the buyer 
does not deal as a consumer; it depends upon the test of whether the breach is so slight that it 
would be unreasonable for the buyer to exercise the right. 798 
2.3. Evaluating accounts 
2.3.1. Internal evaluation 
The right of suspension may play significant roles in practice in providing transactional justice 
for the parties where the seller has failed to perform his reciprocal contractual duties, and the 
buyer has not yet performed his part of the contract. First, the remedy is effective because it 
amounts to a kind of self-help remedy; it may enable the aggrieved buyer to lawfully suspend 
his performance without being sued by the seller and without recourse to legal proceedings. 799 
Second, it has a less drastic effect for the seller in that his failure allows the buyer to refuse to 
perform at least for so long as the failure continues without involving the more drastic step of 
terminating the contract. "' Third, it is conducive to the preservation and performance of 
bargains because the existence of the right may provide the seller with an incentive to cure; the 
798 The SGA ss. 15A(1), 30(2A). 
799 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 245; Beale, supra n. 25, at 16. 
800 Treitel, id. 
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buyer's refusal to take delivery may cause delay in the seller's performance and in order to 
avoid the negative consequences of delay and to obtain payment the seller would strengthen his 
efforts to perform. 80' All these things seem to explain the importance of adopting the right of 
suspension in practice where the aggrieved buyer wants to keep the contract on foot and 
demand goods fully conforming with the contract, being protected from having to advance 
credit to the seller. In this light, the legal liability theory in Korean law and a view in English 
law which do not recognise the separate right of suspension are doubted. 
As to non-recognition of the right in the legal liability theory, it seems true that the specific 
goods dogma as its theoretical background for non-recognition of the right may be justified 
insofar as it is only concerned with non-substitutable and non-repairable specific goods because 
it seems practically unnecessary to admit the right of suspension. However, the problem of the 
legal liability theory is in its unclear position as to whether the theoretical ground extends to 
substitutable and repairable goods. 802 Given that it is extended so, the buyer is obliged to pay 
and take the defective goods delivered even if they could be curable insofar as the goods 
delivered are as they were at the time of contract8'°3 or specification8°4 because the delivery is 
deemed to be complete performance of the seller's duty on the basis of the specific 'goods 
dogma. 805 Therefore, if he wants to demand the seller to cure, he may do so by virtue of the 
rules of the seller's guarantee liability, 806 but only after fulfilling his duty to pay and take 
delivery. This view seems to produce unreasonable results for the buyer, for instance, in that 
the right of suspension in the sale of generic goods depends upon whether the goods are 
specified; the buyer certainly has the right to require the seller's cure under the general liability 
801 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 142; Maskow, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 390. 
802 Cf. Supra n. 340-343 and accompanying texts. 
803 Applied to the cases of specific goods. 
804 Applied to the cases of generic goods. 
805 See supra pp. 33 f. Certainly, the buyer is able to refuse to pay and take the goods if a defect is 
sufficient to trigger his right of rescission under the seller's guarantee liability. But one must note that 
this is different from the right of suspension. 
806 For the right to demand the seller's cure in detail, see infra pp. 253 ff. 
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along with the right of suspension before the generic goods are specified, but once the goods are 
specified and delivered as they were at the time of specification, the buyer's right to require the 
seller's cure is available under the seller's guarantee liability but without the right of suspension 
so that he has to part with money and run a greater risk of non-performance by the seller. 807 It 
seems hard to give any plausible reason for this different treatment. 
As to the right of suspension where a defect is slight, the position in English law regarding 
commercial sales, Korean law, and CISG appears more reasonable than that in English law 
regarding consumer sales in that any attempt by the buyer to reject the goods cannot be justified 
where a defect takes a relatively slight or trivial nature. However, it is submitted that there is a 
danger in that some degree of unavoidable vagueness in stating the requirement of slight nature 
of a defect may be an undesirable element of uncertainty as to when a breach will entitle the 
buyer to reject the goods and to refuse payment. 808 It seems, thus, crucial for the requirement to 
be set in clear guidelines to determine when a breach confers the right of suspension on the 
buyer. The clear guidelines are even more vital from the point of view of consumers because 
the uncertainty may be often used in favour of the seller who has a relatively stronger 
bargaining power than does the consumer who often has to drop his claim or accept less than he 
is supposed to be compensated even though what he really wants is perfect goods, not defective 
ones in his hands. 809 Given that there is no such guidelines in practice, the risk of injustice for a 
few sellers due to the consumer's opportunistic behaviour seems the inevitable price that has to 
be paid in order to achieve a fair result for the overwhelming majority of consumers. 81' 
807 Cf. Supra n. 149 and accompanying texts. 
808 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 350; Collins, supra n. 33, at 334 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 98 f. 
809 Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 4.12. The Commission recommended the retention of 
the absolute right to rejection and termination on the ground of uncertainty inherent in `minor defect' and 
the consumer's weaker bargaining position. Id, at paras. 4.2. ff. 
810 Id., at para. 4.12. 
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2.3.2. External evaluation 
The right of suspension is likely to have economic benefits from society's perspective. 
Namely, it may assist resources in moving more swiftly to a higher value user because one of 
the goals of suspending performance is related to an information function in a sense that it may 
determine the likelihood that the risk of non-performance will materialise; i. e., if termination of 
the contract is necessary in terms of efficiency, "" the information may help termination to take 
place at an earlier time than if the right of suspension was not available so that it ensures that 
the goods move more quickly to a higher value user. 812 In light of this efficiency function of the 
right of suspension, it is submitted that the views in Korean law and English law which do not 
recognise the separate right of suspension should be reconsidered. 
Regarding the right of suspension where a defect is slight, it seems that the approach taken by 
Korean law and CISG may be adequate to enhance efficiency if one can believe that courts will 
respond to a consumer's needs by a consistent and publicised manner to confer on him the right 
as a primary remedy. 813 Nevertheless, it is still doubted whether such an approach has properly 
worked for the consumer's interests in practice. Assuming that most consumers are risk-averse, 
they may prefer an absolute right to reject the goods because they generally want goods of the 
proper quality at the full price, not defective goods at a lower price. 8 ' In addition, in the 
absence of clear guidelines to clarify the test of slight nature of a defect, the absolute right of 
suspension seems crucial in consumer sales in order to redress a market failure caused by the 
information gap between business sellers and consumers. The reason for that is that the test in 
its open texture seems to inevitably render uncertainty and it may interfere with low-cost, 
routinised redress procedures that are essential for consumers who are often reluctant to proceed 
811 For the discussions of efficient termination, see infra n. 939-941 and accompanying texts. 
812 Carter, "Suspending Contract Performance for Breach", in: Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law, (1995), at 487 ff. 
813 Id. 
8 14 Cf. Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 4.5. 
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to courts due to their ignorance. 815 
3. Termination 
3.1. General 
If the buyer realises that he has not obtained the quality or quantity for which he has bargained 
in the contract, he may wish to put an end to further performance and as far as possible to be put 
back into the position he was in before performance on either side was begun. Each legal 
system, following this wish, provides him with a right to put an end to the contract. The right 
has been variously expressed in the use of terminology; `rescission' in Korean law816 and the 
Directive, "' `avoidance' in CISG, 818 and `electing to treat the contract as at an end', `justifiable 
repudiation', `cancellation', `termination', and probably most commonly `rescission' in English 
law, being distinct from that of termination. 819 However, there seems to be no great merit in 
discussing this matter of different terminological use insofar as we are clear that it does not 
mean to put the contract at an end ab initio; the contract will remain to sort out the subsequent 
problems created by the breach of c©ntract. 82° 
The right of termination may play a role in providing protection for the buyer who may suffer 
hardship where non-conforming goods have to remain in his hands and in putting pressure on 
the seller to perform in accordance with the contract. 821 This remedy could be a prompt one for 
815 See supra n. 52-55 and accompanying texts. 
816 KCC Arts. 572(2), 574,575(1), 580(1), 581(1). Cf. For the terminology in Germany, see supra n. 
331. 
817 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.5. 
818 CISG Art. 49. 
819 Beale, supra n. 25, at 13. Prof. Treitel indiscriminately uses `rescission' which may include to 
describe `rescission ab initio'. See Treitel, supra n. 421, at 320. Cf. For the discussion as to its use of 
terminology in English law, see Birds and Bradgate (ed. ), Termination of Contracts, (1995), at 9 ff. 
820 However, there are forceful arguments in Korea as to the question of whether termination operates ex 
tune or ex nunc. See infra n. 990. 
821 Beale, "Remedies: Termination", in: Hartkamp et al. (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 349 f.; Treitel, supra n. 
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the buyer, as a form of self-help remedy, whereas other remedies such as a suit for performance 
or damages often require the courts to be involved. $22 In addition, it may be a useful means for 
the buyer to avoid a bargain which would have been a bad one even if conforming goods had 
been delivered; e. g., where a buyer seeks to terminate the contract on a falling market or where 
he purchases the goods based on incorrect appraisal of the circumstances. 823 Notwithstanding 
its useful functions and its attractive practical effects to the buyer, it cannot be available in 
every case of non-conformity because it could be a formidable remedy against the seller; e. g., 
where the effect of termination throws back on him a risk which had been undertaken by the 
buyer in the contract on a falling market or where he has made transaction-specific investments 
in his attempts to perform the contract which will be wholly or largely wasted as a result of 
termination. &24 All jurisdictions have tried to strike some balance between the competing 
interests at stake. A balance can be struck in a way that recognises the existence of the right of 
termination in principle for the sake of the buyer, but for the sake of the seller limits the right of 
termination in various aspects to certain cases. 825 We will examine in what way each 
jurisdiction has developed the law to recognise the existence of the right of termination and how 
effectively each jurisdiction restricts the right in order to strike a proper balance between the 
conflicting interests. 
3.2. Preconditions: Seriousness of a defect 
3.2.1. Comparative accounts 
3.2.1.1. Korean law 
421, at 321; Collins, supra n. 33, at 332. 
822 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 322. 
823 Id. See also Collins, supra n. 33, at 332. 
824 Id. 
825 Id 
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The buyer's right of rescission under the seller's guarantee liability is generally dependent 
upon the question of whether or not he is still able to achieve the object of the contract in the 
event of the seller's delivery of defective goods. 82' Thus, if he cannot achieve the object that he 
was intended to obtain from the contract, he may declare the contract rescinded. The object is 
neither necessarily contained in the contract nor actually known to the seller. However, the 
buyer's subjective intention is not enough to be said to be the object of the contract. 827 It should 
be determined objectively, taking account of the circumstances of the contract at the time of 
contract, the nature of the goods, etc. 828 In the case of a shortage in quantity, the buyer is given 
a right of rescission only where he would not have entered into the contract had he known of the 
shortfall at the time of contract. 829 One must note that this is the case only in the sale of specific 
goods because the seller's guarantee liability does not deal with the matter of shortage in 
quantity of the generic goods. 83° His right of rescission for shortage in quantity in the sale of 
generic goods is governed under the general liability as to partial impossibility or delay that is 
subject to the principle of fault. 83' The right is dependent on whether or not the object of the 
contract can be achieved in the event of such impossibility or delay. 
In relation to the situation where there is a curable defect and its relationship with a right of 
rescission, it is not clearly dealt with by KCC. However, it is generally understood among 
scholars that, on the basis of the principle of good faith, the buyer may not be able to declare the 
rescission of the contract where a defect can be cured without causing the buyer unreasonable 
expense and inconvenience because such a defect may not amount to a breach which may 
826 KCC Arts. 575(1), 580(1), 581(1). 
827 Yun jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 246; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 340 f.; Sang-yong Kim, supra n. 
392, at 239; Joo-soo Kim, supra n. 125, at 214 f.; Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 194 f. 
828 Id. 
829 KCC Art. 572(2). 
830 See supra n. 397-398 and accompanying texts. 
831 See supra n. 73-75,90-91 and accompanying texts. Insofar as the seller is generally deemed to be in 
fault in the event of the shortage in quantity of the generic goods, there seems to be no particular 
difference between them. However, there may be some cases where the seller is not in fault, e. g., an 
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prevent him from achieving the object of the contract. ß ' In this way it is assumed that the seller 
has a right to cure before or even after the contractual delivery date insofar as it could be 
exercised without causing the buyer unreasonable expenses and inconvenience. 833 
As regards the situation where a part of the performance is not in accordance with the contract 
in terms of quality, there is no such express provision in KCC. It is, however, generally 
understood that the buyer may have a right of rescission as to such a part under the seller's 
guarantee liability if the goods can be quantitatively speaking separable and the object of the 
contract cannot be partially achieved. 834 The buyer's right to rescind the contract in its entirety 
is not allowed as long as the object of the contract can be achieved as a whole even though there 
exists a partial defect. 83' Similar rules apply to a shortage in quantity of the specific goods; a 
right of rescission in its entirety is conferred on the buyer only where he would not have entered 
into the contract had he known of the shortage at the time of contract. In the same manner, the 
buyer of generic goods may be restricted to partially rescinding the contract regarding the 
shortage by virtue of the rules of the general liability83' insofar as the shortage does not affect 
the buyer's achievement of the object of the contract as a whole. However, he may rescind the 
embargo, war, and etc. See Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 533. 
832 Id. See also Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 304 f.; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 269 f.; Dong- 
seok Kim, "Boo-jeok-hap-mool-in-do-ae-dae-han Mae-soo-in-eoi Koo-jae (The Buyer's Remedies for 
Non-conforming Delivery)", (1988) 177 Wol-kan-ko-shi 61, at 65 f.; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 595, at 
302; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 794; Choon-soo Ahn, supra n. 148, at 434. 
833 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 340 f.; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 304 f.; Choon-soo Ahn, 
supra n. 148, at 434. Cf. For the view that the buyer has a right to enforce the seller to cure the defect, 
but no right of rescission until the seller fails to cure, see Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 269 f.; Dae- 
jeong Kim, supra n. 595, at 302; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 832, at 65 f.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 
533,800 f. 
834 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 246; Sang-yong Kim, supra n. 392, at 239; Joo-soo Kim, supra n. 125, 
at 215; Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 195; Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 832, at 66. 
835 Id. 
836 Again, the matter of the shortage in the sale of generic goods is not dealt with in the seller's guarantee 
liability. See supra n. 397-398 and accompanying texts 
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contract in its entirety only if it prevents him achieving the object of the contract as a whole. 83' 
The above rules as to a partial default are deemed to extend to a single instalment so that the 
buyer's right of rescission as to the entire instalment may be governed by those rules in the 
event of a partial default in the relevant instalment. 
Although the matter of an instalment contract which provides for delivery in instalments is not 
clearly stated in Korean law, it is submitted that he is generally given a right of rescission as to 
the particular defective instalment insofar as the preconditions for the right of rescission 
examined above are satisfied. 83' However, if any defective instalment prevents the buyer 
achieving the object of the contract as a whole, he may be entitled to rescind the contract in its 
entirety including past and future instalments. "' In addition, he may rescind the contract as to 
future instalments only where the breach in relation to the instalment clearly shows that such a 
defect will continue in respect to future deliveries. "' 
3.2.1.2. English law 
As examined before in the right of suspension, 841 the right of termination in English law is 
rather complicated and uncertain because of its relationship with the right of rejection. 842 
837 See supra n. 73-75,90-91 and accompanying texts. 
838 Cf. Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 281; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 353 f. 
839 Id. 
840 Id. 
841 See supra n. 782-788 and accompanying texts. 
842 The SGA does not seem to clearly define the relationship between rejection and termination and 
although the SGA s. 11(3) expressly stipulates that the breach of a condition may entitle the buyer to treat 
the contract as repudiated, the meaning of `may' is controversial in a sense that it does not define the time 
when the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract. Cf. Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 10- 
028; Bridge, supra n. 784, at 162 f.; Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 69; Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 
247; Jafarzadeh, supra n. 782, at 36 f. Case law as to this matter is also disputable. See Bradgate and 
White, supra n. 782, at 69 f; Jafarzadeh, supra n. 782, at 37 (for the judicial dicta where a breach of 
condition immediately confers the right of termination, see Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Ltd. 
[19'801 AC 827,849, per Lord Diplock; Bunge Corpn. v. Tradax Export S. A. [1981] 1 WLR 711,724 f., 
per Lord Roskill; The Naxos [ 198912 Lloyd's Rep 462.478, per Butler Sloss L. 3. ) 
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According to the view that does not recognise the separate right of rejection, any breach of the 
statutory implied condition provided in ss. 13-15 may confer on the buyer the immediate right 
of termination, even if the consequences of the breach are not serious. 843 However, the absolute 
right of termination is excluded in non-consumer cases where the breach is so slight that 
rejection would be unreasonable. 8 ` The test of reasonableness is an objective one so that the 
buyer's motives for rejection are not intended to be regarded as relevant. "' 
In contrast, seeing that there are two separate remedies, there are two different opinions as to 
the immediate right of termination. This question is in turn connected with the seller's right to 
cure. On the one hand, it is argued that all cases of non-conforming delivery with a condition 
would render the seller in a breach of condition and confer a right of termination on the buyer 
immediately after he lawfully rejects the goods where the contract is non-severable. 8' 
According to this view, the seller has no right to cure non-compliance with any condition 
regardless of whether the time for delivery has expired because it is always tantamount to a 
repudiation of the contract. 847 On the other hand, some contend that as long as the time for 
delivery has not expired, non-conforming delivery of goods would not necessarily place the 
seller in a breach of condition so that the buyer would not be conferred an immediate right of 
termination because their understanding is based on the idea that the seller's duty is to deliver in 
843 The SGA 15A(1)(a). 
844 The SGA 15A(1)(b). The burden of proof is on the seller (the SGA s. 15A(3)). 
845 Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 4.19,4.21, n. 23. 
846 Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 75 f.; Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 247 f.; Bridge, supra n. 784, at 
162 f. and 197 ff.; Carter, supra n. 716, at paras. 308,407,569,572; Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 
445 f.; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 10-027; Guest and Harris, Beale (ed. ), Chitty on 
Contracts, (1999), at para. 43-042; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 259 ff., 361 ff. The use of `may' in s. 11(3) is 
significant in that it is applicable to the cases where the contract is severable. See Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), 
supra n. 515, at para. 10-028; Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 69; Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 247. 
847 However, the seller may be entitled to the right to cure where a buyer elects to reject without 
terminating, and the right may be so available on the basis of the rules of mitigation of damages where a 
buyer lawfully terminates the contract and then seeks damages (e. g., Pav: u Ltd. v. Saunders [191912 KB 
581). See Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 76; Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 248. 
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compliance with condition within the contractual due time. 848 Therefore, the seller is entitled to 
cure a non-conforming delivery until the expiry of the contractual time for delivery where the 
buyer lawfully rejects849 and the buyer will be allowed to terminate the contract in certain 
circumstances. First, the time for delivery which is of the essence of the contract has elapsed. 
Second, a reasonable additional time for the seller's conforming delivery set by the buyer has 
passed after the contractual time for delivery of which is not initially deemed of the essence of 
the contract. 850 Third, a frustrating time has passed after the contractual time for delivery of 
which is not deemed of the essence of the contract. 851 Fourth, the seller's conduct is tantamount 
to a repudiation; e. g., insisting on his first non-conforming delivery, refusing to cure, attempting 
to cure in a way that indicates his unwillingness or inability to perform his contract or in a way 
that destroys the buyer's confidence. 852 However, one must note that, no matter what one's 
interpretation as to the immediate right of termination is, the buyer's right of rejection and 
termination is not available in non-consumer cases where the breach is so slight that rejection 
848 Goode, supra n. 729, at 362 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 90 ff.; Lord Devlin, "Treatment of Breach of 
Contract", (1966) C. L. J. 192, at 194; Apps, "The Right to Cure Defective Performance", (1994) 
L. M. C. L. Q. 525, at 534 ff. 
849 For the cases submitted with the seller's right to cure, see e. g., Tetley v. Shand [1871125 LT 658; 
Borrowman Phillips & Co. v. Free & Hollis [1878] 4 QBD 500; Ashmore & Son v. C. S. Cox & Co. 
[1899] 1 QB 436; H. Longbottom & Co. Ltd. v. Bass Walker & Co. Ltd. [1922] WN 245; E. E. & Brian 
Smith (1928) Ltd. v. Wheatsheaf Mills Ltd [ 1939] 2 KB 302; McDougall v. Aeromarine of Emsworth Ltd. 
[1958] 3 All ER 431; Agricultores Federados Argentinos Sociedad Cooperativa Limitada v. Ampro S. A, 
Commerciale Industrielle et Financier [ 1965] 2 Lloyd's Rep 157; The Playa Larga [ 1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
171; Wanganyi Motors (1963) Ltd. v. Broadlands Finance Ltd. [1988] 2 NZBLC 103; The Kanchenjunga 
[ 1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391; The Nüzura [ 1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 66. Cf. For the arguments the above cases 
cannot be used as supporting the seller's right to cure in general, see Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 
71 ff.; Bridge, supra n. 784, at 199 f. 
850 Raineri v. Miles [ 19'81 ] AC 1050; Hartley v. Hymans [ 1920] 3 KB 475, at 495, per McCardie J. For 
more detail about the notice procedure to set an additional time which makes time essential, see Carter, 
supra n. 716, at paras. 554 ff. 
451 Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati [ 1957] 2 QB 401. 
'. i? Goode, supra n. 729, at 365 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 91 f.; Lord Devlin, supra n. 848, at 203. 
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would be unreasonable. 853 
As to the matter of discrepancy in quantity, the buyer may be given a right to reject all the 
goods delivered in the event of either deficient or excess quantity delivered. 854 In the latter case, 
the buyer is at his option entitled to accept only the contractual quantity and reject the rest 
instead of rejecting the whole. 85' However, the non-consumer buyer cannot exercise his right to 
reject the whole of the goods delivered where the shortfall or excess is so slight that it would be 
unreasonable to reject the whole. 85' What is uncertain in this matter is whether the seller's 
contractual duty is treated as a condition breach of which entitles the buyer not only to reject the 
goods but also to terminate the contract. This is due to the fact that unlike any implied terms as 
to quality the duty to deliver the correct quantity is not expressly classified as a condition in the 
SGA. It is argued that the buyer's entitlement to reject the whole of the goods delivered in s. 30 
means in substance that the seller's delivery of the wrong quantity is deemed a breach of 
condition. 85' In contrast, some scholars contend that as long as it is not classified as a condition 
in the SGA, s. 11(3) cannot come into play so that the seller's delivery of the wrong quantity 
does not immediately allow the buyer to terminate the contract. 858 
As regards the matter of a partial defect in quality of the goods delivered, i. e., where only 
some of the goods are affected by the breach, the buyer is empowered at his option (not his 
duty) to reject all of the goods, reject all of the goods affected by the breach and keep the rest, 
or reject some of the defective goods and keep the rest, including all those unaffected by the 
breach 
. 
81' However, this is subject to two rules; first, the overriding rule that a non-consumer 
buyer is not entitled to reject the goods if the breach is so slight that rejection would be 
853 The SGA 15A(1). 
854 The SGA s. 30(1), (2). 
855 The SGA s. 30(2). 
856 The SGA s. 30(2A). The burden of proof is on the seller (the SGA s. 30(2B)). 
857 Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 109 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 36; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 364. 
858 Bradgate and White, supra n. 782, at 75; Bridge, supra n. 784, at 199. 
859 The SGA s. 35A(1). See Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 255. 
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unreasonable, 860 and second, the rule that the goods accepted by the buyer should not form part 
of a commercial unit. 86' The right to reject some goods and accept others would extend to a 
particular instalment under a severable contract. $62 
Having already explained the rules where the contract is non-severable, 863 it may be argued 
that they could extend to a single instalment under a severable contract, " even though it is not 
clearly stated in the SGA. 865 That is, the general principles applicable to non-severable 
contracts are extended to each instalment, and consequently, each non-conforming instalment in 
quantity or quality may empower the buyer to reject that particular instalment (subject to ss. 
15A, 30(2A)). 866 However, it must be noted that the buyer, if able to reject a particular 
instalment, is not necessarily empowered to terminate the contract as a whole. It is dependent 
upon whether the breach amounts to a repudiation of the whole contract. 867 It may do so where 
the breach is `so serious as to go to the root of the contract'. 96' The criteria to test the 
seriousness of a breach are as follows; first, the quantitative ratio which the breach bears to the 
860 The SGA s. 15A. 
861 The SGA s. 35(7). A `commercial unit' is defined as `a unit division of which would materially 
impair the value of the goods or the character of the unit'. Id. 
862 The SGA s. 35A(2). 
863 A distinction between severable and non-severable contracts in English law is based on ss. 11(4), 
31(2). 
864 A severable contract is defined in s. 31(2) as a contract providing for `the sale of goods to be 
delivered by stated instalments, which are to be separately paid for'. Cf. For the cases applying more 
flexible rules to hold severability of a contract, see e. g., Jackson v. Rotax [1910] 2 KB 937 (a contract 
providing for delivery of the contract goods as required by the buyer); Regent OHG v. Francesco of 
Jermyn Street [ 1981] 3 All ER 327 (a contract providing for delivery of the contract goods in instalments 
to be determined by the seller); H. Longbottom & Co. Ltd. v. Bass Walker & Co. Ltd. [1922] WN 245 (a 
contract providing for delivery in instalments to be paid for by monthly account). 
865 Bridge, supra n. 784, at 185 f.; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 21 ff.; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 376,378; 
Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 454; Guest, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 8-080. 
966 As regards the buyer's right of partial termination in respect of a particular instalment, it may depend 
upon all the discussions above about the existence of separate remedies of rejection and termination and 
the relationship with the right to cure. 
867 The SGA s. 31(2). 
868 Warinco AG v. Samor SPA [ 1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 582,588, per Donaldson J. 
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whole contract, second, the probability that the breach will be repeated. 869 Yet, it is uncertain 
whether the buyer is also allowed to reject goods delivered in previous instalments and already 
accepted. It is submitted that the language of s. 31(2) suggests that it is concerned with the 
subsequent instalments so that the buyer can refuse to perform outstanding obligation and his 
fulfilment of duties to accept previous conforming instalments cannot be undone. 87° In contrast, 
it is argued that if the previous instalments accepted form part of an individual whole, the buyer 
will be allowed to reject them. 8 ' 
3.2.1.3. The Directive 
Regarding the relevant rules for the seriousness of breach, the buyer's right of rescission in the 
Directive is not dependent upon whether non-conformity amounts to a certain degree of 
seriousness, although the right is excluded where it is minor. 87' However, it is wrong to say that 
the consumer has an absolute right to rescind the contract unless a lack of conformity is minor 
because, as will be examined below, his right of rescission is a secondary remedy which is 
subject to his primary remedies of repair and replacement. 873 That is, the right of rescission is 
available only in two cases; where both repair and replacement are unavailable or where the 
seller has failed to provide those remedies `within a reasonable time' or `without significant 
inconvenience to the consumer'. 
974 
It appears that its unique two-tier remedy scheme as described above explains how the 
Directive deals with the situation where there is a curable non-conformity and its relationship 
with a right of rescission. That is, the consumer cannot rescind the contract where there is a 
869 Maple Flock Co Ltd. v. Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd. [1934] 1 KB 148,157, per Lord 
Heward. See also Robert A Munro & Co Ltd. v. Meyer [1930] 2 KB 312; Regent OHG v. Francesco of 
Jerinyn Street [1981] 3 All ER 327. 
870 Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 455; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 12-070. 
871 Guest, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 8-078. 
872 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.6. 
873 Directive(99/44) Arts. 3.3. and 3.5. 
874 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.5. 
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curable non-conformity insofar as either repair or replacement is available and the non- 
conformity has been cured within a reasonable time and without causing him significant 
inconvenience. The availability of repair or replacement is decided on the grounds of either 
impossibility or disproportionality. $'s The question arises here whether the seller has a general 
right to cure in the Directive. Even though it is not specifically provided for, it seems to grant 
in effect the seller a right to cure because the fact that the consumer is in the first instance 
forced to rely on the remedies of repair and replacement means to make a room in substance for 
the right to cure. 87' One must, however, note that although it is interpreted that the seller has a 
right to cure, the choice between repair and replacement is placed not on the seller but on the 
buyer. 87' Although there is also no specific provision as to whether a cure can be made before 
or after the contractual delivery date, it is presumed that the seller may cure any non-conformity 
before and even after the date provided that it is available and it can be done without 
unreasonable delay and inconvenience. "' 
The Directive does not deal with the matter of partial non-conformity and instalment contracts, 
which is left to domestic laws. 
3.2.1.4. CISG 
The rule in CISG for the seriousness of breach required for the buyer's right of avoidance is 
whether the breach is a fundamental one. 879 A fundamental breach of contract is defined as one 
875 E. g., suppose the consumer purchases a second hand car which is found a major defect. Both repair 
and replacement are not available where it is very expensive to repair in comparison with the value of the 
car, and it is also impossible for the dealer to get a similar replacement car which could be offered as a 
replacement. See Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
876 Cf. Williams & Hamilton, The Impact in the U. K. of the E. U. Directive on the Sale of Consumer 
Goods and Associated Guarantees: Part 2", (2001) 12(1)1. C. C. L. R. 32, at 32 f. 
877 Cf. Infra n. 1243-1250 and accompanying texts. 
878 One must note that time rules are not governed by the Directive so that there may be cases where the 
seller has no right to cure after the contractual delivery date (e. g., where the time for conforming delivery 
is the essence of the contract in English law). 
879 CISG Art. 49(1). 
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which substantially deprives the injured party of the benefit for which he bargained under the 
contract unless the defaulting party did not foresee the breach and a reasonable person of the 
same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result. 88" In order to 
ascertain whether there is a fundamental breach, the following questions are to be asked. First, 
did the aggrieved party suffer a detriment which is such `as substantially to deprive him of what 
he is entitled to expect under the contract'? In this question the decisive factor is the 
importance of the interest which is actually created for the promisee by the contract and its 
individual duties. 881 That is, it is whether the risk of a particular non-conformity was considered 
so serious by the parties that the materialisation of the risk would jeopardise the buyer's interest 
in the performance of the contract regarding the goods. $82 One must note that the interest is 
estimated on the basis of the objective test so that any personal estimate made by the aggrieved 
party (i. e., what he actually expected from the contract) is not necessarily relevant, but a 
legitimate estimate (i. e., what he is entitled to expect from the contract). "' Second, has 
impairment of a material interest on the part of the aggrieved party been foreseeable by the 
defaulting party or a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances? This is a 
subjective (foreseeability of the defaulting party himself) and an objective test (foreseeability of 
a reasonable person) which must be cumulatively assessed. $84 Due to the failure in art. 25 to 
specify the relevant point in time at which the foreseeability standard is to be applied, "' it has 
880 CISG Art. 25. This concept of `fundamental breach' regarding the right of avoidance is also referred 
to in arts. 51(2), 64(1)(a), 72(1), 73. Cf. Arts. 70,46. 
881 Schlechtriem, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 177 f. 
882 Schlechtriem, supra n. 748, at 23. 
883 O. R., at 330. Cf. Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 112 f. 
884 For more detail, see Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 216 ff. See also Schlechtriem, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 179 f.; Bianca, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 270. For the 
controversial issue on burden of proof, see Kritzer, supra n. 725, at 210 f.; Schlechtriem, Schlechtriem 
(ed. ), supra n. 218, at 181 f. 
885 The Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft notes in this matter that "in case of dispute, that 
decision must be made by the tribunal". Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 26. Cf. UNCITRAL 
Yearbook VIII. A/CN. 9/SER. A/1977, (1978), at 31, para. 90 (the legislative history of the treatment of 
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been a matter of controversy amongst scholars. Some advocate that it should be the time when 
the contract was concluded. 886 This is based on that the fact that the parties determine what their 
fundamental interests are at the time of concluding the contract also fixes the conclusion of the 
contract as the relevant time for foreseeability. 887 In contrast, others argue that it is not 
necessary to ignore post-formation developments. 888 According to this view, it should be 
measured at the time of a wilful breach, but it must be limited to the cases where subsequent 
information could affect performance; where a material impairment was unavoidable by the 
time it became foreseeable to the defaulting party, it should not be fundamental. 889 
Regarding the situation where there is a curable non-conformity and its relationship with a 
right of avoidance, CISG expressly gives the seller the liberty to cure both before and after the 
contractual delivery date; the seller may cure any defect up to the delivery date insofar as the 
cure does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or expense, 840 and also he may do so 
even after the delivery date whether delivery was early, timely or late only if the cure is 
point in time in the 1978 Draft indicates that the Committee decided not to specify the point); O. R., at 302 
(A proposal at the Vienna Conference to specify the relevant point being `at the time when the contract 
was concluded' was rejected and it was left to the adjudicating body). For more detail on this issue in 
light of legislative history, see Speidel, Book Review (on Honnold's Uniform Law for International Sales 
under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982)), (1983) 5 Nw. J. Int. Law & Bus. 432, at 442 ff. 
886 Schlechtriem, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 180 f.; Ziegel, "The Remedial Provisions in the 
Vienna Sales Convention: Some Common Law Perspectives", in: Galston/Smit (ed. ), International Sales, 
(1984), at 9-19 f. Other scholars with this view are cited in Will, BiancafBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 
221. 
887 Cf. See the statements of Feltham at the Vienna Conference, O. R., at 302. 
889 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 209; Flechtner, "Remedies under the New International Sales Convention: 
the Perspective from Article 2 of the U. C. C. ", (1988) 8 J. L. &Com. 53, at 75 ff.; Ghestin, "The 
Obligations of the Seller according to the Vienna Sale Convention of the 11th April 1980, on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods", (1988) No. 1 Int'l Bus. L J. 5, at 22. For the scholars who seem to reach 
the same result in a way that basically maintains the time of contract, but admit some exceptions in the 
cases where the defaulting party could still adapt itself to the subsequent information, see Enderlein and 
Maskow, supra n. 288, at 116; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 221. 
889 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 209; Flechtner, supra n. 888, at 75 ff. 
890 CISG Art. 37. 
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proceeded without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of the buyer's expenses. "' Having 
said the seller's specific rights to cure, there is no consensus amongst scholars regarding its 
relationship with the buyer's right of avoidance; $92 in particular, the approach to prevent the 
buyer terminating the contract where there is the capacity and willingness of the seller to 
remedy the defect without unreasonable delay and inconvenience for the buyer. The various 
approaches can be differentiated by their understanding as to how to interpret the concept of 
`fundamental breach' ; does it amount to a fundamental breach where the seller is ready and able 
to reasonably cure the defect? On the one hand, the prevailing view argues that the concept 
must be interpreted dynamically taking account of the seller's capacity and willingness to cure 
the defect without unreasonable delay and inconvenience for the buyer. 893 Therefore, even if 
there is a serious defect, it does not automatically amount to a fundamental breach insofar as, 
following the buyer's notice of a defect, the seller actually cures the defect by virtue of arts. 37 
and 48 or at least he is ready to do that. 894 However, the position will be different if time is of 
891 CISG Art. 48(l). 
892 This is because there is no clarification on this matter by the provisions of CISG and its legislative 
history, and consequently it remains open to interpretation of scholars. See Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), 
supra it 221, at 347 f. Cf. Nicholas, "The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law", (1989) 105 
L. Q. R. 201, at 224; Babiak, "Defining `Fundamental Breach' under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", (1992) 6 Temple Int'l & Com. L. J. 113, at 127. 
893 Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 78; Schlechtriem, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 183; Huber, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 408 ff.; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-23; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 319 
ff.; Kritzer, supra n. 725, at 430 f.; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 114; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 
94; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 373. Cf. OLG Koblenz, 2U31/96,31-01-1997, reported in UNILEX 1997-4 
(also seen at http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/wais/db/case2/970131g1. html and http: //www. uncitral. org/ 
en-index. htm (COULT No. 282); CA Grenoble, RG93/4879,26-04-1995, reported in UNILEX D. 1995- 
15 (also seen at http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950426f2. htrnl and http: //www. uncitral. 
org/en-index. htm (CLOUT No. 152)); Pr. Locarno-C., 6252,27-04-1992, reported in UNILEX D. 1992- 
10 (also seen at http: //www. uncitral. org/en-index. htm (CLOUT No. 56)). Cf. Secretariat's Commentary, 
O. R., at 41, art. 45 (1) (a), No. 6; UNCITRAL Yearbook IV, A/CN. 9/SER. A11973, (1974), at 54 f.; 
Honnold, supra n. 724, at 131 f. 
894 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 408. 
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the essence of the contract or if the defective delivery destroyed the basis of trust between the 
parties. 895 According to this view, once it is deemed a fundamental breach by due consideration, 
the buyer's right of avoidance should prevail over the seller's right to cure. 896 On the other 
hand, some contend that the concept of `fundamental breach' is the one which should be 
decided immediately without considering the seller's offer to cure so that if it is objectively 
serious, it amounts to a fundamental breach which may entitle the buyer to avoid the contract. 89' 
With regard to the consequences of this approach, in particular, the status of the seller's right to 
cure, one takes the view that the role of the seller's right to cure is to supersede the buyer's right 
of avoidance in a way that suspends the right of avoidance insofar as the seller has a legitimate 
right to cure. 898 Another view is that the provisions of CISG should be interpreted in light of the 
good faith canon so that any hasty avoidance by the buyer must be prevented where the seller 
has announced an intention to cure because the approach taken may limit the seller's right to 
cure to cases involving minor defects and it may make it futile in practice. 899 
As to the partial discrepancy in terms of either quantity or quality, the buyer may be entitled to 
treat the missing or non-conforming part as the subject of a separate contract for remedy 
purposes so that he may avoid a part of the contract if the discrepancy relates to that part and if 
the breach is fundamental with respect to that part. 90° In the case where the seller delivers only 
895 Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 78; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 408,410. 
896 See supra n. 893. See also Babiak, supra n. 892, at 127; Schneider, supra n. 748, at 84. 
897 Will, BiancaJBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 349 ff., 356 if. More scholars with this view are cited in 
Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 409, n. 43. This view is generally based on the fact that when 
applying art. 46(2) some conceptual difficulties arise as a result of the dynamic interpretation of 
`fundamental breach'. Will, id., at 356 f. 
898 Id. 
899 Neumayer/Ming, Convention de Vienne sur les contrats de vente internationale de marchandises. 
Conunentaire, (1993), at art. 48, note 4, art. 49, note 4: cited in Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, 
at 409, n. 48a. See also Bridge, supra n. 434, at 94. 
?0 CISG Art. 51(1). This provision is assumed that the goods are capable of being delivered in parts, but 
such parts need not be instalments. See Bennett, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 536; Huber, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 445. Cf. If the seller delivers more than that provided for in the 
contract, the buyer's right to refuse to take delivery is basically restricted to the excess part, but if he 
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a part of the goods sold, the buyer may also avoid irrespective of fundamental breach a part of 
the contract on account of the missing part if the seller fails to deliver that part within an 
additional period of time of reasonable length fixed by the buyer. 96' The buyer's right to avoid 
the contract as a whole is conferred only provided that the discrepancy amounts to a 
fundamental breach of contract in its entirety. 902 Although there is no specific provision, it is 
deemed that the above rules as regards the partial discrepancy supplement the rules on 
instalment contracts provided that an instalment is itself incomplete or partially defective. 9°3 
Therefore, the buyer's right to avoid the contract regarding the entire instalment on account of 
its partial discrepancy is dependent upon the existence of a fundamental breach as a whole, " 
which is to be applied by analogy in that respect. 905 
In the case of instalment contracts, 906 the buyer may avoid the contract with respect to an 
instalment if the seller's failure to perform any of his obligations amounts to a fundamental 
breach as to the instalment. 907 He may do so as regards future instalments provided that the 
takes delivery of all or part of the excess, he must pay for it at the contract rate (art. 52(2)). In 
exceptional circumstances, the seller's excess delivery may constitute a fundamental breach which may 
entitle the buyer to terminate the contract as a whole; e. g., in the contract for 1,000 bags of sugar the 
seller tenders a bill of lading for 1,200 bags which requires the buyer either to accept or to reject the bill 
of lading as a whole. See Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 44, Art. 48, No. 9; Schlechtriem, supra n. 
307, at 80; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 348; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 381; Enderlein and 
Maskow, supra n. 288, at 201. Cf. Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 452 f. (submitting a view 
that the right to reject the entire delivery does not initially depend on a fundamental breach but on 
whether the buyer is required to consent to the delivery of the excess quantity). 
40' CISG Arts. 47(1), 49(1)(b) and 51(1). 
902 CISG Art. 51(2). Cf. ICC (Paris), 8128, (1995), reported in UNILEX D. 1995-34 (also seen at 
http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/958128il. html); ICC (Paris), 7660,23-08-1994, reported in UNILEX D. 
1994-20; LG Berlin, 52S247/94,15-09-1995, reported in UNILEX D. 1991-7 (also seen at 
http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/947660i 1. html). 
903 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 446. 
904 CISG Art. 51(2). 
905 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 446. 
906 An instalment contract requires at least two deliveries to be made in different time. Id., at 544. 
907 CISG Art. 73(1). 
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seller's failure in respect of any instalment gives him `reasonable grounds to conclude that a 
fundamental breach will occur with respect to future instalments'. 908 In addition, he is 
empowered to avoid the contract as to not only the defective, and of future, but also past 
conforming deliveries if later conforming deliveries cannot be used for the purpose 
contemplated by the parties at the time of contract by reason of their interdependence with the 
defective one. " 
3.2.1.5. Comparative view 
As discussed above, the aspects about the seriousness of a defect and its supplementary rules 
in each jurisdiction as a precondition to terminate the contract are significantly distinct from the 
others, even though some general similarities are found between Korean law and CISG. The 
following investigates in which aspects each jurisdiction departs from the others. 
First, the right of termination in Korean law and CISG demands a certain degree of seriousness 
to justify the buyer's termination of the contract, whereas that in English law and the Directive 
does not. In English law, it is rather a strict one so that any breach of implied conditions may 
lead the buyer to reject the goods and terminate the contract, 910 even though the commercial 
buyer is not permitted to reject the goods if it is so slight that it would be unreasonable to reject 
them. 41' The right of termination in the Directive is not so strict as English law in that it is a 
secondary remedy which is subject to the primary remedies of repair and replacement912 and 
908 CISG Art. 73(2). Cf. LG Ellwangen, I kfH 0 32/95,21-08-1995, reported in UNILEX D. 1995-20 
(also seen at http: //cisgw3law. pace. edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/95082lg2. html); CA Grenoble, RG/3275, 
22-02-1995, reported in UNILEX D. 1995-7 (also seen at http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2 
/950222f1. html and http: //www. uncitral. org/en-index. htm (CLOUT No. 56)). 
909 CISG Art. 73(3). 
910 The priori classifications of these terms into conditions are no doubt based on the assumption that the 
effect of non-performance of some terms is likely to be more serious than non-performance of others. 
However, one must note that this does not look at the result of breach. 
91 The SGA s. 15A(1). 
912 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.5. 
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also relies on whether the lack of conformity is minor. 913 
Second, in the case of Korean law and CISG which has the minimum requirement as to the 
degree of seriousness, the concepts used for the requirement and their definitions seem at first 
sight significantly different; in Korean law, the relevant question is whether the buyer can 
achieve the object of the contract in the event of a defect in quality and whether he would have 
entered into the contract had he known of a shortage in quantity, "' whereas in CISG it is 
dependent upon the `fundamentality' question which can be measured by two tests of, first, 
whether the buyer suffered a detriment which is substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, second, whether the substantial detriment has been known 
or foreseeable by the seller or a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances. 915 However, the closer examination of the relevant factors seems to reveal that 
there is no significant difference in that the decisive factors in Korean law and the first test in 
GSG is focused on, at the end, the same question of what was the primary object or interest of 
the contract which must be estimated on the basis of the objective test, 916 The residual matter to 
be compared is whether the second test of knowledge or foreseeability under CISG makes some 
departure from Korean law. It may be understood that the test provides the seller with a 
possible pretext on the basis of non-foreseeability or knowledge which has no specific 
counterpart in Korean law. 9 ' In this light, it seems plausible to say that the specific provision 
for the pretext may make difference in terms of burden of proof, which is argued by the 
prevailing view that the burden of proof of non-foreseeability or knowledge should be born by 
the seller who wants to invoke an excuse. 91$ Yet, it is doubted how much difference it would 
make in practice compared to Korean law because it may be understood that the foreseeability 
9" Directive(99/44) Art. 3.6. 
914 See supra n. 826-831 and accompanying texts. 
915 See supra n. 879-889 and accompanying texts. 
916 See supra n. 828-831,881-883 and accompanying texts. 
917 Will, BiancalBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 215; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 115; O. R., at 
295 ff.; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 85 f.; Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 88. 
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test is instead relevant for the first test; that is, the former test is deemed to have a 
supplementary function as an aid to interpret the parties' intention as to their obligations. "' 
Therefore, it is arguable that it is still on the buyer who must, foremost, prove the seller's 
knowledge or a reasonable person's foreseeability which may be crucial for interpreting the 
contract. 920 In this light, it is submitted that the foreseeability test seems to be secured fairly 
enough in Korean law, which may also take account of the seller's knowledge or a reasonable 
person's foreseeability in interpreting the contract. In addition, even if the burden of proof is on 
the seller so that the buyer does not need to prove it, it seems that in practice the lack of 
foreseeability would be quite unlikely, which may result that being not much difference to 
Korean law. 92' However, the argument as to the relevant time of the foreseeability test in CISG 
may yield a significant departure from Korean law insofar as it is judged the time of breach 
rather than the time of contract on which Korean law is based. 922 
Third, regarding the situation where there is a curable defect and its relationship with the right 
of termination, all the jurisdictions seem more or less similar in that the buyer may not be 
allowed to terminate the contract where there is the seller's willingness and capacity to cure 
within a reasonable time and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience, even 
though the approach to prevent the seller from terminating the contract varies according to each 
jurisdiction and the interpretations in each jurisdiction. 923 In this regard, it was found that they 
could all recognise the seller's right to cure before and even after the contractual delivery date 
either by interpretation or specific provisions which may prevent the buyer exercising the right 
918 Will, id., at 216 f.; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 319 ff.; Babiak, supra n. 892, at 121 f. 
919 Schlechtriem, Schlechtriern (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 178 f., 181 f. Cf. Bridge, supra n. 434, at 86. 
920 Schlechtriem, id. 
921 Bridge, supra n. 434, at 86. 
922 See supra n. 828-829,885-889 and accompanying texts. 
923 That is, it is based on the good faith principle in Korean law, the recognition of two separate rights 
and no immediate right of termination in English law, the two-tier remedial scheme in the Directive, and 
the specific provision for the seller's general right to cure and its various interpretations regarding the 
relationship with `fundamental breach' in CISG. 
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of terrnination. 924 However, as far as English law is concerned, all these similarities can be 
easily denied if it accepts neither that there are two separate rights of rejection nor that the 
breach of condition does not raise an immediate right of termination. "25 
Fourth, with respect to the matter of a partial default, all the jurisdictions (except the Directive, 
depending on the domestic law concerned) similarly understand that the buyer may be able to 
terminate the contract as to the relevant part provided that a partial default satisfies the 
requirements for termination in relation to the part. However, there seems to be a significant 
departure as to the right of termination in its entirety; the buyer in English law may exercise it 
instead of a partial termination at his option (but subject to ss. 15A, 30(2A) in non-consumer 
cases), whereas Korean law and CISG has no such option and the right is possible only if a 
partial default meets the requirements for termination as a whole. 
Fifth, in the instalments contract, the rights to termination as to a particular instalment, future 
instalments, or whole instalments including the previous deliveries seem to be similarly 
conferred on the buyer in Korean law, English law, and CISG if a breach satisfies the relevant 
preconditions for termination, 9' although the position in English law as to termination of the 
previous instalments is not clear. 92' However, it is submitted that the termination may be 
possible in English law if the previous deliveries accepted form part of an individual whole, 
which would lead the same result as Korean law and CISG in most cases. 928 
924 Note that the right to cure in the Directive is not a genuine one in that the seller has no choice between 
repair and replacement. 
925 See supra n. 841-853 and accompanying texts. 
926 The preconditions are similar in each law that termination as to a particular instalment depends on the 
rules as to non-severable contract, termination as to future instalments on the probability that the breach 
will be repeated, and termination as to whole instalments on the impossibility in achieving the object of 
the contract as a whole in light of their interdependence. 
927 See supra n. 870-871 and accompanying texts. 
928 See supra n. 871. 
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3.2.2. Evaluating accounts 
3.2.2.1. Internal evaluation 
As we saw above, there are considerable conflicts of interests between parties concerning the 
right of termination. 929 The requirement of a certain degree of seriousness can be said to be the 
most important single principle used to discourage the buyer's opportunism so that the right of 
termination is available only if a breach amounts to a certain degree of seriousness. "' In this 
light, Korean law and CISG having such requirements as `fundamentality' or `achievability of 
the object of contract' are likely to prevent such opportunism in most cases, whereas it is 
unlikely in English law and the Directive, although it appears that the requirement of a non- 
slight/minor defect in non-consumer sales in English law and in the Directive becomes a little 
closer to Korean law and CISG. 93' 
The seller's right to cure could also serve as a means to prevent the buyer's opportunism where 
there is a curable defect and the seller's willingness and capacity to cure within a reasonable 
time and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience even if it is sufficient to meet 
the requirement of a certain degree of seriousness. In this light, the approaches taken by some 
scholars in English law who argue that there are no separate rights of rejection and termination, 
or who persist in their belief that a breach of condition raises an immediate right of termination, 
can be easily an issue of criticism. 
The position in English law concerning the buyer's option to terminate as a whole for any 
partial default in non-severable contract seems also to attract some criticism in that it could be 
used for the buyer's opportunistic behaviour to avoid the situation which would have revealed a 
929 See supra n. 821-825 and accompanying texts. 
930 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 350; Collins, supra n. 33, at 334 f.; Beale, supra n. 821, at 352 f. 
931 In addition, the two-tier remedial system in the Directive making the right of termination subject to 
the primary remedies of repair and replacement goes even further to become closer to Korean law and 
CISG. However, note that the requirement of a non slight/minor defect in English law and the Directive 
can be never equivalent to Korean law and CISG. 
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bad bargain had it been duly performed. That is, the buyer may take advantage of the situation 
simply by terminating the whole contract where a partial default has caused him some loss only 
as to the particular part but without any substantial harm as a whole, although the right is still 
subject to ss. 15A, 30(2A) in non-consumer sales. 
However, the question arises whether all the above arguments could be correspondingly 
applicable to consumer sales. Given that some degree of vagueness in stating the requirement 
of seriousness (either by `fundamental breach' or `achievability of the object of contract') and 
the seller's right to cure after the contractual delivery time932 is unavoidable, "' the similar 
arguments raised above in the right of suspension could be applied here; 934 the vagueness has 
produced undesirable uncertainty as to when the buyer is entitled to the right of termination, and 
the uncertainty has been often used against the consumer, but in favour of the seller who has a 
relatively stronger bargaining position. 935 Assuming that the requirement of seriousness and the 
right to cure after the delivery time is hard to be designed in clear guidelines to determine when 
a breach confers a right of termination on the buyer and that the consumer's opportunistic 
behaviour is rare in general, it seems crucial for most consumers to have the absolute right of 
termination. 936 
As regards a possible difference in the factors to decide the existence of a serious breach 
between Korean law and CISG, in particular, where the view in CISG that the relevant time for 
the foreseeability test should be the time of breach is accepted, the view could be problematic 
when one takes account of the buyer's opportunism. The reason for that is that the buyer may 
be able to pave the way to escaping a bad bargain simply by subsequently sending information 
where a breach would not have rendered a fundamental breach in the absence of such 
932 Cf. Treitel, supra n. 421, at 374 f.; Bradgate, supra n. 466; Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
933 Consequently, the vagueness may produce a lowering of the overall level of fulfilling an effective 
function of the right of termination to put pressure on the seller to perform the contract according to its 
terms because of the uncertainty of seriousness requirement. 
93 4 See supra n. 808-810 and accompanying texts. 
935 Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 4.12. 
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information. 937 It may well interfere with the basis of the bargain between the parties which was 
made at the time of contract. 938 
3.2.2.2. External evaluation 
The question of when it is efficient to terminate the contract in economic terms can be 
answered by the comparison of allocative costs between two possible remedies of termination 
and damages; if the allocative costs of termination939 is less than the cheaper allocative costs of 
damages between when the buyer keeps the goods with some adaptation and when he disposes 
the goods and purchases the substitute goods, 94° the parties would likely agree to termination. 94' 
Thus, if the rules as to termination are to produce the same result, they may enhance efficiency, 
reducing the transaction costs. It is not for sure that the implementation of the distinction based 
on `fundamentality' under CISG or `achievability of the object of contract' under Korean law is 
directly related to minimisation of costs. 942 Nonetheless, it seems arguable that the approach 
taken by CISG and Korean law gives more room to reach the efficient result than a perfect 
tender rule taken by English law because the courts under the former approach may be given a 
considerable discretion compared to those under the latter approach and consequently, only at a 
guess, they may decide the cases in the most efficient way as producing the efficient 
supplementary rules. 
Another concern of efficiency is the consequences of termination which may throw back onto 
the seller the risk of a decline in market price or the risk of the inappropriateness of product 
936 Id. 
937 Schlechtriem, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 180 f. 
938 Bridge, supra n. 434, at 86. 
939 Allocative costs of termination generally include the cost of returning the goods to the seller, the cost 
to the seller of reselling the defective goods, the buyer's cost of purchasing substitute goods, and etc. 
940 Allocative costs of damages are the buyer's costs of adaptation, or his costs of disposal and cover, and 
the administrative costs of determining the buyer's loss. 
941 Priest, supra n. 31, at 963 f. 
942 Cf. Id., at 974. 
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choice which was originally placed on the buyer at the time of contract. 943 The consequences 
may let the buyer easily evade the point of minimising allocative costs if he is allowed to 
terminate the contract in any case of defects, whether a defect is substantial or just minor, 
whether a defect is curable and there is the seller's clear willingness and capacity to cure 
without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience and within a reasonable time, or whether 
termination is based on the subsequent information sent to the seller after concluding the 
contract. In this light, if the legal rules allow termination in any case of defects as giving more 
chance to the buyer behaving opportunistically, it may reduce the joint value of the contract and 
of future contracts of the same type. 944 Therefore, it is submitted that the termination rules 
relying on the seriousness of breach, the seller's right to cure, and the foreseeability at the time 
of contract may serve as a filter to prevent the opportunism. 
The other concern of efficiency is in minimising distributive costs which consist of transfers of 
resources between the parties; e. g., the parties' expenditure to minimise their personal share of 
the joint costs. 945 This concern is of relevance of certainty issue because as long as the rules are 
uncertain the parties may expend more resources in negotiation or litigation in an attempt to 
obtain what they desire. "' In this regard it seems true that remaining unavoidable vagueness in 
Korean law and CISG may significantly increase the distributive costs so that they are greater 
than the savings achieved by choosing the remedy which otherwise would minimise allocative 
costs. It seems arguable that the matter of distributive costs may be sorted out as time goes on 
because as the cases are accumulated the rules may become clearer with the assistance of 
modern communications. 947 
The residual matter is in the consumer's needs for a clear right of termination. Given that 
943 Cf. Id., at 966 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 99. 
94' Id., at 103. 
94' Priest, supra n. 31, at 966 f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 99. Cf. It is particularly related to the case where 
there is a declining market because the parties will fight to obtain the outcome they want in order to avoid 
the loss caused by the declining market. 
946 Id. 
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there are no clear guidelines to clarify the test of seriousness, the absolute right of termination is 
likely to produce more efficient results in consumer sales. The reasons for this are, first, the 
consumer who is assumed risk-averse may prefer an absolute right of termination because they 
generally want goods of the proper quality at the full price, not defective goods at a lower 
price, 948 and second, the test of seriousness in its open texture and its inevitable uncertainty may 
hinder low-cost, routinised redress procedures that are essential for the consumer who is often 
reluctant to proceed to courts due to their ignorance, 949 
3.3. The option to terminate 
Where the requirements for termination explained above are met, the buyer does not have to 
exercise this right, but it is entirely dependent upon his choice whether he wants to put an end to 
the contract or to keep the contract and claim damages or specific performance. 950 That is, the 
seller's non-conforming delivery does not automatically terminate the contract. The option to 
terminate the contract is the same in all the jurisdictions. "' When he exercises his option of 
termination, all the systems require the buyer to declare his intention by unequivocal words or 
conduct (except the Directive which leaves the issue to national laws) which does not need to be 
in a particular form or by a specific means of transrmission. 952 
gal Id., at 101. 
948 Cf. Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 4.5. 
949 Cf. See supra n. 52-55 and accompanying texts. 
950 For the purpose of granting the buyer the choice, see Treitel, supra n. 421, at 381; Collins, supra n. 
33, at 381. 
951 Treitel, The Law of Contract, (1999), at 783 f.; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 381; Carter, supra n. 716, at 
paras. 745,1001; The SGA s. 11(3) (... may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated. ); CISG 
Art. 49(1) (... may declare the contract avoided... ); Directive(99144) Art. 3.5. (... may... have the contract 
rescinded:... ); Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 223; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 162 f. Cf. ULIS Arts. 
25,26, and 30 for an example of ipso facto termination. 
952 CISG Art. 26; Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 27, art. 24, No. 4; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra 
n. 218, at 425; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 223 f.; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 163; Carter, supra n. 
716, at para. 1015 f.; Treitel, supra n. 951, at 787 f.; McKendrick, Contract Law, (2000), at 386 f.; Vitol 
SA iv. Norelf Ltd [ 1996] AC 800. 
204 
3.4. Loss of the right of termination 
3.4.1. Comparative accounts 
3.4.1.1. Korean law 
Where the seller's delivery of defective goods satisfies the requirements for termination 
discussed above, the question arises whether the buyer can exercise the option to terminate the 
contract even after lapse of a reasonable time. Such lapse of a reasonable time does not in 
principle deprive the buyer of his right of rescission. However, in the case where the buyer 
alleges the existence of a defect, the seller is entitled to set a period within which the right of 
rescission must be claimed; if it is not claimed within such a period, the buyer may lose his 
right. 953 In addition, delay in rescission may also result in loss of the right of rescission because 
to assert the right after lapse of a considerable period would be contrary to the principle of good 
faith. 954 Furthermore, the buyer may be excluded from exercising the right of termination where 
restoration of the goods becomes impossible in substantially the condition in which he received 
them, which is ascribed to the buyer's own fault or wilful conduct, or where the buyer has 
converted the goods into another object by processing or alternating them. 955 
3.4.1.2. English law 
In English law, the buyer may lose his right to reject and terminate in the following cases of 
affirmation of contract. 956 The first case is where he intimates to the seller that he has accepted 
953 KCC Art. 552. 
954 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 183; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 216,249; Jeung-han Kim, supra 
n. 135, at 86. 
95' KCC Art. 553. 
956 The SGA s. 11(4). 
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the goods. "' This case includes not only cases of express intimation but also those where it 
may be inferred from the buyer's conduct as long as it is clear. 95' The second case is where his 
act after the seller's delivery is inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 959 It is applied to the 
cases where the physical return of the goods is impossible as a result of the buyer's conduct; 
e. g., selling, any other dispositions, consumption or use of the goods more than necessary to 
check their conformity with the contract. 96" However, the above two cases of the intimation of 
acceptance and inconsistent act with the seller's ownership cannot amount to acceptance unless 
he has first had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods. 96' The third case is where after 
a reasonable period he retains the goods without indicating that he rejects them. 962 
Reasonableness of a period will be a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of the 
individual case; 963 the factors to be considered are, for instance, the nature of the goods, the 
conduct of the parties, the custom of the particular trade, market conditions, and whether the 
buyer has been given a reasonable time to examine the goods. 964 One must note that, unlike the 
first two cases, the fact that the buyer has not had a reasonable opportunity to examine does not 
necessarily prevent the buyer being deemed to have accepted the goods because it is taken into 
account only as a relevant factor. 
957 The SGA s. 35(1)(a). 
958 Varley v. Whipp [1900] 1 QB 513; Law Commission WP 85, Sale and Supply of Goods, (1983), para. 
2.53. 
959 The SGA s. 35(1)(b). 
960 Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 251; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at 580 f. However, the buyer is 
not deemed to have accepted the goods `merely because he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under 
an arrangement with the seller, or the goods are delivered to another under a sub-sale or other 
disposition'. The SGA s. 35(6). Cf. Supra n. 706-708 and accompanying texts. 
961 The SGA s. 35(2). 
962 
The SGA s. 35(4). 
963 The SGA s. 59. 
964 The SGA s. 35(5). Cf. Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 252 f.; Law Commission 
WP 85, supra n. 958, at 
para. 2.57; Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 5.19; Goode, supra n. 729, at 
376 f.; Bridge, 
supra n. 784, at 176 f.; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 
12-055. See also supra n. 726-729 
and accompanying texts. 
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3.4.1.3. The Directive 
The Directive does not appear to deal with the matter of loss of the right of termination. 
However, one must note that it has a two-year time limit during which consumers can exercise 
their rights including rescission for any defect which exists at the time of delivery. "' Apart 
from that, it seems to be mostly left to domestic laws. 
3.4.1.4. CISG 
Similarly to English law, CISG stipulates that the buyer may lose the right of avoidance where 
he fails to give notice to the seller of his avoidance within a reasonable time. "' When 
measuring a reasonable time, the factors to be taken into account are, for instance, a certain 
period within which to consider and investigate the position and to obtain legal advice, the 
nature of the goods, fluctuations in price, and (as the case may be) the possibility of cure by the 
seller in accordance with arts. 37 and 48(1). 967 In addition, the buyer may lose his right of 
termination where restitution of the goods in substantially the condition in which he received 
them becomes impossible; 968 he may lose the right by consuming, altering, or reselling the 
goods. The exceptions to this loss are as follows; first, where the buyer's inability is due to his 
examination of the goods, 969 second, where the goods have been resold, altered or consumed by 
the buyer in the normal course of business or use before he discovered or ought to have 
965 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.1. 
966 CISG Art. 49(2). In the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods, the reasonable time begins 
to run from the moment when the buyer knew or ought to have known of the breach (art. 49(2)(b)(i)), but 
if he has given a notice under art. 47(1) requiring the seller to perform within a reasonable time, it begins 
to run from the expiration of that time or from the seller's declaration of refusal to perform his duty 
within such time (art. 49(2)(b)(ii)). Where the seller offers to cure the defect within a specific period in 
accordance with art. 48(2), it starts to run from the expiration of the period or from the buyer's 
declaration of refusal of the offer (art. 49(2)(b)(iii)). 
967 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 430 f. 
968 CISG Art. 82(1). 
969 CISG Art. 82(2)(b). 
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discovered their non-conformity, 97° and third, where it is not due to the buyer's act or omission 
that he cannot make restitution in accordance with art. 82(1). 9" 
3.4.1.5. Comparative view 
Despite the difference in language used of the provisions and no counterpart of the seller's 
right to give a period set for termination in English law and CISG, 972 it seems that the 
circumstances in which buyer will be deprived of the right of termination are generally similar 
in all the relevant jurisdictions. However, there are two aspects of which further examination is 
required. 
First, as regards loss of the right due to lapse of a reasonable time, one must note that `a period 
for examination of the goods under Korean law and CISG', strictly speaking, is not considered 
in the calculation of `a reasonable period for the notice of avoidance' because Korean law and 
CISG distinguish the period for the notice of defects and of avoidance. 973 That is, when 
measuring the reasonable period for the latter notice, it is already presumed in Korean law and 
CISG that the buyer has done due examination of the goods. The matter of whether the buyer 
has been given a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods in English law is rather related to 
the issue of the buyer's notice and examination duty in CISG and Korean law. However, there 
seems to be no particular difference because all the jurisdictions do not necessarily preclude the 
buyer terminating the contract where he could not find a defect by due examination. 
Nevertheless, the question arises whether each jurisdiction recognises a long-term right to reject 
where there is a latent defect that could not be discovered within a reasonable time. The 
position in CISG, Korean law and the Directive seems to allow the long-term right to reject 
970 CISG Art. 82(2)(c). 
971 CISG Art. 82(2)(a). 
972 It seems to be doubted how useful the seller's right is in practice because it would be rare that the 
seller asks the buyer's position. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 183. 
973 Cf. Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 430 f.; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 247. 
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insofar as it is exercised within a limitation period of two years in CISG974 and the Directive, 975 
(as the case may be) six months or one year in Korean law, 976 whereas English law does not 
seem to recognise the right although the test of whether the buyer has had a reasonable 
opportunity to examine appears to be related to the right. 97 However, one must note that the 
test does not absolutely prevent a finding that the buyer has accepted despite that he has not had 
such an opportunity. 9 ' 
Second, regarding loss of the right based on impossibility of restoration, there is a dissimilarity 
in that the buyer under Korean law and CISG is still allowed to terminate the contract in the 
cases where he has resold on, transformed or consumed the goods in the course of normal 
business or use, 979 whereas this is not necessarily true in English law. 9so 981 The justification of 
the position in Korean law and CISG appears that, insofar as the buyer's inability to return the 
goods is not ascribed to his fault, the buyer should not be prevented from being able to 
terminate the contract, and that the seller is properly protected by the requirement that the buyer 
must account to the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the goods. 982 
3.4.2. Evaluating accounts 
974 CISG Art. 39(2). 
975 Directive(99/44) Art. 5.1. 
976 KCC Arts. 573,582, KCmC Art. 69(1). 
977 Law Commission WP 85, supra n. 958, at para. 4.66. ff.; Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 
5.6. ff. See also Bradgate, supra n. 558, at 253 f.; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at 585 f. Cf. 
Bernstein v. Pamson Motors Ltd. [1978] 2 All ER 220; The Kanchenjunga [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 391. 
978 Bradgate, id.; Reynolds, id. 
979 In this case, it is not deemed to be ascribed to the buyer's own fault or wilful conduct in Korean law. 
See supra n. 955 and accompanying texts; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 248 f. 
980 Bridge, supra n. 434, at 98; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-27. 
981 Note that the SGA s. 35(6)(b) provides that the buyer may not lose his right to reject merely because 
he has delivered the goods to another under a sub-sale or other disposition. 
982 KCC Art. 549(1); CISG Art. 84(2). See Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-27; cf. Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 
67, at 241 f. 
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3.4.2.1. Internal evaluation 
The above two differences could be evaluated in light of one of the functions of the 
termination rules to discourage the buyer's opportunism; the buyers complaining of defective 
goods will be most tempted to prefer termination where there has been a substantial drop in the 
market price so that the seller is forced to absorb a loss which the contract contemplated that 
this loss would fall on the buyer in exchange for the chance of gain from a rise in price. 9ß3 
Therefore, the position in Korean law and CISG as to a long-term right to reject984 and as to loss 
of the right of termination based on impossibility of restoration seems to be doubted in this 
light, although the principle of good faith may well come forward to prevent the buyers 
attempting to terminate the contract. 985 However, it still remains a question in terms of 
consumer protection that may consistently require a long-term right to reject. Given that 
consumers often have insufficient sophistication and bargaining power, it seems crucial that 
consumers need such a right to deal with recalcitrant sellers because their bargaining position as 
against the sellers has to be a strong one if they are to be adequately protected. 
3.4.2.2. External evaluation 
Similarly, the position in Korean law and CISG as to a long-term right to reject and as to loss 
of the right of termination based on impossibility of restoration may be criticised in light of the 
buyer's opportunism in a declining market because the position may provide the buyer more 
chances to circumvent the point of minimising the allocative costs. 986 In addition, the parties 
wishing to maximise the joint value of the transaction may not want to terminate the contract 
983 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 512; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-27. 
984 The position in English law has been justified on the basis of its policy of finality of transactions. See 
Bernstein iv. Pantson Motors Ltd. [197812 All ER 220,230; The Kanchenjunga [19901 1 Lloyd's Rep 
391,398. 
985 CISG Art. 7(1). 
986 For the examples of the allocative costs, see supra n. 939-940. 
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provided that the goods have a greater value in the buyer's hands than in the seller's hands, 987 
which would be often the case as time goes on, or as the goods are used or transformed in a 
considerable way so that it becomes impossible to restore the goods substantially in the 
condition in which the buyer received them. 9$8 
The above evaluations as to a long-term right to reject appear to work properly in commercial 
sales, but one often asks whether the same is also true in light of the consumer's interests. Most 
consumers who are assumed risk-averse may prefer such right because what they generally 
want is goods of the proper quality at the full price, not defective goods at a lower price. In 
addition, even if the buyer has a long-term right to reject, one must note that the reasonable 
period requirements both for the examination and notice duty and for the exercise of the right of 
termination in CISG and Korean law may well prevent the buyer's opportunism and its 
interpretation of `reasonable period' in light of efficiency may ensure the minimisation of joint 
costs to the buyer of discovering the defect either by inspection or through an attempt to use the 
goods and of the depreciation of the goods during the period that they are in the buyer's hands 
but not yet accepted. 989 
3.5. Consequences 
3.5.1. Comparative accounts 
When the buyer legitimately terminates the contract, it brings the contract to an end resulting 
in that it releases both parties from their future primary obligations either wholly or in part. 99° 
987 Priest, supra n. 31, at 965. 
988 E. g., the buyer's use or adaptation of defective goods to fit his particular needs provides strong 
evidence that damages are the cheaper remedy because the use or adaptation discloses that the value of 
the goods to him is likely to exceed their market value. Priest, supra n. 31, at 976,989 f. 
989 Id., at 977. 
990 CISG Art. 81(1); No provision in KCC for this consequence, but generally admitted although there 
are serious disputes as to the question of whether termination operates ex tunc or ex mmc (For the 
scholars with the ex tunc effect, see Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 170 ff.; Wook-gon Kim, "Hae jae-eoi 
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Notwithstanding the release of the parties from their obligations, it does not necessarily mean 
that the seller is totally discharged from any liabilities; he may be liable to pay damages for any 
loss which results from his delivery of non-conforming goods. 99' An arbitration clause remains 
in effect as well as a clause fixing liquidated damages and, if valid, a penalty clause. 992 Another 
consequence of termination is that the parties must restore whatever one party has received from 
the other party. 
993 If both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do concurrently. 
994 In 
general, all the above general consequences of termination seem more or less the same in all the 
jurisdictions, although the Directive mostly leaves the matters to domestic laws. 995 However, 
there seems to be one aspect which draws one's attention and may reveal a significant 
divergence; the question is whether the buyer must also return any benefit which he derived 
from the use or consumption of the goods while in his possession. Korean law, CISG and the 
Hyo-kwa-ae-kwan-han Bup-ri-so-go (A Study on the Theories on the Effects of Rescission)", in: Hwang, 
Juk-in et al., Son-hae-bae-sang-bup-eoi Jae-moon-jae (The Matters on Compensation Law), (1990), at 
711 ff.; Chang-soo Yang, "Hae-jae-eoi Hyo-kwa-ae-kwan-han Hak-seol-deul-ae-dae-han So-gam (An 
Impression on the Theories on the Effects of Rescission)", (1991) 18(4) Ko-shi-yeon-koo 26, at 35 ff.; 
Seok-woo Kim, supra n. 135, at 134. For the scholars with the ex nunc effect, see Hyung-bae Kim, supra 
n. 67, at 227 ff.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 768 ff.; Oh-seung Kwon, "Gae-yak-hae-jae-eoi Hyo-kwa 
(The Effects of Rescission)", (April, 1983) 268 Sa-bup-haeng-jeong 42; Yong-dam Kim, "Hae-jae-eoi- 
hyo-kwa-ae-kwan-han I1-ko-chal (A Study on the Effects of Rescission)", (May, 1983) 269 Sa-bup- 
haeng-jeong 34; Jeung-han Kim, supra n. 135, at 97 ff. ); McDonald v. Dennys Lascells Ltd. [1933] 48 
CLR 457,469 f; Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. [ 1947] AC 356,367 ff.; Moschi v. Lep Air Services Ltd. [ 1973] 
AC 331,345,350; Beale, supra n. 25, at 105; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 382 f.; Carter, supra n. 716, at 
paras. 314,1038 f., 1206 f., 1211 f. 
991 CISG Art. 81(1); KCC Art. 551; Johnson v. Agnew [1980] AC 367; Photo Production Ltd. v. 
Securicor Ltd. [1980] AC 827,848 f.; Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. [1984] AC 382,390; 
Beale, supra n. 25, at 105; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 395 f.; Carter, supra n. 716, at paras. 1219 if. 
992 CISG Art. 81(1); Beale, supra n. 25, at 105 f.; Carter, supra n. 716, at paras. 1210,1224 ff.; Hyung- 
bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 246. 
993 CISG Art. 81(2); KCC Art. 548(1). Cf. Note that this is normally true in English law, but there are 
some exceptions. See Beale, supra n. 25, at 111 f.; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 385 ff. 
994 
CISG Art. 81(2); KCC Arts. 536,549. 
995 
Recital 15. 
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Directive (subject to the Member States' choice) require the buyer to restore it, 996 whereas 
English law seems negative on the basis of a total failure of the consideration for which the 
money was paid. 997 However, one must note that, insofar as qualitative defects are concerned, 
English law has a relatively short-lived right to reject with a corresponding automatic right to 
return of the purchase price in full and consequently the requirement is treated unimportant. 
3.5.2. Evaluating accounts 
3.5.2.1. Internal evaluation 
The position in English law as to restitution of any value of the use or consumption of the 
goods may increase the likelihood that the buyer's termination is ascribed to his opportunistic 
behaviour. The reason for that is that no allowance for such use or consumption may render 
him a considerable private benefit in the event of his claim of termination, which is generally at 
the expense of the seller. However, it is unlikely to cause a significant injustice in practice in 
relation to defects in quality because the buyer in English law may have only a short period of 
time before the right of rejection will be lost. 
998 
3.5.2.2. External evaluation 
996 CISG Art. 84(2); Recital 15; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 178; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 240 
ff.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 186 f. 
997 Law Commission 160, supra n. 516, at para. 6.4. (The Law Commissions rejected suggestions that the 
buyer's refund should be reduced on the ground of such use or consumption on the basis of its difficulty 
in calculating the value of use or consumption); Treitel, supra n. 421, at 386 f.; Bradgate and Twigg- 
Flesner, supra n. 425. Cf. Rowland v. Divall [ 1923] 2 KB 500; Barber v. NWS Bank plc. [ 1996] 1 All ER 
906. 
998 Nevertheless, the position in English law could be particularly problematic where the buyer's claim is 
based on defects in title in English law. See Rowland v. Divall [1923] 2 KB 500; Karflex Ltd. v. Poole 
[1933] 2 KB 251; Butterworth v. Kingsway Motors Ltd. [1954] 1 WLR 1286. Cf. Treitel, "Some 
Problems of Breach of Contract", (1967) 30 MLR 139, at 146 ff.; Bridge, "The Title Obligations of the 
Seller of Goods", in: Palmer and McKendrick (ed. ), Interests in Goods, (1993), at 133 ff.; Lord Goff of 
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Where allocative costs can be minimised by termination, the parties would maintain the 
distribution of risk which is implicit in a contract of sale at a fixed price by allowing the seller 
to offset the depreciation in value due to the buyer's use or consumption. 999 Nevertheless, if the 
rules as to the consequences of termination render the buyer a private benefit for his use or 
consumption while in his possession, such rules are likely to encourage the seller to incur 
greater settlement or litigation costs in an attempt to avoid the buyer's termination because it 
leaves him with the goods which are not only defective, but also used and therefore depreciated 
in value. 1000 That is, the more the goods have depreciated by the buyer's use or consumption of 
them the stronger the incentive to fight against the buyer's claim to termination so that the 
greater such costs are incurred. The increase of such costs, in turn, may reduce the joint value 
of the transaction. In this light, it appears that the position in English law that does not require 
the buyer to return any value of the use or consumption of the goods is doubted. Yet, insofar as 
defects in quality are concerned, a relatively short-lived right of rejection in English law may 
not necessarily yield a considerable inefficiency. 1°0' 
4. Monetary Relief 
I. General 
Where a seller has tendered non-conforming goods in either quality or quantity and a buyer 
has sustained some losses as a consequence of such tender, it is conceivable that there are two 
forms of monetary relief for the aggrieved buyer; a right to a claim in damages for any loss 
resulting from the seller's non-conforming tender and a right to reduce the contract price. In 
general, these rights are separately recognised in CISG, 'ooz whereas only the former right is 
Chieveley and Jones, The Law of Restitution, (1993), at 421 ff. 
999 Priest, supra n. 31, at 968. 
10°° Id., at 979. Cf. Beale, supra n. 25, at 111 f. 
10°' This may not be true in relation to defects in title. See supra n. 998. 
1002 CISG Arts. 45(1)(b), 50. 
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recognised in English law10°3 and only the latter right in the Directive. 1004 Under Korean law, 
the specific provision for damages without stipulating price reduction appears at first sight to be 
similar to the position in English law. "" Yet, it is by no means clear that it is correct to 
interpret the provision for damages in the same way as English law due to the traditional 
continental approach to the seller's guarantee liability that permits the right to reduce the price 
as the only monetary relief. '006 The following discussion will investigate the issue of in what 
way two kinds of monetary relief are developed in each jurisdiction, asking the question of 
whether the monetary relief is realised under one single remedy or two separate remedies, and if 
under two separate remedies, whether two separate remedies are compatible. The principal 
issue is whether the right to claim damages under the seller's guarantee liability of Korean law 
is the same as the right to damages in the other jurisdictions; this is closely related to the issue 
of the nature of the seller's guarantee liability. '0°' In relation to this question, the focus will be 
on damages under the seller's guarantee liability in Korean law, looking at the grounds on 
which damages may be awarded and the interests protected by the damages. However, it should 
be noted that this is not the place to deal with the rules limiting damages, not only because of 
limited space but also because the rules of limiting damages are of no particular relevance to the 
rules of the seller's guarantee liability (which are the main concern of this thesis) owing to the 
1003 English law has no direct analogue in relation to the right to reduce the price. Instead it provides the 
buyer with a right in all cases to damages, assessed on the difference in value basis, and permits the buyer 
to "set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price" (the SGA s. 
53(1)(a)). This set off rule may be compatible with the right to reduce the price, but as will be shown, it 
does not seem to be the same right as contemplated by CISG and the Directive. 
1004 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.5. No right to claim damages appears in the Directive, but one must note that 
it does not mean that the buyer has no right to claim damages. This is dealt with under domestic laws. 
See Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 90; 10th Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 21; 
Directive(99/44) Art. 8.1. 
boos KCC Arts. 575(l), 581(l). 
1006 Exceptionally, damages are allowed in the cases where the goods lack a quality which they are 
expressly warranted to have and where the seller fraudulently conceals a defect. BGB §463. Cf. French 
Code Civil Art. 1645. 
1007 For the discussion as to the nature under Korean law, see supra pp. 30 ff. 
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peculiarity in the nature of damages under the seller's guarantee liability as contrasted with the 
nature of ordinary damages. 1008 
4.2. Damages 
4.2.1. General 
Damages are commonly classified as expectation, reliance and restitution damages. '0o9 First, 
the expectation interest measure confers on the buyer the value of the seller's promise, the 
object of the award thus being to put him into as good a financial position as that in which he 
would have been had the contract been duly performed. 1°''° Second, the reliance interest 
measure compensates the buyer against expenses reasonably incurred through relying on the 
promise of performance. 'o" Its goal is to put him in the position he would have been in if he 
had not made the contract. Third, the restitution interest measure restores to the buyer any 
benefits in the form of money that he transferred to the seller between the formation of the 
contract and the breach. The restitution interest measure often overlaps with the reliance 
interest measure because the buyer's payment constitutes a form of reliance, which may be 
recoverable on a claim for reliance loss. 10'2 However, one must note that the above three 
interest measures can be by no means exhaustive to describe all kinds of damages; it is 
conceivable that there are consequential damages which are not necessarily recoverable under 
those measures, although it may sometimes form part of the expectation interest of the 
aggrieved party. 1013 The term of consequential damages may refer to the loss of gain which the 
1008 In addition, the matter of quantification will not be dealt with because unlike English law and CISG, 
Korean law has no relevant specific rules either in KCC or in the cases, but largely rests on the court. 
10°9 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 82 ff.; Treitel, supra n. 951, at 873 ff.; Harris, supra n. 27, at 39 ff. 
1010 Korean law often refers to this interest as `positive interest'. 
1011 It is also known as `negative interest' in Korean law. 
1012 
Note that a claim for restitution is not strictly one for damages since its purpose is not to compensate 
the claimant for a loss, but to deprive the defendant of a benefit. See Treitel, supra n. 951, at 876. 
1013 In addition to consequential damages, there are also cases in which expenses incurred after breach 
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buyer suffers in consequence of not receiving the goods contracted for or to such things as 
personal injury or damage to property (other than the very goods contracted for) suffered as a 
result of the breach. 
Having said that, the following sections discuss the ground for a claim for damages and the 
scope of the interests protected under the seller's guarantee liability in a comparative way. 
4.2.2. Comparative accounts 
4.2.2.1. Korean law1014 
4.2.2.1.1. Grounds for a damages claim under the seller's guarantee liability 
The starting point to examine the ground for a damages claim under the seller's guarantee 
liability is that Korean law has a unique dual liability system; the general liability for non- 
performance"" and the seller's guarantee liability. 1016 Another point is that a right to claim 
damages under the general liability is specified identically in the articles dealing with the 
seller's guarantee liability. "" One of difficulties Korean law faces is in that one cannot simply 
understand the right to damages in the seller's guarantee liability is the same one as in the 
general liability because they are distinctively treated in light of its legal history, nature and etc. 
will be recoverable in attempts to reduce the loss; e. g., expenses incurred in taking care of non- 
conforming goods or in making a cover purchase to avoid the loss which would otherwise result from the 
breach (which are described as `incidental damages' in UCC s. 2-715(1)). 
1014 The discussion of damages in Korean law will be mainly focussed on the scholars' various views not 
only because the court cases are inconsistent in many aspects but also because they do not seem to 
provide a clear clue in interpreting damages under the seller's guarantee liability. However, it will be 
attempted to quote some cases in footnotes where they are thought to be relevant to one's interpretation of 
the damages. Cf. For the study of cases in Korean law, see Dae jeong Kim, supra n. 595, at 264 ff. 
101' For the general liability for non-performance in general, see supra pp. 20 if. 
1016 For the seller's guarantee liability in general, see supra pp. 26 If. For the differences between two 
liabilities and their relationship in general, see supra pp. 29 f., 37 f., 45 ff. 
1017 KCC Arts. 390,575 (1), 5 '80,5 81. 
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There are two different theories submitted to understand the seller's guarantee liability: the legal 
liability theory10'8 and the contractual liability theory. '0'9 The former understands that it is a 
legal liability that is imposed on the seller by the law regardless of the contractual parties' 
intention and exists separately from the general liability for non-performance. On the other 
hand, the latter contends that it is a contractual liability in a sense that KCC presumes a 
contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods, which can be categorised as incomplete 
performance. 'ozo These two different theories result in the discordance as to the ground for a 
damages claim under the seller's guarantee liability: a legal duty or a contractual duty. 
4.2.2.1.2. The interests protected by the damages claim under the seller's guarantee 
liability 
4.2.2.1.2.1. The legal liability theory 
Most scholars in favour of the legal liability theory generally agree that the interpretation of 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability should be measured on the basis of the buyer's 
reliance interests on the validity of the contract. 1021 The reason for that is that the theory is 
based on its theoretical background of the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio in which a 
1018 See supra pp. 30 ff. 
1019 See supra pp. 38 ff. 
1020 For the practical differences in general in adopting either theory, see supra pp. 46 f. 
1021 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 231 f.; Tae-jae Lee, supra n. 135, at 46 f.; Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 135, 
at 136; Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 611 f.; the Korean Supreme Court Case, 30/10/1957,4290 Min- 
Sang 552 (In this case the buyer purchased black tungsten from the seller who said there will be 
international bids on the tungsten. However, the seller delivered black tungsten mixed with impurities, 
which contained carbon tungsten and others, and the bids were not taken for the tungsten so that the seller 
had to do re-separation of the ores. Against the seller's claim for payment of the price the buyer refused 
the payment and made a plea of the set-off between the payment and damages due to the impurities. The 
High Court of Justice held that the plea of the set-off was not allowed due to the absence of the seller's 
fault in the delivery of defective goods. However, in the buyer's appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held 
that the seller's liability for defective goods was the one regardless of the fault principle and the buyer's 
claim for damages should be based on his reliance interests). 
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part of the contract becomes invalid due to there being initial impossibility to deliver non- 
defective goods. 1022 They argue that any compensation for expectation interests and 
consequential losses should be excluded from the extent of damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability. "" This is because they understand that the seller's guarantee liability is in the nature 
of legal liability rather than contractual one and it is only interested in striking a proper balance 
by the law in terms of value for money the buyer paid in the cases where there exists initial 
impossibility to deliver non-defective goods which may result in no room for the buyer to rely 
on the general liability for non-performance due to the invalidity of the contract. 1024 It is also 
generally recognised among the scholars that the buyer claiming damages on a reliance basis 
should not be put into a position better than that in which he would have been had the contract 
been duly performed. "" 
4.2.2.1.2.2. The contractual liability theory 
4.2.2.1.2.2.1. General 
The contractual liability theory generally understands the seller's guarantee liability is a 
contractual one in its nature; it rests on breach of the seller's contractual duty to deliver non- 
defective goods that may be categorised as incomplete performance. 1026 Insofar as its 
understanding as to the nature along with the ground for a damages claim is concerned, it is 
natural to say that the understanding should be reflected in defining of the scope of damages; 
i. e., expectation interest. One of difficulties this theory faces, however, is in that the contractual 
liability in its nature cannot simply lead into the compensation for expectation interest, even 
1022 See supra pp. 33 f, 36 f. 
1023 As will be examined later, some argue that the compensation is possible under the general liability. 
See infra pp. 223 ff. 
1024 For the discussions about the nature of the seller's guarantee liability from the point of view of the 
legal liability theory, see supra pp. 30 ff. 
1025 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 232. Cf. KCC Art. 535(1). 
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though some argue it should. This is based on its idea that damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability which exists regardless of the fault principle cannot be treated in the same way as 
damages under the general liability which is governed by the fault principle. "" The idea has 
yielded various views to find the most appropriate interpretation of damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability, which is distinguished from those under the general liability; most attempts 
by the contractual liability theorists to distinguish damages under the seller's guarantee liability 
from those under the general liability have been executed in a way that limits the scope of 
damages the buyer can recover under the seller's guarantee liability. What follows is to 
investigate the various views submitted by the contractual liability theorists. 
4.2.2.1.2.2.2. `A' theory (Expectation interests + Consequential loss) 
This theory argues that, since KCC does not specifically provide the extent of damages under 
the seller's guarantee liability, such damages must be decided on the general rule on the scope 
of damages1028 under the general liability for non-performance. 1029 Therefore, it may include 
1026 For the discussion of the nature in light of the contractual liability theory, see supra pp. 38 ff. 
1027 See supra pp. 72 ff. Otherwise it may result in that the fault principle as the central rule to govern 
the breach of a contract made for value may lose its position in a considerable way because, as KCC Art. 
567 states, such rules are correspondingly applied to all other contracts made for value in the event of the 
debtor's defective performance. Namely, insofar as most contracts are made for value, such 
corresponding application to other contracts made for value may considerably deprive of the central 
position of the fault principle where the creditor claims for damages in the event of the debtor's defective 
performance if damages under non-fault based liability (the seller's guarantee liability) are not 
distinguished from damages under fault based liability (the general liability). 
1028 KCC Art. 393. 
1029 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 227 f.; the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 18/5/1967,66 Da 2618; 
4/2/1969,66 Da 1615. Cf. the Korean Supreme Court Case, 14/11/1989,89 DaKa 15298 (In this case the 
buyer harvested much less than the previous years, which was about half-attributable to that the seeds 
delivered were afflicted with a disease causing the leaves desiccated. The buyer sued the seller for his 
damages on lost profit, which can be said a kind of expectation interest. It was held that the measure of 
damages must be ascertained by the difference between the actual earnings and the average income had 
all sorts of normal costs for cultivating the potatoes been spent and only the half of the damages as 
worked out above would be awarded to the buyer because the damages were only half-attributable to the 
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both expectation interests and consequential loss insofar as there is adequate causation between 
the seller's wrong doing (delivery of defective goods) and the buyer's loss suffered and the 
foreseeability test is satisfied. 'o3o In the end, the theory does not discriminate in substance 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability from those under the general liability. 
4.2.2.1.2.2.3. `B' theory (Reliance interests + Expectation interests) 
The theory begins with that the seller's guarantee liability is an exceptional liability to the 
general liability for non-performance in terms of the fault principle. 103' lt insists that the scope 
of damages under the seller's guarantee liability and its requirement should be divided into two 
categories; reliance interests (e. g., price reduction, contract expenses, l°3Z restitution of the price 
paid and etc. ) and expectation interests. °033 The compensation for the former interests does not 
require fault, whereas the one for the latter interests does under the seller's guarantee 
liability. 1034 However, the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability should not 
include consequential loss, but it may be recoverable under the general liability on the basis of 
the positive breach of contract. 
1035 
defective seeds. However, unfortunately it did not make clear on which liability the claim is based 
between the seller's guarantee liability and the general liability). Cf. One scholar also argues that 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability must include expectation interests. See Joo-soo Kim, supra 
n. 125, at 220 f. (However, compared to Prof. Eun-young Lee, price reduction is not submitted as a 
separate remedy in his argument and it is based on the idea that the seller's guarantee liability requires the 
seller's fault in general). 
1030 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 228 f. For the adequate causation and foreseeability test, see KCC 
Art. 393; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 614 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 250 ff. 
'03' Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 260 ff. 
1032 E. g., the administrative expenses of making the contract (postal expenses and agency fees), the 
expenses of setting the contract aside and etc. 
1033 Id., at 262 ff. 
1034 Id. Cf. Compensation for these interests must also satisfy with the adequate causation and 
foreseeability test specified under KCC Art. 393. 
1035 Id., at 264 f. Although he does not provide the particular reason for the exclusion of consequential 
loss, it seems that he tries to sort out all the matters directly related to the defective goods themselves 
within the regime of the seller's guarantee liability and the other matters like consequential loss within 
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4.2.2.1.2.2.4. `C' theory (Reliance interests) 
This theory contends that the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability should not 
be simply interpreted in light of its nature so that admitting a contractual liability in its nature 
does not necessarily mean the reparation for expectation interests because one still needs to 
distinguish between the general liability for non-performance governed by the fault principle 
and the seller's guarantee liability being a non-fault based liability. 1036 Insofar as the seller's 
guarantee liability is deemed to be a non-fault based liability for the purpose of striking proper 
balance in terms of value for money the buyer paid, it is argued that damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability must be in principle limited to the reparation for reliance interests (e. g., price 
reduction, contract expenses, restitution of the price paid, and etc.; they are restricted to the 
cases where there is no problem about compensating even in the absence of fault). 1037 
4.2.2.1.2.2.5. `D' theory (Price reduction) 
This theory insists that the provision for damages under the seller's guarantee liability1038 is an 
exceptional rule to the general provision for damages under the general liability for non- 
the general liability on the basis of the breach of the seller's collateral duty of care. See also infra n. 
1061-1066 and accompanying texts. 
1036 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 318,341 ff.; Bup-young Ahn, supra n. 167, at 202,204 f., 212 f., 
216 f. 
1037 Hyung-bae Kim, id., at 318,341 f., 345 f.; Bup-young Ahn, id., at 219 f., 222 f. Cf. Hyung-bae 
Kim, supra n. 94,253 ff. (He used to argue that damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability should be 
interpreted in light of its rationale, which may be derived from the interpretation of contract. It must 
be 
asked which loss suffered from the defective tender (rather than asking which 
legal interests) could be 
reimbursed under the seller's guarantee liability when taking account of 
its rationale. Distinguishing 
between the sale of specific goods and the sale of generic goods, while 
in the former case only contract 
expenses (reliance interest) may be compensated, in the latter case not only such contract expenses 
but 
also benefit he would have made had the contract duly been performed 
(expectation interest) and 
consequential loss. ) Cf. Accord; Kwang-min Seo, supra n. 193, at 
30 ff. (but he is in favour of the legal 
liability theory so far as the sale of specific goods is concerned). 
1038 KCC Art. 580. 
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performance"" in terms of the requirement of fault. 104° On this basis, it is argued that such 
damages should mean nothing but price reduction itself in light of its legal history and 
comparative studies with other continental legal systems, 1041 even though there seems to be 
some linguistic difficulties under the existing law to understand that the meaning of damages is 
merely price reduction insofar as KCC is deemed to certainly distinguish between damages and 
price reduction by having a separate provision for price reduction in the case of a shortage in 
quantity. '°42 
4.2.2.1.3. The protection of other interests 
4.2.2.1.3.1. The legal liability theory 
On the presumption that the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability is confined 
to the reliance interest, the residual question is whether the buyer can ever be compensated for 
expectation interest or consequential loss even if it is deemed that the seller's tender of 
defective goods itself, or such things as personal injury or damage to property other than the 
very goods contracted for, which were suffered as a result of the defect, are attributable to the 
seller's fault. 
In relation to the compensation for expectation interests, it is argued that the protection of such 
interests could be made by allowing concurrence with the general liability for incomplete 
performance'°43 (so called, the concurrence theory). "' That is, the buyer may choose his claim 
1039 
KCC Art. 390 ff. 
1040 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 264 f. 
1041 Id. Accord; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 303 f. 
1042 KCC Arts. 572(1), 574. He also insists that rescission under the seller's guarantee liability should be 
interpreted Wandelung in German law (BGB §462) or faction redhibitoire in French law (Code Civil 
Art. 1646) in its effects so that the buyer is entitled to recovery of his payment and contract expenses. 
Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 277 f. 
1043 For the discussion about incomplete performance, see supra pp. 24 ff. 
1044 For the scholars allowing the concurrence in the sale of specific goods, see Ki-sun Kim, supra n. 
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between the seller's guarantee liability and the general liability for non-performance so that he 
may be compensated for expectation interest by resting his claim on the latter liability. The 
basis of this view is that there is no problem whichever liability the buyer's claim is based on as 
the seller's guarantee liability is seen as completely distinct from the general liability in its 
nature. "" One must note that the compensation of expectation interest on the ground of 
incomplete performance under the general liability requires the seller's fault in essence, 
'046 In 
contrast with this view, some scholars contend that concurrence cannot be allowed with the 
general liability (so called the non-concurrence theory). '°47 The reason for that is that there is no 
possibility for the buyer to base his claim on the general liability for incomplete performance as 
long as the legal liability theory is based on the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio and 
specific goods dogma; '°48 insofar as the seller delivers the goods in status quo at the time of 
contract, his contractual duty is completed so that there is no room for incomplete 
performance. '°49 With regard to the sale of generic goods, it is reasoned that the specific 
provision for the seller's guarantee liability for generic goods"" are intended to completely 
exclude the application of the rules of the general liability for incomplete performance. 'os" 
135, at 134; Hyun-tae Kim, supra n. 135, at 117. For the scholars allowing the concurrence in the sale of 
generic goods, see Young-hwan Lee, supra n. 135, at 115 ff.; Yeon-eoi Eo, supra n. 135, at 26. Cf. 
Jeung-han Kim and Yi-seo Ahn, Shin-chae-kwon-gak-ron (New Particulars in Obligatory Law), (1963), 
at 225 (arguing the compensation of expectation interests within the seller's guarantee liability with the 
requirement of fault). 
1045 Id. See also supra n. 161-162 and accompanying texts. For the differences and interrelationship 
between two liabilities in general, see supra n. 29 ff., 37 ff., 45 ff. 
1046 KCC Art. 390. Cf. It is also required to satisfy with the adequate causation and foreseeability test 
specified under KCC Art. 393. 
1047 Hyun-chae Kim, supra n. 135, at 543; Tae-jae Lee, supra. n. 148, at 43 f.; Jeong-pyoung Lim, supra 
n. 94, at 165; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 247 f.; Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 169 ff.; Won-lim Jee, 
supra n. 135, at 402 f.; Jeung-han Kim and Hak-dong Kim, supra n. 104, at 111 f.; Yong-han Kim, supra 
n. 163, at 33 ff. See also supra n. 163-166 and accompanying texts. 
1048 For the discussion about the principle, see supra n. 146-149 and accompanying texts. 
1049 Id. 
1050 KCC Art. 581. 
1051 Yun jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 170 f.; Jeung-han Kim and Hak-dong Kim, supra n. 104, at 112; 
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As regards the compensation for consequential loss, it is generally agreed that the buyer can be 
remunerated for such consequential losses by applying the rules as to the positive breach of 
contract. 1052 That is, the seller may be responsible for any losses suffered in consequence of 
defective goods in addition to whatever is recoverable under the seller's guarantee liability 
because such consequential losses raise the matter of the positive breach of contract due to the 
breach of duties of care and protection of the other party's life, health and property. 'os3 It is also 
noted that the seller's fault is essential to raise the positive breach of contract. 'osa 
4.2.2.1.3.2. The contractual liability theory 
4.2.2.1.3.2.1. General 
As the foregoing account showed, the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability 
has been variously interpreted so as to distinguish it from that under the general liability on the 
ground of its unique feature of the seller's guarantee liability being non-fault based liability and 
its peculiar rationale to strike a balance in terms of value for money the buyer paid. The 
residual matter to be settled under the contractual liability theory is in relation to the other 
interests which are not covered under the seller's guarantee liability, because it may be unjust if 
the buyer cannot be reimbursed for his loss of expectation interests or consequential loss (as the 
case may be) caused by the defective tender which was attributable to the seller's fault. 'O" The 
very core of the matter is placed in the question of how the theory based on the idea that the 
Yong-han Kim, supra n. 163, at 34 f. 
1052 Yun-jik Kwak, id.; Yong-han Kim, id., at 33 ff.; Jeong-pyoung Lim, supra n. 94, at 165. 
1053 Yong-han Kim, supra n. 163, at 33. For the various views as to the grounds in substance of the 
positive breach of contract in terms of a network of duties, see supra n. 94. 
1054 KCC Art. 390. Cf. It is also required to satisfy with the adequate causation and foreseeability test 
specified under KCC Art. 393. 
1055 Insofar as `A' theory is concerned, there is no need to discuss this matter due to full coverage under 
the seller's guarantee liability. Cf. The Korean Supreme Court Case, 7/5/1997,96 Da 39455 (the case for 
the buyer's damage claim for consequential losses caused by defective goods was held on the basis of the 
225 
seller's guarantee liability is for the breach of a contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods 
which is categorised as `incomplete performance' under the general liability can settle the 
interrelationship between the seller's guarantee liability and the general liability. 
1056 
4.2.2.1.3.2.2. The concurrence theory 
This theory maintains that the interests that cannot be recovered under the seller's guarantee 
liability should be protected by the means of allowing concurrence with incomplete 
performance. "" The ground for the concurrence is that even though the seller's guarantee 
liability is similar in its nature to the general liability for incomplete performance, ` ' the 
`special' incomplete performance (the seller's guarantee liability) is distinctive from the 
`general' incomplete performance (the general liability) in terms of its requirements and effects; 
in particular, there is no requirement of fault. 1059 Therefore, insofar as the fault principle is 
satisfied, the buyer may be empowered to claim damages under the general liability for 
incomplete performance, by which he may be compensated for his loss of expectation interests 
or consequential loss. '060 
4.2.2.1.3.2.3. The non-concurrence theory 
The starting point of this theory is in the principle of lex specialis derogat legem 
generalem. 1061 That is, it is understood that the rules of the seller's guarantee liability are 
general liability for incomplete performance requiring the seller's fault). 
1056 See supra pp. 45 ff. 
1057 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 313 ff.; Sang-Yong Kim, supra n. 203, at 80 f.; Bup-young Ahn, 
supra n. 167, at 225 f.; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 306 ff. 
1058 The similarity is only in that both liabilities place the seller on a contractual duty to deliver non- 
defective goods. Hyung-bae Kim, id., at 314 f. 
1059 Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 224 ff. 
1060 KCC Arts. 390,393. Cf. It is also required to satisfy with the adequate causation and foreseeability 
test specified under KCC Art. 393. 
1061 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 264 ff.; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 260 ff.; Kwang-min Seo, 
supra n. 193, at 40 ff. 
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special rules within the rules of the general liability so that the general rules are excluded to the 
extent which the special rules are applied, 
1062 On the basis of this simple principle, concurrence 
is not basically allowed with the general liability. However, one must note that this theory 
understands that the principle of lex specialis derogat legem generalem is applied only to the 
extent of the buyer's losses which can be recoverable under the special regime of the seller's 
guarantee liability, "" and it argues that the special regime have lacuna insofar as damages for 
expectation interests or consequential loss are concerned. 1064 On the basis of the principle that 
the general rules may supplement the special rules where the latter rules have lacuna, the theory 
maintains that the general regime for non-performance may play a role so as to supplement the 
lack of the special regime so that the buyer may be entitled to damages for expectation interests 
or consequential loss under the general liability. '065 For such damages, the requirement of the 
seller's fault is essential. 1066 
4.2.2.2. English law and CISG 
4.2.2.2.1. Grounds for a damages claim under the seller's guarantee liability 
The ground for a damages claim under English law and CISG must be examined in light of 
their unified liability system; unlike Korean law, they treat the seller's guarantee liability as part 
of the general system of `breach of contract' rather than an independent regime for defective 
1062 Dae-jeong Kim, id. 
1063 That is, reliance and expectation loss in `B' theory, reliance loss in `C' theory, and only price 
reduction in `D' theory. 
1064 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 264 ff. It may be only related to consequential loss in `B' theory, 
expectation and consequential loss in `C' theory, all the other possible losses than price reduction in `D' 
theory. 
1065 Id. Cf. Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 229 (She is in favour of the non-concurrence theory in 
principle, but exceptionally allows concurrence provided that the buyer's claim for replacement is not 
compatible with his claim for damages under the seller's guarantee liability). 
1066 Cf. It is also required to satisfy with the adequate causation and foreseeability test specified under 
KCC Art. 393. 
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goods. 1067 It is generally understood that any breach of implied obligations to deliver the goods 
in conformity with the contract or to deliver the goods corresponding with certain standard or 
quality under the SGA'o6s and CISG'o69 is deemed to be just like all other breaches of contract 
which themselves arise from broken promises. 107° Having said that, it is worth noting that any 
breach of contract, no matter what form it takes, confers on an injured buyer a right to claim 
damages under English law and CISG. '07 The ground for the buyer's damages claim is the 
seller's breach of a contractual duty to deliver the goods free from defects. 1072 
4.2.2.2.2. The interests protected by damages claim under the seller's guarantee liability 
4.2.2.2.2.1. English law 
As already stated, a breach of contract always gives rise to liability in damages. The basic rule 
in the award of damages is that it is compensatory and is designed above all to give the 
aggrieved buyer the benefit of the promised bargain; namely, it is generally said that the 
aggrieved buyer's expectation interests are protected by the award of damages in a sense that 
the purpose of the award of damages is to put the plaintiff in as good an economic position as 
1067 See supra pp. 49 ff. 
1068 See supra pp. 52 ff. 
1069 See supra pp. 58 ff. 
1070 For the discussion as to the nature of the seller's liability for defective goods, see supra pp. 62 f. 
1071 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 75; Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 540; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra 
n. 218, at 368; Stoll, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 555 ff.; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 301 f.; Knapp, 
BiancaBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 539 f.; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 297. 
1072 The ground and interests protected by a damages claim under the Directive is not dealt here because 
the damage claim has recourse to domestic laws (Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 90; 101h Report by Select 
Committee, supra n. 277, at 21; Directive(99/44) Art. 8.1. ), although given that a domestic law entitles a 
buyer to a damages claim, the ground for the claim may be understood the breach of the seller's 
contractual duty to deliver conforming goods with the contract as examined before and the damage claim 
may certainly protect in principle the expectation interests (but, it may depend on the requirement of 
fault). See supra pp. 62 f. For the implied contractual duties under the Directive in general, see supra pp. 
56 ff. 
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that in which he would have been had the seller not committed a breach. '173 
The award of damages being in principle based on the expectation interests, it is plainly 
established that the buyer is entitled to choose between claiming on an expectation or a reliance 
basis. 1074 However, it is generally recognised that the aggrieved buyer's claim based on reliance 
loss should not put him in a position better than that in which he would have been had there 
been no breach. 1075 One example in which the buyer's claim may be based on reliance loss is 
where he is unable to prove to a satisfactory standard the lost expectancy, precisely because of 
the seller's breach. '°76 
Recovery on the basis of the restitution interests instead of the expectation interests is available 
to the aggrieved buyer in the cases, e. g., where the seller's delivery of goods is so defective that 
the buyer justifiably rejects and terminates the contract. 3°7 It is worth noting that the aggrieved 
buyer may be, on restoring the defective goods to the seller, allowed to combine his restitution 
claims with claims for expenses incurred in reliance on the contract and the excess cost of a 
substitute insofar as there is no double recovery in respect of the same loss. 1078 Where the buyer 
1073 Treitel, supra n. 951, at 873 f.; Robinson v. Harman [1848] 1 Ex 850,855, per Parke B.; British 
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. 
[ 1912] AC 673,688, per Viscount Haldane L. C. 
1074 Culliance v. British "Rema " Mfg. Co. [ 1954] 1 QB 292,303; Anglia Television Ltd v. Reed [ 1972] 1 
QB 60,63-64; CCC Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd [1985] QB 16,32; cf. Lloyd v. 
Stanbury [1971] 1 WLR 535,547; The Selda [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 416,419 quoted in Treitel, supra n. 
951, at 877, n. 16. 
1075 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 97 f.; Treitel, supra n. 951, at 877 f.; C. & P. Haulage v. Middleton [ 1983] 1 
WLR 1461; CCC Films (London) Ltd v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd [1985] QB 16; McRae v. 
Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] 84 CLR 377; Bowlay Logging Ltd v. Domtar Ltd. [1978] 
4 WWR 105. 
1076 See Anglia Television Ltd v. Reed [ 1972] 1 QB 60; McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission 
[1991] 84 CLR 377. 
1077 Treitel, supra n. 951, at 877. This is one of the cases of a total failure of consideration. 
For the cases 
where the buyer is entitled to reject the goods and terminate the contract, see supra pp. 184 
if. 
1078 Millar's Machinery Co. Ltd. v. David Way & Son [1934] 40 Com Cas 204; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 
98 ff. Cf. Barker, "Restitution of Passenger Fare", (1994) LMCLQ 291; McKendrick, "Total Failure of 
Consideration and Counter-Restitution: Two Issues or One'? ", in: Birks (ed. ), Laundering and Tracing, 
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claims for restitution of a sum of money as opposed to damages, such claim may leave the 
buyer better off than he would have been had there been no breach (e. g., where he made a bad 
bargain) because unlike a reliance loss claim, there is no ceiling to the expectation interests in a 
restitution claim in which the measure of recovery is what the seller received rather than what 
the buyer has lost by way of reliance or by way of lost expectation. 
1079 
In addition, the buyer can often recover `consequential loss', which may refer to further harm, 
such as personal injury108ß or damage to property108' suffered as a result of breach. 1012 
One must note that the buyer's claim for damages under English law is not affected by the 
matter of whether the breach of contract has been culpably committed intentionally or 
negligently or in any other way (non-fault based liability). '0$3 What really matters is the mere 
fact of the breach of contract. '°84 
4.2.2.2.2.2. CISG 
(1995), at 217 ff.; Burrows & McKendrick, Cases and Materials on the Law of Restitution, (1997), at 210 
ff. 
1079 Id., at 100 ff.; Treitel, supra n. 951, at 878. 
1080 Godley v. Perry [ 1960] 1 All ER 36. 
1081 Bostock & Co Ltd. v. Nicholson & Sons Ltd. [ 1904] 1 KB 725. 
1082 See also Smith v. Green [1875] 1 CPD 92. Cf. The Batis [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 345 (expenses 
incurred in complying with directions wrongfully given by the defendant). Cf. British Sugar plc. v. NEI 
Power Projects Ltd [ 1997] 87 Build LR 42 for the meaning of consequential damages. 
1083 See supra n. 588-589 and accompanying texts. 
1084 In order for the buyer to recover damages, he must prove that the losses were caused 
by the breach 
and he will be recovered to the extent that losses fall inside the rule of remoteness of 
damage. The 
remoteness rule specifies that the defendant will be liable for losses that, considered at the time of 
contract, fell within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as 
liable to result from a breach. This 
rule was stated in the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale 
[ 1854) 9 Ex 341. It consists of two limbs (the 
first limb is that the plaintiff would recover in respect of losses arising 
in the usual course of things, and 
the second limb states that it was designed for more unusual 
losses present to the minds of the particular 
contracting parties). For more detail, see Treitel, supra n. 
951, at 898 ff.; Harris, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 
847, at para. 27-024 ff. Compare with KCC Art. 
393 which is similar to the rules of Hadley v. 
Baxendale. 
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An aggrieved buyer is granted a general right to claim damages whenever there has been any 
breach of the contract. 'oas The basic formula for damages for the breach of contract under CISG 
is designed to compensate the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the injured buyer as a 
consequence of breach. '086 Assuming a causal connection between the breach and the loss, 
CISG seeks to place the aggrieved buyer in the same financial position he would have enjoyed 
had the seller not committed the breach of contract; i. e., similarly to English law, the damages 
claim under CISG serves in principle to protect the buyer's expectation interests. "" The 
general rule for damages stipulated in art. 74 being in principle to protect the aggrieved buyer's 
expectation interests, a lesser measure of reliance or restitution interest protection is presumably 
also available within such rule, depending on the circumstances; i. e., it does not necessarily 
seem to deny the buyer the right to claim recovery of his reliance interest alternatively, if any, 
along with his restitution interest in order to place him in the position in which he would have 
been had he not relied on the due performance of the contract where the buyer is entitled to 
avoid the contract. 1088 However, where it can be proved in such a case that the buyer would 
have suffered a financial loss had the contract been duly performed, one must not shift such loss 
to the seller when calculating the buyer's loss. 1089 
As specified in the general rule for measuring damages, "... consists of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach", the buyer is 
1085 CISG Art. 45(1)(b). 
1086 CISG Art. 74. 
1087 Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 59, Art. 70, No. 3; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 445; Enderlein and 
Maskow, supra n. 288, at 300; Knapp, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 543; Stoll, Schlechtriem 
(ed. ), supra n. 218, at 553; Farnsworth, "Damages and Specific Relief', (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 249; 
Bridge, supra n. 434, at 102; Lookofsky, "The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods", in: Blanpain (ed. ), International Encyclopaedia of Laws - Contracts, 
(1993), at 123. 
1088 Stoll, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 554; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-37; Lookofsky, supra n. 
1087, at 123. 
1089 Stoll, id. 
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also entitled to recover any consequential loss caused by the breach of contract. 'o9o However, 
one must note that any consequential damages with regard to the cases of death or personal 
injuries caused by the defective goods are excluded, regardless of whether the buyer himself or 
a third party is involved. 109' 
The buyer's right to recover damages is not related to any proof of the seller's culpable 
breach, 1092 i. e., there is no requirement of fault. 
1093 However, in certain exceptional cases, the 
seller may be exempted from his liability for damages to the extent that he can demonstrate the 
following; first, that the failure to perform was attributable to an impediment beyond his 
control, second, that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into 
account at the time of contract, third, that he could not reasonably have been expected to have 
avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences. "" 
1090 CISG Art. 74. 
1091 CISG Art. 5. See Stoll, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 557. 
1092 But his right is governed by a general rule of remoteness and causation of damage in art. 74 which 
stipulates that damages equal to the loss suffered as a consequence of breach will be awarded, upto the 
limit of what was or ought to have been foreseen at the time of the contract by the defendant as a possible 
consequence of breach. For more detail, see Stoll, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 567 ff. Cf. Sutton, 
"Measuring Damages under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods", (1989) 
50 Ohio St. L. J. 737; Ferrari, "Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeability of Damages in Contract 
Law", (1993) 53 Lou. L. Rev. 1257; Nicholas, supra n. 892, at 230 f.; Darkey, "Damages Provisions 
under UN Convention", (1989) 15 J. L. & Com. 139; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-36 f.; Bridge, supra n. 
434, at 102 f. 
1093 See supra n. 588-589 and accompanying texts. See also Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 37, Art. 
41, No. 3; Knapp, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 540; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 298, 
320; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 23 f. and 75; Lookofsky, supra n. 1087, at 123; Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, 
at 101; Talion, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 573. Cf. Nicholas, "Prerequisites and Extent of 
Liability for Breach of Contract under the U. N. Convention', in: Schlechtriem (ed. ), Einheitliches 
Kaufrecht und nationales Obligationenrecht, (1987), at 286; Nicholas, "Fault and Breach of Contract", 
in: Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 351 ff.; Nicholas, "Impracticability and Impossibility in 
the U. N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", in: Galston/Smit (ed. ), 
International sales, (1984), at 5-10 ff. (He tries to find that CISG is based on a concept of fault from the 
point of view of German law, art. 79 being the basis of the fault principle). 
1094 CISG Art. 79(1); Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 107; Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 101; 
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4.2.2.3. Comparative view 
As regards the ground for the buyer's claim for damages under the seller's guarantee liability, 
it was shown in Korean law that it depends upon the matter of which theory one takes for the 
nature of the seller's guarantee liability. The legal liability theory takes the view that the 
ground is on the breach of a legal duty to deliver non-defective goods imposed on the seller 
irrespective of the parties' contractual intention. On the other hand, the contractual liability 
theory contends that it is the breach of a contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods which 
is generally in accordance with the ground under English law and CISG. 
KCC stipulates the same right to claim damages under the seller's guarantee liability as the 
one under the general liability. The latter right is in principle to protect the aggrieved party's 
expectation interests in order to place him in the same financial position as he would have been 
if the contract had been duly performed. In some cases, however, depending upon the 
circumstances, this right may include the buyer's reliance and consequential loss. In this light, 
it is similar to the right to claim damages in English law and CISG. 'o95 
Then, the question is whether the fact that the same right of damages as in the general liability 
is specified in the seller's guarantee liability means that it protects expectation interests as well 
Stoll, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 606; Tallon, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 576; 
Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 320 f.; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 107; Audit, "The Vienna Sales 
Convention and the Lex Mercatoria", in: Carboneau (ed. ), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, rev. ed., 
(1998), at 179 f. However, some scholars argue that the exemption conferred on the seller by art. 79 is 
not applicable to the cases of the delivery of non-conforming goods based on that the replacement of 
"circumstances" by "impediment" in the process of legislation of art. 79 implies a barrier to performance 
which prevents performance (as contrasted with circumstances that lead to defective performance). This 
view seems to be submitted because they are overly anxious about the introduction of fault liability 
through the "back door", art. 79. See Honnold, supra n. 218, at 477 ff.; Nicholas, supra n. 1093, at 5-10 
ff. Cf. For the counterpart in English law of art. 79, see supra n. 222; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 106 f. Cf. 
Hudson, "Exemptions and Impossibility under the Vienna Convention", in: McKendrick (ed. ), Force 
inajeure and Frustration of Contract, (1991), at 175 ff. 
1095 However, one must note that it is distinctive from English law and CISG in terms of the requirement 
of fault. 
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as consequential loss. The answer was quite negative even from the point of view of the 
contractual liability theory which takes the view of the ground for damages being on the breach 
of the contractual duty. In general, the theory has tried to find a lesser measure of damages for 
the seller's guarantee liability than the one for the general liability because of its distinctive 
nature of non-fault based liability. 1096 That is, it is thought that it may be unfair for the seller to 
remunerate the buyer for his expectation loss as well as consequential loss even if the seller was 
not at fault. In the end, one may find that the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability in Korean law departs from English law and CISG, 1097 although `A' theory in Korean 
law is similar to English law and CISG in that it may compensate the buyer's expectation loss 
and even consequential loss regardless of the fault principle. "" 
There have been various views in Korea so as to find the most appropriate lesser measure for 
damages under the seller's guarantee liability. Of the various views, the reliance measure seems 
to draw one's attention in light of a comparative study because this measure is sometimes taken 
as an alternative of the expectancy measure in English law and CISG, depending on the 
circumstances. 1°99 Notwithstanding the apparent similarity, a careful examination may reveal 
dissimilarity in its contents, although it seems similar insofar as the legal liability is concerned. 
The reliance measure taken by the contractual liability theory in Korea is generally understood 
to include price reduction, contract expenses, restitution of the price when the contract has been 
rescinded, and etc.; it is restricted to the cases where there is no problem about compensating in 
the absence of fault, "00 but it seems to exclude a reliance loss in foregoing the opportunity of 
1096 But except `A' theory. See supra pp. 220 f. 
1097 The protection of the buyer's expectation interests or consequential loss not covered 
by the seller's 
guarantee liability in Korean law, as the case may be, has been left to the general liability 
for incomplete 
performance based on the fault principle by the means of either allowing concurrence with the general 
liability or applying the principle of the general rules supplementing the 
lack of the special rules. 
1098 See supra pp. 220 f. 
1099 See supra pp. 218 f. (for the legal liability theory), 221 
f. (for `B' theory), 222 (for `C' theory). 
11°° See supra pp. 222 ('C' theory). Cf. See also supra pp. 
221 f. (`B' theory; it takes the similar view as 
`C' theory in a sense that the reliance interest is protected regardless of the 
fault principle. But one must 
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making a profitable contract with another person. "o' On the other hand, it seems that the 
measure in English law, CISG and the legal liability theory includes such loss in the foregone 
opportunity to contract with someone else. ' 102 The reason for the limited reliance measure in 
the contractual liability theory in Korean law seems to lie in their reluctance to award damages 
for the foregone profit which is thought in principle to be the buyer's risk and generally 
governed by the fault principle. 
"" 
4.2.3. Evaluating accounts 
4.2.3.1. Internal evaluation 
As to the rationale of the award of the right to claim damages, there seems to be no doubt that 
it is to protect the aggrieved party's expectation interests in the event of the other party's breach 
of his contractual undertaking. ' 104 This rationale has been well reflected in the claim for 
note that unlike `C' theory, the expectation interest is also protected within the seller's guarantee liability 
on the condition of satisfying the fault principle). 
1101 This loss is categorised in continental law as one of negative damage (lucrum cessans) as contrasted 
with actual loss (damnum emergens). Negative damage is often an element in expectation interest 
although it may be an element of reliance interest like this case of the foregone profit. See Treitel, supra 
n. 421, at 84 f. 
1102 See supra pp. 218 f.; Bridge, supra n. 784, at 539 f.; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 334; Bridge, 
"Expectation Damages and Uncertain Future Losses", in: Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 
427 ff. Cf. East v. Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461 (In this case the claimant was interested in buying a 
hairdressing salon and was induced to buy one belonging to the defendant by the latter's fraudulent 
representation. It was held that the claimant could be compensated for damages with regard to another 
such business in which he would have invested his money if the representation had not been made, but 
not the profits which he would have made out of the defendant's business, if the representation relating to 
it had been true. ) 
1103 Cf. Kwang-min Seo, supra n. 193, at 36 f.; Bup-young Ahn, supra n. 167, at 219 f.; Hyung-bae Kim, 
supra n. 67, at 241 f.. Cf. KCC Art. 535(1). 
1104 From the point of view of Korean law, it is generally governed by the fault principle so that the 
contractual undertaking may extend right up to the point at which he promises to do their best to produce 
the envisaged result. 
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damages under English law and CISG. However, the same is hardly true so far as the seller's 
guarantee liability in Korean law is concerned, because of both the long disputes as to the nature 
of the seller's guarantee liability and its unique feature of a non-fault based liability. 
Undoubtedly, there seems to be no problem in excluding the expectation interests from the 
measure of damages from the point of view of the legal liability theory because in any event the 
theory does not accept the seller's contractual undertaking to deliver non-defective goods which 
is the basic foundation for the damages claim for the breached party's expectancy. Leaving 
aside the matter of its justification in excluding the expectation interests in the seller's guarantee 
liability, "os however, the question arises in its view as to the protection of expectation interests; 
some scholars argue that it must be remunerated by the means of allowing concurrence with the 
general liability, whereas the others insist no concurrence, restricting all the damages to reliance 
loss in the seller's guarantee liability. 1106 First, as regards the former view, there seems to be no 
room for the concurrence insofar as the sale of specific goods is concerned and the theory is 
based on the specific goods dogma107 because all the contractual duties, breach of which is the 
cornerstone for the damage claim for expectation loss under the general liability, are deemed to 
have been fulfilled if the goods are delivered as they were at the time of contract. """ Second, 
the latter view cannot avoid some criticism in that it is unfair for the buyer if he cannot recover 
his expectation loss in the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods attributable to the 
1105 As argued long before, its grounds for non-contractual undertaking have been criticised in various 
aspects by the contractual liability theorists and further by this thesis. See supra pp. 38 ff., 69 if. Cf. Is 
the restriction to reliance loss by the legal liability theory free from criticism? The first question is 
whether the restriction will achieve its purpose to find a lesser measure than the expectation measure; in 
practice, it may be more or less equivalent as long as the reliance measure includes the loss of profit by 
foregoing the opportunity to make the contract with the third person. The second question is that its 
theoretical basis on the invalidity of the contract cannot be compatible with the cases where the buyer 
claims damages without the contract being rescinded because the matter of invalidity is closely related 
only to the cases where the contract is rescinded. See Kwang-min Seo, supra n. 193, at 35 ff. 
1106 See supra n. 1043-1051 and accompanying texts. 
1107 See supra pp. 33 f. 
1108 Nevertheless, note that the concurrence may be possible if the generic goods are concerned. 
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seller's fault in the sale of generic goods. 
Moving onto the contractual liability theory, the question arises whether its assumption of the 
seller's contractual undertaking is linked with the expectation measure. Some argue that the 
scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability should be limited on the basis of its 
unique nature of non-fault based liability to the limited reliance loss109 or the price reduction 
only. '" Having stated this limitation, their remaining task was to find the way to compensate 
the aggrieved buyer for his expectation loss because it is natural to say that their assumption of 
the contractual undertaking should be in principle followed by the compensation for such loss in 
the event of the breach of the undertaking; two views have been submitted (the concurrence 
theory and the non-concurrence theory). "" Both theories seem quite plausible in their 
theoretical construction, although their practical result would be more or less the same. 1112 
However, they too cannot be free from criticism in terms of the ensuing questions. First, as to 
the concurrence theory, it still remains the question to be answered, as was asked by the non- 
concurrence theory, of how it could clearly explain the principle of lex specialis derogat legem 
generalem in their theory. "'3 Second, regarding the non-concurrence theory, the question is in 
that, depending on the type of loss, the applicable provision is differentiated for the same cause 
of action (the seller's delivery of defective goods).... although it is in practice quite difficult to 
clearly distinguish the various type of loss. "" Consequently, it may cause the instability of law 
unless it provides clear guidelines for the applicable provision. "" 
1109 See supra p. 222. 
' 110 See supra p. 222. 
1111 See supra pp. 225 ff. 
1112 Namely, it is similar in that the interests not protected under the seller's guarantee liability are 
protected by the general liability at the end on the condition of satisfying the fault principle. 
1113 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 254 ff. 
1114 E. g., the provisions for the seller's guarantee liability (arts. 580 and 581) are exclusively applicable 
for some of the reliance loss, whereas the provisions for the general liability (art. 390) applicable to the 
loss of the other interests not protected by the seller's guarantee liability. 
I11' Bup-young Ahn, supra n. 167, at 208 f., 224 f. 
1116 Id. 
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Given that all the complexities faced in Korean law are basically due to the disputes about the 
nature of the seller's guarantee liability along with the artificial distinction of fault or non-fault 
based liability, one should recall the arguments raised at the beginning of this thesis which was 
aimed at unifying the dual liability system in light of the approach taken by English law and 
CMSG. 1" The first argument was related to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability, which 
maintained that it should be a contractual liability for the breach of the seller's contractual duty 
to deliver non-defective goods in light of the logic and reasonableness of the existing 
theories. "" This finding could be understood as a foundation for a damages claim based on the 
buyer's expectancy in the sale of both generic goods and specific goods. The second argument 
was that Korean law needs another way of thinking, first, that one needs to interpret in an 
unified way that damages under the seller's guarantee liability are as they are under the general 
liability so that it may include all kinds of loss, second, that the requirement of fault is 
dependent upon what remedy the buyer seeks to claim rather than the artificial distinction of 
fault or non-fault based liability. "" Consequently, insofar as the damages claim under the 
general liability is subject to the fault principle, "' the requirement of fault is also crucial for the 
damages claim under the seller's guarantee liability. This argument appears unfavourable from 
the point of view of the buyer compared to the existing theories because, given that no specific 
provision for a price reduction in the case of qualitative defects under KCC means he cannot 
claim a price reduction, "" he may not have any monetary relief where it is shown the absence 
of fault on the seller's part. However, there seems no particular difference in practice since, 
even if any fault is not found, it is generally understood that some losses may be still 
compensated regardless of the fault principle under the general liability (e. g., contract expenses 
1117 See supra pp. 65 ff. 
1118 See supra pp. 68 ff., 77 f. 
1119 See supra pp. 73 ff. 
1120 KCC Art. 390. 
1121 In contrast, KCC has a provision for a price reduction in the case of defects in quantity. KCC An. 
572(3). 
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where the contract is rescinded), and, as will be argued later, the buyer is still allowed to claim a 
price reduction which exists separate from a damages claim. "" This seems even clearer when 
one considers that most contractual liability theorists limit the scope of damages under the 
seller's guarantee liability to, at most, reliance loss or price reduction which would have no 
problem to be compensated in the absence of fault if it was dealt under the general liability and 
they leave the matters of expectation loss and consequential loss to the fault principle. "" In this 
light, the arguments raised seem helpful to ease the complexities in interpreting damages under 
the seller's guarantee liability, in particular, for the compensation of expectation loss and 
consequential loss, without any disadvantage on the buyer. ' 124 
4.2.3.2. External evaluation 
The goal, from an efficiency perspective, is to employ the legal remedy that will hinder the 
parties from producing inefficient breach, ensuring resources to be allocated to their highest- 
valued uses. 125 It has been submitted that, of the measures of contract damages, expectation is 
the only measure of contract damages that discourages breach only where performance is more 
1122 Notwithstanding no provision on price reduction, the ensuing discussion will show how the price 
reduction in the case of defects in quality could be independently recognised of damages under the 
existing KCC. See infra n. 1175 and accompanying texts. 
1123 See supra pp. 219 ff., 225 ff. But except `A' theory (supra pp. 220 f. ) 
1124 Accord; Choon-soo Ahn, supra n. 148, at 441 f. 
1125 Ulen, "The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies", in: 
Katz (ed. ), Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, (1998), at 117; Mercuro and Medema, 
Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism, (1997), at 75; Beale, supra n. 25, at 160 f.; 
Miceli, Economics of Law, (1997), at 71 f.; Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 
(1988), at 142 f.; Posner, supra n. 21, (1998), at 130 f.; Polinsky, supra n. 22, at 29 f.; Cooter & Ulen, 
supra n. 27, at 172 f.; Harris, supra n. 27, at 84 f. On the other hand, since economic efficiency assumes 
that there be circumstances where the breach of contract is more efficient than performance, the legal 
rules should also encourage the parties to breach the contract in the cases where such breach is efficient. 
Assuming efficiency requires maximising the sum of the payoffs to the promisor and promisee, the cases 
of efficient breach are where the costs of performance exceed the benefit to all the parties. Cf. Cooter & 
Ulen, supra n. 27, at 172 f. Cf. For the critical views as to efficient breach, see Harris, supra n. 27, at 86 
f.; Beale, supra n. 25, at 163 f. 
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efficient than is breach. ' 126 The reason for that is that expectation damages fully internalise to 
the potential breacher all costs of the breach to the victim. "" For instance, suppose that A has a 
computer for sale at a price of $1,000. B is willing to pay up to $1,300, and agrees to purchase 
the computer at the price of $1,000. Thus, at A's asking price, B realises a consumer surplus of 
$300. Before the sale is completed, C offers A $1,200 for the same computer (an amount equal 
to the value he places on possessing it). If the court imposes expectation measure which makes 
B as well-off as if the contract had been performed, A will have an incentive to perform because 
the payment of B's expectation damages (the consumer surplus $300) is greater than A's gain 
($200) when he takes the higher offer from C and breaks the contract with B. Consequently, the 
expectation measure seems to properly ensure the goal of the legal remedies, namely that the 
computer still remains with one who values it most. However, the award of reliance or 
restitution damages may not produce an efficient result because the breacher does not 
internalise the full cost of the breach to the victim. For instance, in the example case of the 
contract between A and B, suppose B agrees to purchase the computer at the same price of 
$1,000 with a good faith deposit of $400 and the remaining payment within 5 days. He values it 
$1,300. In reliance on this contract, B purchases some accessories for the computer, spending 
$100 that is non-refundable. Before the computer is conveyed to B, C offers $1,200 for the 
same computer, which is valued by C at the same amount as he pays. Both reliance and 
restitution damages would provide A with an incentive for inefficient breach, resulting in that 
the computer does not move to the highest-valued use (B values it more than C) because the 
cost of breaching is inefficiently low. That is, if the court is supposed to take reliance measure, 
it may provide an incentive for A to breach the contract with B who values the computer most 
because reliance damages will make A an additional gain of $100 after the compensation of 
$100 for the expenses for the accessories and refund of $400 if he takes the higher offer from C. 
1126 Id. 
1127 However, in reality, expectation damages actually awarded by the court are not perfect 
due to the 
practical difficulty to estimate the breached party's expectation. 
See Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 175; 
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Similarly, restitution will also provide A with an incentive for an inefficient breach because it 
will make A an additional gain of $200 after refund of $400 when he contracts with C who 
values the computer lesser than B. 
Having said that, the question arises whether each theory and jurisdiction may well respond to 
the result derived above. Insofar as the legal liability theory is concerned, it seems that it is not 
necessary to discuss the matter of damages based on the buyer's contractual expectation under 
the seller's guarantee liability because it is understood that the seller is not deemed to promise 
the buyer to deliver non-defective goods in the contract. ' 12' However, the answer may be 
different if one considers the case of the sale of generic goods, which undoubtedly has a 
contractual duty to deliver non-defective goods. Although some of the legal liability theorists 
allow the expectation damages in that case by the means of allowing concurrence with the 
general liability (the concurrence theory), the others argue that it is restricted to the reliance 
damages because they understand the special provisions for the seller's guarantee liability for 
generic goods are intended to exclude the application of the general liability (the non- 
concurrence theory). ' 129 It seems apparent that the latter theory may provide the seller with an 
incentive for inefficient breach because the restriction to the reliance damages does not 
internalise to the seller the full cost of the breach to the buyer. On the other hand, the 
contractual liability theory (which allows the expectation damages by whatever means), "" 
English law and CISG may discourage the seller to commit an inefficient breach to the extent 
that their routine measure is based on the expectation. However, one must recall that the scope 
of expectation in Korean law departs from that in English law and CISG in terms of the 
requirement of fault; "" the former is based on the seller's promise to do their best to produce 
the envisaged result, whereas the latter requires the seller to guarantee it. Given that, in the 
Ulen, supra n. 1125, at 120. 
1128 See supra pp. 30 ff. 
1129 See supra pp. 223 ff. 
1130 For the means to allow the expectation damages in this theory, see supra pp. 
225 ff. 
1131 But note that `A' theory in Korean law does not require 
fault. See supra pp. 220 f. 
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modern world, exchange transactions are largely standardised and they are quickly and 
painlessly executed, it seems better to assume that one treats the parties to guarantee the 
envisaged result rather than merely to do their best to procure it. 113' This view seems to be well 
witnessed in Korea by the efforts of the many scholars to reverse the burden of proof and to 
narrow the possibilities for rebutting the presumption of fault in sales transactions so that the 
seller may face a very difficult task to show that he was not at fault, which may end up being 
equivalent to imposing the strict liability on the seller. "" 
Another point to be evaluated in light of efficiency is in the uncertainty inherent in the 
interpretation of damages under the seller's guarantee liability in Korean law. ' 114 As examined 
above, the long disputes about damages under the seller's guarantee liability seem to cause a 
form of market failure in a way that increases the transaction costs by the contractual parties in 
order to clarify the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability. The principal reason 
for that is the uncertainty caused by the various attempts in Korean law to distinguish damages 
under the seller's guarantee liability from damages under the general liability. This failure 
seems to suggest that one should support the view submitted above to attempt to interpret in a 
unified way that damages under the seller's guarantee liability are as they are under the general 
liability. "" 
4.3. Price reduction 
4.3.1. General 
Where the seller delivers defective goods, another type of financial remedy under Korean law, 
the Directive and CISG is the right to reduce the contract price. The legal principle of price 
1132 Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 549 f.; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 263 f. 
1133 Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 263 f.; Bup-young Ahn, supra n. 167, at 222 ff.; Kwang-min Seo, 
supra n. 193, at 41; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 279 f. 
1134 See supra pp. 217 ff. 
1135 Cf. See supra pp. 76 f. 
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reduction can be traced back to the actio quanti minoris of Roman law, which was inherited to 
continental laws; 136 the underlying principle of price reduction is said to be that the buyer may 
keep the defective goods tendered by the seller in which case the contract is adapted to the new 
circumstances in a way that the price is reduced as if the subject matter of the goods had from 
the outset been the defective goods actually delivered. 1137 The legal nature of price reduction is 
deemed to be a quasi-restitutionary rather than compensatory, and to be intended to prevent the 
seller receiving full payment where he has not performed in full. 1 3' The further thing to be 
noted is in its nature that unlike damages being subject to negotiation or litigation, it is a non- 
judicial remedy in the sense that the buyer can unilaterally declare a reduction without a prior 
judicial adjudication, providing some immediate relief, although it may force the seller to file 
suit if he does not agree. 139 
English law does not recognise the principle of price reduction for the seller's delivery of 
defective goods, although it may be compared with the SGA s. 53(1)(a) by which the damages 
to which the buyer is entitled by reason of the defect can be deducted from the price. 
4.3.2. Comparative accounts 
4.3.2.1. Korean law 
Unlike other continental laws, Korean law has no particular provision for price reduction as a 
remedy for the seller's delivery of defective goods in quality, although such a remedy is 
stipulated in KCC for the case of shortage in quantity, 114' and in KCmC. ' 14' It is, however, 
1136 For the historical background, see supra pp. 31 f., 39 ff. 
1137 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 437 f.; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 372. 
1138 Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 372. 
1139 Will, id., at 373; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 288, at 196; Bergsten & Miller, "The Remedy of 
Reduction of Price", (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 255, at 265 f.; Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 43; 
Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 798. 
1140 KCC Art. 574. 
"a' KCmC Art. 69(1). 
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generally recognised by scholars and by case law in defective quality, even though there are 
various views as to the means to recognise it. The first view argues that it can be allowed in the 
form of a partial avoidance of the contract on the basis of initial impossibility in part142 which is 
one of theoretical backgrounds of the legal liability theory. 1143 Analogous to full restitution in 
the case of rescission, the proportionate reduction provides a degree of quality-gap 
compensation in order to strike a balance in terms of value for money where there is initial 
impossibility in part which may lead to the contract being partially invalid. "' The second view 
maintains that it is generally included in the buyer's claim for damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability. ' 14' This view does not seem to recognise it as a separate remedy, although it 
is well reflected in the interpretation of damages under the seller's guarantee liability. 146 The 
third view contends that damages under the seller's guarantee liability means nothing but price 
reduction itself. 114' The fourth view insists that Korean law recognises price reduction as 
distinct from damages under the seller's guarantee liability. ' 14' However, this view does not 
seem to clearly provide the means to allow price reduction in the case of qualitative defects 
under the existing KCC. 
The particular importance of price reduction in Korean law is that the buyer is given a right to 
reduce the price regardless of the fault principle once it is found to be an imbalance in terms of 
value for money the buyer paid. The right in principle is merely one to have the price reduced 
in the proportion which the actual value of the goods delivered bears to the value which it 
1 142 See supra pp. 36 f. 
1143 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 231. 
1144 Id. 
1145 Kwang-rnin Seo, supra n. 193, at 38 f.; Bup-young Ahn, supra n. 167, at 219 f.; Hyung-bae Kim, 
supra n. 66, at 224 f.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 341 f., 345 f; Kyu-chang Cho, supra n. 136, at 262 
f. 
1146 According to this view, price reduction is treated as one of reliance losses and claimed in the form of 
a damages claim. 
1147 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 264 f.; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, at 303 f. See also supra p. 
')22 
1148 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 227. 
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would have had if it had not been defective. ' 149 Although it is not clear about the relevant time 
for estimating both values, it seems that insofar as the first view is concerned, it is the time of 
contract due to its theoretical basis. The right could be claimed even after the buyer has paid 
the contractual price. ""' Price reduction is generally compatible with damages for other losses 
under the seller's guarantee liability"" as well as damages under the general liability for the 
losses not covered by the seller's guarantee liability. "" 
4.3.2.2. English law 
Where the seller delivers non-conforming goods in quality, the buyer has a right to claim 
damages for breach of warranty in the cases where he elects or is compelled to affirm the 
contract and retain the goods. '153 The buyer may claim the right to claim damages by way of 
abatement against the price where he has not paid yet. ' 154 Therefore, he may exercise a measure 
of self-help by simply withholding a part or all of the price where the seller sues for the price so 
that he may set up the defects as a defence reducing his liability. The award of damages is 
prima facie assessed according to the difference between the value of the goods at the date of 
delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had at that time if they had conformed with 
the contract. ' Iss His claim for damages may completely extinguish his liability to pay, even if it 
is too late to reject. Where the buyer has suffered further damage, the buyer is not precluded 
from bringing a separate action for damages for the same breach of warranty or a counterclaim 
1149 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 270 f. Cf. the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 22/7/1980,79 Da 
1519; 24/7/1979,78 Ma 248. 
1150 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 167, at 227. 
1151 For the losses covered by the seller's guarantee liability, see supra pp. 218 ff. Note that, from the 
standpoint of the second view, there is no need to discuss the compatibility of price reduction with 
damages. 
1152 For the losses not covered by the seller's guarantee liability, see supra pp. 223 ff. 
1153 The SGA s. 53(1). For the cases of loss of the right of termination, see supra pp. 205 f. 
1154 The SGA s. 53(1)(a). For the leading case before the SGA, see Mondel i'. Steel [1841] 8 M&W 858, 
151 ER 1288. See also Poulton v. Lattimore [1829] 9 B&C 259. 
1155 The SGA s. 53(3). 
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in the seller's action for the price. "" 
One must note that even if the buyer has paid the full price or the seller has recovered the full 
price by an action against him, the buyer is not bound to set up the breach of warranty by way 
of defence when the seller sues for the price; he may subsequently bring an separate action 
against the seller for damages attributable to the breach of warranty. 157 
In the case of the seller's delivery of non-conforming goods in quantity, English law does not 
allow the buyer to reduce the price. However, the SGA s. 30(1) makes clear that if he accepts 
the delivery of a quantity of goods less than he contracted to buy, he must pay for them at the 
contract rate. 
4.3.2.3. The Directive 
Should a consumer not be entitled to have the goods repaired, or to get a replacement, or 
should the seller fail to provide repair or replacement within a reasonable time, or without 
significant inconvenience to the consumer, the consumer may require that the contractual price 
be reduced. "5$ Insofar as the rights awarded by the Directive are exercised without prejudice to 
other rights that the consumer is entitled under domestic rules, the compatibility of price 
reduction with damages may rely on the domestic rules. "" Significance of price reduction 
under the remedial system of the Directive seems that it is the last resort the consumer can rely 
on where he is not entitled to any other remedies in the Directive along with domestic sales laws 
in the event of the seller's delivery of non-conforming goods. The Directive does not give 
guidance as to how price reduction is to be assessed. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it may be 
1156 The SGA s. 53(4). Cf. For unclearness of the meaning of `further damage', see Harris, Guest (ed. ), 
supra n. 515, at para. 17-047. 
1157 The reason for that is that the existence or extent of a defect may not become apparent to the buyer 
until after the buyer has paid the price claimed by the seller. See Harris, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at 
para. 17-047. 
1158 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.5. 
1159 Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 90; 10`h Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 21. See also 
Directive(99/44) Art. 8.1. 
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calculated as is under CISG; the price is reduced proportionally in the same ratio that the value 
of the goods as delivered bears to the value they would have had had they conformed to the 
contract at the time of delivery. "'0 In addition, although it is not clear whether the consumer 
can claim this right after he has paid the price, it seems to be fair to say that he may do so in 
light of comparison with CISG and other jurisdictions, which specify such a right. 
4.3.2.4. CISG 
CISG also entitles the buyer to a certain reduction in price where the goods do not conform to 
the contract in quality, quantity and description or are not contained or packaged in the manner 
required by the contract. 16' The reduction is a proportional reduction of the price calculated by 
the ratio of the value of conforming goods to that of the goods actually delivered at the time of 
delivery. 116' This right could be exercised irrespective of whether the buyer has already paid the 
price. 1163 The buyer is entitled to combine price reduction with a claim for damages so that he 
may base his claim for price reduction on art. 50, and claim damages for additional losses. "" 
The right to price reduction is of importance as an independent right along with the right to 
damages under CISG in that, first, the seller is not exempted from price reduction even if he can 
show non-conformity is due to an impediment within the meaning of art. 79; second, the right to 
price reduction is not affected by the limitations to which a claim for damages is subjected 
under arts. 74-77; third, the amount the buyer may get by proportional price reduction may be 
higher than that by damages where the market price has fallen because damages are in principle 
assessed by the linear calculation method (the actual difference in value between the 
1160 Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
1161 CISG Art. 50. 
1162 Id. Cf. It used to be based on the time of contract in art. 46 ULIS and the preliminary drafts of CISG 
up until art. 46 of the 1978 New York Draft. The prevailing view under BGB §472 stands with this time 
of concluding the contract. See Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 441. 
1163 CISG Art. 50. 
1164 CISG Art. 45(1)(b) and (2). See Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 43, Art. 46, No. 13. 
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conforming and non-conforming goods at the time of delivery); "" fourth, CISG provides no 
time limit for the buyer to exercise price reduction insofar as he gives notice of lack of 
conformity in due course, whereas the right of avoidance or specific performance is subject to 
time limit of `within a reasonable time'. 
"66 
4.3.2.5. Comparative view 
As examined above, price reduction in Korean law, CISG and the Directive is more or less 
similar in that, first, the amount of any price reduction is to be calculated according to the ratio 
that the value of the goods delivered bears to the value they would have had if the goods had 
been non-defective, and second, it may be exercised regardless of whether the buyer has already 
paid, third, it may be combined with damages for additional losses. "" One possible departure 
exists in relation to the relevant time for assessing the value of the goods actually delivered and 
the value of the hypothetical conforming goods; one of the various views in Korean law seems 
to be based on the time of contract, whereas CISG and the Directive on the time of delivery. 
In English law, there is no counterpart of price reduction in a strict sense regarding qualitative 
defect although it may be comparable with s. 53 of the SGA. One must note that s. 53 is not a 
remedy separate from that of damages and it is deemed to be a particular means of exercising 
the right to claim damages. 168 That is, while price reduction in Korean law, CISG and the 
Directive can be claimed regardless of the buyer's entitlement to damages, the abatement rule in 
1165 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 336 ff.; Kritzer, supra n. 725, at 344,377; Huber, id., at 438; Bernstein and 
Lookofsky, id., at 95; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 373. Cf. Treitel, supra n. 421, at 108. 
For the linear calculation method for damage claim where the buyer retains the goods, see Secretariat's 
Commentary, O. R., at 59, Art. 70, No. 6 f.; Knapp, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 546; Huber, 
Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 559; Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 99. 
1166 CISG Arts. 46 and 49. See Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 372; Enderlein and Maskow, 
supra n. 288, at 197. 
1167 However, the Directive is not clear because the issue of compatibility is left to domestic laws. See 
supra n. 1159 and accompanying texts. 
1169 Cf. Robinson v. Hannan [1848) 1 Ex. 850,855; British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912] AC 673.689. 
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s. 53 relies on such entitlement. The further thing to note is that the rule can be exercised only 
where he has not paid the price. In relation to quantitative defect, s. 30(1) of the SGA can be 
comparable as price reduction, but it differs in terms of the method of calculating the reduced 
price because it does not refer to the actual value of the goods, but only the contract rate. ' 169 
4.3.3. Evaluating accounts 
4.3.3.1. Internal evaluation 
As investigated above, each jurisdiction has shown their own particular importance of price 
reduction under their own remedial system both as a separate remedy and a non judicial 
remedy, although English law has no price reduction in a strict sense and has found itself in no 
particular need of price reduction because its damages rules are deemed sufficient to protect the 
breached party regardless of the fault principle. Korean law has also recognised its importance 
because of the historical background of the seller's guarantee liability, having faced endless 
disputes as to the meaning and scope of damages along with no provision for price reduction 
being one of its heritages from Roman law. "'0 As shown above, the attempts to recognise price 
reduction in Korea have been executed in various ways. It could be broadly divided into two 
categories. One is the attempt to recognise it within the provision for damages under the 
seller's guarantee liability; damages are understood either as nothing but price reduction 
1169 Cf. Piliounis, "The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time 
(Nachfrist) under the CISG: Are these worthwhile changes or additions to English Sales Law? ", (1999), 
as reproduced at "http: //www. cisg. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/piliounis. html", at 23 f.; Gärtner, "The Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods Contains Some Well-Known Inconsistencies, but There Is 
Much in It Which Is Worth Preserving and Which Better Accords with Commercial Reality Than the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979", (2000), as reproduced at "http: //www. cisg. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/gartner. html". 
1170 If damages under the seller's guarantee liability are understood like damages in English law which is 
not governed by the fault principle, it seems true that the importance of price reduction may lose its place 
under Korean law because in any event the buyer is empowered a right to claim damages simply by 
proving his loss. One scholar takes this view in Korean law. See supra pp. 
220 f. 
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itself, "" or including price reduction as one of reliance losses. "" The other tries to find it 
somewhere else apart from the provision for damages under the seller's guarantee liability. "73 
Given that Korean law admits the arguments raised above for the purpose of unifying the dual 
liability system that it needs to interpret in a unified way that damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability are as they are under the general liability, ' 174 the former category can be left 
out of our concern. The residual matter is in the question of how price reduction can be allowed 
under the existing law by the latter category. It is carefully submitted that it can be possible by 
way of analogical interpretation of KCC Art. 572 which stipulates price reduction in the cases 
of quantitative defects. 117' However, the best way seems that it needs legislative consideration 
to elucidate price reduction as a separate remedy in KCC Art. 580. 
4.3.3.2. External evaluation 
The uncertainty inherent in the means to derive the right to price reduction under Korean law 
can be an issue for the evaluation in light of efficiency. This evaluation is analogous to the 
point argued above as to its uncertainty of the meaning of damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability176 because the matter of price reduction is closely connected with the interpretation of 
damages as examined before. Since the uncertainty may lead to a market failure, increasing the 
transaction costs by the contractual parties in order to clarify the meaning of damages (either 
price reduction itself"" or including price reduction as one of reliance losses), "" it seems to 
support the argument raised above that Korean law needs to interpret in a unified way that 
1171 See supra n. 1147 and accompanying texts. 
1172 See supra n. 1145-1146 and accompanying texts. 
1173 See supra n. 1142-1144,1148 and accompanying texts. 
1174 See supra n. 359-365,1117-1124 and accompanying texts. 
1175 The view allowing price reduction in the form of a partial avoidance of the contract cannot be 
justified because of unreasonableness of its theoretical background of initial impossibility in part as 
discussed long before. See supra pp. 69 if. 
1176 See supra n. 1134-1135 and accompanying texts. 
1177 See supra n. 1147 and accompanying texts. 
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damages under the seller's guarantee liability are as they are under the general liability and find 
a distinctive price reduction which is free from the provision for damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability. 
Another point in terms of efficiency is in that price reduction along with damages under 
Korean law and CISG may produce an inefficient result in particular where the market has 
fallen by the due delivery date. Suppose that A makes a contract with B for the sale of No. I 
apples at the price of $100, but delivers No. 2 apples. Before the apples are delivered, the 
market price which was $100 for No. 1 and $90 for No. 2 at the time of the contract has fallen 
about 20%; hence $80 for No. I apple and $72 for No. 2 apple. On the basis of non-conforming 
delivery, B claims price reduction which is assessed by the proportional calculation method; B 
recovers $10 ($100 - ($100 x $72 / $80)). It seems certain that this claim may put back on A 
part of the risk of the market decline which was initially allocated to B because B may be 
compensated only $8 by a damages claim ($80 - $72). 1179 Therefore, B's claim for price 
reduction in this case, while throwing back onto A part of his risk, may provide A with an 
incentive to perform when breach appears more efficient because such claim may compensate B 
more than damages which is based on the expectation principle. ' 80 
A further point to be discussed in the light of efficiency is related to the relevant time chosen 
for estimating the value of the goods actually delivered and the value of the hypothetical 
conforming goods. It seems the time of delivery is closer to the parties' intention. "" This is 
because at the time of contract, the buyer contemplates only to obtain the contractual standard 
1178 See supra n. 1145-1146 and accompanying texts. 
1179 Accord; Bridge, supra n. 434, at 101 f. 
1180 lt exceeds about $2 ($10 - $8). Cf. Assume that the price-level rises about 20% in the same case. 
Damages rule may compensate B about $12 ($120 - $108), whereas price reduction about $10 ($100 - 
($100 x $108 / $120)). Consequently, B does not recover the full contractual expectancy by a price 
reduction. However, one must note that, although price reduction may not fully internalise to A all costs 
of the breach to B, those costs can be internalised either by combining price reduction with damages 
subject to no-double recovery principle (see Honnold, supra n. 218, at 338 f.; Nicholas, supra n. 892, at 
226) or by exercising B's option to claim damages instead of price reduction. 
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goods rather than any inferior goods. 182 The value of inferior goods at that time has in fact 
nothing to do with the buyer. It seems that such value is totally irrelevant until after the time of 
delivery when he discovers the lack of conformity because it is only at that moment that the 
buyer decides which remedies to choose, depending upon the marketability and the actual rather 
than the historical value of the non-conforming goods, as compared to the value of the goods 
contracted. 183 Suppose that D agrees to sell No. 1 corn to E, but delivered No. 3 corn. At the 
time of contract, the value of No. 1 was $200 and that of No. 3 was $150. The market price of 
No. I and No-3 corn falls disproportionately; say 20% and 60% respectively. It may produce 
either the reduced price of $150 based on the time of contract' 184 or $75 based on the time of 
delivery. "" In the case of price reduction, it means E holds the corn not only of inferior quality 
but also of even more inferior market value. It seems that it is fair to say D should bear the risk 
of a declining market value, which would have been D's anyway had E chosen not to accept. In 
this light, the time of contract cannot be justified because there seems to be no plausible reason 
why acceptance would result in a change in risk distribution. 1186 
5. Specific performance 
5.1. General 
It is conceivable that another remedy when the seller delivers non-conforming goods is 
specific performance. This means that, in its broadest sense, a process whereby the aggrieved 
buyer obtains as nearly as possible what was agreed in the contract, as opposed to reparation in 
1181 O. R., at 358; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 370 f. 
1182 "Will, id. 
1183 Id. 
1184 $150 = $150 (Value of non-conforming goods) x $200 (Contract price) / 
$200 (Value of conforming 
goods). 
1185 $75 = $60 (Value of non-conforming goods) x $200 (Contract price) 
! 160 (Value of conforming 
goods). 
1186 Will, id. 
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money for the failure to obtain it. "87 The remedy has several advantages. First, as defined 
above, it enables the aggrieved buyer to obtain as far as possible what was agreed by the 
parties. "" Second, it may avoid difficulties in estimating the amount of damages. 189 Third, it 
may emphasise the importance of contractual obligations. "' In light of these advantages, each 
jurisdiction has developed the remedy of specific performance, 19' although it may be very 
different in its nature. ' 192 
This section basically aims to examine the meaning and importance of specific performance in 
each jurisdiction, to ask the question whether specific performance is treated as a right of the 
buyer available in the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods, and to consider what 
requirements must be satisfied for the remedy of specific performance. 
5.2. Comparative accounts 
5.2.1. Korean law 
The terms which describe specific performance in Korean law are not restricted to the cases 
where the court orders the defaulting party personally to perform the contract, but may include 
any process by which the aggrieved party receives the substance of what he bargains for. 
Therefore, in Korean law, an order of specific performance includes, first, that it coerces the 
1187 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 43. 
' 188 Lando and Beale (ed. ), supra n. 509, at 395. 
1189 Id. 
1190 Id. 
1191 KCC Arts. 389,581(2); the SGA s. 52(1); Directive(99/44) Art. 3.3.; CISG Art. 46. Cf. For the 
comparison in general between Civil law and Common law, see Treitel, supra n. 421, at 43 ff. 
1192 Cf. For the difference in the use of terminology of specific performance, see Treitel, supra n. 421, at 
45 f.; Dawson, "Specific performance in France and Germany", (1959) 57 Mich. L. R. 495; Szladits, "The 
Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law", (1955) 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 208; Romero, "Specific 
Performance of Contracts in Comparative Law: Some Preliminary Observations", (1986) 27 C. de D. 
785; Zamir, "Toward a General Concept of Conformity in the Performance of Contracts, (1991) 52 La. L. 
Rev. 1. 
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defaulting party to perform himself his obligations, "" second, that it entitles the creditor to the 
right to receive performance at the expense of the debtor, the execution of which may be 
performed by the creditor himself or by a third party, 194 and third, that it is indirectly coerced 
by means of the court order, either appointing a reasonable term for performance by the 
defaulting party and directing the payment of a fixed amount of damages in proportion to the 
delay if he fails to perform within such term, or directing immediate payment of damages. ' 195 
The mechanisms of enforcing a judgment for performance in Korean law depend upon the 
nature of the obligation upon which the judgment is based; it is a traditional analysis to draw a 
basic distinction between "obligation to give" and "obligation to do". "96 Based on this 
distinction, one must note that specific performance in the sales contract implies in principle 
only the first category because it is a typical case of the obligation to give, which is of relevance 
to our issue of the sale of goods. "9' 
Specific performance under the seller's guarantee liability is recognised as a right available in 
the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods. "98 It is in principle no different from the 
1193 KCC Art. 389(1). 
1194 KCC Art. 389(2). 
1195 The Korean Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter KCCP) Art. 693. The payment provided in this 
provision is construed as damages rather than fine in that it goes to the creditor. See Yun-jik Kwak, 
supra n. 62, at 192 f. Cf. KCC or KCCP does not adopt means of imprisonment for the enforcement of 
contract, which are employed in German law (CC Proc. Art. 888). The basic reason for that seems to 
protect the liberty of the defaulting party as a citizen. See Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 192 f. Cf. For 
the position in French law along with the concept of astreinte in general, see Treitel, supra n. 421, at 59 
ff. 
1196 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 62, at 190 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 141 ff.; Fun-young Lee, supra 
n. 68, at 582 ff. 
1197 A judgment of specific performance as to the obligation to give is enforced by the marshal taking the 
goods away from the defaulting party and handing them over to the aggrieved party. 
KCCP Art. 689. 
The second and third category applies to the obligation to do. The difference 
between them is that the 
second method is only available when the personal participation of the 
debtor is not necessary for the 
performance of the obligation, whereas the third method is executed only where such participation of the 
debtor is crucial for the performance of the obligation. 
1198 KCC Arts. 389,581(2). 
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right of rescission or damages. Accordingly, if the buyer applies for a judgment for 
performance, the court is bound to grant him a judgment forcing the seller to perform what the 
seller has undertaken under the contract as long as all the relevant requirements are satisfied. 
Where the seller delivers goods which are defective in quality, it is conceivable that there are 
two particular aspects of the general right to require performance; replacement and repair. As 
regards the former, it is generally agreed that, as KCC provides, the buyer is entitled to demand 
delivery of other non-defective goods in lieu of the right to damages or the right of rescission in 
the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods. 1199 This right is only applied to the sale of 
generic goods because in the sale of specific goods, the seller's duty is from the outset restricted 
to those goods so that there is no room to acquire any other goods if the specific goods delivered 
are themselves defective. 12oo It is worth noting that the wording of art. 581 °2©' seems to suggest 
that the right to require substitute goods can be exercised regardless of the seriousness of a 
defect (i. e., regardless of whether it is possible to achieve the object of the contract despite the 
existence of a defect), as long as the existence of any defect is proved. 1202 In relation to the right 
to require repair, it is not entirely clear whether the buyer is invested with such right in the event 
of the seller's delivery of defective goods because, unlike the right to require replacement, there 
is no specific provision in KCC. '2'°3 According to the legal liability theory, the right to require 
repair is not admitted in the case of both generic and specific goods on the basis of its 
theoretical background of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma and its 
corresponding application to generic goods when they become ascertained (e. g., by 
1199 KCC Art. 581(2). 
1200 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 800; KCC Art. 581(1). 
1201 Article 581 (Sale in Kind and the Seller's Liability for Warranty) (1) Even where the subject-matter 
of a sale has been specified in kind, if there exist any defects in the specified subject-matter, the 
provisions of the preceding Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. (2) In the cases of the preceding 
Paragraph, the buyer may demand the non-defective item without rescinding a contract or claiming for 
damages. 
1202 Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 275 f.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 
801. 
1203 Cf the Korean Supreme Court Case, 13/7/1993,93 Da 4783. 
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delivery). 1204 On the other hand, some of the contractual liability theorists argue that insofar as 
the defect is capable of being remedied by repair, the buyer may require the seller to repair it, 
whether the goods were specific from the outset or originally generic. l"os 
As to the right to damages combined with the right to require performance, although the 
wording of art. 581(2) appears that the former cannot be combined with the latter, it is generally 
understood that the buyer can claim damages for delay or for breach of subsidiary duties where 
the right to require performance will not fully compensate him; e. g. where he has suffered lost 
gains as well as deprivation of the actual subject-matter of the contract. 1211' However, one must 
note that insofar as the damages constitute of part of the expectation interests or are 
consequential losses, the loss may not be within the scope of damages under the seller's 
guarantee liability, but may be recovered under the general liability governed by the fault 
principle. 1207 
With regard to the right to require performance in the event of shortage in quantity, it seems 
clear that that right is not dealt with under the seller's guarantee liability because, as stated long 
before, the matter of the shortage in quantity under the seller's guarantee liability is of relevance 
only to the cases of initial impossibility (i. e., specific goods), which may not raise the buyer's 
right to require performance. 120' However, in the cases of generic goods, there is no doubt that 
1204 For the background, see supra pp. 33 f. 
1205 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 801; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 269 f., 275 f. (the view 
restricting the right to require repair only in the cases where the object of the contract can be achieved 
despite the existence of a defect); Dong-seok Kim, supra n. 832, at 62 f.; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 167, 
at 304 f. Contra; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 341; Sang-yong Kim, supra n. 392, at 240; Choon-soo 
Ahn, supra n. 148, at 434. 
1206 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 800 f.; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 206, at 271 f., 287. 
1207 See supra pp. 217 ff. However, it could be within the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee 
liability, if one follows some of the contractual liability theorists; `A' (Expectation interests + 
Consequential loss) or `B' theory (Reliance interests + Expectation interests). See supra pp. 220 ff. If 
one stands with some of the legal liability theorists (the non-concurrence theory), the buyer may never be 
compensated for such damages, in particular, expectation interests. See supra n. 1047-1051 and 
accompanying texts. 
1208 KCC Art. 574. See also supra n. 397-398 and accompanying texts. 
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the buyer may be also entitled to require performance as to the quantitative shortage part under 
the general liability. 1209 
5.2.2. English law 
The notion of specific performance in English law is restricted to the cases where the court 
addresses the order to the defaulting party to do specifically what he has promised. i2" Thus, the 
order forces the defendant to perform himself the obligation. 121' Not performing the order of the 
court is a contempt of court and it may be sanctioned by fines or imprisonment. "" 
Under English law, granting specific performance is a remedy which is not treated as a right of 
the buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's breach, but as an equitable remedy whose exercise is 
left to the discretion of the court. 1 " In general, English courts are very reluctant to decree 
specific performance of contracts for the sale of goods and such performance is granted in very 
limited circumstances. This position is reflected in statutory form in the SGA, which empowers 
the making of an order of specific performance on the fulfilment of two requirements; first, the 
goods to be delivered by the defaulting seller are "specific or ascertained", and second, the court 
must "think fit" the grant of an order for specific performance. 1214 
S. 52(1) clearly limits an order of specific performance to those circumstances involving 
1209 KCC Art. 389(1). Cf. Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 327. 
'21° Treitel, supra n. 421, at 46. 
1211 Id 
1212 Id. 
1213 Lamare v. Dixon [1873] LR 6 HL 414,423, per Lord Chelmsford; Stewart v. Kennedy [1890] 15 
App Cas 75,102, per Lord Watson. Cf. Treitel, "Specific Performance in the Sale of Goods", (1966) 
J. B. L. 211; Jones and Goodhart, Specific Performance, (1996), at 143 ff.; Sharpe, Injunctions & Specific 
Performance, (1983), at 8-230 ff.; Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies, (1984), at 52 ff.; Burrows, 
"Specific Performance at Cross-roads", (1984) 4 Leg. Stud. 102. For a good description of English law 
approach to specific performance and contractual remedies in general, see Co-operative Insurance 
Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [ 1998] AC 1,9 ff., per Lord Hoffmann. 
1214 The SGA s. 52(1). However, it is submitted that the statutory formula is much wider than the 
practice because the fact that the court is statutorily reminded that it has a discretion has not had an effect 
of the more liberal grant of specific performance in practice. See Bridge, supra n. 784, at 531 f. 
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"specific" or "ascertained" goods; "specific goods" are defined as "identified and agreed on at 
the time a contract of sale is made and includes an undivided share as a fraction or percentage, 
of goods identified and agreed on as aforesaid", 1215 and "ascertained goods" mean "identified in 
accordance with the agreement after the time a contract of sale is made". "" Notwithstanding 
its clear limitation to "specific" or "ascertained" goods, the position in relation to unascertained 
goods is not so clear as it seems in its face. Some view the SGA as a codification of the 
common law (and equity) regarding sales law, meaning that the SGA is designed to provide a 
comprehensive code and concurrently the limitation to "specific" or "ascertained" goods is 
intended that the remedy cannot be granted for unascertained goods. 121' On the other hand, 
others argue that the SGA operates in addition to any other remedies available at the common 
law or equity because, first, s. 52(1) does not in terms state that specific performance can be 
ordered only where the goods are "specific or ascertained", second, the idea that the SGA is a 
comprehensive code is arguable. "" This view is supported by a case where the judge granted 
an interim injunction (which was treated as in effect specific performance) to stop an oil 
company from cutting off supplies of petrol (i. e. unascertained goods) to a garage since the 
garage was unable to locate an alternative supply of petrol due to an interruption of supply as a 
result of the Yom Kippur war. 12'9 However, it is submitted that the case is hard to reconcile 
1215 The SGA s. 61(1); Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. v. Dominion Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. [1909] AC 293,311. 
1216 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606,630, per Atkin L. J. C£ Thames Sack and Bag Co. Ltd. v. Knowles & Co. 
Ltd. [1918] 88 LJKB 585,588, per Sankey J. ("ascertained" means that "the individuality of the goods 
must in some way be found out, and when it is, then the goods have been ascertained"). 
1217 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606,635, per Atkin L. J. ("The sum total of legal relations arising out of the 
contract for the sale of goods may well be regarded as defined by the Code. ") In this case, the majority 
refused to order specific performance for what it considered to be unascertained goods. 
1218 Treitel, supra n. 951, at 954; Treitel, supra n. 1213, at 223 f. See also 
Bridge, supra n. 784, at 532; 
Jones and Goodhart, supra n. 1213, at 146 f. 
1219 Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. V. I. P. Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 1 WLR 576. Cf. Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd. v. 
Thompson Garage (Biggin Hill) Ltd. [1972] 1 QB 318,324; Redler Grain Silos Ltd. v. B. 1. C. C. Ltd. 
[1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 435. 
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with the language of s. 52(l) and with both earlier1220 and subsequent cases. 1211 In addition, the 
case is weakened by the fact that the court failed to discuss whether in fact it had the power to 
grant such a remedy under those circumstances and also failed to discuss how the remedy fit 
into s. 52 or Re Wait. 1222 Therefore, it is difficult to say that the scope of when a court might 
have discretion to grant specific performance extends to unascertained goods. 1221 
Having said that, one must note that the mere fact that specific goods or ascertained goods are 
involved does not necessarily mean that the court will exercise its discretion and order specific 
performance because, as stated in s. 52(l), the court is given a broad power to grant an order of 
specific performance only `where it thinks fit'. The foremost consideration of the court in 
granting specific performance is that the remedy will be granted only where the normal 
common law remedy of damages is inadequate. 1224 Although there is no clear rule as to the test 
of adequacy of damages, specific performance may be granted in general based on inadequacy 
of damages where damages fail to afford a complete remedy to the buyer, 1221 where it is hard to 
assess and recover damages1221 or where the buyer cannot get a satisfactory equivalent of what 
1220 E. g., Re Wait [ 1927] 1 Ch 606. 
1221 Re London Wine (Shippers) Co. Ltd. [1986] PCC 121,149 (Oliver J. was inclined to think that the 
case was not strictly a contract of sale of goods, but a long-term supply contract); Societe des Industries 
Metallurgiques SA v. The Bronx Engineering Co Ltd. [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 465. 
1222 [192711 Ch. 606. 
1223 Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 508 f. 
1224 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [ 1998] AC 1,11. Cf. Beswick v. 
Beswick [1968] AC 58,88,90 f., 102 (this case envisaged a wider role of specific performance, based on 
the appropriateness of the remedy in the circumstances of the case rather than as a supplementary remedy 
in a hierarchical system of remedies. It suggested that the question is not whether damages are an 
"adequate" remedy, but whether specific performance will "do more perfect and complete justice than an 
award of damages"). For the more expansive view, see also Tito v. Waddel (No. 2) [1977] Ch 106,322; 
Rainbow Estates Ltd. v. Tokenhold [1998] 2 All ER 860,868; Evans Marshall and Co. Ltd. v. Bertola S. 
A. [1973] 1 WLR 349,379; Treitel, supra n. 951, at 954 f.; McKendrick, supra n. 952, at 442 f. 
1225 Wilson v. Northampton & Banbury Junction Raiht'av Co. [1874] 9 Ch App 279,284, per Lord 
Selborne. Cf. Macdonald, "The Inadequacy of Adequacy: The Granting of Specific Performance", 
(1987) 38 N. Irel. Leg. Q. 244. 
1226 Hart v. Herwig [ 1873] 8 Ch App 860,866, per Mellish LJ; Fells v. Read [ 1796] 3 Ves 70,71, per 
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he contracted for from some other source. 1227 
In Behnke v. Bede Steam Shipping Co. Ltd., 1228 specific performance was granted because the 
ship in question was of peculiar and practically unique value to the buyer so that damages 
would not be an adequate remedy. 122' However, it does not follow that the buyer of a ship will 
be invariably granted specific performance. In CN Marine Inc. v. Stena Line A/B, 1 Z3° the court 
reversed the trial judge's discretion in favour of specific performance, even though the ship had 
highly individual characteristics . 
1231 The court's reluctance to grant specific performance can be 
also shown in Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA v. The Bronx Engineering Co Ltd. 1232 In 
this case, the seller had wrongfully repudiated a contract to deliver a complex machine to be 
manufactured by him which was over 220 tons in weight and costs around £270,000 and it was 
shown that the buyer would have to wait a further nine to twelve months for a substitute 
machine to be supplied by another seller. Despite the considerable delay to get a substitute, the 
court did not decree specific performance on the basis that goods were of a type obtainable on 
the market in the ordinary course of business and the additional loss suffered by the buyer as the 
result of the delay would be covered by an increased award of damages. 1233 
In addition to the adequacy of damages, the court is entitled to look at all the circumstances of 
the cases including the conduct of the parties1234 and to consider the hardship which an order 
Lord Loughborough LC. 
1227 Adderley v. Dixon [1824] 1 Sim & St 607,610; Buxton v. Lister [1746] 3 Atk 383; Cohen v. Roche 
[1927] 1 KB 169; Phillips v. Lamdin [1949] 2 KB 33; Behnke v. Bede Steam Shipping Co. Ltd. [1927] 1 
KB 649. 
1228 [192711 KB 649. 
1229 Id., at 661 
1230 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336. 
1231 For another example showing the court's reluctance to grant specific performance even where there 
is no close equivalent available, Cohen v. Roche [1927] 1 KB 169 (the court refused specific performance 
to the buyer of a set of Hepplewhite chairs, saying that they were "ordinary articles of commerce and of 
no special value or interest. "). 
1232 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 465. 
1233 Id., at 468 f. 
1234 The relevant factors are, for instance, whether there had been any default by the buyer, whether he 
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would inflict on the seller. 
1211 
Damages may be awarded in addition to specific performance. 
1236 Therefore, the buyer may be 
entitled to get specific performance plus damages, e. g., for delay in completion. "" 
5.2.3. The Directive 
Although the concept of specific performance is not used in the Directive, it recognises the 
concept by providing two forms of the buyer's right to require performance; repair and 
replacement. 1238 The Directive does not specify what mechanism courts shall employ to require 
the performance of the contract. All such matters seem to be left to the general procedure of 
domestic laws. This was shown earlier in their evidence to the Select Committee that 
representative of the Commission indicated that it is not intended to alter national judicial 
procedures and practice. 
"" 
Under its unique two-tier remedial scheme of the Directive, the buyer's right to require either 
repair or replacement takes the position of primary remedy in a sense that the other remedies 
(rescission and price reduction) are available only where the primary remedy cannot be 
invoked. '240 This remedy is treated as a right available in the event of the seller's delivery of 
non-conforming goods, as stipulated under the heading of "Rights of the consumer" in art. 3. 
had delayed unreasonably in seeking the remedy, whether there had been misrepresentation by the buyer, 
or whether the seller had made the contract as the result of a mistake. See Treitel, supra n. 951, at 957; 
Harris, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 17-093; Snell & Turner, Snell's Equity, (1990), at 602,608 ff. 
1235 Tamplin v. James [ 1880] 15 ChD 215,221; Stewart v. Kennedy [ 1890] 15 App Cas 75,105; Patel v. 
Ali [ 1984] Ch 283 (but these cases are not related to the sale of goods). See Treitel, supra n. 951, at 955 
f.; Harris, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 17-093; Snell & Turner, supra n. 1234, at 612. 
1236 Chancery Amendment Act 1858 s. 2 (known as Lord Cairns' Act); The Supreme Court Act 1981 s. 
50; Treitel, supra n. 951, at 974 ff.; McDermott, Equitable Damages, (1994), at 169 ff.; Jones and 
Goodhart, supra n. 1213, at 285 f. 
1237 Ford-Hunt v. Raghbir Singh [1973] 1 WLR 738; Easton v. Brown [1981] 3 All ER 278. 
1238 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.3. 
1239 10th Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 18,32,54; Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 33 
f. 
1240 Directive(99/44) Arts. 3.3. and 3.5. 
261 
Insofar as all the relevant requirements are satisfied, therefore, it appears that the court would in 
principle be obliged to order specific performance upon the consumer's application for such 
performance. However, one must note that, although the position is not so clear due to the 
absence of express provision in the Directive, it seems that the Directive as being a minimal 
harmonisation measure would not require the national court to grant specific performance. 1241 
As indicated by representative of the Commission in their evidence to the Select Committee, the 
Directive is not intended to alter national judicial procedures and practice. '242 
The consumer's right to demand repair or replacement is not available where neither is 
possible or it would be disproportionate to do either. 1243 The limitation based on impossibility 
and disproportionality should be separately applied to repair and replacement. 1244 Therefore, the 
consumer's secondary remedies (rescission or price reduction) cannot be pursued as long as one 
of the primary remedies (repair or replacement), at least, is still possible and proportionate. 1245 
It is suggested that it will be impossible to replace goods that are unique or of specific nature, 
e. g., second-hand goods, 1246 whilst a repair will usually be impossible if the goods have been 
misdescribed, e. g., a clocked car cannot be put right. "" It is disproportionate where the chosen 
remedy imposes on the seller costs which, in comparison with the alternative remedy, are 
1241 10`h Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 18,32,54; Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 33 
f. 
1242 It is submitted that the present English law where repair or replacement costs can be recovered as 
damages would comply with the Directive, which is not dissimilar to some continental laws enforcing 
specific performance by allowing the buyer to have repair or replacement done at the seller's expense 
(e. g., French law (Code Civil Art. 1144); Tallon, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), Contract Law Today, (1989), at 
266 ff. ). See Beale and Howells, supra n. 257, at 33. That is, it seems that English law would maintain 
its present regime in relation to specific performance, insofar as the requirement of the Directive as a 
minimal harmonisation measure would be complied with. Cf. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
1243 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.3. 
1244 Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, supra n. 425. 
1245 Id. 
1246 Recital 16. 
1247 Williams & Hamilton, supra n. 876, at 33. 
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unreasonable. 12A8 In assessing disproportionality, the following factors should be taken into 
account; the value of the goods without the lack of conformity, the significance of the lack of 
conformity, and whether the alternative remedy could be completed without significant 
inconvenience to the consumer. 124' The test of reasonableness is in the question of whether the 
12so costs of one remedy are significantly higher than the costs of the other. 
The matter of compatibility of damages with the right to demand repair or replacement and 
that of specific performance in the case of shortage in quantity are left to national law because 
the Directive deals with neither damages nor shortage in quantity. 125' 
5.2.4. CISG 
The term specific performance is used in art. 28 and it refers to orders of performance 
addressed to the seller in the event of his non-conforming delivery. However, CISG does not 
provide the mechanisms to be employed by the courts in order to require the seller to perform 
what was agreed in the contract. 1252 This matter is necessarily left to the general procedure of 
the forum. 1151 
Specific performance under CISG is deemed to be a right in the event of a breach of contract. 
It is intended to act as direction to a court, upon the buyer's application for specific 
performance, to order such performance and enforce the order against the seller by the means 
available to it under its procedural law where the requisite requirements are fulfilled. '254 
However, the court is not bound to grant the order for specific performance unless it would do 
1248 Directive(99/44) Art. 3.3. 
1249 Id. 
1250 Recital 11. 
1251 Green Paper, supra n. 277, at 90; 100° Report by Select Committee, supra n. 277, at 21. See also 
Directive(99/44) Art. 8.1. 
1252 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 219. 
1253 1d 
1254 Secretariat's Commentary, O. R., at 38, Art. 42, No. 8. 
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so in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by CISG. 'Z55 Therefore, where the 
forum's rules on specific performance in domestic sales contracts are more restricted than those 
in CISG, the forum is permitted to apply its restrictive domestic law to transactions governed by 
CISG. The same is also arguably true in the cases where the buyer claims to require substitute 
goods or repair, which is largely unknown to common law countries, insofar as those claims are 
deemed to be a species of the more general right to demand performance as agreed. 1216 
Where the seller delivers non-conforming goods in quality, CISG provides two rights to 
require performance; the right to require substitute goods1257 and the right to require repair. "" 
Regarding the former, it is limited only to the cases of a fundamental breach, 1259 i. e. the buyer 
must have suffered a detriment which substantially deprives him of what he is entitled to expect 
under the contract. 126o The decisive criterion is whether, despite the defect, it is reasonable to 
expect the buyer permanently to accept the goods and to content himself with damages for loss 
of value or with price reduction as compensation for the difference in value. 1261 In addition it 
must be also taken account of the possibility of remedying the lack of conformity by repair 
within a reasonable time after the date of delivery. '262 In addition, the buyer may require 
1255 CISG Art. 28. This limitation was the result of a compromise between civil law countries and 
common law countries. Cf. Bergsten, "The Law of Sales in Comparative Law", in: Les Ventes 
Internationales de Marchandises, (1981), at 11 ff. For the criticism of the compromise, see Will, 
BiancalBonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 333 f.; Walt, "For Specific Performance Under the United Nations 
Sales Convention", (1991) 26 Tex. Int'l L. J. 211, at 218 ff.; Kastely, "The Right to Require Performance 
in International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention", (1988) 63 
Washington Law Review 607, at 624 ff.; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-9. 
1256 Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 85 ff.; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 202 f.; 
Treitel, supra n. 421, at 44 f.; Ziegel, supra n. 748, at 105; Walt, supra n. 1255, at 217; Schlechtriem, 
supra n. 307, at 63,76. Contra; Kastely, supra n. 1255, at 635 ff.; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 310 f. 
1257 CISG Art. 46(2). 
1258 CISG Art. 46(3). 
1259 CISG Art. 46(2). 
1260 CISG Art. 25. 
1261 Huber, Schlechtriern (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 384 ff. Cf. Supra n. 879-889 and accompanying texts. 
1262 Huber, id. Cf. However, one must note that the possibility of cure is arguable as a factor to decide 
fundamental breach (see supra n. 890-899 and accompanying texts for the relationship between 
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delivery of substitute goods only if he makes his request either in conjunction with timely notice 
of defects given under art. 39 or, at the latest, within a reasonable time thereafter. 1263 Moreover, 
it is required that he must be prepared to return the goods already received. 1264 
The right to require repair is not dependent upon the fundamentality of breach, but restricted to 
the cases where it is reasonable to require repair by the seller, having regard to all the 
circumstances. 1265 It is submitted that a repair will be unreasonable if the cost to the seller is 
unreasonably high; '266 e. g. where the cost of repair is disproportionately higher than the cost of 
acquiring a substitute, where the cost of repair bears no reasonable relationship to the advantage 
that the buyer will derive from such repair, or where some minor repairs can be made more 
readily by the buyer. 1267 The right to claim repair, like the right to require substitute goods, 
must be exercised within a reasonable time after notice of defects has been given, so that the 
seller is not left in doubt as to the buyer's intentions. 1268 Further thing to be noted is that, 
although neither art. 46(2) or (3) refer to inconsistent remedies, it appears that the exercise of an 
inconsistent remedy undoubtedly precludes the buyer from later demanding repair or 
replacement. 1169 
fundamental breach and the seller's right to cure). 
1263 CISG Art. 46(2). 
1264 CISG Art. 82(1). 
1265 CISG Art. 46(3). 
1266 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 391 f.; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 338 f.; 
Schlechtriem, supra n. 307, at 76; Fitzgerald, "CISG, Specific Performance, and the Civil Law of 
Louisiana and Quebec", (1997) 16 J. L. &Com. 291, at 293; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 309 f.; Kastely, 
supra n. 1255, at 618 f. 
1 267 Huber, id. 
1268 CISG Art. 46(3). 
1269 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 306 f.; Will, Bianca/Bonell (ed. ), supra n. 221, at 338; Fitzgerald, supra n. 
1266, at 293. Inconsistency may arise where the buyer avoids the contract so that he can no longer 
demand performance because of one of consequences of avoidance releasing the seller from his 
contractual obligations and where the buyer claims the reduction of price and damages for non-delivery 
(based on the difference between the contract and the market price) because these remedies and specific 
performance compensate for the same thing and it is unreasonable that the buyer receives compensation 
twice. See Treitel, supra n. 421, at 50 f.; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 378; Catalano, 
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Although there is no particular provision in art. 46, the right to require substitute goods or 
repair should be interpreted in light of the principle of good faith. 1270 Therefore, the requirement 
of good faith may effectively prevent the buyer from speculating at the seller's expense and 
from punishing the seller by requiring performance when it would be onerous to do so. 1271 
As regards the matter of shortage in quantity, the buyer is also entitled to require the seller to 
deliver the missing part pursuant to art. 46(1) rather than art. 46(2) or (3). The reason for that is 
that in respect of that missing part, it is deemed that there is a simple failure to perform within 
the meaning of art. 46(1), not a lack of conformity under art. 46(2) or (3). 1272 The consequence 
is that his right to require performance is not subject to the conditions stipulated in art. 46(2) or 
(3); fundamental nature of the shortage, request within a reasonable time. 'Z'3 
If the buyer requires performance of the contract under art. 46, it is permitted that the buyer 
can also claim damages for any loss that cannot be remedied by means of delivery of substitute 
goods or repair (e. g., losses caused by delay or ancillary losses). "" However, it cannot be 
"More Fiction than Fact: The Perceived Differences in the Application of Specific Performance under the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", (1997) 71 Tulane L. Rev. 
1807, at 1810. 
1270 CISG Art. 7; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 309 f.; Kastely, supra n. 1255, at 619 f.; Huber, Schlechtriem 
(ed. ), supra n. 218, at 381; Fitzgerald, supra n. 1266, at 293 f.; Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, at 
84; Cf. Some argue that it must be also restricted in light of the duty to mitigate damages performance 
(CISG Art. 77) and the duty to preserve and dispose of the goods (CISG Arts. 85,86,88(2)); e. g., where 
he would be demanded to resell the goods to prevent rapid deterioration. See Secretariat's Commentary, 
O. R., at 39, Art. 42, No. 14; Honnold, supra n. 218, at 309 f.; Flechtner, supra n. 888, at 60 f.; Bridge, 
supra n. 434, at 100, n. 192; Fitzgerald, supra n. 1266, at 293 f.; Bernstein and Lookofsky, supra n. 563, 
at 84; Treitel, supra n. 421, at 73 f. Contra; Kastely, supra n. 1255, at 621 ff.; Farnsworth, supra n. 1087, 
at 249 ff.; Hellner, "The UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods - an Outsider's View", in: 
Jayme (ed. ), Jus internnationes, Festschrift für Stefan Riesenfeld, (1983), at 98 f.; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 
9-41 f). Cf. Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 378 f. (limits to the right to require performance 
based on exemption under art. 79). 
1271 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 309 f. See also Kastely, supra n. 1255, at 619 f.; Huber, Schlechtriem 
(ed. ), supra n. 218, at 381. 
1272 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 382 f. 
1273 Id. 
1274 CISG Art. 45(2). 
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compatible with damages calculated on the assumption of non-delivery (based on the difference 
between the contract and the market price). 1275 
5.2.5. Comparative view 
As to the concept of specific performance used in English law and Korean law and its 
mechanisms to be employed by the courts to require the performance of the contract, it seems 
similar to both English and Korean law as they are based on the direct enforcement of the 
seller's personal performance, insofar as it is related to the "obligation to give". 1276 However, 
one must note that the position in Korean law may be different in the case of the buyer's right to 
require repair. Although the position in Korean law is not entirely clear, given that Korean law 
allows the right to require repair, an order of specific performance may include the buyer's right 
to repair non-conformity by himself or by a third party at the expense of the seller because the 
seller's duty to repair seems to fall within the category of "obligation to do". 1277 
The importance of the role given to specific performance constitutes a major difference in the 
above four laws examined. In English law, specific performance is a secondary remedy, which 
means that a court may grant specific performance only when the grant of the primary remedy 
of damages is inadequate. 1278 The court has also a discretionary power in granting specific 
performance. It is not a right of the buyer which he can claim in all cases but an equitable 
remedy whose exercise is left to the court to decide whether to grant it or not. The situation is 
entirely different in CISG, Korean and the Directive1279 where contrary to English law, specific 
1275 See supra n. 1269. 
1276 The position in the Directive and CISG is, as examined above, left to the applicable domestic law. 
1'" See supra n. 1196-1197 and accompanying texts. Where the personal participation of the seller is 
crucial for the repair, it is conceivable that it may also include the indirect enforcement of performance by 
means of the court order, either appointing a reasonable period for performance by the defaulting party 
and directing the payment of a fixed amount of damages in proportion to the delay if he fails to perform 
within such term, or directing immediate payment of damages. 
1278 Treitel, supra n. 421, at 44,75. 
1279 As to the matter of the primacy of specific performance, it seems that there is no doubt in that it is a 
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performance is available as a right of the buyer. 128° Thus, upon the buyer's application for 
specific performance, the court has to grant it unless the circumstances give rise to certain 
exceptions that do not fulfil any requirement in question for the exercise of specific 
performance128' because unlike English law, the court does not have a discretionary power over 
granting specific performance. "82 In addition, the buyer under English law may be limited to 
the requirement that the goods be specific, ascertained or otherwise identified under the 
contract, ' 283 whereas the same is not true under Korean law, the Directive and CISG. Likewise, 
unlike English law, the buyer in Korean law, the Directive and CISG is not required to show the 
court that damages are an inadequate remedy. 
In comparing Korean law with the two other systems that provide specific performance as a 
right of the buyer, it seems that Korean law has close similarities to them in that it has two 
forms of specific performance in the event of the seller's delivery of defective goods in quality; 
repair and replacement. In addition, it is similar that his right to claim damages can be 
compatible with specific performance, 1214 although on some views of Korean law this may not 
be within the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability. 1285 
primary remedy over rescission and price reduction in the Directive. See supra n. 1240 and 
accompanying texts. The position in Korean law and CISG seems that the buyer may choose between 
damages and specific performance. See KCC Art. 581(2) (it entitles the buyer to choose which of the 
three remedies; rescission, damages and delivery of substitute goods); Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 
343 f.; Dae-jeong Kim, supra n. 595, at 302 f.; Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 229 f.; Treitel, supra n. 
421, at 75. Contra; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 376. 
1280 But the position in CISG is subject to art. 28 which gives the national court a discretion to depart 
from CISG rules if they do not order specific performance under their national law in similar contracts of 
sale not governed by CISG, and similarly that in the Directive also seems to depend upon the discretion 
of the Member States' court (see supra n. 1241-1242 and accompanying texts). 
1281 For the requirements, see supra n. 1200-1202(Korean law), 1243-1250(the Directive), 1259- 
127 1 (CISG) and accompanying texts. 
1282 Again the position in CISG and the Directive is subject to the conditions stated in supra n. 1280. 
1283 The SGA s. 52(1). 
1284 Cf. The position in English law is also same. See supra n. 1236-1237 and accompanying texts. 
1285 See supra n. 1207 and accompanying texts. It is conceivable that if one stands with one of the legal 
liability theorists (the non-concurrence theory), no part of expectation interests may be compensated; e. g., 
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Despite the similarities, the requirements for specific performance seem to show some 
divergences. The right to require specific performance in the Directive is subject to the test of 
impossibility and disproportionality of, as the case may be, either repair or replacement. In 
regard to the test of impossibility, although Korean law and CISG do not specifically provide 
such a test, it is self-evident because if performance is impossible, the right to require 
performance is devoid of purpose. 1286 As to the test of disproportionality, despite some 
difference in structure and language used for the test, a close examination of the factors for such 
test in the Directive'287 seems to reveal much in common with those under CISG for the test of 
fundamental breach for the right to require substitute goodsr288 and reasonableness for the right 
to demand repair1289 along with the imperative requirement of the good faith on the part of the 
buyer who claims specific performance. 129° However, the position in Korean law differs from 
the Directive and CISG in that the buyer is in principle entitled to the right to demand substitute 
goods whether or not, despite the existence of a defect, the buyer is able to achieve the object of 
the contract intended at the time of contract. 1291 In addition, assuming that the right to demand 
repair is admitted under Korean law, it is not clear whether such right can be pursued even 
where the costs of repairing the goods to the seller are unreasonably high. Another difference 
as to the requirements to specific performance is that while the buyer's right to coerce repair or 
replacement under CISG is subject to the further requirement of the notice of his claim at the 
latest within a reasonable time after giving notice of defects under art. 39, '292 the same is not 
true under Korean law and the Directive. 
damages for delay in completion. See supra n. 1047-1051 and accompanying texts. 
1286 Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 380; KCC Art. 389(1). 
1287 See supra n. 1243-1250 and accompanying texts. 
1288 See supra n. 1259-1260 and accompanying texts. 
1289 See supra n. 1265-1267 and accompanying texts. 
1290 See supra n. 1270-1271 and accompanying texts. 
1291 See supra n. 1201-1202 and accompanying texts. 
1292 CISG Art. 46(2) and (3). But no such requirement in the cases of quantitative 
defects. See supra n. 
1272-1273 and accompanying texts. 
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5.3. Evaluating accounts 
5.3.1. Internal evaluation 
As examined above, it is true that a claim for specific performance is the buyer's ordinary right 
in Korean law, the Directive and CISG, 1293 whilst it is regarded as exceptional in English law 
depending upon the court's discretionary power. Although the difference appears to have a 
broad gap between them, it may be probably more marked in theory than in practice. "" Many 
writers acknowledge that there is little practical difference between the use of specific 
performance in the common law as compared to the civil law. '245 It is submitted that although 
the claim to specific performance is regarded as a general right in the civil law system, it does 
not in practice have the significance originally attached to it because of the reality of business 
transaction. 1296 That is, whenever goods are fungible and easily obtainable, an aggrieved party 
will generally prefer to hold the defaulting party liable in damages rather than risk wasting time 
and money on litigation to get goods he presumably needs. 1297 There is also a case that an 
aggrieved party may seldom seek the defaulting party's performance after the breach of what 
was agreed in the contract because the breach may often result in that the aggrieved party loses 
trust in the quality of the defaulting party's performance. Moreover, substitute performance at 
the expense of the seller in Korean law appears in practice to differ little from damages in 
1293 Note that the position in CISG and the Directive is subject to the conditions stated in supra n. 1280. 
1294 Cf. Treitel, supra n. 421, at 47. 
1295 Honnold, supra n. 218, at 199 f.; Enderlein and Maskow, supra n. 432, at 177; Will, Bianca/Bonell 
(ed. ), supra n. 221, at 334; Markesinis, Lorenz, and Dannemann, supra n. 62, at 617 f., 624; Zweigert and 
Kötz, supra n. 20, at 519; Huber, Schlechtriem (ed. ), supra n. 218, at 202; Walt, supra n. 1255, at 232; 
Bergsten, supra n. 1255, at 11 ff.; UNCITRAL Yearbook V, A/CN. 9/SER. A11974, (1975), at 53; 
UNCITRAL Yearbook Vi, A/CN. 9/SER. A/1975, (1976), at 101 f.; Honnold, supra n. 724, at 130,226 f.; 
Lando and Beale (ed. ), supra n. 509, at 400; Bishop, "The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract", 
(1985) 14 J. Legal Stud. 229, at 318 f.; Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-11. 
1296 Id. See also Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 66, at 139. 
1297 Id. 
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English law insofar as the ultimate financial position of the buyer is concerned, although in 
theory it may depart from damages in that the whole expense is placed on the shoulders of the 
seller directly. 1218 In addition to the practical implications of two different systems, one must 
also note that the various limitation rules to the general right to demand performance, as in 
Korean law, the Directive and CISG, 1299 seem to narrow their theoretical gap between the civil 
law and the common law, which may lead to similar results in many cases. 1300 
However, the difference between them can be crucial, resulting in unfair results in certain 
cases, in particular, where the purchase of substitute goods elsewhere will not be a satisfactory 
solution; e. g., where substitute goods may be difficult to locate, where there may be some delay 
in their production, where alternative seller or manufacturers may not have comparable 
reputations for quality. "" It is conceivable that, in any of these cases, the buyer's preference 
may well be to insist the original seller or manufacturer's performance, even if the buyer may 
be involved in some litigation. "" In such a case, Korean law, the Directive and CISG may well 
be ready to grant the aggrieved buyer an order for specific performance by the original seller or 
manufacturer, whereas the position in English law seems both unclear and quite negative to 
grant such an order. 13°3 This is not only because of, as stated in s. 52(1), their reluctance to 
order specific performance in the cases of unascertained goods, but also because of uncertainty 
inherent in the court's discretion. 1304 
1298 Cf. Treitel, supra n. 421, at 45 ff. 
1299 See supra n. 1200-1202,1243-1250,1259-1271 and accompanying texts. 
1300 For the various ways to limit the right to require performance, see Treitel, supra n. 421, at 47 ff. 
1301 Cf. Kastely, supra n. 1255, at 611. Cf. Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA v. The Bronx 
Engineering Co Ltd. [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 465 (the court did not decree specific performance despite a 
substantial delay to get a substitute machine; see supra n. 1232-1233 and accompanying texts). 
1302 Id. 
1303 Note that the position in CISG and the Directive may be also unclear because of the conditions stated 
in supra n. 1280. 
1304 It is submitted that, compared to the civil law, the common law rules are still in a state of disorder 
and inconsistent. See Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-10; Zweigert and Kötz, supra n. 20, at 540. Cf. Treitel, 
supra n. 1213, at 215 f. (he asked whether it would not be proper to allow the buyer to claim specific 
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As regards the differences as to the requirements of specific performance, Korean law which 
appears to have no counterpart in respect of disproportionality in the Directive, or 
fundamentality and reasonableness in CISG seems doubtful in light of the rationale to restrict 
specific performance in most legal systems. It is submitted by Treitel that the reasons for such 
restriction are, first, that "it may be regarded as an undue interference with the personal freedom 
of the debtor", 1305 and second, that "it may impose strains on the machinery of law enforcement 
which are too severe when balanced against the benefit derived from enforced performance". 1306 
Therefore, although the seller's guarantee liability rules under KCC do not contain an express 
rule as to such restriction, one hopes that the principle of good faith in Korean law may prevent 
the buyer from resorting to the right to require performance where the buyer's exercise of the 
right may impose on the seller unreasonable costs or effort for repair or replacement. 1307 
5.3.2. External evaluation 
It is frequently said in terms of `efficient breach' that specific performance is inefficient 
because it may prevent a seller from transferring the goods to a third party who values them 
performance in sales contract generally and to refuse him the remedy only where the seller has some 
justifiable interests in resisting it); Dawson, supra n. 1192, at 533 (severe criticism on the various 
doctrines of the common law to limit specific performance and to grant so great a discretion on the court); 
Lawson, Remedies of English Law, (1980), at 211 (in favour of a general right to specific performance). 
Cf. Waddams, "The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract", in Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 
812, at 471 ff. (the view against the general right to specific performance, suggesting that a distinction 
between money remedies and specific remedies will always be necessary and stressing the importance of 
the court's discretionary power). 
1305 This is true not only where performance can be rendered personally by the defaulting party, but also 
where the aggrieved party could be put into almost as good a position for most practical purposes by 
monetary relief. In addition, specific performance may put the defaulting party into hardship that would 
not be occasioned by monetary relief, in particular, where such relief would be subject to reduction under 
the mitigation rules. See Treitel, supra n. 421, at 47. 
1306 id 
1307 Accord; Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 167, at 230. Cf. Dae jeong Kim, supra n. 595, at 303 f. Cf. For 
the other approach to limit the right to require performance, see the UNIDROIT Principles Art. 7.2.2.; the 
Principles of European Contract Law Art. 9: 102. 
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most. 1308 However, many economists argue that allowing specific performance need not 
discourage an efficient allocation of the goods because, given zero transaction costs, it can be 
assumed that the parties will renegotiate their contract; 
1309 the seller may renegotiate with the 
buyer to share some of the surplus from a sale to the third party in exchange for a release of the 
buyer's claim for specific performance. 131° How the surplus is distributed is in fact efficiency- 
neutral. '3" However, one must note that the efficiency-neutral nature of specific performance 
does not necessarily answer the question of which remedy is superior to the other because if 
transaction costs are positive, the result is indeterminate. Thus, regard should be had to the 
impact of transaction costs of pre- and post-breach transaction costs in order to evaluate which 
remedy is superior. 1 " 
In regard to pre-breach transaction costs, the economic efficiency argument concludes that a 
1308 Cohen, "The Relationship of Contractual Remedies to Political and Social Status: A Preliminary 
Inquiry", (1982) 32 U. Toronto L. J. 31, at 59; Date-Bah, "The United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: Overview and Selective Commentary", (1979) 11 Rev. Ghana 
L. 50, at 62; Farnsworth, "Damages and Specific Relief', (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 247, at 250 f.; 
Ziegel, supra n. 886, at 9-10. See generally Posner, supra n. 21, (1998), at 145 ff.; Rogerson, "Efficient 
Reliance and Damages Remedies for Breach of Contract", (1984) 15 Rand J. Econ. 39; Kornhauser, "An 
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies", (1986) 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, at 711 f. 
Cf. Supra n. 1125 and accompanying texts. 
1309 Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 215 ff.; Miceli, supra n. 1125, at 88 f.; Mercuro and Medema, supra 
n. 1125, at 78 f.; Ogus, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), supra n. 1242, at 259 f.; Epstein, "Inducement of Breach 
of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership", (1987) 16 J. Legal Stud. 1, at 36 f.; MacNeil, 
"Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky", (1982) 68 Va. L. Rev. 947, at 950 ff.; Kronman, 
"Specific Performance", (1978) 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351, at 353,373; Schwartz, "The Case for Specific 
Performance", (1979) 89 Yale L. J. 271, at 284 ff. 
1310 The price of release will be something between the value of performance to the buyer and the surplus 
the seller would make from the subsequent sale with the third party. It may depend upon the bargaining 
strength and abilities of the original two parties. 
1311 Id. The difference between damages and specific performance is purely distributional that a damages 
award may result the seller capturing all the surplus from the subsequent sale with the third party, whilst 
an order of specific performance may let the parties share such surplus. For the examples of distribution 
of surplus comparing the remedies of specific performance and expectation damages, see Cooter & Ulen, 
supra n. 27, at 218 f. 
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rule allowing specific performance may conform to what the parties want at the time of contract 
only where the good is unique because the expense of locating it in cases where an identical 
good is not available in the market is substantial and the risk of undercompensation is great. '3`3 
However, several economists have argued that the criterion of uniqueness for the parties' 
preference as to a remedy of specific performance is not necessarily appropriate and it should 
rather be whether the buyer either values the contract goods more highly than does the market 
or is in doubt that accurate damages will be obtainable or collectable. "" 
In this light, it seems doubted that the unclear and negative position in English law to grant 
specific performance in the example cases dealt with in the internal evaluation13'S may be seen 
as a way of reducing the transaction costs that the parties would otherwise have incurred in 
providing for a remedy of specific performance. 
As to post-breach transaction costs, they may be conveniently divided into three categories to 
consider the impact of such costs; i) the costs of the court enforcing and supervising 
performance where the parties' renegotiation is unsuccessful to release the seller, ii) the parties' 
renegotiation costs for such release, and iii) the cover costs for one of the parties to locate and 
obtain for the aggrieved buyer an alternative to what was promised under the contract. 1316 The 
first category does not occur if damages are awarded. It seems, however, significant where 
personal service is involved. "" The costs in the second category should be compared with 
1312 Ogus, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), supra n. 1242, at 260 if. 
1313 Kronman, supra n. 1309, at 365 ff. 
1314 Ulen, Katz (ed. ), supra n. 1125, at 122 (stressing on the importance of subjective valuations); Linzer, 
"On the Amorality of Contract Remedies; Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement", (1981) 81 
Colum. L. Rev. 111, at 125 (the parties' preference for specific performance where damages cannot be 
ascertained by a market evaluation); Schwartz, supra n. 1309, at 279 ff. (the parties' preference is hard to 
be generalised and their concern is not only related to the nature of the goods, but also to the likelihood of 
obtaining and enforcing an accurate damage award). 
1315 See supra n. 1301-1304 and accompanying texts. 
1316 Ogus, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), supra n. 1242, at 261 f. 
1317 Id.; Ulen, Katz (ed. ), supra n. 1125, at 122 f. It may be of relevance to the right to require repair, 
which may incorporate flexibility and discretion in the manner and quality of performance. 
274 
those that are incurred in the process of obtaining monetary compensation; e. g., litigation costs 
and proof costs. 131g An order of specific performance may be less efficient than an award of 
damages only where the former costs outweigh the latter. No a priori comparative assessment 
or estimate can be made on the basis of unsupported assertions. 1319 However, it is expected that 
an order of specific performance may be more efficient where the buyer has a high subjective 
value in the goods because litigation or proof costs of such value may increase much more than 
the renegotiation costs. 1320 In relation to the third category, efficiency asks the question of 
whether the buyer or the seller may have lower cover costs. 132' The comparative cover costs 
depend partly upon the functioning and accessibility to the market. 1322 If the seller has better 
information on the market and easier access to the market, his costs are likely to be lower than 
the buyer so that an order of specific performance may be more efficient. 1323 On the other hand, 
an award of damages will be superior where the buyer may easily obtain an alternative to what 
was agreed in the contract and specific performance may cause the seller unreasonable expenses 
or effort. The above arguments as to the comparative post-breach transaction costs seem to 
explain not only that an order of specific performance does not always create an inefficient 
result, but also why each jurisdiction having specific performance as an ordinary right stipulates 
rules to limit the exercise of specific performance; disproportionality in the Directive, or 
fundamentality and reasonableness in CISG. In this light, the position in Korean law which 
1318 Ogus, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), supra n. 1242, at 261 f.; Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 219 ff.; Walt, 
supra n. 1255, at 235. 
1319 Walt, supra n. 1255, at 235, n. 123. 
1320 Id.; Ogus, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), supra n. 1242, at 261 f. Cf. For the argument that contract law 
should adopt specific performance more widely as a remedy because the problem of valuation by courts 
is generally so severe and the possibility of undercompensating of the aggrieved party through a damage 
remedy is high, see Ulen, Katz (ed. ), supra n. 1125, at 121; Schwartz, supra n. 1309, at 366 ff.; Miceli, 
supra n. 1125, at 88 f. 
1321 Ogus, id., at 262; Walt, id., at 235 ff. 
1322 Walt, id., at 237. 
1323 But he may be reluctant to cover from one of his competitors. Note that if the buyer's needs are 
peculiar to him, his costs are lower than the seller's and yet because of high subjective value the court 
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appears to have no limitation rules under the seller's guarantee liability should be re-exan-ined 
and interpreted in a way that enhances efficiency along with the imperative principle of good 
faith. 
6. Concluding remarks 
6.1. "Dual liability system vs. Unified liability system" and "Legal liability vs. Contractual 
liability" 
Further to the previous discussions in Chap. II, the study examined how the problems Korean 
law has suffered by adopting either the legal liability theory or the contractual liability theory 
are unfolded in the rules as to the effects of the seller's guarantee liability and showed 
inferiority of the legal liability theory and justified an argument that one needs to introduce a 
genuine unified liability system into Korean law. 
First, the legal liability theory which does not admit the buyer's right of suspension cannot be 
justified in light of its practical importance where the seller has failed to perform his reciprocal 
contractual duties and the buyer has not yet performed his part of the contract. 1324 It can be also 
criticised in terms of its efficiency function in providing the buyer with information on whether 
non-performance will occur; where termination of the contract is more efficient, the information 
may help termination to take place at an earlier time than if the right of suspension was not 
available so that the goods move more quickly to a higher value user. 1325 Although the legal 
liability theory can be justified insofar as it is concerned with non-substitutable and non- 
repairable specific goods, the problem is that the theory may be interpreted as requiring that its 
theoretical basis of the specific goods dogma be extended to substitutable and repairable goods; 
thus, where the seller delivers defective (but substitutable and repairable) goods, the buyer's 
may often order specific performance. See Ogus, Harris and Tallon (ed. ), supra n. 1242, at 262. 
1324 See supra pp. 176 f. 
1325 See supra pp. 179. In this light, a view in English law which does not recognise the separate right of 
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right to require the seller's cure under the seller's guarantee liability can be invoked only after 
fulfilling his duty to pay and take delivery so that it is inevitable for him to run a greater risk of 
non-performance by the seller. "" 
Second, the examination of the various views submitted by the legal liability theory or the 
contractual liability theory as to the scope of damages and its relationship with price reduction 
was executed in light of the logic, practicability and appropriateness of each view, certainty in 
defining the scope of damages under the seller's guarantee liability and the argument that 
expectation measure is the only measure of contract damages to enhance efficiency. 1327 It 
showed that none of the views is satisfactory insofar as all the complexities each view faces are 
inherently due to the disputes as to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability and due to the 
artificial distinction of fault and non-fault based liability. "" Consequently, it proved that in 
order to resolve inadequacy of each view, one needs to recall the arguments raised before for 
the ultimate purpose of achieving a genuine unified liability system in Korean law. 1329 
6.2. Protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties? 
6.2.1. Consumers' interests 
This study has showed that the consumer's real interests are differentiated from the 
commercial buyer's in that unlike the commercial buyer's, what the consumer generally wants 
is goods of the proper quality at the full price, not defective goods at a lower price. In this light, 
it was found, first, that the absolute rights of suspension and termination seem crucial in 
consumer sales, so that the position in Korean law and CISG (which depends the right of 
suspension seems also unjustifiable. 
1326 See supra pp. 177 f. This is because the seller's delivery of defective goods as they were at the time 
of contract or specification is deemed to be complete performance of his duty. 
1327 See supra pp. 235 ff., 249 ff. 
1328 See supra pp. 235 ff., 249 ff. 
1329 See supra pp. 68 ff., 77 f. 
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suspension on the slight or trivial nature of a defect) and the position in Korean law, the 
Directive and CISG (which depends the right of termination on a certain degree of seriousness 
of breach and the seller's right to cure after the delivery date) is inadequate to reflect the 
consumer's interests. 
1330 Second, the non-recognition of a long-term right to reject in English 
law where there is a latent defect that could not be discovered within a reasonable time may be 
adverse to consumers' interests. 133' 
6.2.2. Common interests 
Where the issue was not directly related to the interests of consumers as opposed to those of 
commercial buyers, the study showed in what aspects each law fails to reflect the common 
interests of all the parties. 
First, a view in CISG that the relevant time for the foreseeability of substantial detriment to the 
buyer in the event of non-conformity as a requirement for a right of termination should be the 
time of breach rather than the time of contract seems to interfere with the basis of the bargain 
between the parties which was agreed at the time of contract. 1332 The reason for that is that the 
view may provide the buyer with an opportunity to escape a bad bargain which was a risk 
initially allocated to the buyer. 
'333 
Second, CISG and Korean law which do not deprive the buyer of the right of termination, 
despite his inability to return the goods in substantially the same condition as he received them 
if his inability to return is due to his transformation or consumption in the course of normal 
business or use, seems inappropriate in some cases where there has been a substantial drop in 
the market price because it may encourage the buyer's opportunism, transferring to the seller a 
market risk originally born by the buyer. 
'334 
1330 See supra pp. 178,179 f. 
1331 See supra pp. 210,211. 
1332 See supra pp. 201 f. 
1333 id. 
1334 See supra pp. 210 f. 
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Third, a view in Korean law requiring the seller's fault for the expectation damages claim 
seems adverse to the parties' general preference that they are likely to guarantee the envisaged 
result rather than merely to do their best to procure it in light of sales in the modem world being 
largely standardised and quickly and painlessly executed. 1335 
Fourth, the remedy of price reduction and its proportional calculation method in Korean law, 
CISG and the Directive seems to distort the original distribution of the risks of market fall 
which was agreed between the parties at the time of contract. 1336 
Fifth, given that the price reduction remedy was agreed between the parties, the position in 
CISG and possibly the Directive that the relevant time for assessing the value of the goods 
actually delivered and that of the hypothetical conforming goods is the time of contract rather 
than that of delivery would be also contrary to the parties' intention where there is a market 
fall. 1337 This is because at the time of contract the buyer contemplates only to obtain the 
conforming goods rather than any inferior goods and the value of inferior goods is totally 
irrelevant until after the time of delivery when he discovers the lack of conformity. 1338 
Sixth, the reluctance and uncertainty in English law in ordering specific performance based on 
the discretionary power does not reflect the parties' preference in particular where the purchase 
of substitute goods elsewhere is not a satisfactory solution. '339 
Seventh, Korean law, which has no limitation on the right to require specific performance, is 
likely to be both unfair and adverse to the parties' intention because the buyer's unlimited 
exercise of such right in some cases may impose on the seller unreasonable costs or effort for 
repair or replacement. 
1340 
1335 See supra pp. 241 f. 
1336 See supra p. 106. 
1337 See supra pp. 251 f. 
1338 Id. 
1339 See supra pp. 271,273 f. 
1340 See supra pp. 272,274 ff. 
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V. Exclusion of the Seller's Liability for Non-Conforming Goods 
1. General Remarks 
It is a common feature of written, and even oral contracts in the present day (in particular those 
in standard form) that the business seller often inserts into them clauses variously termed 
"exemption", "exclusion" or "disclaimer" which purport to exclude or restrict the liability of the 
seller for breach of contract. In relation to defective goods, which are our main concern, such 
clauses take various forms to exclude or restrict the seller's liability for the delivery of defective 
goods; the specific exclusion of "statutory implied conditions" or "the seller's guarantee 
liability", the exclusion or limitation of the right of termination, the confinement of the amount 
of damages that may be recoverable, or the clause to shorten a time limit allowed by law for 
termination or other remedies. Exemption clauses often attract serious objection because they 
may alter a distribution of risks that the buyer would reasonably have intended. 1341 It may be 
often caused by his simple ignorance; it may result from lack of opportunity to become aware of 
the clauses or inability to understand their full potential implications. 1342 In addition, it may be 
also caused by disparity in bargaining power; the buyer has no effective bargaining power to 
negotiate the clauses, nor to refuse to contract even if he is fully aware of the unacceptable 
clauses. 1343 
Korean law and English law have recognised all these problems and developed various 
techniques to control exclusion and limitation clauses by applying stringent rules requiring the 
clauses to be incorporated effectively into the contract, 1344 and by construing such clauses in a 
restrictive way. 1345 Yet, these techniques of control which operate indirectly and concentrate on 
1341 Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 13-002. 
1342 id. 
1343 Id. 
1344 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 39 ff.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 728; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), 
supra n. 515, at para. 13-011 ff.; Guest, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 12-013 if. 
1345 Yun jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 42 ff.; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 728 f.; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), 
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procedural, rather than substantive, considerations, proved inadequate because provided that the 
clauses are clearly worded and effectively incorporated into the contract, the courts has no 
power to cut it down. Therefore, each jurisdiction has employed the legislative intervention 
technique which allows the courts to directly control the clauses and to consider its substantive 
fairness, '346 
Bearing in mind one of the ultimate purpose of this thesis to investigate how effectively each 
law protects the reasonable expectations of the parties, the ensuing discussion is to examine in a 
comparative way, first, whether each jurisdiction treats the seller's guarantee liability for non- 
conformity in quality and quantity as mandatory rules, second, if it does, to what extent it is 
treated so (e. g., in terms of the status of the parties and the form of contract), and third, if not, in 
what way it controls the seller's attempt to exclude or restrict his liability for non-conformity in 
quality and quantity. 
2. Comparative accounts 
2.1. Korean law 
The rules on the seller's guarantee liability in Korean law are of a non-mandatory nature. 1 " 
Thus, the parties are allowed to insert a clause in the contract to exclude or restrict the seller's 
guarantee liability and the clause is in principle valid insofar as it is effectively incorporated 
into the contract and its content is clear. 
1348 However, if, notwithstanding that the seller is aware 
supra n. 515, at para. 13-019 ff.; Guest, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 14-005 ff. The courts often 
adopt the principle of contra proferentem that any ambiguities in the clause would be construed contrary 
to the interests of the party seeking to rely on it. 
1346 The Korean Act on Regulation of Standard Terms of 1986; The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2083); The EC Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC, O. J. No. L. 95,21); Directive(99/44) Art. 7. 
1347 Yun jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 254; Eun-young Lee, supra n. 68, at 796; Sang-kwang Lee, supra n. 
167, at 309 ff.; Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 349. 
1348 Id 
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of the existence of a defect, he inserts the exemption clause, the clause is void and he is liable 
for the defect under the seller's guarantee liability134' because it is deemed to be contrary to the 
general principle of good faith. 135o 
In addition, the fact that the seller did not know of the existence of a defect does not 
necessarily render that the exemption clause is always valid because it must also pass through 
legislative control of standard terms under by the Korean Act on Regulation of Standard Terms 
of 1986 (hereinafter KARST). "" The clause falls within the scope of the application of 
KARST if. 1112 first, the standard term forms a part of the contract, 1353 second, it has not been 
individually negotiated, 1354 third, it has been preformulated in advance, 13" and fourth, it is 
intended to be incorporated into numerous contracts. 
1356 One must note that the application of 
1349 KCC Art. 584. 
1350 Yun-jik Kwak, supra n. 74, at 254. Cf. Hyung-bae Kim, supra n. 67, at 349 (in this case the seller 
will be liable not only for the defect under the seller's guarantee liability, but also for the breach of his 
duty to disclose the existence of a defect). 
1351 For the general explanation of KARST, see Sang-jeong Lee, "Yak-kwan-kyu-jae-bup So-go (A 
Study on Regulation of Standard Term Act)", (1989) 1 So-bi-ja-saeng-hwal Yeon-koo 48. 
1352 KARST Art. 2(1). 
1353 It is not important whether it forms a part of main or auxiliary obligations. Eun-young Lee, "Yak- 
kwan-kyu-jae-bup Hae-seol (Comment on Regulation of Standard Term Act)", (May, 1987) 317 Sa Bup 
Haeng Jeong 43, at 43. 
1354 Insofar as a term has been subject to negotiation, it is out of the scope of KARST even if the term has 
not been changed in the process of negotiation. However, it is crucial that the buyer must have a real 
opportunity to scrutinise and influence the substance of the term. Young-gap Kim, "Yak-kwan-kyu-jae- 
eoi Bup-ri-wa Soo-jeong-hae-seok-eoi Moon-jae (The Legal Theories on Standard Terms Regulations 
and the Matters of Modification Interpretation)" (1997) 46(1) Bup-jo 80, at 86 f. 
1355 It does not matter who drafted the term, whether it be the supplier, a trade association, or even a 
commission representing the interests of persons usually confronted with standard terms of that kind. 
What is important is that the term has been introduced into the contract by one party. See Eun-young 
Lee, supra n. 1353, at 43. 
1356 The intent to use the term as a standard one in numerous contracts is sufficient, but the term for one- 
off contract is out of the scope. Egan-young Lee, supra n. 1353, at 43; Young-gap Kim, supra n. 1354, at 
85 f. 
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KARST does not depend on whether the buyer is a consumer or a businessman, "" and the fact 
that a standard term has been individually negotiated does not necessarily mean that the 
remainder of the contract is not governed by KARST. 
'358 
Given that a clause to exclude or restrict the seller's guarantee liability falls within the scope 
of KARST, there are three relevant hurdles for the seller to overcome to get the clause to be 
effective. 
First, the clause is not deemed to be incorporated into the contract where the seller fails to 
fulfil the duties to give notice of1359 or to elucidate the substance of the clause. 1360 As regards 
notice, it must be given in a reasonable manner for the transaction in question in order to 
provide the buyer a reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of the clause. '36' However, 
even if it is reasonably expected that notice may be given by other means than tendering a 
written standard term, the seller is still obliged to provide an exemplar of the term which can be 
kept by the buyer where the buyer requests it. 1362 It is also required that the contents of the 
terms be written in conspicuous and comprehensible language. 136' Regarding the duty to 
elucidate, one must note that it is limited to the essential part of the contract and it is not 
required where the nature of the contract makes it significantly difficult. 1364 The crucial test to 
decide the essential part of the contract is whether the buyer would have entered into the 
1357 Id. 
1358 Id. 
1359 KARST Art. 3(1). 
1360 KARST Art. 3(2). The buyer who has signed a document including the clause may still claim that it 
was not effectively incorporated on the basis of the seller's failure to give notice or to elucidate the 
substance of the clause. 
136J KARST Art. 3(1). It could be done by tendering the written standard terms, by oral statements or by 
posting a conspicuous notice at the place the contract is made. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1353, at 45. 
1362 KARST Art. 3(1). 
1363 Eun-young Lee, Yak-kwan-kyu jae-bup (Regulation of Standard Term Act), (1994), at 117. Cf. The 
Korean Supreme Court Case, 9/3/1999,98 Da 43342 (where a party tendered a document that generally 
and abstractly introduces the contents of insurance, it was held that he did not fulfil his duty to explain 
unless the other party knew or could have been aware of them). 
1364 KARST Art. 3(2). 
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contract had he been given an explanation. 1365 However, the duty of explanation is not applied 
where the buyer already knew or could not have been unaware of the clause. 
1366 In addition, an 
exclusion clause in a written document cannot be incorporated where it is overridden by an 
individually negotiated agreement that is inconsistent with the clause. 1367 
Second, the clause cannot be effective by the operation of the following rules; that a standard 
clause must be both objectively and consistently interpreted in light of average customers, 136& 
that it must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of good faith, 13'9 and that ambiguous 
clauses are construed against the drafter. 1370 
Third, where a clause excludes or restricts the seller's guarantee liability, or a clause makes the 
liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions, the clause is not deemed 
to be enforceable `unless there is a reasonable ground for insertion of the clause' . 
137 In 
addition, if the goods are sold by sample or by description as to quality or performance, a clause 
to exclude or restrict the seller's guarantee liability rendered by the sample or the description is 
1365 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 118; Oh-seung Kwon, So-bi ja-bo-ho-bup (Consumer Protection 
Law), (1997), at 117; Dong-hoon Kim, "Yak-kwan-kyu-jae-eoi Pan-rae-wa-e-ron (Cases and Theories on 
Standard Terms Regulations)" (1997) 42(12) Ko-shi-gae 115, at 117. See e. g., the Korean Supreme 
Court Cases, 12/12/1995,95 Da 11344; 25/611996,96 Da 12009. Cf. For the insurance cases where it 
was held a certain clause was not incorporated due to the drafter's failure to explain, see the Korean 
Supreme Court Cases, 12/4/1996,95 Da 4893; 8/3/1996,95 Da 53546; 11/8/1995,94 Da 52492; 
14/10/1994,94 Da 17970; 10/3/1992,91 Da 31883. 
1366 See e. g., the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 11/5/1999,98 Da 59842; 7/9/1999,98 Da 19240; 
9/3/1999,98 Da 43342; 27/11/1998,98 Da 32564; 9/9/1997,95 Da 45873. 
1367 KARST Art. 4. Cf. The Korean Supreme Court Cases, 28/3/1989,88 Da 4645; 26/11/1985,84 DaKa 
2543. It is not important whether the agreement is reached orally or in writing. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 
1353, at 46. However, it does not mean the clause is invalid because it may be restored where the 
agreement is subsequently found ineffective. Young-gap Kim, supra n. 1354, at 92. 
1368 KARST Art. 5(1). Cf. The Korean Supreme Court Cases, 25/6/1996,96 Da 12009; 26/5/1995,95 Da 
36704; Ji-yeol Son, "Yak-kwan-ae-kwan-han Pan-rae-eoi Dong-hyang (The Trend of Cases Regarding 
Standard Terms)", (1988) 10 Minsa-panrae-yoenkoo 408, at 422. 
1369 KARST Art. 5(l). 
1370 KARST Art. 5(2). Cf the Korean Supreme Court Case, 25/6/1996,96 Da 12009. 
1371 KARST Art. 7(3). 
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invalid insofar as it cannot be shown a reasonable ground for the clause. "" In determining the 
existence of a reasonable ground, one must take into account all the relevant circumstance of the 
transaction in question at the time of contract and all other terms of the contract. 1373 For 
instance, if an exemption clause is offset by a lower price, it may evidence that there is a 
reasonable ground. "" However, a lower price does not always constitute a reasonable ground 
because it must be proved that the loss of the buyer's rights due to the exemption clause was 
reasonably compensated by the reduced price. "" 
Given that all the above three requirements are satisfied, the question arises whether an 
exclusion clause of the seller's guarantee liability is always effective. It is related to the matter 
of to what extent the general provision under KARST that is the general gauge to assess the 
fairness of a standard term is applicable. 1116 On the one hand, some argue that, once the clause 
has passed a test specifically designed for exclusion clauses of the seller's guarantee liability, it 
is not justifiable to impose another test by the general provision on the clause. "" On the other 
hand, others contend that even if the clause is valid in terms of the specifically designed test, it 
may be still invalidated where it infringes the fairness rules stated in the general provision. 1378 
The rules are that where the clause prejudices the customer in a manner that violates the 
command of good faith, the clause is deemed unfair. 1379 In the case of doubt about the fairness 
1372 Id. 
1373 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1353, at 48. The burden of proof is on the supplier who seeks to rely on the 
clause. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 186 f., 209. However, any attempt by the seller to exclude or 
restrict the buyer's right of rescission rendered by the seller's guarantee liability is unequivocally void. 
KARST Art. 9(1); Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 264 ff. 
1374 Id. 
1375 Id. 
1376 KARST Art. 6. 
1377 KochlStübing, AGB, (1977), § 9, Rdn. 6; cited in Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 191, n. 2. Cf. 
Prof. Eun-young Lee also stands with this view, but note that the `reasonable ground' test is in fact 
executed on the basis of criteria stipulated in the general provision. 
1378 Kyung-hwan Jang, "A Study on the General Provisions of Regulation of Standard Term Act", PhD 
thesis, The Graduate School of Seoul National Unilversity, (1990), at 80 ff. 
1379 KARST Art. 6(1). 
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of a standard clause, KARST uses three presumptions to determine when such a clause 
prejudices the buyer contrary to the general principle of good faith. 
1380 One is a presumption of 
unfairness of a standard clause when it creates any unreasonable disproportion to the detriment 
of the buyer. 1181 The test of unreasonable disproportion must be assessed in light of a 
comparison between benefits rendered by the clause to the customer and those to the 
supplier. 1382 In addition, the test must depend upon what are reasonable interests from the point 
of view of the run of average customers. ' 313 Another apparent case of unfairness is presumed in 
the case where a standard clause is so unusual that the buyer could not reasonably expect it. 1384 
In assessing the unexpectedness of a clause, all the relevant circumstances must be taken into 
account at the time of contract in light of the run of average customers, 1385 which includes 
conspicuousness and comprehensibility of the clause that the court may find crucial. "" The 
other presumption is concerned with standard clauses that contradict the rights and obligations 
inherent in the nature of the contract. '387 This presumption applies to the cases where standard 
clauses eviscerate terms that are material to the contract; a clause to entitle the supplier to render 
a contractual performance substantially different from what was reasonably expected of the 
customer at the time of contract. 1399 
1380 KARST Art. 6(2). 
1381 KARST Art. 6(2-1). 
1382 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1353, at 47. Cf. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 185 f. 
1383 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1353, at 47. 
1384 KARST Art. 6(2-2). 
1385 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 188 f. Cf. the Korean Supreme Court Cases, 27/12/1994,93 Da 
29396; 11/12/1990,90 DaKa 26553 (the cases show the courts are generally reluctant to judge the 
unfairness of a clause on the basis of unexpectedness; Dong-hoon Kim, supra n. 1365, at 120). 
1386 Kyung-hwan Jang, supra n. 1378, at 207 (criticising that this test of unexpectedness is already dealt 
with in the matter of incorporation and it should not be a part of the unfairness test to control substances 
of the clause). 
1387 KARST Art. 6(2-3). 
1388 Eun-Young Lee, supra n. 1353. at 47 f. This presumption applies, e. g., to a dragnet security clause b 
which has the effect that, as long as any item purchased from the seller is not yet completely paid for, all 
the other goods bought from the seller serve as security for the open balance and can be repossessed upon 
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2.2. English law 
2.2.1. Incorporation, construction and other Common law rules 
In order to be effective, at the first stage, to exclude the seller's liability for non-conformity in 
quality or quantity a contractual clause must be validly incorporated into the contract in 
question. The clause can be incorporated in two ways, first, where it is in a document signed by 
the buyer because he may be bound by what he signs regardless of whether he has read it, 1399 
second, where a reasonable notice of the clause has been given to the buyer at or before the time 
of contract in order to make it part of the contract. 1390 What amounts to a reasonable notice is a 
question which depends upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. 139' The more 
unusual or unexpected the clause, the greater the degree of the notice required by the courts. 
'392 
At the second stage, it must be shown that the clause, properly interpreted or construed, covers 
the loss which has arisen. The general approach the courts have adopted to the interpretation of 
exclusion clauses is a strict one, under which the exclusion clause is construed contra 
proferentem. Therefore, an exclusion clause of `no warranty express or implied' may not 
default of any payment because the extended possibility of repossession makes it difficult for the buyer to 
obtain unrestricted possession of the purchased goods. 
1389 But it is not applied where its effect has been misrepresented (the clause is still part of the contract, 
but it is not enforceable) or where non est factum can be pleaded (see Saunders v. Anglia Building Society 
(No. 2) [1971] AC 1039). 
1390 For the cases holding the notice was ineffective because it was given after the time of contract, see 
e. g., Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd. [1949] 1 KB 532; Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd. [1971] 2 QB 
163. For the cases holding that a notice is not regarded as having been given where the clause appears on 
a document that would not be expected to have a contractual effect, e. g. Chapleton v. Barry UDC [ 1940] 
1 KB 532 (receipt for hiring deck-chair). 
1391 See e. g., Thompson v. L. M. and S. Ry [1930] 1 KB 41; The Mikhail Lernzontov [1990] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 579,594; Sugar v. London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co. [1941] 1 All ER 172. 
1392 See e. g. J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461; Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto 
Visual Prograninies Ltd. [1989] QB 433. One must note that a clause can be incorporated into a contract 
by a course of dealing that must be both regular and consistent. See McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne 
287 
exclude conditions, "' and an exclusion of liability for breach of implied terms may not exclude 
liability for breach of express terms. "" 
It must be noted that English law used to adopt a doctrine known as `fundamental breach of 
contract', under which exemption clauses might be inoperative in the case of such breach. 
1395 
This rule has been disapproved by the House of Lords and it is now established that it should be 
assimilated into the rules as to construction. '396 That is, the question whether an exclusion 
clause covers a fundamental breach is a question of construction so that a clearly worded 
exclusion clause may even cover such a breach. However, one must note that it is likely that the 
courts will show their reluctance in general to uphold the exclusion clause as to a fundamental 
breach unless it is not clearly and fairly susceptible of only one meaning. 139' 
In addition to the above two stages, it must be also noted that there are further Common law 
rules to control exclusion clauses. The seller cannot rely on an exclusion clause where he 
misrepresents, whether fraudulently or otherwise, the terms or effect of the clause inserted by 
him in a contract. 139s He is not also allowed to rely on an exclusion clause contained in a 
written document when it is overridden by an express inconsistent undertaking given at or 
Ltd. [ 1964] 1 WLR 125. Cf. Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons [ 1969] 2 AC 31. 
1393 Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394. 
1394 Andrews Bros (Bournemouth) Ltd. v. Singer and Co. Ltd. [ 1934] 1 KB 17. For further examples as 
to the matter of construction of exclusion clauses of the seller's liability for non-conformity, see 
Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 13-022 ff. (if there is a gross non-conformity between the 
goods as described in the contract and as delivered, the courts may hold that an exemption clause 
purporting, e. g., to require the buyer to take the goods `with all faults and imperfections', to deprive the 
buyer of the right to reject, or to exclude the seller's liability for errors of description, is not applicable to 
a failure to provide the contract goods). 
1395 See e. g., Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936. 
1396 Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 
AC 361; Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Ltd. [1980] AC 827; Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd. v. Malvern 
Fishing Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 WLR 964. The position is now effectively confirmed by s. 9 of UCTA. 
1397 Bradgate, Commercial Law, (2000), at 75; McKendrick, supra n. 952, at 230 f. 
1398 Curtis ir. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. [1951] 1 KB 805. See also Jaques v% Lloyd D. George 
& Partners Ltd. [ 19681 1 WLR 625; Charlotte Thirty Ltd. v. Croker Ltd [ 1990] 24 Const. L. R. 46. 
288 
before the time of contract. 
3399 
2.2.2. Legislative control 
2.2.2.1. General 
The legislative control of exemption clauses in English law must be examined in light of two 
overlapping legal regimes; the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (hereinafter UCTA) and the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (hereinafter the Regulations). 1400 The 
reason for this is that English law has failed to consolidate the new rules, which had to be 
implemented by virtue of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, '40' with 
those already contained in UCTA. As a result there are two separate but overlapping legislative 
1399 Couchman v. Hill [ 1947] KB 554. 
1400 The Regulations replace earlier regulations made in 1994 which were introduced to implement the 
EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. For discussions on the EC Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts or the Regulations 1994, see Beale, "Legislative Control of Fairness: The 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts", in: Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 231 
ff.; Brownsword and Howells, "The Implementation of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms", (1995) J. B. L. 
243; Macdonald, "Mapping the Unfair Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts", (1994) J. B. L. 441; Reynolds, "Unfair Contract Terms", (1994) 110 L. Q. R. 1; Weatherill, 
"Prospects for the Development of European Private Law Through "Europeanisation" in the European 
Court - The Case of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts", (1995) 3 Eur. Rev. of 
Private Law 307, at 316 ff.; Harrison, Good Faith in Sales, (1997), at 699 ff. Cf. Bright and Bright, 
"Unfair Terms in Land Contracts: Copy Out or Cop Out", (1995) 111 L. Q. R. 655; Collins, "Good Faith in 
European Contract Law", (1994) 14 O. J. L. S. 229; De Moor, "Common and Civil Law Conceptions of 
Contract and a European Law of Contract; The Case of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts", (1995) 3 Eur. Rev. of Private Law 257; Tenreiro, "The Community Directive on Unfair 
Terms and National Legal Systems The Principle of Good Faith and Remedies for Unfair Terms", (1995) 
3 Eur. Rev. of Private Law 273; Joerges, "The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation 
Process and as a Contest of Disciplines - an Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts", (1995) 3 Eur. Rev. of Private Law 175; Whittaker, "Unfair Contract Terms, Public Services 
and the Construction of a European Conception of Contract", (2000) 116 L. Q. R. 95; Howells & 
Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law, (1997), at 88 ff. 
1401 93/13/EEC, O. J. No. L. 95,21. 
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controls applicable to exclusion and similar clauses in contracts even though the two separate 
controls may generally produce the same results in many respects, but one must note that they 
differ in some important respects. It is accordingly crucial for the seller seeking to rely on 
exclusion clauses as to his liability for non-conformity to pass through the double barrier of 
UCTA and the Regulations. This is not only because of the different tests used but also the 
different scope of application between them. In UCTA, exemption clauses as to the seller's 
liability for non-conformity are divided into two categories; 1402 clauses always ineffective'403 
and clauses subject to the test of reasonableness. '404 Unlike UCTA, which treats different 
clauses in different ways, the Regulations control exemption clauses invariably by virtue of the 
test of faimess. 'aos 
2.2.2.2. UCTA 
2.2.2.2.1. Clauses always ineffective 
If a clause purports to exclude or restrict liability under the implied conditions under the SGA 
(the seller's implied undertakings as to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to 
their quality or fitness for a particular purpose), "" it is always of no effect insofar as the buyer 
is dealing as a consumer. "" The buyer deals as a consumer if three conditions are satisfied; 
first, he is not buying in the course of a business, second, the seller is selling in the course of a 
. 
'4o8 business, three, the goods are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption 
1402 For varieties of exemption clauses, see UCTA s. 13; Guest, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 14-060 
ff. 
1403 UCTA s. 6(2). 
4404 UCTA ss. 3,6(3). 
1405 Regulation 5,6. 
1406 The SGA ss. 13,14 and 15. 
1407 UCTA s. 6(2). 
1408 UCTA s. 12(1). Anyhow s. 14 of the SGA attaches only where the seller sells 
in the course of a 
business. 
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The concept of a sale `in the course of a business' is defined in light of the contractor's status in 
the particular contract rather than its general status. In R&B Customs Brokers Ltd. v. UDT 
Finance Ltd., the Court of Appeal held that the buyer only makes a contract `in the course of a 
business' within UCTA, either where the purchase was an integral part of the business, or where 
it is one of a regular kind of contract made by the buyer. "09 In addition to the above three 
conditions, for the buyer to deal as a consumer, a sale must not be by auction or by competitive 
tender. 1410 
2.2.2.2.2. Clauses subject to reasonableness test 
Unlike the above category of clauses always ineffective, some clauses in the other category 
may be valid but only if they satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. In relation to our 
discussion about the seller's liability for defective goods, clauses subject to the requirement of 
reasonableness can be divided into two groups; clauses regarding quantitative and qualitative 
defects. 
First, if a clause excludes or restricts the seller's liability about quantitative defects, it is 
invalid where it does not fulfil the requirement of reasonableness. 14" The requirement applies 
whether or not the buyer is dealing as a consumer but, if he is not, then it only applies where the 
'. 'a'2 buyer is dealing on the other party's `written standard terms of business 
1409 [1988] 1 All ER 847 (this case relied on decisions on the meaning of `in the course of a business' in 
cases under the Trade Description Act; Davies v. Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301; Havering London 
Borough v. Stevenson [ 1970] 3 All ER 609). See also Rasbora Ltd. v. JCL Marine Ltd. [ 1977] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 645; Peter Symons & Co. v. Cook [1981] 131 NLJ 758. Cf. Stevenson v. Rogers [1999] 1 All ER 
613 (holding that any sale by a business, whatever incidental or one-off, is deemed to be a transaction `in 
the course of a business' under the meaning of s. 14 the SGA). De Lacy, "Selling in the Course of a 
Business under the Sale of Goods Act 1979" (1999) 62 M. L. R. 776; De Lacy, "Business Seller's Liability 
for the Implied Terms under the Sale of Goods Act 1979" (Jan., 2000) Insolv. L. 27. 
1410 UCTA s. 12(2). 
1411 UCTA s. 3(2). 
1412 UCTA s. 3(1). Cf. McCrone i'. Boots Farm Sales Ltd. [1981] SLT 103 (a Scottish case on the 
meaning of the equivalent phrase `standard form contract' where Lord Dunpark said that the term is wide 
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Second, if an exclusion clause relates to the implied conditions in ss. 13-15 of the SGA, but the 
buyer is not deemed to deal as a consumer within the scope of s. 6(2) of UCTA, the 
reasonableness requirement applies. 
'413 Unlike the exclusion clause as to the seller's liability 
about quantitative defects, it is immaterial whether the buyer is purchasing on the other party's 
written standard terms of business. 1414 
The reasonableness requirement, strictly speaking, differs according to whether an exclusion 
clause is related to quantitative and qualitative defects. As to the former, the test is whether the 
term was a fair and reasonable one to have included in the contract, having regard to 
circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to the parties at the time 
when the contract was made. 1415 Regarding the latter, there are guidelines set out in Schedule 
21416 They include following factors: (a) the relative strengths of the parties' bargaining 
positions, taking into account alternative means by which the customer's requirements might be 
met; (b) whether the customer received any inducement to agree the term, or in accepting it had 
an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with any other person without accepting a 
similar term; 1417 (c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
enough "to include any contract, whether wholly written or partly oral, which includes a set of fixed 
terms or conditions which the proposer applies without material variation to contracts of the kind in 
question"). Although the object of the concept of standard terms is in principle to identify contracts 
which are not individually negotiated, a buyer may deal on standard terms even where there has been 
negotiation, which may depend on the question of fact. See St Albans City and District Council v. 
International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All E. R. 481; see also Salvage Assn. v. Cap Financial Services Ltd 
[ 1995] F. S. R. 654; The Flamar Pride [ 1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 434. 
1413 UCTA s. 6(3). 
1414 Atiyah and Adams, supra n. 421, at 208; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at para. 13-083. 
1415 UCTA s. 11(1). 
1416 UCTA s. 11(2). The onus of proving that it was reasonable to incorporate a term in a contract lies on 
the party so contending. UCTA s. 11(5). 
1417 Woodman v. Photo Trade Processing Ltd. (7 May 1981, unreported), cited in Lawson, "The Unfair 
Contract Terms Act: A Progress Report" (1981) 131 NLJ 933, at 935. In this case, a clause in a contract 
for the processing of a roll of photographic film which provided the limitation of the developer's liability 
to the cost of replacement of the unprocessed film was held unreasonable where the customer claimed 
damages for the loss of pictures of a family wedding. The court was influenced by the fact that the 
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existence and extent of the term; 1418 (d) where the term excludes or restricts liability unless some 
condition is complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that 
compliance with that condition would be practicable; '419 (e) whether the goods were 
manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the customer. Where an exclusion 
clause seeks to restrict the liability of the seller to a specified sum of money, regard is to be had 
in particular to: (a) the resources available to the party relying on the term for the purposes of 
meeting the potential liability; (b) how far it was open to him to protect himself by insurance. '420 
Although Schedule 2 is applicable strictly only to the cases of the exclusion clauses as to the 
implied conditions, one must note that the courts are likely to consider the guidelines in other 
cases. '42' 
2.2.2.3. Regulations 
The Regulations impose two requirements; the requirement that the terms be `plain, intelligible 
language' which applies only to any written term1422 and the requirement of fairness which 
customer had little choice: few film processors accepted greater liability than the defendants and the 
industry code of practice required processors to offer a two-tier service whereby the processor would 
accept greater liability on payment of an increased price. 
1418 Terms in small print or in difficult language are likely to be held unreasonable. See The Zinnia 
[1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211; Knight Machinery Holdings Ltd. v Rennie [1995] S. L. T 166 (a clause 
requiring notification of rejection within 7 days in a contract for the supply of a printing machine was 
held ineffective partly because of its lack of clarity as to what was required). 
1419 R. W. Green Ltd. v. Cade Bros. Farms [1978] Q. B. 574 (a short time limit on claims on a bulk sale of 
seed potatoes was held unreasonable as to latent defects). 
1420 UCTA s. 11(4). Cf. Salvage Assn. v. Cap Financial Services Ltd [1995] F. S. R. 654 (a clause limiting 
liability to £25,000 was held unreasonable when the party relying on the clause had indemnity insurance 
of £5,000,000). 
taxi Stewart Gill Ltd. v. Horatio Myer & Co. Ltd. [1992] QB 600; The Flamar Pride [1990] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 434; Singer Co. (U. K. ) Ltd. v. Tess and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 164,169. 
See Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 86; Beale, supra n. 1400, at 235; Reynolds, Guest (ed. ), supra n. 515, at 
para. 13-085; Guest, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 14-082. 
1 122 Regulation 7(1). 
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applies to any term (whether written or oral). 
1423 In relation to the former, where there is doubt 
as to the meaning of a written term, it shall be interpreted in a way most favourable to the 
consumer. 14' This effect does not seem to add more than the principle of contra proferentem 
that has been long recognised in English law. The particular importance of the Regulations in 
English law, concerning exclusion clauses as to the seller's liability for non-conformity, is 
found where their scope of application is wider than UCTA and where their test of fairness 
differs from the test of reasonableness in UCTA. 
As to the scope of Regulations, it applies to any contract made between a `seller or supplier' 
and `consumer', subject to certain exclusions. "" 'Consumer' is defined as `a natural person 
who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is acting for purposes which are outside his 
trade, business or profession' . 
1426 This definition seems wider than that of UCTA in that, first, 
as regards contracts for the sale of goods, it does not require that the goods be `of a type 
ordinarily supplied for use or consumption' 1427 (but note that insofar as ss. 13-15 of the SGA are 
concerned, such goods will be still within UCTA), 1428 and second, it covers the consumer's 
purchase at an auction sale or by competitive tender. '429 `Seller or supplier' for the purpose of 
the Regulations is meant `any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by these 
Regulations, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly 
owned or privately owned'. 1430 This definition could be also wider than that of UCTA in that, if 
1423 Regulation 5(1). 
1424 Regulation 7(2). 
1425 Regulation 4(1). 
1426 Regulation 3(1). 
1427 UCTA s. 12(1)(c). 
1428 UCTA s. 6(3). 
1429 UCTA s. 12(2). See Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 15-017; Atiyah, Adams and 
Macqueen, The Sale of Good, (2001), at 257. Cf. It is also narrower than that of UCTA in that it clearly 
excludes a company so that the buyer in R&B Customs Brokers would not be a `consumer' under the 
Regulations. Whittaker, id.; Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 86; Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 
812, at 238. 
1430 Regulation 3(1). 
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the R&B case143' is applied to the question whether the seller acted `in the course of a business' 
under UCTA, 
1432 it may cover the case, for instance, where a company sells off one of its old 
cars because the sale may not be `in the course of a business' under UCTA1433 (but note that so 
far as ss. 13-15 of the SGA are concerned, it may be still caught by UCTA). 1434 In addition, 
one must also note that the scope of the Regulations is wider in that unlike UCTA, '435 it does not 
require that the contract as a whole be on standard terms; '436 the Regulations apply to individual 
terms and it expressly stipulates that the fact that an individual term has been negotiated shall 
not impede the application of the Regulations to the rest of the contract if an overall assessment 
of it indicates that it is a pre-formulated standard contract. "" 
Regarding the test of fairness, the Regulations set out two sets of criteria to be taken into 
consideration in deten-nining the fairness of a term; first, the term must create a significant 
imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer, and second, the creation of that imbalance must be contrary to the requirement of 
good faith. '438 In assessing the fairness of a term, the following factors should be also taken into 
account; first, the nature of the goods or services, second, all the circumstances attending the 
1431 Supra n. 1409. 
1432 It is submitted that the position in English law is not clear because R&B case concerns the status of 
the buyer rather than the seller. Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 81 ff. 
1433 Id, at 89. However, if Stevenson v. Rogers case (supra n. 1409) is applied, any transaction other than 
a purely private one may be `in the course of a business', which leads the case to fall within the scope of 
both the Regulations and UCTA. Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 89. 
1434 UCTA s. 6(3). 
1435 However, it is also narrower in that while UCTA can be applied to both negotiated and non- 
negotiated terms in consumer contracts (see supra n. 1412), the Regulations are applicable only to terms 
which have not been `individually negotiated', as defined in Regulation 5(2). Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 
91; cf. Scott and Black, Cranston's Consumers and the Law, (2000), at 90 f. 
1436 Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 91. Thus, the Regulations do not raise the difficulties under s. 3 of 
UCTA where a standard term is used as a basis for negotiation leading to variation of some of its terms. 
Id. Cf. Guest, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 14-069; Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 15- 
024. 
1437 Regulation 5(3). 
1438 Regulation 5. 
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conclusion of the contract, and third, all other terms of the contract or of a contract on which it 
is dependent, 1439 One must note that the assessment of fairness does not extend to the matters of 
core terms; the main subject matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price. '44° Although 
it is not expressly stipulated in the Regulations, the requirement of plain and intelligible 
language in any written term of a contract'' is likely to constitute an important factor in the 
assessment of fairness because an unintelligible term may deprive a consumer of a real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted with its effect. "" In addition, the Regulations contain an 
`indicative and non-exhaustive list(s) of the terms which may be regarded as unfair'. 1443 This 
list is a list for the terms which it contains are not necessarily to be held unfair, but they will 
provide a general presumption of unfairness. ' 
In most cases, the crucial criteria in the assessment of fairness are likely to be the general 
1439 Regulation 6(1). For the detailed explanations on these factors, see Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 
846, at para. 15-039 ff. 
1440 Regulation 6(2); cf. Director General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc. [2000] 2 All ER 
759 (it was held that a term in a consumer credit agreement which provided that, in the event of default 
by the consumer, interest should continue to be payable on any outstanding sums at the contract rate and 
that interest on the debt would continue to run after any judgment, did not define the main subject matter 
because it related to default interest and did not concern the adequacy of the price or remuneration); 
Falco Finance Ltd. v. Gough [1999] C. C. L. R. 208. Although Regulation 6(2) may possibly involve the 
implied conditions under the SGA, it is submitted that it is unlikely to exclude the conditions from the 
test of fairness because otherwise the Regulations may lose their substantial power to control unfair 
terms. Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 91. One must note that, in any case, the exclusion of the core terms 
applies only if the term in question is expressed in plain and intelligible language (Regulation 6(2)) and 
the terms can be taken into account when assessing the fairness of individual terms covered by the 
Regulations. Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 92; Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 15-027. 
1441 Regulation 7. 
1442 Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 15-071; Beale, supra n. 1400, at 248; cf. UCTA 
Schedule 2(c). However, one must note that it may overlap with the factor of "all the circumstances 
attending the conclusion of the contract" in Regulation 6(1). Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 
15-041. 
1443 Regulation 5(5), Schedule 2. 
1444 The main concern in this thesis that is the seller's liability for non-conformity in quality and quantity 
draws one's attention in particular to para. 1(b) of Schedule 2. 
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requirement of good faith and its relationship with the requirement of `significant 
imbalance'. "' Although there is little guidance as to the requirement in the Regulations, the 
recitals to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts provide the following 
factors to which regard should be had in the assessment of good faith; (a) the strength of the 
bargaining positions of the parties, (b) whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the 
term, (c) whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the 
consumer, and (d) whether the seller or supplier has dealt fairly and equitably with the 
consumer. '446 These factors seem more or less similar to the guidelines in the assessment of 
`reasonableness' under UCTA as the first three factors are found in Schedule 2 of UCTA. " 7 
The fourth factor appears to suggest that it differs from UCTA in that the seller's conduct after 
the conclusion of the contract may also form a factor for the test of good faith. '448 However, 
one must note that insofar as the requirement of good faith is intended to qualify the fairness of 
the term, it seems irrelevant to the fairness of a party's post-conduct, and consequently it seems 
to become clear that the fourth factor is already included in the general test's reference to "all 
the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract. "`9 
2.3. The Directive 
The rules in the Directive are of a mandatory nature in that any clauses in the contract of sale 
which seek to directly or indirectly waive or restrict the rights of a consumer resulting from the 
1445 Regulation 6(1). See Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 92. 
1446 Recital 16. These factors were included in Schedule 2 of the 1994 Regulations, which was omitted 
from the 1999 Regulations because the Schedule was not justified by the text of the EC Directive on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
1447 UCTA Schedule 2(a), (b) and (e). 
1448 Whittaker, Beale (ed. ), supra n. 846, at para. 15-044. While UCTA clearly stipulates the burden of 
proof of reasonableness on the party seeking to rely on the exclusion clause in question (s. 11(5)), neither 
the Regulations nor the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts provides a rule for the 
burden of proof of fairness. Id., at para. 15-047. 
1449 id. 
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Directive will not bind the consumer. 145' However, it is permissible for the seller or consumer 
to agree that the seller's liability for non-conformity of second-hand goods can be for a shorter 
period of no less than one year. 
1451 
This mandatory nature is applied insofar as the contract of sale is within the scope of the 
Directive, which must be examined in the following aspects. First, a consumer must be "any 
natural person who, in the contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are 
not related to his trade, business or profession". last It has been submitted that the intentional 
omission of the word, `directly', in the definition of consumer that was inserted in the previous 
draft Directive seems to exclude all purchases either directly or indirectly connected to his 
trade, business or profession, 
1453 The clear wording of `natural person' in the definition of a 
consumer, as contrasted with that of a seller, seems to exclude a company or other legal person 
however small from the definition of a consumer. Second, a seller must fall within the 
definition of a seller under the Directive which describes it as "any natural or legal person who, 
under a contract, sells consumer goods in the course of his trade, business or profession". "" It 
is not clear whether a sale "in the course of his trade, business or profession" under the 
Directive is extended to the cases of a seller's any incidental or one-off sale, although it was 
submitted by a scholar that the cases may be out of the scope of the Directive on the basis of its 
use of languages of "in the course of `his' business" rather than "in the course of `a' 
business". 1455 Third, subject-matter must be consumer goods which are defined widely as "any 
tangible movable item" with the exception of (a) goods sold by execution or otherwise by 
authority of law, (b) water and gas where not sold in a limited volume or set quantity and (c) 
1450 Directive(99/44) Art. 7.1. 
1451 Id. 
1452 Directive(99/44) Art. 1.2(a). 
1453 See supra n. 631-633 and accompanying texts. E. g., a car dealer purchasing a computer for his 
office is out of the scope of the Directive. 
1454 Directive(99144) Art. 1.2(c). 
1455 See supra n. 634-635 and accompanying texts. 
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electricity. 
'456 Fourth, the transaction in question must be a "contract of sale". 145' Although the 
Directive does not define it, it clearly includes a contract for the supply of consumer goods to be 
manufactured or produced'... and a contract for the supply of consumer goods to be installed. "" 
2.4. CISG 
Under CISG, it is expressly stated that the parties may derogate from or modify the effect of 
any of its provisions. '460 Therefore, the parties under CISG are in principle free to insert a 
clause in the contract to exclude or restrict the seller's liability for defective goods. The validity 
of the clause is controlled by virtue of the rules of domestic laws because CISG only concerns 
the rules as to sales contract formation and the rights and obligations of the parties to the sale, 
whereas it does not deal with the matters of validity of the contract, of any of its provisions or of 
any usage, and of the effect the contract may have on the property in the goods sold. 'a6' 
2.5. Comparative view 
As was examined, the approaches to control of exclusion clauses in English law and Korean 
law are similar in general that in order to be effective, the clause is subject to the following 
tests; whether it is properly incorporated into the contract, whether its proper interpretation 
covers the loss which has arisen, and whether it is fair or reasonable. There seems no particular 
difference in the second test in a sense that the construction of the clause is executed in a 
1456 Directive(99/44) Art. 1.2(b). The Member States have an option that second-hand goods sold at 
public auction when consumers have the opportunity of attending the sale in person are not within the 
meaning of "consumer goods". Directive(99/44) Art. 1.3. Cf. Williams & Hamilton, "The Impact in the 
U. K. of the E. U. Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees: Part 1", (2000) 
11(9)1. C. C. L. R. 318, at 320 f. 
1457 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.1. 
1458 Directive(99/44) Art. 1.4. 
1459 Directive(99/44) Art. 2.5. 
1460 CISG Art. 6. 
1461 CISG Art. 4. Cf. Hartnell, "Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" (1993) 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 1. 
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restrictive way in each jurisdiction, "" whereas the first and the third test seem to show some 
dissimilarities. 
Regarding the first test, it seems different in that unlike English law, the buyer's signature on a 
document including a clause in question is not necessarily a crucial factor to decide whether the 
clause is incorporated into the contract in Korean law1463 and in that there is no counterpart in 
English law of the seller's duty to explain the essential part of the contract. 14M 
In respect of the third test, one needs a further examination, particularly, in the ambit of the 
application of the reasonableness or fairness test and in the factors to be considered for the test. 
First, as to the ambit of the application of the reasonableness or fairness test, UCTA seems 
broader than KARST in that it is not restricted to the terms which have not been individually 
negotiated . 
146' Although the Regulations are similar to KARST in this light, "' the requirement 
in KARST that it be intended to be incorporated into numerous contracts has no counterpart in 
the Regulations . 
1467 However, given that most standard terms in consumer contracts are 
generally intended to be incorporated into numerous contracts, this seems to bear no 
significance in practice. Second, regarding the factors to be considered in defining 
reasonableness or fairness, the tests of `unreasonable disproportion""' and `unreasonable 
ground' under KARST1469 seem similar to the test of fairness under the Regulations 1470 in that 
1462 See supra n. 1368-1370,1393-1394 and accompanying texts. Although there is no requirement in 
English law that it must be construed by virtue of the principle of good faith, it is unlikely that thorough 
examination of the cases in English law would produce different results from Korean law. 
1463 See supra n. 1360,1389 and accompanying texts. 
1464 See supra n. 1364-1366 and accompanying texts. But it seems similar in light of their application of 
stringent rules requiring the clause to be effectively incorporated into the contract (e. g., both jurisdiction 
requires the seller to give the buyer a reasonable notice of the clause (supra n. 1361-1362,1390-1392 and 
accompanying texts)). 
146 See supra n. 1354-1355,1412 and accompanying texts. 
1466 See supra n. 1435-1437 and accompanying texts. 
1467 See supra n. 1356 and accompanying texts. 
1468 See supra n. 1381-1383 and accompanying texts. 
1469 See supra n. 1371-1375 and accompanying texts. Cf. The prohibition of an exclusion clause of the 
seller's guarantee liability unless it is proved `a reasonable ground' in KARST may be ensured by the 
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they appear to focus on imbalance in terms of value for money and all other terms of an 
agreement. In addition, the test of `unexpectedness' 147' and `contradiction of material terms' 
under KARST14'2 and that of `reasonableness' in UCTA1473 look alike in the respect that they are 
both most concerned with the matter of the customers' reasonable awareness. 1474 The difference 
is in that, compared to KARST, English law has relatively detailed rules along with the 
guidelines for the application of reasonableness test under UCTA'475 that are similar to the 
criteria for the assessment of good faith under the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts. 1476 However, one must note that the general requirement of good faith in KARST'47 
may consider the same guidelines as English law, producing the same results in practice. 
The striking feature of English law and the Directive from the point of view of Korean law is 
that any attempt by the seller to exclude or restrict the seller's liability for defective goods ire 
quality is invariably void in consumer sales. 1478 In contrast, Korean law must look at the same 
test of fairness3479 and that of reasonable grounds as in commercial sales. MO Although it is 
submitted that those tests must be construed in a stricter way in consumer sales, "" it does not 
necessarily render the clause always invalid. As to the extent to which the seller's liability is 
not excludable, English law may be broader than the Directive in the following aspects. First, 
operation of the general test of unfairness to some extent on the basis of `unreasonable disproportion' or 
`unusual clause'. 
1470 See supra n. 1438-1439 and accompanying texts. 
1471 See supra n. 1384-1386 and accompanying texts. 
1472 See supra n. 1387-1388 and accompanying texts. 
1473 See supra n. 1415-1419 and accompanying texts. 
1474 For the similar concern in the Regulations, see supra n. 1441-1442 and accompanying texts. 
1475 See supra n. 1416-1421 and accompanying texts. 
1476 See supra n. 1446 and accompanying texts. 
1477 See supra n. 1379 and accompanying texts. 
1478 See supra n. 1406-14 10 and accompanying texts 
1479 See supra n. 1379-1388 and accompanying texts. 
1480 See supra n. 1371-1375 and accompanying texts. 
1481 Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1353, at 48. 
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the buyer in R&B Customs Brokers1482 who is a limited company would not fall within the 
definition of consumer within the Directive which requires being a natural person. 1483 Second, 
the intentional omission of `directly' from the definition of consumer in the Directive seems to 
make it clear that, for instance, while a car dealer who purchases a computer is excluded from 
the definition of consumer under the Directive, he may be within that under UCTA. '484 
However, English law may be narrower than the Directive in that unlike in UCTA, the Directive 
does not require that the goods be "of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or 
consumption ", 
1485 
3. Evaluating accounts 
3.1. Internal evaluation 
It has been submitted that the problems of fairness associated with the use of standard terms 
occur in the following cases; first, where the customer is unfairly taken by surprise due to his 
ignorance of the terms, and second, where even if he knows of the substance of the terms and 
objects to it, he is met with a take-it-or-leave-it situation. 
1486 
The first case is related to the situations where had the customer been aware of the 
1482 [ 19881 1 All ER 847. 
1483 Directive(99/44) Art. 1.2(a). 
1484 See supra n. 1409,1452-1453 and accompanying texts. In addition, if the use of languages of "in the 
course of `his' trade" under the Directive means that, as a scholar submitted, it excludes any incidental or 
one-off sale, the position in English law may be broader than the Directive because the sale may be 
within the meaning of "in the course of `a' business" under UCTA in accordance with Stevenson v. 
Rogers. See supra n. 634-635,1454-1455 and accompanying texts. 
1485 UCTA s. 12(1). The inclusion of a contract for the supply of consumer goods to be installed under 
the Directive appears that it is broader than English law. However, this is not true because the contract in 
English law may be governed by the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and s. 6(2)(b) of UCTA 
renders the supplier's liability as to quality unexcludable. 
1486 Beale, "Unfair Contracts in Britain and Europe", (1989) 42 Current Legal Problems 197, at 201 ff.; 
cf. Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [19671 1 AC 
361,406, per Lord Reid. 
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implications of exclusion clauses, he would not have accepted it or would have taken steps to 
safeguard his position. Given that the vast majority of customers' complaints about exclusion 
clauses of the seller's guarantee liability are likely questions of unfair surprise, 1487 one's first 
question should be whether he was aware of the clauses and their implications. However, in 
light of the useful functions of standard terms for mass-contracts, the test of unfairness does not 
necessarily require that the clauses provide the customer with individualised information, but it 
should suffice that they are conspicuous and transparent from the point of view of the run of 
average customers. 148' Although both English law and Korean law do not expressly require that 
the clauses be conspicuous and transparent, English law may protect the run of average buyers 
from an unintelligible clause because the requirement of conspicuousness and transparency is 
likely to constitute a factor in assessing the test of unreasonableness under UCTA1A89 and 
possibly the test of fairness under the Regulations. "'0 In contrast, it is not clear that the buyers 
are properly protected in Korean law in relation to an exclusion clause of the seller's guarantee 
liability. The reason for this is that it is arguable that the test of unexpectedness in KARST 
which undoubtedly takes into account the matter of conspicuousness and transparency"" should 
be imposed on an exclusion clause of the seller's guarantee liability even after it has satisfied 
with the test specifically designed for the clause in KARST which does not seem to concern the 
matter. ' 492 
The second case is of relevance where the customer is well aware of the implications of an 
exclusion clause, but he has no choice but to accept the clause because he has no bargaining 
power to get it changed and is unable to find another supplier who will offer better terms. One 
1487 In the present state of empirical knowledge, this proposition can be made only at a guess. See Beale, 
supra n. 1486, at 201; Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 247. 
1488 Beale, supra n. 1486, at 202; Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 247. 
1489 UCTA Schedule 2(c); Stag Line Ltd. v. Tyne Shiprepair Group Ltd [ 1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211. 
1490 See supra n. 1441-1442 and accompanying texts. 
1491 See supra n. 1384-1386 and accompanying texts. 
1492 See supra n. 1377-1378 and accompanying texts. For the specifically designed test, see supra n. 
1371-1375 and accompanying texts. 
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of the reasons why one ever strikes down a clause which is well understood but cannot be 
negotiated rests on feelings that there are, as a matter of social policy, certain rights of which 
the customer should not be deprived and certain obligations that suppliers should not be able to 
avoid. '493 This seems true where the law prohibits a clause excluding liability for death and 
injury resulting from negligence. 
1494 However, regarding our main concern that is an exclusion 
clause of the seller's guarantee liability, the question arises whether the same is also true of the 
rule of English law forbidding a clause excluding certain implied conditions in consumer 
sales, 1495 It has been argued that it may be justified on the ground that cases in which a 
particular consumer is fully aware of the clause and willing to accept it are so rare that it is 
better to ban the exclusion clause in every case. 
'496 In addition, it could be also justified on the 
basis that a control by virtue of the `reasonableness' test and its likely uncertainty would 
weaken the consumer's bargaining position. 1497 If one assumes that these justifications are 
correct, it seems unfortunate in that Korean law does not allow the absolute ban. The same is 
also true that unlike the Directive, the absolute ban under UCTA does not apply where the 
goods are not "of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption"1498 because it is 
conceivable that many business items are commonly purchased for private use. 1499 
1493 Cf. Law Commission 69, Second Report on Exemption Clauses in Contracts, (1975), at para. 146; 
Beale, supra n. 1486, at 205. 
1494 UCTA s. 2(1); cf. KARST Art. 7(1) (it prohibits a clause excluding any legal liability caused by 
gross negligence or by intention). See Beale, supra n. 1486, at 205. 
1495 See supra n. 1406-1410 and accompanying texts. 
1496 Beale, "Inequality of Bargaining Power", (1986) 6 O. J. L. S. 123, at 135. 
1497 Law Commission 24, Exemption Clauses in Contracts; First Report, (1969), at para. 73; Beale, supra 
n. 1496, at 135. Cf. It is also justified as paternalism that even if consumers are willing to take the clause, 
they should not be allowed to do so because it is not in their real interests. Kennedy, "Distributive and 
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power", (1982) 41 Maryland L. R. 563; cf. Ramsay, supra n. 54, at 54 f. 
1498 UCTA s. 12(1). 
1499 Bradgate, supra n. 1397, at 83. Cf. In addition, it is doubted the position in the Directive that a 
limited company and all purchases either directly or indirectly connected to the buyer's trade, business 
and profession would be excluded from the absolute ban (see supra n. 1482-1484 and accompanying 
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3.2. External evaluation 
When the law controls terms in a contract, it is said that the law regulates the contract. The 
economic rationale for regulating contracts resembles the economic rationale for regulating 
markets. 1500 The economic rationale for regulating markets begins with a description of a 
perfectly competitive market, which requires no regulation. 'so' Any departure from the 
perfectly competitive market is the central economic rationale for intervention by the law to 
remove barriers to the smooth operation of markets. 'so2 Therefore, the law to control standard 
form contracts should be evaluated in terms of the question of how efficiently it corrects market 
failures by regulating the terms of contracts. 'so3 
One market failure is related to the existence of monopoly or oligopoly. The use of standard 
terms itself was thought to indicate the existence of monopoly or oligopoly constituting some 
form of exploiting the weaker party in terms of value for money and the exploitation was used 
as a term of opprobrium to undermine the enforceability of a contract. '504 However, this thought 
cannot be justified as long as sellers use standard terms to increase the efficiency of exchange; 
first, it can promote price competition by reducing product differentiation, and second, it 
texts) because the justification based on an unequal bargaining power seems to make imperative the 
protection of the small merchant buyers as well who has no more ability to negotiate and understand a 
contract than does an ordinary consumer. Cf. For a study to recognise and protect the small merchant 
buyers, see Warkentine, "Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and 
`Merchant/Consumers' Through Default Provisions" (1996) 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 39. 
1500 Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 186. 
1501 For the fundamental conditions for the optimal operation of a competitive market, see supra n. 24 
and accompanying texts. 
1502 For various kinds of market failures, see supra n. 45-49 and accompanying texts. 
1503 Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 186. 
1504 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308,1316, per Lord Diplock; 
Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum L. Rev. 
629, at 631. Cf. Priest, "A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty" (1981) 90 Yale L. J. 1297 (An 
empirical study shows no correlation between concentration and the use of exclusion clauses in 
guarantees offered by manufacturers in US). 
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reduces transaction costs for drafting, bargaining and agreement. 1505 Therefore, the use of 
standard terms may often indicate perfect competition rather than monopoly or oligopoly. '506 In 
addition, as to the rules based on the test of exploitation in terms of value for money, they do 
not seem to properly correct every possible market failure. The reason for that is that where 
harsh terms are rather "the result of information costs", 1507 the customer's preference over the 
price and its likely result of the supplier's offer of harsh terms with a lower price1508 may not 
constitute a form of market failure in the traditional sense of divergence from market value. 'so9 
In this light, it is unfortunate that the test of fairness under the Regulations is based on 
"imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations" which has connotations of exploitation in 
terms of value for money. 151' In addition, the view in Korean law that an exclusion clause of the 
seller's guarantee should be controlled only by the specifically designed test for such a clause 
under KARST15" seems doubtful given that, as most scholars understand, the test is simply 
based on the existence of imbalance or disproportion in light of value for money or terms of an 
agreement. 1512 The reason for that is that otherwise it would open a possibility for the supplier 
to claim there was no overall imbalance as a harsh term is offset by a lower price. In this sense, 
it seems that another view in Korean law that even if an exclusion clause passes the specifically 
1505 Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 27, at 252. 
1506 Id. 
1507 Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 232. 
1508 That is, when suppliers offer more favourable terms with a higher price, many customers often fail to 
understand the reason for the higher price and even think not worthwhile to scrutinize it so that they will 
naturally seek a less expensive contract elsewhere. It may, thus, result in that the suppliers are likely to 
find it more profitable if he shifts more risks expressly to the ignorant customers by using standard terms. 
At the end, the customers' preference over the price may produce a tendency toward harsh standard terms 
with a lower price where they are ignorant of full information about the standard terms. See Goldberg, 
supra n. 58, at 483 ff.; Trebilcock, "An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of Unconscionability", in: 
Reiter and Swan (ed. ), Studies in Contract Law, (1980), at 379 ff.; Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), 
supra n. 812, at 232; cf. for other possible explanations of harsh terms, see Beale, supra n. 1486, at 200. 
1509 Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 233. 
'510 Beale, supra n. 1486, at 200 f.; Beale, Beatson and Friedmann (ed. ), supra n. 812, at 242. 
1511 See supra n. 1377 and accompanying texts. 
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designed test, it must be also examined by the general rules for the unfairness test, 1513 is more 
plausible because a presumption of unfairness in the general rules is not limited to the cases of 
"any unreasonable disproportion" which has connotations of imbalance in terms of value for 
money and all other terms of an agreement, 
1114 but 
can be made on the basis of 
s "unexpectedness". "" 
Then, the question moves to a market failure in information. In the absence of adequate 
information as to an exclusion clause, the buyers (particularly consumers) may misjudge the 
costs or benefits of the transaction they are contemplating so that it may cause inefficient 
results. "" Therefore, the efficiency of the law to control the clause in a standard form contract 
relies on the fundamental question of how it redresses the market failure. Although it is 
unfortunate that both English law and Korean law do not provide a stricter sanction for the 
seller's failure to produce enough information, the test of unreasonableness under UCTA and 
that of fairness under the Regulations seem to consider this failure. In this regard, the position 
in Korean law depends upon one's interpretation as to the applicability of the test of 
unexpectedness to an exclusion clause of the seller's guarantee liability. "" However, it is 
worth noting that it is not necessary for all the buyers to be well informed in order for markets 
to be behaving competitively in light of one's consideration that information has the properties 
of a public good and a market perfecting effect because the small group of individuals who 
search for information and complain about the clause provide benefits to other buyers by 
1512 See supra n. 1371-1375 and accompanying texts. 
1513 See supra n. 1378 and accompanying texts. 
1514 See supra n. 1381-1383 and accompanying texts. Prof. Eun-young Lee argues that an exclusion 
clause offset by a lower price does not necessarily satisfy the test of unreasonable disproportion in every 
case, e. g., where it is economically or socially better to distribute some risks to the customers even if a 
higher price is inevitable. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 186. 
1515 See supra n. 1384-1386 and accompanying texts. 
1516 For the various kinds of inefficient results due to a market failure in information, see supra n. 50. 
1517 See supra n. 1377-1378 and accompanying texts. 
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keeping the sellers in line. 15's Therefore, one's question should not be on whether individuals 
are uninformed, but on whether this lack of information has produced non-competitive prices 
and terms. 
'599 
In respect of the controls of a clause to restrict or exclude certain implied conditions in English 
law, the prohibition of the clause seems plausible in most consumer sales because if consumers 
who are assumed risk-averse fully understood the clause, they probably would not agree to 
purchase the goods with the clause. Besides, it appears to acknowledge the realities of 
consumer transactions and help eliminate the economic inequalities in those transactions, 
redressing a possible market failure in a standard form transaction between consumer and 
business seller. Against the absolute ban and its justifications, some would argue that the rules 
provided by the law should not be the benchmark so that exclusions of the implied conditions 
should be allowed because some consumers may be often willing to purchase the goods that are 
flawed, e. g., a junked car on which to learn auto mechanics. The response to this argument can 
be made that eliminating exclusions of the implied conditions would not necessarily impose 
some kind of strict liability on all consumer sales because, for instance, `salvage' or `seconds' 
goods clearly labelled as such would have a lower quality as the expectation for fulfilling the 
conditions. '52° However, it is doubted that the response would also apply to other situations 
where a clause restricts the consumers' rights rendered in the event of breach of the implied 
conditions; e. g., exclusion of the liability for consequential losses. 152' The real question is 
`should the seller be always liable for the consequential losses even where the true intention of 
the parties is the consumers who will take the risk because the consumers are in a better position 
to insure the risk in question? ' It seems that this is not what the parties would expect. 152", In this 
1518 Ramsay, supra n. 50, at para. 4.8. ff. 
1519 Id. 
1520 Miller, supra n. 651, at 1583; Rosmarin, supra n. 651, at 1611, n. 72. 
1521 Hellner, "Consequential Loss and Exemption Clauses" (1981) 1 O. J. L. S. 13, at 26; Beale, supra n. 
1486, at 205 f. 
1522 Beale, id., at 206. Cf. Collins, Regulating Contracts, (1999), at 290 f. 
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light, unlike the above internal evaluation, the position in English law is seen as surprising from 
the point of view of Korean law that invariably relies on the test of reasonableness or fairness 
even in consumer sales, which has at least a room to uphold the clause by asking the question of 
`whether a known and understood risk exposes both the consumer and other most consumers to 
an unacceptable degree of risk, even if it is compensated by a lower price'"1523 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This study investigated the rules as to the exclusion of the seller's liability for defective goods 
in light of one of the purposes of this thesis to examine how effectively each law protects the 
reasonable expectation of the parties. In this light, the main questions were twofold; first, 
whether the rules reflect the interests of consumer which may be different from those of 
commercial buyers, and second, even if an issue is not related to the particular interests of 
consumers, whether they reflect the common interests of all the parties. 
I. Consumers' interests 
The position in Korean law that, unlike English law, it does not absolutely ban a clause 
excluding or limiting the seller's liability for defective goods in consumer sales does not seem 
to properly protect the consumers' interests because most consumers would not generally enter 
into a contract providing such a clause. In addition, the position in English law was inadequate 
to reflect the consumers' interests in that the absolute ban under UCTA does not apply where 
the goods are not of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption because it is 
conceivable that many business items are commonly purchased for a private use. However, the 
proposition that the absolute ban would provide a right answer in a consumer context was 
doubted where the consumers are in a better position to insure the risk of consequential losses. 
1523 Beale, id. Cf. Eun-young Lee, supra n. 1363, at 186. 
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4.2. Common interests 
Given that harsh terms are rather the result of information costs, some scholars' view in 
Korean law and possibly the Regulations do not seem to correct a market failure in information 
insofar as they base the control of the terms on the existence of imbalance or disproportion in 
light of value for money or terms of agreement. That is, their basis for the control of the terms 
may not correct a market failure in information which may cause the consumer's preference 
over the price and its consequences of the supplier's offer of harsh terms with a lower price 
because it may be possible for the supplier to claim that there was no overall imbalance or 
disproportion where a harsh term is offset by a lower price. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This study has discussed all the relevant rules as to the seller's liability for goods that do not 
conform to the contract in quality or quantity for the purposes of investigating, first, whether 
there is any need to introduce the unified liability system into Korean law and, if there is the 
need, how to achieve the unified liability system under the existing law; second, how effectively 
the relevant rules as to the seller's liability for non-conforming goods protect the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. 
1. The unified liability system in Korean law ? 
1.1. Dual liability system vs. Unified liability system 
As to the first purpose of this study, it asked the question of how the problems inherent in the 
dual liability system are exposed in light of the unified liability system, whether the problems 
are properly resolved in the unified liability system, and which liability system provides more 
clarity. It found that the dual liability system causes various complexities owing to the separate 
existence of general liability and the seller's guarantee liability which relies on its artificial 
distinction between `non-performance' and `defective performance'. Insofar as the 
complexities are inherently due to the separate existence of two liabilities, it was shown that the 
unified liability system can resolve most problems Korean law faces because in English law and 
CISG all the matters of non-performance are homogeneously dealt with under the name of 
breach of contract. In addition, all the complexities in Korean law prove by themselves that the 
unified liability system gives more clarity. 
1.2. Legal liability vs. Contractual liability 
Along the same line as the above findings, the study re-examined the two existing theories as 
to the nature of the seller's guarantee liability, which are closely related to the possible 
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unification of the dual liability system in Korea, in the light of the logic and reasonableness of 
each theory. The examination of the legal liability theory and its theoretical background based 
on the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio and specific goods dogma revealed themselves 
illogical and unreasonable under the existing legal system. Nevertheless, the further 
examination of the contractual liability theory which is much appreciated for its contribution for 
the unification of the dual liability system showed that its rationale to unify and simplify the 
dual liability system is proved somewhat illusive because it draws another casuistic distinction 
between fault and no-fault liability. That is, insofar as the distinction is ultimately based on the 
artificial idea that all the remedies in the general liability are governed by the fault principle and 
those in the seller's guarantee liability exist regardless of the fault principle, it has caused other 
complexities in its attempts to distinguish the remedies of rescission and damages in the general 
liability from those in the seller's guarantee liability. 
1.3. Introducing unified liability system into Korean law 
On the basis of the above examinations, the study set out two matters which need to be settled 
for the ultimate purpose of achieving a genuine unified liability system in Korean law which is 
free from all the complexities each theory faces; the matter of whether and how the seller's 
guarantee liability is understood as a contractual one in its nature and the matter of how to 
resolve the casuistic distinction between fault liability and no-fault liability. 
In relation to the former, it seems apparent that it should be a contractual one as was proved by 
the above further examination of two theories. However, given that the contractual nature is 
still arguable in terms of the theories themselves, the study suggested a legislative consideration 
to introduce a provision that there should be a contractual duty to deliver conforming goods in 
the sale of both generic and specific goods, which is similar to English law, CISG and the 
Directive. 
As to the latter, it submitted that the matter could be resolved by another way of thinking. 
This is that rescission and damages in the seller's guarantee liability should be as they are in the 
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general liability and the focus of the distinction should be based on the requirements of each 
remedy rather than resting on the artificial idea that all the remedies in the general liability are 
governed by the fault principle and those in the seller's guarantee liability exist regardless of the 
fault principle. That is, each remedy should be dealt with individually in terms of its own 
requirements so that, unlike the artificial idea, not all the remedies in the seller's guarantee 
liability are necessarily free from the fault principle. The interpretation may have the result that 
the remedy of damages requires fault, whereas that of rescission arguably does not. In order to 
realise this thinking under the existing law, the study suggested that one needs to find a new 
unitary concept of non-performance, such as `breach of contract' in English law and CISG, 
which is free from the fault principle because the previous concept of non-performance assumes 
the existence of fault in a sense that, where there is no fault, the existence of non-performance 
itself is denied. The use of the new concept isolated from the fault principle may enable one to 
deal with each remedy individually in terms of the requirement of fault. 
1.4. The substance of the rules as to the seller's guarantee liability in light of "Dual liability 
system vs. Unified liability system" and "Legal liability vs. Contractual liability" 
The complexities caused by having the dual liability system and by adopting either the legal 
liability theory or the contractual liability theory was further examined in relation to the 
substance of the rules as to the seller's guarantee liability. 
First, the separate treatments on the basis of the artificial distinction between `non- 
performance' and `defective performance', so that non-conformity both in quantity in the sale of 
specific goods and in quality is governed by the seller's guarantee liability, whereas delivery of 
aliud and non-conformity both in quantity in the sale of generic goods and in packaging are 
governed by the general liability, was proved itself unreasonable in light of the practicability 
and appropriateness of the rules, comparative study, the parties' preference and the rules' 
certainty. The reason for this is that, although all these aspects of non-conformity are 
interrelated, the distinction has substantial consequential differences in the requirements and the 
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remedies available. 
Second, it was argued that the objective criterion theory to judge the existence of non- 
conformity, based on an ordinary standard alone regardless of the parties' intention and 
supported by the legal liability theorists, is inferior to the subjective criterion theory based on 
the parties' intention and supported by the contractual liability theorists, in terms of history and 
logic, comparative study and the parties' preference. 
Third, an examination in the light of comparative study and the parties' preference showed 
that the relevant time when non-conformity must exist to raise the seller's guarantee liability 
should be at the time of the passage of risk, as is argued by the contractual liability theory. 
Fourth, the legal liability theory that does not allow the buyer's right of suspension under the 
seller's gurantee liability is criticised in the light of its practical importance where the seller has 
failed to perform his reciprocal contractual duties and its efficiency function in providing 
information on whether non-performance will occur. The problem of the legal liability theory is 
that its theoretical basis of the specific goods dogma may be interpreted as requiring that it be 
extended to substitutable and repairable goods and consequently the buyer's right to require the 
seller's cure under the seller's guarantee liability is available only after performing his duty to 
pay and take delivery; threrefore, if he wants to invoke the right to require the seller's cure 
under the seller's gurantee lability, he has to part with money even before the completion of the 
seller's cure and run a greater risk of non-performance by the seller. The reason for that is that 
the seller's delivery of defective goods as they were at the time of contract or specification is 
deemed to be complete performance of his duty. 
Fifth, the various views as to the scope of damages, along with the interpretation of price 
reduction, under the legal liability theory and the contractual liability theory were examined in 
light of the logic, practicability and appropriateness of each view, the argument that the 
expectation measure is the only measure of contract damages to enhance efficiency, and 
certainty in the interpretation of damages under the seller's guarantee liability. The examination 
revealed that none of the views submitted by either theory is adequate insofar as all the 
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problems each view has are basically related to the complexities inherent in the disputes as to 
the nature of the seller's guarantee liability and in the artificial distinction of fault and non-fault 
based liability. Consequently, it justified once more the arguments raised for the ultimate 
purpose of achieving a genuine unified liability system in Korean law in order to resolve the 
inadequacy in all those views. 
2. Protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties? 
In order to achieve another purpose of this study of investigating how effectively each law 
protects the reasonable expectation of the parties, the main question was posed whether the 
rules reflect the different interests of consumer and commercial buyers as well as those of 
private and business sellers, and even if an issue is not related to the particular interests of 
consumers or private sellers, whether they reflect the common interests of all the parties. 
2.1. Private sellers' interests 
In relation to private sellers' interests which may be distinguished from business sellers', the 
study found that Korean law and CISG seem to fail to reflect the former interests in that, unlike 
English law, the rules as to the existence of a defect under the seller's guarantee liability are 
correspondingly applied to sales even between private seller and commercial buyer, even if in 
many cases the extent of liability of the private seller may be considerably different from that of 
the business seller. 
2.2. Consumers' interests 
As regards consumers' interests, which may be differentiated from commercial buyers', each 
system showed its own drawbacks in various aspects. The drawbacks are summarised as 
follows. 
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2.2.1. The requirements for the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
First, the study revealed that the position in English law was doubted in that its separate 
treatment between breaches of quality duties and quantity duties results in that the absolute ban 
on the business seller's attempt to exclude or limit his liability in consumer sales is not applied 
to the matter of quantity. 
Second, it showed that the position in English law, Korean law and CISG, which does not take 
account of public statements made by the producer or his representative as a factor to decide the 
existence of non-conformity, does not seem to reflect the interests of consumers, who often rely 
on such statements in making their decisions. 
Third, it was found that the requirement of absence of negligence in failing to discover non- 
conformity at the time of sale in Korean law, which is more than the requirement of mere 
knowledge as to the existence of a defect in CISG, does not seem to reflect the interests of 
consumers, who decide to purchase the goods relying on the name of brand and the reputation 
of retailer even without looking at the goods and do not know when they are supposed to 
examine the goods at the time of purchase. The uncertain position in this matter under the 
Directive should be resolved in this light. 
Fourth, it was revealed that it is unfortunate that the Directive allows the Member States an 
option to impose a notice duty on the consumer and, fixes a minimum period of two months 
because most consumers are normally ignorant of the duty and even if they are aware of it, there 
may be many cases where the consumers take more than two months to appreciate they have a 
legal right and to prepare themselves for a claim. 
2.2.2. The effects of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
First, the study found that the absolute rights of suspension and termination seem crucial in 
consumer sales so that the position in Korean law and CISG under which the right of suspension 
depends on the slight or trivial nature of a defect, and the position in Korean law, the Directive 
and CTSG under which the right of termination depends on a certain degree of seriousness of 
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breach and the seller's right to cure after the delivery date, is inadequate in light of protecting 
consumers' interests. 
Second, it showed that non-recognition of a long-term right to reject in English law where 
there is a latent defect that could not be discovered within a reasonable time may be adverse to 
consumers' interests. 
The reason for the above two arguments is in the consumers' real interests that what they 
generally want is goods of the proper quality at the full price, not defective goods at a lower 
price. 
2.2.3. The exclusion of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
First, the thesis revealed that the absence of an absolute ban on a clause excluding or limiting 
the seller's liability in consumer sales under Korean law does not seem to properly protect the 
consumers' interests as they generally would not enter into the contract which has the clause. 
Second, by the same token, it is unfortunate in English law that the absolute ban under UCTA 
does not apply where the goods are not of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or 
consumption even though many business items are commonly purchased for a private use. 
However, it was doubted that the absolute ban is the right answer where consumers are in a 
better position to insure the risk of consequential losses. 
2.3. Common interests 
Although the issue was not directly related to the interests of consumers or private sellers as 
opposed to those of commercial buyers or sellers, the study tried to examine whether each 
jurisdiction properly reflects the common interests of all the parties and it showed in what 
aspects each jurisdiction fails to reflect those interests. 
2.3.1. The requirements for the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
First, the separate treatment between non-conformity in quality and in quantity and its 
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consequences under Korean law may not reflect the contracting parties' preference, given that 
the matter of quantity is, in its nature, generally similar to that of description as to quality. 
Second, the English position that the passage of risk, which is the relevant time when non- 
conformity must exist, is linked with the transfer of property rather than the handing over of the 
goods was unfortunate in light of the parties' preference because the parties are likely to put the 
risk of damage on who is in a better position to take care of the goods. This is rather more 
closely related to the matter of delivery than to the transfer of property. 
Third, it was found that the position in Korean law and the Directive that the relevant 
requirements as to ignorance of the existence of non-conformity and absence of negligence in 
failing to discover non-conformity are applicable to the cases of the contractual guarantees may 
interfere with the basis of bargain the parties have agreed where a buyer genuinely relies on a 
specific contractual guarantee by a seller who is supposed to remedy a non-conformity. 
Fourth, the study showed that CISG and the Directive, which provide a fixed time limit 
running from the time of delivery after which the buyer may lose any right to rely on a lack of 
conformity, may often face a criticism that it does not pay sufficient regard to the diversity in 
the goods and any arbitrary time limit may be contrary to the parties' intentions in some cases 
where non-conformity is hardly discovered until the expiry of the time limit. 
Fifth, Korean law which excludes the following two cases from the application of the notice 
duty was shown to be inappropriate to reflect the parties' interests; (a) where some professionals 
(e. g., artists, lawyers, and doctors who are not recognised as merchants) purchase goods either 
directly or indirectly relating to their profession, (b) where a merchant buyer purchases goods 
relating to his commercial purposes from a private seller whose transaction is not regarded as a 
commercial act. The reason for that is that the sellers in those cases are most likely to demand 
such a duty in order to prevent the buyers, who are deemed professional, from speculating at the 
expense of the seller and enable the slier to be sure that he does not need to reckon with claims 
at any particular time. 
Sixth, the silence as to the earliest time when the notice duty could emerge in documentary 
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sales in Korean law should be resolved in the light that most sellers in the documentary sales are 
likely to require the buyer to give a reasonable notice even before the seller's delivery of the 
goods if the buyer learns of non-conformity of the goods upon receiving documents. 
Seventh, it was found that a requirement in Korean law to raise the notice duty that the seller 
must be unaware of the existence of non-conformity at the time of delivery does not fully reflect 
the parties' intention. The reason for that is that, given that one of their purposes of imposing 
the notice duty on the buyer is to provide the seller with an opportunity to redress a non- 
conformity and to prepare for any negotiation or dispute with the buyer, the parties may prefer 
the relevant time to be the time when the period the buyer should give notice expires rather than 
at the time of delivery. 
Eighth, the requirement to specify the nature of non-conformity in the notice in Korean law 
and CISG seems inadequate in light of the parties' intention in a modern age of electronic 
communication. This is because insofar as a notice of mere dissatisfaction is likely to achieve 
the essential purpose of the notice duty to prevent the buyer's opportunistic behaviour, the seller 
is supposed to make inquires with the buyer to learn of what is the nature of non-conformity by 
a simple phone call in the modem age of electronic communication. 
Ninth, it was found that the position in Korean law and the Directive depriving the buyer of all 
the rights he can rely on in the event of his failure to give notice in timely and proper fashion is 
inappropriate to reflect the parties' intention since it may be harsh on most buyers in the context 
that a minor oversight would mean the loss of all their rights as to non-conformity even if the 
oversight was understandable and does not cause any substantial prejudice to the seller. The 
inappropriateness is even more apparent from the point of view of consumers who are not 
familiar with the notice. 
2.3.2. The effects of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
First, the rule in CISG that the relevant time for the foreseeability of substantial detriment to 
the buyer in the event of non-conformity as a requirement for a right of termination is at the 
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time of breach, rather than at the time of contract, interferes with the basis of the bargain 
between the parties which was agreed at the time of contract because the understanding 
provides the buyer with an opportunity to escape a bad bargain which was a risk originally born 
by the buyer. 
Second, in CISG and Korean law, allowing termination despite the buyer's inability to return 
the goods in substantially the same condition as he received them where he has transformed or 
consumed the goods in the course of normal business or use seems inappropriate in some cases 
where there has been a substantial drop in the market price because it may encourage the 
buyer's opportunism, transferring to the seller a market risk originally allocated to the buyer. 
Third, given that sales in the modern world are largely standardised and they are quickly and 
painlessly executed, one view in Korean law requiring the seller's fault on non-conformity for 
the expectation damages claim seems contrary to the parties' general preference that they are 
likely to guarantee the envisaged result rather than merely to do their best to procure it. 
Fourth, it was shown that a remedy of price reduction and its proportional calculation method 
in Korean law, CISG and the Directive seems to distort the original distribution of the risks of 
market fall which was agreed between the parties at the time of contract. 
Fifth, even if the price reduction remedy was agreed between the parties, the rules in CISG and 
possibly the Directive as to the relevant time for estimating the value of the goods actually 
delivered and that of the hypothetical conforming goods, which set it at the time of contract 
rather than that of delivery, would be also adverse to the parties' intention where there is a 
market fall because at the time of contract the buyer contemplates only to obtain the conforming 
goods rather than any inferior goods and the value of inferior goods is totally irrelevant until 
after the time of delivery when he discovers the lack of conformity. 
Sixth, the reluctance and uncertainty in English law of ordering specific performance based on 
the discretionary power does not reflect the parties' preference because the order is either 
uncertain or rather negative where the purchase of substitute goods elsewhere is not a 
satisfactory solution in many cases. 
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Seventh, the position in Korean law which has no limitation on the right to require specific 
performance is likely to be both unfair and contrary to the parties' intention where the buyer's 
exercise of such right may impose on the seller unreasonable costs or effort for providing 
substitute goods or remedying non-conformity. 
2.3.3. The exclusion of the seller's liability for non-conforming goods 
Assuming that harsh terms are rather the result of information costs, some scholars' view in 
Korean law and possibly the Regulations does not seem to correct a market failure in 
information as long as they control the terms to exclude or limit the seller's guarantee liability 
on the basis of the existence of imbalance or disproportion in light of value for money or terms 
of agreement. This is because where there is a market failure in information which often causes 
the consumer's preference over the price and its consequences of the supplier's offer of harsh 
terms with a lower price, their basis to control the terms would open a possibility for the 
supplier to claim that there was no overall imbalance or disproportion where a harsh term is 
offset by a lower price. 
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APPENDIX 
A. KOREAN CIVIL CODE (KCC) 
Book I. General Rules (1-184) 
Chap. V. Juristic Acts (103-154) 
Sec. 1. General rules (103-106) 
Article 105 (Optional Provisions) If the parties to a juristic act have declared an intention which differs 
from any provisions of laws or ordinances which are not concerned with good morals or other social 
order, such intention shall prevail. 
Chap. VII. Extinctive Prescription (162-184) 
Article 162 (Extinctive Prescription of Claims or Property Right) 
(1) A claim shall lapse if it is not exercised for ten years. 
(2) A property right other than a claim or ownership shall lapse if it is not exercised for twenty years. 
Book II. Real Rights (185-372) 
Chap. I. General Provisions (185-191) 
Article 188 (Effect of Changes in Real Rights over Movables, Easy Delivery) 
(1) The assignment of real rights over movables takes effect by delivery of the article in possession. 
(2) When an assignee holds the movables, the assignment takes effect by a mere declaration of intention 
by the parties. 
Book III. Claims (373-766) 
Chap. I. General Provisions (373-526) 
Sec. 1. Subject of Claims (373-386) 
Article 374 (Duty of an Obligor to Deliver a Specific Thing with Good Manager's Care) If the delivery of 
a specific thing is the subject of a claim the obligor is bound to preserve such thing with the care of a 
good manager until it is delivered. 
Article 375 (Claim in Species) 
(1) Where the subject of a claim is designated in species only, and its quality cannot be determined by the 
nature of the juristic act or by the intention of the parties, the obligor is bound to perform with a thing of 
medium quality. 
(2) If in the cases mentioned in the preceding Paragraph the obligor has completed all acts that are 
necessary for the performance or has with the consent of the obligee designated a thing to be performed, 
such thing shall thenceforth constitute the subject matter of the claim. 
Sec. 2. Effect of Claim 
Article 387 (Time for Performance and Delay of Performance) 
(1) Where a definite time for the performance of a claim is fixed, the obligor shall be responsible for 
delay as from the commencement of such time. If an indefinite time for the performance of a claim is 
fixed, the obligor shall be responsible for any delay as from the time when the obligor has become aware 
of the arrival of the time for performance. 
(2) If a time for the performance of a claim is not fixed, the obligor shall be responsible for the delay as 
from time when demand for performance has been made upon him. 
Article 388 (Forfeiture of the Benefit of Time) The obligor cannot claim the benefit of time under the 
following circumstances: 1. If the obligor has destroyed, diminished or extinguished the security; 2. If the 
obligor has failed to perform the obligation to furnish the security. 
Article 389 (Forced Execution of Obligation) 
(1) If an obligor does not perform his obligation on purpose, the obligee may apply to the court for 
specific performance thereof; but this shall not apply to cases where the nature of an obligation does not 
so permit. 
(2) If the obligation mentioned in the preceding Paragraph has a juristic act for its subject, application 
may be made to a court for a decision which shall act as a substitute for a declaration of intention by the 
obligor; if it has an act which is not entirely personal to the obligor for its subject, application may be 
made to the court to compel performance by a third person at the expenses of the obligor. 
(3) Where the obligation has forbearance for its subject, and the obligor has violated it, application may 
be made to the court to have that which has been violated by the obligor removed at the obligor's expense, 
and that reasonable precautionary steps be taken against future repetition. 
(4) The provisions of the three preceding Paragraph shall not affect a demand of compensation for 
damages. 
Article 390 (Non-performance of Obligations and Claim for Damages) If an obligor fails to effect 
performance in accordance with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages; 
but this shall not apply to cases where performance has become impossible and this is not due to the 
obligor's intention or fault. 
Article 391 (Intention or Negligence (Culpa) of the Helper for Performance) Where a legal representive 
(proxy) for the obligor effects performance in lieu of (proxy) the latter or the obligor effects performance 
through the other person as an employee, the intention or fault of the legal representive or other person 
shall be deemed as that of the obligor. 
Article 392 (Claims for Damages Arising from in the Course of Delayed Performance) The obligor shall 
be responsible for damages during delay of the performance even where he is not at fault; but this shall 
not apply to cases where the damage is inevitable even if he performed at the time when the time of 
performance became due. 
Article 393 (Extent of Demand for Damages) 
(1) The compensation for damages arising from the non-performance of an obligation shall be limited to 
ordinary damages. 
(2) The obligor is responsible for reparation for damages that have arisen through special circumstances, 
only if he had foreseen or could have foreseen such circumstances. 
Article 394 (Method of Reparation for Damages) In the absence of any different agreement the damages 
shall be recovered in money. 
Article 395 (Performance Delay and Reparation for Damages in Lieu of Performance) Where the obligor 
has delayed the performance of an obligation, and the obligor fails to perform within a reasonably fixed 
time that the obligee has given notice, or performance after delay is no longer profitable for the obligee, 
the obligee may refuse to accept performance and claim damages in lieu of (in return for) performance. 
Article 396 (Compensatio Culpae) If there has been any fault on the part of the obligee in regard to the 
non-performance of the obligation, the court shall take it into account in determining the liability for and 
assessing the amount of the damages. 
Sec. 6. Extinction of Claim (460-526) 
Sub-Sec. 1. Performance 
Article 462 (Delivery of a Specific Thing in its Existing Condition) If the delivery of a specific thing is 
the subject of the obligation, the obligor must deliver the thing in the condition in which it exists at the 
time when the delivery thereof is due. 
Chapter II. Contract (527-733) 
Sec. 1. General Rules (527-553) 
Sub-sec. 1. Formation of Contract (527-535) 
Article 535 (Culpa in Contrabendo) 
(1) In case the objective of a contract is unattainable and the contract is concluded, a party to the contract 
who was aware of, or should have been aware of such unattainability, shall be liable for damages suffered 
by the other party who relied upon the contract as valid. However, the amount of damages to be recovered 
may not exceed the profit which have accrued, if the contract was valid. 
(2) The provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall not apply in cases where the other party was aware of 
or could have been aware of such unattainability. 
Sub-sec. 2. Effect of Contract (536-542) 
Article 536 (Exceptio non adimpleti contractus) 
(1) One of the parties to a bilateral contract may refuse performance of his own obligation until the other 
party tenders performance of his obligation. However, this shall not apply where the obligation of the 
other party is not due. 
(2) If one of the parties to a contract is bound to tender performance of his own obligation first to the 
other party, and if there is any significant cause existing by which the other party's performance becomes 
difficult, the main stipulation of the preceding Article shall apply. 
Article 537 (Obligor's Burden to Bear the Risk) If the performance of an obligation of one of the parties 
to a bilateral contract becomes impossible by any cause for which neither of the parties is responsible, the 
obligor may not be entitled to counter-performance. 
Sub-sec. 3. Rescission for the Future and Rescission of Contract (543-553) 
Article 544 (Delay of Performance and Rescission) If one of the parties does not perform his obligation, 
the other party may fix a reasonable period and demand its performance, and may rescind the contract, if 
no performance is effected within such period. However, if the obligor declares in advance his intention 
that he will not effect such performance, no demand shall be required. 
Article 545 (Periodic Acts and Rescission) If, according to the nature of the contract or by a declaration of 
intention of the parties, the objective for which the contract has been entered is unattainable unless it is 
performed at a designated time and date or within a designated period, and one of parties has not effected 
performance on his part, the other party may without making a demand mentioned in the preceding 
Article rescind the contract. 
Article 546 (Impossibility of Fulfilment and Rescission) If performance has become impossible for any 
cause for which the obligor is responsible, the obligee may rescind the contract. 
Article 548 (Effect of Rescission and restitutio naturalis) 
(1) If one of the parties has rescinded the contract, the other party shall be liable to restore the former to 
his original position. However, the rights of third persons shall not be prejudiced thereby. 
(2) Interest shall be paid upon any money to be repaid in the case mentioned in the preceding Paragraph 
as from the day on which such money has been received. 
Article 549 (Restitutio naturalis and Concurrent Fulfilment) The provisions of Article 536 shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to the case mentioned in the preceding Article. 
Article 551 (Rescission for the Future or Rescission and Claims for Damages) Rescission for the future or 
rescission of a contract shall not effect any claim for damages. 
Article 552 (Right of Demand as to Whether the Other Party Exercises the Right of Rescission or not) (1) 
If no period is fixed for the exercise of a right of rescission, the other party may demand of the person 
entitled to rescission to make a definite answer by fixing a reasonable period as to whether he rescinds the 
contract or not. 
(2) If no notice of rescission has been received within the period mentioned in the preceding Paragraph, 
the right of rescission shall lapse. 
Article 553 (Extinction of Right of Rescission due to Injury, etc. ) If a person entitled to a right of 
rescission has by his wilful act or negligence materially damaged the subject-matter of the contract, or has 
become unable to return it, or has caused it to be converted into another object by processing or alterating 
it, the right of rescission shall be extinguished. 
Sec. 2. Gift (554-562) 
Article 559 (Donor's Liability for Warranty) 
(1) A donor shall not be liable for any defect or deficiency in the thing or right which forms the subject of 
his gift. However, this shall not apply to cases where he was aware of such defect or deficiency and has 
nevertheless failed to inform the donee thereof. 
(2) In respect of a gift subject to a charge, the donor shall assume the same liability in respect of warranty 
as that of a seller to the extent of such charge. 
Sec. 3. Sale (563-595) 
Sub-sec. 1. General Rules (563-567) 
Article 567 (Mutatis Mutandis Application to Contract for Value) The provisions of this section shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to contracts for value other than sales. However, this shall not apply in case where 
the nature of such contracts does not so admit. 
Sub-sec. 2. Effect of Sale (568-589) 
Article 569 (Sale of a Right Belonging to Another Person) In case where a right, which has been made the 
object of a sale, belongs to another person, the seller shall acquire such right and transfer it to the buyer. 
Article 570 (Sale of a Right Belong to Another person-Seller's Liability for Warranty) If in the case 
mentioned in the preceding Article the seller is unable, by acquiring the right he has sold, to transfer it to 
the buyer, the buyer may rescind the contract. However, if he was aware at the time the contract was 
made that the right did not belong to the seller, he may not claim damages. 
Article 571 (Sale of a Right Belonging to Another Person-bona fide Seller's Liability for Warranty) 
(1) If the seller was unaware at the time the contract was made that the right which has been made the 
object of a sale did not belong to him, and the seller is unable, by acquiring the right he has sold, to 
transfer the right to the buyer, the seller may, paying damages suffered by the buyer, rescind the contract. 
(2) If, in the case of the preceding Paragraph, the buyer was aware at the time the contract was entered 
that the right did not belong to the seller, the seller may, by giving notice that he is unable to transfer the 
right to the buyer, dissolve the contract. 
Article 572 (The Case Where Part of the Right Belongs to Another Person and the Seller's Liability for 
Warranty) 
(1) If the seller is unable to acquire and transfer the right to the buyer by reason of the fact that a part of 
the right which forms the object of a sale belongs to another, the buyer may demand a reduction of the 
purchase-price in proportion to the part. 
(2) If in the case of the preceding Paragraph the buyer would not have bought the remaining part, had 
such alone been the object the sale, the buyer acting in good faith may cancel the contract. 
(3) The bona fide buyer may claim damages besides claiming for a reduction of the purchase-price or the 
dissolution of a contract. 
Article 573 (Period during Which the Right Mentioned in the Preceding Article is to be Exercised) The 
right mentioned in the preceding Article shall be exercised within one (1) year from the time when the 
buyer because aware of the fact, if the buyer was acting in good faith, and from the time when the 
contract was entered if the buyer was acting in bad faith. 
Article 574 (Partial Shortage and Loss of the Items Sold and the Seller's Liability for Warranty) The 
provisions of the preceding two (2) Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the cases where the items sold 
by quantity shows a shortage or part of it had already been lost at the time when the contract was entered 
and the buyer was unaware of such shortage or loss. 
Article 575 (The Case Where Restricted Real Rights Exist in a Contract and the Seller's Liability for 
Warranty) 
(1) Where the subject-matter of a sale is subject to a superficies, servitude, registered lease (chonsegwon), 
right of retention, or pledge and the buyer was unaware thereof, the buyer may rescind the contract only if 
the objective of the contract is not unattainable thereby. In other case the buyer may only claim damages. 
(2) The provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall apply mutatis mutandis to the cases where a servitude 
which has been represented as existing in favour of the immovable which is the subject of the sale does 
not exist or where a registered lease exists on such immovable. 
(3) The rights mentioned in the preceding two (2) Paragraphs shall 
be exercised within one (1) year from 
the time when the buyer became aware of the fact. 
Article 580 (Seller's Liability for Warranty Against Defect) 
(1) If any defects exist in the subject-matter of a sale, the provisions of Article 575, Paragraph (1) shall 
apply mutatis mutandis. However, if the buyer was aware of or was not aware due to his negligence of 
any defects, this shall not apply. 
(2) The provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall not apply to the cases of compulsory sale by public 
auction. 
Article 581 (Sale in Kind and the Seller's Liability for Warranty) 
(1) Even where the subject-matter of a sale has been specified in kind, if there exist any defects in the 
specified subject-matter, the provisions of the preceding Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(2) In the cases of the preceding Paragraph, the buyer may demand the non-defective item without 
rescinding a contract or claiming for damages. 
Article 582 (Period during Which the Rights Mentioned in the Preceding Two Articles are to be 
Exercised) The rights mentioned in the preceding two Articles shall be exercised by the buyer within six 
months from the time when he was aware such fact. 
Article 583 (Liability for warranty and Concurrent Fulfilment) The provisions of Article 536 shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to the cases of Articles 572 through 575,580 and 581. 
Article 584 (Special Stipulation for Relief of Liability for Warranty) Even where the seller has made a 
special stipulation that he is not liable in respect of the warranties mentioned in the preceding fifteen 
Articles, he may not be relieved of liability in respect of any fact of which he was aware and nevertheless 
failed to disclose or in respect of any right which he himself created in favour of, or assigned to, a third 
person. 
Article 588 (The Buyer's Right to Refuse Payment Where a Third Person Claims the Right) If a third 
person claims a right over the subject-matter of the sale, and in consequence there is a danger of the 
buyer's losing what he has bought in whole or in part, he may refuse payment for the purchase-price 
within the limit of danger. However, this shall not apply when the seller furnishes adequate security. 
Sec. 9. Contract for Work (664-674) 
Article 667 (Contractor's Liability for Warranty) 
(1) If any defect exists in the completed subject-matter of a work or in a certain part of the subject-matter 
of a work which has been finished before the completion of all the work, the person who ordered the 
work may fix a reasonable period for the contractor to repair and rectify such defect. However, this shall 
not apply if the defect is not material and its rectification would involve excessive expense. 
(2) The person who has ordered the work may claim damages in lieu of, or together with, rectification of 
the defect. 
(3) In the cases of Paragraph (2), the provisions of Article 536 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
Article 668 (Contractor's Liability for Warranty-Right of Rescission of the Person who Ordered a Work) 
If, by reason of some defect in the finished subject-matter of the work, it cannot be used for the purpose 
for which it was ordered, the person who ordered the work may rescind the contract. 
However, this shall 
not apply to a building or any other structure on land. 
Article 669 (Contractor's Liability for Warranty-Release from Responsibility in the Event the Defect has 
Arisen through the Nature of the Materials Supplied or Instructions Given by the Person who Ordered the 
Work) The provisions of Articles 667 and 668 shall not apply, if the 
defect in the finished subject-matter 
of the work has arisen through the improper type or 
defective quality of the materials supplied by the 
person who ordered the work, or by reason of 
insufficient or incorrect instructions given by him. 
However, this shall not apply if the contractor, knowing the unfitness of the materials or of the 
insufficiency and incorrect nature of the instructions, has failed to advise the person who ordered the 
work. 
B. KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE (KCmC) 
Book I. General Rules (1-45) 
Chap. I. General Propvisions (1-3) 
Art. 3 (Unilateral Commercial Activities) If an act of a party among the relevant parties is considered as a 
commercial activity, this act shall apply to all the parties involved. 
Book II. Commercial Acts (46-168) 
Chap. I. General Provisions (46-66) 
Art. 46 (Basic Commercial Activities) The following activities which are effected as business are called 
commercial activities: Provided, that this shall not apply to such activities as are effected by persons who 
manufacture articles or render services solely for the purpose of earning wages. 1. Sales of movables, 
immovables, valuable instruments and any other properties; 2. Lease of movables, immovables, valuable 
instruments and any other properties; 3..... ; 21. Act concerning purchase, recovery, etc. of any business 
claims. 
Chap. 11. Sale (67-71) 
Article 69 (Buyer's Duty to Examine Subject-Matter and to Notify Defects therein) 
(1) In the case of a sale between merchants, the buyer shall, upon taking delivery of the subject-matter, 
examine it without delay, and if he discovers any defects therein or any deficiency in quantity, 
he shall 
immediately dispatch notice thereof to the seller, otherwise, he has no right to rescind the contract, to 
demand a reduction in the price or to claim damages thereby. The same shall apply in cases where, within 
six months, the buyer discovers in the subject-matter of the sale a 
defect which was not immediately 
discoverable. 
(2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to the seller acting 
in bad faith. 
C. Korean Act on Regulation of Standard Terms (KARST) 
Chap. I. General Provisions (1-5) 
Article 2 (Definitions) 
(1) In this Act, the term "standardized contracts" means the general terms and conditions of a contract, 
regardless of their name, type, or scope, prepared 
in advance by one party in a certain form for the 
purpose of entering into a contract with a 
large number of persons. 
(2) In this Act, the term "enterprise" means a person who is a party to a contract and offers a standardized 
contract to another party as the content of the contract. 
(3) In this Act, the term "customer" means a person who is a party to a contract and has received from an 
enterprise an offer to incorporate a standardized contract into the contract. 
Article 3 (Obligation to Specify and Explain Standardized Contracts) 
(1) Prior to entering into a contract, an enterprise shall explain to its customers the content of a 
standardized contract in a way that it would generally be expected for the type of contract in question and 
shall, upon the request of the customer, deliver a copy of the standardized contract to the customer to help 
the customer understand the standardized con- tract: Provided, That this does not apply to a standardized 
contract which is approved by an administrative agency under other Acts and which is provided for in the 
Presidential Decree of the Act because of the need to effect a speedy transaction. 
(2) An enterprise shall explain the important particulars of a standardized contract so that customers can 
understand them: Provided, That this does not apply where such an explanation is extremely difficult due 
to the nature of the contract. 
(3) If an enterprise enters into a contract in violation of the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) above, it 
may not claim that the pertinent standardized contract forms a part of the contract. 
Article 4 (Precedence of Individual Agreement) If an enterprise and a customer agree on a matter that is 
addressed in standardized contracts in a manner that is different from the standardized contracts, such 
agreement shall prevail over the standardized contracts. 
Article 5 (Construction of Standardized Contracts) 
(1) A standardized contract shall be construed impartially in accordance with the principle of trust and 
good faith and shall not be construed differently depending on the Customer. 
(2) If the meaning of a standardized contract is not clear, it shall be construed in favor of the Customer. 
Chap. II. Unfair Clauses in Standardized Contracts (6-16) 
Article 6 (General Principles) 
(1) Any clause in a standardized contract which is not fair or is contrary to the principle of trust and good 
faith shall be null and void. 
(2) Any clause in a standardized contract that falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be 
presumed to be unfair: 1. A clause which is unreasonably unfavorable to customers; 2. A clause which 
customers would have difficulty anticipating in light of various circumstances such as the type of 
transaction, type of contract, and etc.; or 3. A clause which is so restrictive of essential rights under a 
contract that the purpose of the contract may not be achieved. 
Article 7 (Prohibition of Exemption Clause) Any clause of a standardized contract concerning the liability 
of contraction parties that falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be null and void: l. A 
clause that exempts an enterprise from liability for intentional wrongdoing of gross negligence on the part 
of the enterprise, its agents, of employees; 2. A clause which limits, without substantial reason, the extent 
of damages payable by the enterprise; or 3. A clause which, without substantial reason, excludes of 
limits 
the warranty liability of an enterprise, tightens requirements that customers must meet to exercise their 
rights under the warranty of, where the enterprise has provided a sample of the subject matter of the 
contract or has indicated the quality of performance, and etc. of the subject matter, excludes or 
limits the 
warranty for the subject matter. 
Article 9 (Cancellation or Termination of Contract) Any clause of a standardized contract concerning the 
cancellation or termination of a contract which 
falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be 
null be and void: 1. A clause which excludes of 
limits the right of customers to cancel or 
terminate the contract under Acts; 2. A clause which grants an enterprise the right to cancel or terminate 
the contract which is not provided for by the Act or which reduces 
the requirements enterprises must meet 
to exercise the right to cancel or terminate the contract as provided 
for by the Act, therefore putting 
customers at an unreasonable disadvantage; 
3. A clause which, without substantial reason, obligates 
customers to pay excessive restitution if they cancel or 
terminate a contract, or which 
unreasonably provides for customers to waive their claim 
to restitution; 4. A clause which unreasonably 
reduces the restitution obligation of an enterprise or 
its duty to pay damages in the event of cancelling or 
terminating a contract; or 5. A clause in a contract providing 
for a continuous creditor-debtor relationship 
which might put customers at an unreasonable disadvantage by providing for a duration that is 
unreasonably short long by allowing implied extensions or renewals of the contract. 
Note: The above statutes are translated by Korean Legislation Research Institute 
(http: //www. klri. re. kr). 
